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## Working Paper: Concentration of Secondary Schooling for Irish and UK Elite Politicians

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**Working Paper: Concentration of Secondary Schooling for Irish and UK Elite Politicians**

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## **The Schooling of Irish and UK Cabinet Ministers**

The study of elites and their formation has returned to centre stage in recent years. The lessons from these studies can be made more universal if a measure of elite formation could be developed that is comparable. The multifaceted nature of the concept of elite formation makes this complex. However, in this paper, by building upon measures used in other fields, such as industrial economics, we offer such a measure that facilitates comparison of elite formation. We illustrate this measure through a comparison of the schooling of Irish and British political elites.

**Keywords:** elites; schools; concentration, elite formation

### **Introduction**

The on-going global economic crisis began with a number of dramatic events in the United States' (US) financial system in 2007. While there are many arguments as to the crisis' exact origins, encompassing issues such as the easy availability of credit, sub-prime lending, deregulation, the incorrect pricing of risk and a host of other issues ([Blundell-Wignall](#) and [Atkinson](#), 2009; Calomiris, 2009; von Peter, 2009; Tobias and Shin, 2010), a key observation has been that important networks of elites in various institutions and in various countries were blind to obvious warning signs from a 'group think' illusion that 'this time it is different' (Kolb, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). For instance, in the US mortgage industry once the perception of a bull market took hold, it was accepted uncritically by the banks and the consultants who advised them, so that when the crash occurred all the experts were taken aback by a 'supposed perfect storm' (Klob, 2010: 280). It is this kind of situation that has led to a renewed interest in the study of elites (Hartmann, 2007; Ho, 2009; Khan, 2011). By elites, we are referring to

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those ‘small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential part in political and social affairs’ (Parry, 1967: 12).

This article contributes to the renewed study of elites by looking specifically at the education of the Irish and United Kingdom (UK) political elites. In particular, we look at those politicians who attained the office of full minister in Irish and UK governments in the 75 years between 1937 and 2012. We carefully selected 1937 as our starting point, as that year saw the introduction of the Irish Constitution (*Bunreacht na hÉireann*), which through Article 15, 16, 18 and 28 established Ireland’s current form of cabinet government under a parliamentary system, thereby allowing for a more meaningful comparison of the cabinets of Ireland and the United Kingdom.

### **Theoretical Perspectives on Elites**

To some extent social science perspectives have tended to depersonalise the elite. Traditionally, social scientists regarded the elite as people (historically men) who are 'so placed within the structure that by their decisions they modify the milieu of many other men' (Mill, 1953: 112). For Marx and Engels (Marx and Engels, 1906:15) the political elite were merely ‘a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ part of an almost epiphenomena that reflected the underlying structure of capitalism. In a way, the elite were seen as slaves to the interests of capitalism. Structural change in the form of communist control of the means of production would see the end of class-based societies and consequently the disappearance of elites. From a liberal economics perspective, elites, based on anything but merit, would also be swept away by the competitive forces of the market. In this view ‘elite status stems from the control of human, capital, decision making and knowledge resources’ (Desmond, 2004: 264).

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Early and influential works on elites included Gaetano Mosca's 1896 *The Ruling Class*, a study of the division of societies into a ruling and a ruled class – the elite and the masses (Mosca, 1939); Robert Michels' 1911 *Political Parties*, a work on how elites used the power of being organised (Michels, 1999) and Vilfredo Pareto's 1916 *The Mind and Society*, a study of how power moves within the elite social class (Pareto, 1935). All three authors, together often referred to as the Italian School of Elitists, were in some way responding to the contemporary development of mass democracy, and their view that there was always, even in a democracy, a small ruling class that held the real power in a society (Blad, 2009: 227). For instance, Mosca (1939: 50) argued that the ruling class 'performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings' whereas the masses are controlled by the elite through laws and violence if necessary. For Michels (1911) 'the rule of the few is inevitable, in all times and in all places, however democratic the organisation may seem to be' (Slattery, 2003: 52). This 'iron law of oligarchy' as Michels (1911) referred to it, arose because individuals were naturally unequal and society functioned better with the masses being led by a better qualified elite.

