Pilgrimage, Existence, and Psychic Distress: An Exploration of the Bodily and Psychic Phenomenon of Pilgrimage

Christine Jamieson

Concordia University, Montreal QC, christine.jamieson@concordia.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/ijrtp

Part of the Tourism and Travel Commons

Recommended Citation
doi:https://doi.org/10.21427/2a8f-qc53
Available at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/ijrtp/vol7/iss1/8

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.
Pilgrimage, Existence, and Psychic Distress: An Exploration of the Bodily and Psychic Phenomenon of Pilgrimage

Christine Jamieson
Concordia University, Montreal QC
christine.jamieson@concordia.ca

In ‘Pilgrimage, Existence, and Psychic Distress,’ Christine Jamieson draws on the work of psychoanalyst and linguist Julia Kristeva, tracking the haunting desire for healing and liberation inherent in pilgrimage as it touches the deep and irresolutely corporeal experience of what it means to be human.

Key Words: pilgrimage, the body, Kristeva, Arendt, Lonergan, dialectic, phenomenology, stranger, liminality, liminal, alienation, love.

Introduction

The phenomenon of pilgrimage touches the deep psychic and corporeal experience of being human. On the one hand, the notion of ‘pilgrimage’ reminds us that our lives are founded on desire, a fact that is both animating and haunting. On the other hand, the act of pilgrimage allows for a cathartic expression of this deeply creative ground of our humanness that can open us to healing and liberation. The key insights for this article will come from three sources. First, and most extensively, they will come from the work of psychoanalyst and linguist, Julia Kristeva. Through the lens of Kristeva’s exploration of the psychic structure of the human person, we glimpse a ‘divided condition’ upon which our lives are built. In my view, it is this divided condition that conjures up the need for, and living out of, pilgrimage. Secondarily, the article will draw on Hannah Arendt’s understanding of one of the three fundamental activities of the human condition, that of ‘action’ and what action contributes to human existence. As we will see, Arendt’s understanding fits the phenomenon of pilgrimage as cathartic. It also facilitates a deeper understanding of the link between pilgrimage and transcendence. Building on Arendt’s insight, when one thinks of pilgrimage in relation to healing and liberation, it is necessary to consider a transcendent dimension of human existence. To explore this transcendent dimension, Bernard Lonergan’s thought will be employed.

It is Kristeva’s understanding of the psychic structure of the human person that first touches on what might be called a condition of pilgrimage. Kristeva posits the ‘divided condition’ of being human as grounding human existence. Building on Kristeva and Arendt, if the road of exile, of stranger, and of foreigner describes an underlying human condition and is, in fact, the lived reality of all human beings, this wandering pilgrim existence is not without its joy, liberation, and healing. Lonergan guides us to consider the outward manifestation of pilgrimage reflecting the inner journey toward authenticity. The central idea underlying my overall argument is that pilgrimage and being a pilgrim is an outer manifestation of an inner psychic dynamic.

Figure 1 : Sculpture of Man

Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission
The Psychic Structure of the Human Person: Our Divided Condition

Foreigner: choked up rage deep down in my throat, a black angel clouding transparency, opaque, unfathomable spur. The image of hatred and of the other; a foreigner is neither the romantic victim of our clannish indolence nor the intruder responsible for all the ills of the polis. Neither the apocalypse on the move nor the instant adversary to be eliminated for the sake of appeasing the group. Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affinity founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself. A symptom that precisely turns ‘we’ into a problem, perhaps makes it impossible. The foreigner comes in when the consciousness of my difference arises, and he disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, unamenable to bonds and communities.¹ⁱ

The phenomenon of pilgrimage in the twenty-first century is striking. Interest in pilgrimage and the activity of pilgrimages is expanding in many religious traditions. It is also emerging as an important activity for seekers who do not profess any religious tradition. ² In tracing the origins of the word, it is significant to note that the French word for pilgrim is pélerin, which has its roots in peleron meaning ‘stranger’ and ‘alien.’ The French word stems from the late Latin peregrinus. While the Latin word refers to ‘a person on a journey, a person who travels from place to place; a traveller, a wanderer, an itinerant,’ in earlier use as peregrinus it referred to a ‘foreigner,’ an ‘alien,’ or a ‘stranger.’³ The experience of alienation and foreignness is reminiscent of Saint Augustine’s words in his City of God:

Now, it is recorded of Cain that he built a city, while Abel, as though he were merely a pilgrim on earth, built none. For, the true City of the saints is in heaven, though here on earth it produces citizens in whom it wanders as on a pilgrimage through time looking for the Kingdom of eternity.⁴

Picking up this theme, Zygmunt Bauman draws our attention to Augustine’s conviction that ‘we are pilgrims through time.’⁵ Our endpoint, where we are heading, is not in time or space, rather to be human is to journey with no recognizable end in sight. In this sense, a pilgrim is one who experiences his or her life as a journey or a sojourn, the end of which will be to arrive at an unimaginable unknown. The ‘unimaginable unknown’ has not been experienced; it is outside of or beyond what we can know. Yet, human beings sense it through exposure to destabilizing experiences, that is, experiences that break down our ordinary way of thinking about and understanding encounters with the world. We sense an ‘unimaginable unknown’ through alienation, strangeness, and foreignness.

In one of her novels, Murder in Byzantium, Julia Kristeva has the heroine Stéphanie Delacourt express her experience through the words, ‘Je me voyage/I travel myself.’ Kristeva links this expression to Saint Augustine, ‘who only recognized one native land, that of the traveller; as he put it ‘in via, in patria.’’⁶ Human beings experience themselves as strangers because they are on a journey toward an unnameable destination that can be known only indirectly through the experience of alienation and strangeness. When Stéphanie Delacourt states that she travels herself, she is pointing to the inner journey one travels when one calls ‘into question [his or her] own internal frontiers: ‘I travel myself.’ It is only on this condition that ideas can be substituted for sorrows, and rebirth and renewal become possible.⁷


Lispector writes of encountering at a bus stop a man with a coati (a kind of raccoon) on a leash. I imagine: if the man took him to play in the square, at some point the coati would grow uncomfortable: ‘But, good God, why are the dogs looking at me like that?’ I also imagine that, after a perfect day of being a dog, the coati would feel melancholic, looking at the stars: ‘What’s wrong with me, after all? ... What is this anxiety, as if I only loved something I didn’t know?’

The strange tale articulated in Lispector’s story highlights a common experience of strangeness that postmodern sensibility heightens. Postmodernity signifies a continual shifting of realities, of communities, of values and of what threatens. It is a time of suspicion and resistance to the imposition of a fixed and absolute identity. It is a time of deep psychic distress. Pressing in on us is our own divided condition as speaking subjects. This has something to do with what Kristeva refers to as the ‘foreigner that lives within us.’ It has to do with the psychological disarray that Kristeva so skillfully and profoundly identifies, arising from our split condition as speaking subjects.

In her work, Kristeva draws attention to a dialectic within the human psyche.[9] We are not immediately transparent selves in our effort to communicate through language. Rather, our capacity as speaking subjects is impacted by what is prior to language, by what has always been prior to language, that is, the concrete body of the human person. In the beginning, we are only instincts, drives, and needs experienced in our body. We gradually develop not only bodily, but also psychically and intellectually. Yet, that completely bodily realm is not left behind as we develop. Rather, it continues to circulate ‘beneath’ the psyche and the intellect, and continues to produce an effect on them. Kristeva speaks of both the language of the body or the body’s imprint in language, and also of the ‘place’ of the body that is outside language. For Kristeva, the body is the place where we are as speaking beings; it is the place of the material support of the language of communication, yet it remains forever outside language. Because the body is prior to and outside of language, it can never be represented. It always escapes attempts to be signified through the gaze of the symbolic realm. The body is radical alterity. What is represented is the attempt, in the realm of the symbolic to circumscribe, control, and reign in the body. There is an ‘original’ bodily experience prior to our entry into language, prior to language providing us tools for identification and differentiation. The original experience continues to impact us in ways of which we literally are not conscious. It is a preconscious experience. We catch glimpses of it now and then when we become aware of the desire and drive of obsessions and fears, of phobias and of uncontainable hatred or pain. We catch glimpses also in moments of great ecstasy, creativity, and liberation.

