ORCID
- Pierce Ryan: 0000-0002-2724-1029
Abstract
In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor.
Keywords
Cybersecurity, game theory, ransomware, threat analysis
DOI Link
Publication Date
2022-01-01
Publication Title
IEEE Access
Volume
10
First Page
32836
Last Page
32844
Deposit Date
2026-07-10
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Additional Links
Recommended Citation
Ryan, Pierce; Fokker, John; Healy, Sorcha; and Amann, Andreas, "Dynamics of Targeted Ransomware Negotiation" (2022). Research Outputs: 2025-Present. 5.
https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschmatro/5