A key concept in these early theories was the 'circulation of elites', whereby a particular elite is replaced by another, and this cycle is repeated endlessly without evolution to any truly classless society. According to Pareto (1935) it was this competition between alternative elites that drove history rather the classes of Marxist analysis. Perhaps reflecting his economic background, Pareto saw the possibility and benefit of a more meritocratic selection of members of the elite, but all three early elite theorists saw the existence of elites as functional. These theorists were, perhaps unfairly in the cases of Mosca and Pareto, associated with fascism and as a consequence their theories were ignored for some time. However, over the longer term their

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influence on the understanding of elites has been hugely significant.

C. Wright Mills' 1956 *The Power Elite*, was an important development in elite studies, as it analysed elite power in the context of institutions instead of individuals. Mills (1956) sought to show that powerful elite made up of big corporations, the military and the federal government, and not the citizens, ruled the US. This was a highly controversial argument at a time in the twentieth century when the self styled home of democracy was confronting the 'evil forces of communism in the Cold War' (Slattery, 2003: 171). Fascinatingly, this perspective was repeated in President Eisenhower's farewell address in 1961 – in what he referred to as the military-industrial complex (Hartung, 2001).

Bottomore (1964; 1993) examined the role of elites in the class structure in both developed and developing nations. He argued (1964) that the unique challenges facing developing nations – from political instability, to rapidly growing populations, to a world economy dominated by already developed states – made elites, and leaders capable of effective action, vitally important. Bourdieu (1984; 1996) focussed on the reproduction of the elite, stressing the role of particular educational institutions, the role of doxa – unconscious beliefs that support extant social arrangements that privilege the dominant, and habitus – a set of dispositions and habits learned that align individuals with their positions in society. All this contributes to the reproduction of the extant social structures (Bourdieu, 1990).

Some see the elite as essential to the functioning of a democratic society (Higley & Burton, 2006; Kesiter and Southgate, 2012; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Putnam, 1976). In part, this positive view of elites is due to social scientists regarding them as a less cohesive, more pluralistic and meritocratic replacement for a single ruling class whose power reflected only its ownership of capital. Keller (1991) sees a great danger in the

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excessive loss of cohesiveness among elites, that lead and give society its unity. For, ‘Strategic elites are those in society that are responsible for maintaining an institution, its roles and its norms’ (Kestler and Southgate, 2012: 195). Indeed, Higley et al., (1996) and Murphy (2006) point out that in Eastern Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continuity of political elites from the communist to the postcommunist period provided a relatively high degree of cohesiveness and security that was conducive to democratic competition. The ex-communist elites contributed to the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions in many of these countries.

In addition to national and regional political elites (Botella et al., 2010) there are elites that now transcend national boundaries in a variety of spheres. Cotta (1984) and Verzichelli and Edinger (2005) argue that we are gradually witnessing, for the first time, the emergence of a cohesive supranational political elite within the European Union (EU). This elite tends to be made up of a fairly homogenous group, people from the professional middle classes and those whose occupation lend themselves to political life (Keating and Cairney, 2006: 43). In the context of economic globalisation, Sklair (2001; 2009) argues that we can see the emergence of a global capitalism that is being directed by a corporate elite. This is an elite no longer tied to the traditional nation state boundaries, and is not dependent upon, nor does it derive its power from, the state (Kivisto, 2011; Rothkopf, 2009;). This group effectively constitutes the new elite of what are now being referred to as postmodern states - where sovereignty is nebulous.

A concern that functionalist theorists have had with modern society is that elites may lack sufficient cohesion to be effective (Higley, Hoffmann-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991). Such a functionalist perspective can be seen in recent public debates in Ireland, with a post-crisis opinion piece asserting that ‘We need elites – people with

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the skills, networks and resources required to do the varied and complex tasks on which we all depend. If these tasks are to be done we have no option but to trust those who do them' (Grace, 2011).

Recently, there has been criticism of the functionalist and positive view of elites. On a theoretical level Hartmann (2007) has amassed evidence that there remains a strong connection between social class and the ability to become a member of the elite. If the elite is more hereditary than meritocratic, an elite loses both legitimacy based on its rare skills and enough connections with the rest of the society to make decisions on its behalf. Hartmann (2007) has also contested the view that competition between heterogeneous subgroups is sufficiently strong to ensure that their decisions are not dominated by the selfish interest of any particular class. Returning to the arguments of Mills (2000) and Bourdieu (1996), both Hartmann (2007) and Rothkopf (2009) contend that the business elites' (national and transnational) power now dominates that of the other elites, including the political elite. As the power of the state has diminished that of the political elite have been reduced to minor power broker status, this in an environment where international business leaders move freely between positions in government and private life largely beyond the gaze of parliaments (Rothkopf, 2009). In the context of the global financial crisis, with governments pumping vast sums of money into the banks, while scaling back social spending, Hartmann (2007) arguments appear startlingly prescient.