This phenomenology of the body stems from Kristeva’s analysis of the completely bodily relationship between the mother and the child at the very origins of the child’s existence. It is that original relationship that is the nucleus, for Kristeva, in understanding our attitude toward the body at an individual level and a cultural level. Kristeva’s description of the experience of the human person unearths a deep, pervasive dialectic that constitutes the very foundation of what it means to be a speaking subject. Drawing on Freud, and Jacques Lacan’s rereading of Freud, Kristeva sees the dialectic within the human person as being what she terms the ‘semiotic’ process and the ‘symbolic’ process. The mature human person embodies both. The dialectic between them occasions the speaking subject.

The semiotic process refers to the infantile experience, which is pre-subject/object, that is, before the child differentiates between itself and its mother. In contrast to some theories in child development, for Kristeva this infantile stage is not left behind as the child becomes a speaking subject. Rather, the semiotic process engages in a dialectical relationship with the symbolic process. In terms of child development, the symbolic process emerges with the entrance of a ‘third’ to disrupt the undifferentiated (from the child’s perspective) experience of the mother-child relationship. The ‘third,’ although not restricted to the father, signifies the paternal function.

The beginning of differentiation is the beginning of language. It is a time in the child’s development that signifies a repression of the undifferentiated maternal relationship where all drives and needs are given full reign. As such it marks the emergence of the initial

stages of the formation of the child’s identity. It signifies the possibility and capacity of the child, in being a speaking subject, to become an ‘I’ - one who distinguishes between ‘I’ and ‘other’ through language. Thus, the ‘symbolic’ refers to the restraints put on the child through ‘the establishment of sign and syntax’ of ‘grammatical and social constraints.’

As this deep underlying structure is what constitutes the speaking subject, Kristeva would define the speaking subject as a ‘split subject.’ For Kristeva, even though the repression of the semiotic or maternal relationship is absolutely necessary for the human person to acquire and maintain an identity, we must be aware of the dialectical relationship between the semiotic and symbolic. If we, as individuals and societies, repress one or the other of these two processes that constitute who we are, it leads, at the extreme, to psychosis (the repression of the ordering symbolic realm) or totalitarianism (the repression of the chaotic yet creative semiotic realm).

Kristeva’s dialectic of the speaking subject resonates with the notion of pilgrim as exile and stranger, as one who is on a journey and who is without a home. In addition to the etymological origins of the word ‘pilgrim,’ Victor Turner has noted that historically, pilgrimage tended to emerge in periods of upheaval, destruction, and unrest, and in times of rapid social change. When one considers the journeys of Saint Paul, for instance, and the ‘community of foreigners’ that formed the Pauline Church, we glimpse a deeply spiritual pilgrimage. Kristeva comments on this experience of the Pauline congregations:

One thing among others is striking in the Pauline conception of the Ecclesia. Beyond the material unease of foreigners, Paul spoke to their psychic distress and he proposed, instead of an insertion in a social set aimed at satisfying their needs, a journey between two dissociated but unified spheres that they could uncover in themselves: a journey between ‘body’ and ‘soul,’ ...[12]


This journey between two dissociated but unified spheres - between body and soul - is the inner journey of pilgrims. It is, according to Kristeva, the inner journey of all human beings. New Testament scholarship [13] points out that Saint Paul’s mission was particularly successful in appealing to the liminal community of so-called ‘god-fearers,’ non-Jews who were no longer pagan but had not fully become Jews. In that situation, Saint Paul spoke to people’s psychic distress, a distress that was the result of being outsiders, exiles, and foreigners. Yet, Paul was not offering an escape from this psychic condition experienced as displacement, rather, he invited his hearers to live that liminality more intensely by offering them a journey. Paul was offering a lifelong journey that in the end, for Paul, was based on the authentically human, and deeply conflicted, gap between cross and resurrection.

