Document Type
Article
Disciplines
5.2 ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
Abstract
We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant one.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2
Recommended Citation
Marvao, Catarina and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, "Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization" (2023). Articles. 232.
https://arrow.tudublin.ie/creaart/232
Funder
Open Access funding provided by the IReL Consortium.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
Publication Details
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2
Marvão, C., Spagnolo, G. Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization. Rev Ind Organ 63, 155–186 (2023).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09920-2