### **Methodology for Measuring Eliteness and its Components**

In examining how elite a particular system of institutions is in the composition of a specific societal elite group (for example, in looking at how elite the UK secondary school system is in relation to the composition of the UK cabinet) it is desirable to



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capture both the influence and the exclusiveness of that institutional system. At the level of a particular institution, a measure of what we mean by the influence of a particular institution upon a specific societal elite group is that proportion of the societal elite that are affiliated with that institution (for example, the percentage of UK cabinet ministers who were past pupils of the exclusive ‘public school’ Eton College). What we mean by exclusiveness of a particular institution might be roughly measured by the degree which being socialised there is an uncommon experience (for example, the percentage of UK school children of the relevant age that attend Eton). However, both the influence and exclusiveness of a particular system of institutions is a little more complex than this intuition would suggest. For that reason we will examine measures of influence and exclusiveness separately in turn, before combining them to provide an index of how elite a set of institutions are.

#### Measuring the influence element of eliteness

The influence of particular set of institutions in elite studies seems to be composed of both the share of the elite affiliated with those institutions, along with the limited number, or ‘fewness’, of those institutions. For example, Hartmann (2009: 69) not only points out that since 1945 over 60 percent of permanent secretaries in the UK’s civil service were educated in elite schools, but also that the most important of these schools are what are known as the ‘Clarendon Nine’. These two dimensions of institutional influence make it hard to compare the role of institutions in the production of elites across different countries as one dimension may be higher and the other lower, thus making it increasingly more complex to keep in mind both dimensions as one compares and contrasts an increasing number of countries. Similar problems have been encountered in studies of international trade concentration (Hirschman, 1945),

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biological diversity in particular environments (Simpson, 1949), supplier concentration in particular markets (Herfindahl, 1950), the degree of the division of labour (Gibbs & Martin, 1962) and sociological heterogeneity (Blau, 1977).

An adapted version of the concentration measures employed in these other domains provides an index of institutional influence that captures both the share of elite factor and the fewness factor in a set of institutions. Our proposed Institutional Influence Index (I-Index) of a systems of institutions is the sum, across the number of institutions ( $n$ ) of squared shares ( $s$ ) of affiliates of each institution ( $i$ ) in the elite:

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} s_i^2$$

Or

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2$$

where  $m_i$  is the number of affiliates of institute  $i$  that are members of the elite in question and  $M$  is the total number of members of that elite.

This formulae is an application of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (H-Index) as described by, for example, Davies, Lyons, Dixon, & Geroski (1991: 82) and in common usage in industrial economics. Adopting this formula not only means the desirable properties of the index are supported by its years of development and its use in economics, but also means particular values of the index can be compared with the many, in economics terms, ‘measures of market power’ (equivalent to institutional influence here) in terms of H-Index in other contexts. From an economist’s perspective

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the I-index can be thought of as an application of the H-Index to the measurement of supplier concentration in a particular market for institutional socialisation services to particular elites. The special definition of this market from an economics perspective and the importance of institutional influence in theories of elite justify the I-index neologism. The I-index goes up if, other things being equal, any one institution gets a greater share of its affiliates in influential positions. The value of the I-index will also go up if there are fewer institutions involved in producing members of the elite.

#### Measuring the exclusiveness element of eliteness

The other side of elite reproduction is the exclusivity of the institutions involved. Like institutional influence, there are two dimensions of exclusivity among a population of institutions. Firstly, the more alternatives there are to any one institution, the more exclusiveness there can be, other things being equal. For example, if all of a relevant population go to a single educational institution there is no exclusiveness to that institution, though of course it may be very influential. The other aspect of exclusiveness is the inequality of the shares of each institution: the more unequal the shares the more exclusiveness there is. For example, if there are two educational institutions and both take a 50 percent share of the population then neither can be considered more exclusive than the other. But, if one of these institutions takes only a 1 percent share of the population and the other takes 99 percent, then the 1 percent institution is clearly exclusive and there is more exclusivity in the system. Again, in focussing on exclusivity we are, for the moment, ignoring how influential the institutions may be. If  $P$  is the total number in the relevant general population and  $p_i$  is the number of the relevant general population in institution  $i$ , and  $n$  is the number of institutions, then a measure of exclusiveness (X-Index) would be