There is a tension that constitutes human existence, a crack that runs through the heart of every human being and every human story. I draw from Kristeva’s deep psychoanalytic reading of the human psyche to express something of this human experience. It helps us to understand the need, particularly in postmodernity, for pilgrimage and the journey toward authenticity. It is a pilgrimage that does not reach resolution. Rather, it embraces a more ethical stance, what Kristeva calls ‘an ethics of respect for the irreconcilable’ [14] ... the irreconcilable within ourselves and within others.

13. See, e.g., Marcus J. Borg and John Dominic Crossan, The First Paul: Reclaiming the Radical Visionary Behind the Church’s Conservative Icon (N. Y.: Harper One, 2009), 89.
Pilgrimage as the Quest for Beginning

Kristeva’s ethics of respect for the irreconcilable suggests that to be a pilgrim is to recognize the fundamental dividedness within human existence, and to move toward it, rather than away. It suggests the willingness to lean into beginning rather than being ‘thrown into death.’ Pilgrimages are beginnings. They correspond to what Hannah Arendt identifies as ‘action’ distinct from ‘labour’ and ‘work.’ While all three activities have to do with ensuring a future for newcomers into the world, ‘action’:

has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human activities.\(^{15}\)

To be a pilgrim is to act in the world and so to bring about something new. The inherent dialectical condition of being human is the underlying condition out of which pilgrimage emerges. The condition is one of being a foreigner, an exile, and a stranger among all others who are also irreconcilably different one from another. Yet, the quest of pilgrimage is not the quest for one’s own unique death:

Death is a central concept in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger speaks of being ‘thrown into existence,’ and the ‘thrownness’ is ‘thrownness into death.’ Because death is the inevitable yet unpredictable future of every human being, Heidegger says that ‘Death is the way to be, which Dasein (roughly, a human person) takes over as soon as it is.’ And Heidegger quotes with approval the saying, ‘As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.’\(^{16}\)

Heidegger’s statement that ‘Death is a way to be, which Dasein [or being-in-the-world] takes over as soon as it is,’\(^{17}\) reflects only one of the two parts of the paradoxical Christian assertion of death and resurrection. Arendt counters Heidegger’s ‘being as death’ in her emphasis on human action that continually creates beginnings. In my view, this links into the quest of a pilgrim, the quest for continual new beginnings. The quest of pilgrimage is the quest for the authenticity of beginning, of being a beginner always and even up to one’s death.

The idea of continual beginning up to one’s death manifests in the notion of peregrinatio referred to elsewhere in this special issue.\(^{18}\) Peregrinatio describes early medieval Irish monks who practiced self-exile not primarily for evangelization but to live more intensely their understanding of themselves as strangers. ‘Peregrinatio does not mean evangelism, neither does it mean ‘pilgrimage’ in the most familiar modern sense. The broad classical meaning of peregrinus in antiquity was ‘stranger.’\(^{19}\) Rather than a journey to ‘somewhere,’ peregrinatio in its original manifestation was a journey to ‘no-earthly-where.’ It was a journey of continual beginnings. Those who exiled themselves lived a marginal existence that, at times, meant experiencing inhospitality, hatred, and scorn. These wanderers entered into and embraced their own never-ending strangeness.

Like folly for Christ’s sake, peregrination is a way of practising self-abasement, for unlike the pilgrim to the Holy Places, who has a definite earthly destination, the exile or peregrinus has a dangerously vagabond air and


\(^{17}\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 289.

\(^{18}\) See particularly Sara Terreault’s article on ‘The Eschatological Body’ in this issue.

For Lonergan, decline cannot reverse itself. The conditions that lead to decline, egoistic disregard of others ... loyalty to one’s own group matched by hostility to other groups ... concentrating on short-term benefits and overlooking long-term costs cannot be reversed from within decline itself. Decline has an accumulative effect, creating ever deeper and more entrenched distortions. The problem of evil is difficult to avoid. Its effect on individual intentions and actions eventually accumulates into systemic structures that are so pervasive as to overwhelm all efforts toward progress. One experiences the imprisonment of decline. It is an experience that calls for something beyond human effort to break the downward spiral.

Here, Lonergan introduces a third principle, redemption. What overcomes decline is an act of redemption. For Lonergan, the solution to decline is supernatural, not in the sense of something beyond our universe imposing its will on hapless humans; rather, he understands redemption as that which can address a...
lack of knowledge and can restore the human conviction and commitment necessary for a higher integration. It is ‘higher’ integration because it is supernatural integration. That is, in the face of the onslaughts of evil, it is possible to believe, to hope, and to love. That one can live faith, hope, and love in the midst of decline, from a Christian theological perspective, is made possible through the incarnation of Christ and his redemptive act of death and resurrection. It is redemptive praxis because it does not escape the concrete tasks required of human beings to overturn hatred with self-sacrificing love. The solution to decline does not originate from within the situation of decline nor from the person imprisoned in decline. The solution, for Lonergan, comes from something more than what humans can generate themselves. Lonergan puts this quite succinctly in the following statement:

*Can a people, a civilization, recover from such decline? To my mind the only solution is religious. What will sweep away the rationalizations? More reasoning will hardly do it effectively, for it will be suspected of being just so much more rationalizing. And when reasoning is ineffective, what is left but faith? What will smash the determinism - economics, social, cultural, psychological - that egoism has constructed and exploited? What can be offered but the hoping beyond hope that religion inspires? When finally the human situation seethes with alienation, bitterness, resentment, recrimination, hatred, mounting violence, what can retributive justice bring about but a duplication of the evils that already exist? Then what is needed is not retributive justice but self-sacrificing love.*

Supernatural intervention does not override human freedom but takes it up and makes renewal possible. Faith, hope, and love are gifts allowing human participation with God’s act of redemption. Linking pilgrimage to healing and liberation, the third claim of this paper, has its basis in redemption.

Pilgrimage is redemptive in three ways. First, it moves us to act in the world and, as Arendt points out, acting in the world brings the possibility of new beginning. Second, pilgrimage shifts us out of the illusory world of unity and oneness with self, and reveals to us our foreignness. We do not belong to this world. We experience exile and strangeness in ourselves and in others. ‘What’s wrong with me, after all? ... What is this anxiety, as if I only loved something I didn’t know?’ Pilgrimage facilitates bringing this preconscious reality closer to our awareness. Finally, pilgrimage allows us to encounter the other both in ourselves and in those we meet on the journey. Pilgrimage, by throwing us into the experience of an explicit realisation of our alienation and foreignness via the act of journey, facilitates the possibility of offering ourselves more authentically to others in community. Further, pilgrimage leads us to realise our own need for the gift of others, received as hospitality, aid, and company on the way. These experiences promote self-transcendence, self-integration, and the possibility of self-sacrificing love, healing the wound between the semiotic and the symbolic of which Kristeva speaks, and realising the redemption to which Lonergan points.


Conclusion

The underlying contention of this paper is the claim that pilgrimage is an outer manifestation of an inner psychic dynamic. Kristeva provides a convincing case of the deep and pervasive influence of the body on human identity. The divided condition (that Kristeva asserts as basic to the human condition), can be linked to the phenomenon of pilgrimage. This is true not only etymologically but also concretely, in the movement of the body and its impact on the physical and psychic experience of all human beings as pilgrims on earth. Yet, pilgrimage is not only a condition of being human that one must endure, it is also an action that one can initiate. Arendt’s explanation of the importance of action in allowing for something new to happen is also reminiscent of the body’s role in the continual initiation of new beginnings. Finally, the experiences of creation and alienation that pilgrimages intentionally promote are taken up and transformed in the possibility of self-sacrificing love as the redemptive principle or the higher integration of progress and decline.

Bibliography