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$$X = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} [1 / (\frac{p_i}{P})]$$

Our measure of exclusiveness will rise, other things being equal, if some institutions accept only smaller shares of the relevant population. This is as we might expect, if for example, Eton halved its intake of students. In such a circumstance we would naturally think of resulting in increased exclusiveness in the system.

#### Combining measures of influence and exclusiveness into a measure of eliteness

The elite index of a system of institutions is not a simple product of their exclusiveness and their influence indices, but rather requires a measure that links exclusiveness and influence at the level of each institution before aggregation to the level of the system. After all, institutions may be very exclusive without being elite if their affiliates have no positions of influence. So, even if a particular institution contributes a lot to the exclusiveness of a system, if it has no affiliates in the particular elite being measured it should make no contribute to the eliteness of that studied system. Similarly, an institution may be very influential, in the sense of having many affiliates in influential positions, but be so inclusiveness of the entire population that it cannot be claimed to the eliteness of the system. For example, being baptised as a Roman Catholic in 20<sup>th</sup> century Ireland may indeed admit one to a very powerful institution, but such a happening would confer no rare power on any individual in that circumstance. Rather, eliteness is the linked combination of both exclusivity and influence.

The influence and exclusive measures above can be combined into a linked

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Institutional Eliteness Index (E-Index) as below:

$$E = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} I_i X_i \right) - 1$$

Where  $I_i = \left( \frac{m_i}{M} \right)^2$ , where  $X_i = [1 / (p_i/P)]$  and where, as above,  $m_i$  is the number of affiliates of institute  $i$  that are members of the elite in question and  $M$  is the total number of members of that elite.  $P$  is the total number in the relevant general population and  $p_i$  is the number of the relevant general population in institution  $i$ .

Of course, the E-Index indicator, like any summary measure, cannot be expected to capture every nuance contained in all the data that compose it. However, the E-Index has some desirable qualities as a measure of the elite nature of a set of institutions. If all institutions have an equal share of the relevant general population and all institutions have an equal share of their affiliates in the elite then the E-Index will be equal to zero. Likewise, if the shares of each institution's affiliates is exactly proportional to their share in the general relevant population then the E-Index will be zero. If any institution's affiliates have a larger share of membership of the elite then the E-Index will rise. If an elite producing takes a smaller share of the general population, this increased exclusiveness of the institution will be reflected in a rise in the E-Index.

### **Countries Selected for Examination**

Through comparative studies, we can discover trends and achieve an understanding of broader political and societal characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3). The value of comparison is the perspective it offers, and its goal of building a body of increasingly

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complete explanatory theory (Mayer et al., 1993; Mahler, 1995). But, as Lieberman (2001: 5) recommends, in addition to cross country cases, comparative historical analyses covering longer time spans is also beneficial. This approach is defined by ‘the use of systematic and contextualized comparison’ (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 3). In order to address these recommendations, we decided to draw our data from two countries over a period of 75 years. The countries we will focus upon are Ireland and the UK.

Both of these countries were selected for examination using the most-similar case selection technique, whereby the same independent variables are focused upon (Gerring, 2007). Ireland and the UK share the overarching criteria of being long-standing democracies and capitalist states. Both countries have been democracies since the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Ireland gained its independence from the UK. As a result of that historical link, both countries are parliamentary democracies, and the Irish parliamentary system, despite taking on an increasing number of the characteristics associated with a consensus democracy, still bares many similarities to the Westminster system in both structure and culture (Gallagher, 2010; Lijphart, 1999). Consequently, cabinet government – encompassing the characteristics of collective cabinet responsibility, cabinet consensus and ministerial responsibility for their departments – is of critical policy making importance in both countries, acting as real constraints on ministers, more so even than the parliaments themselves (Connolly and O’Halpin, 1999). Thus, ‘in the Westminster model, parliament is not seen as a real maker of law but instead provides a forum where the issues raised by a government proposal can be fully aired’ (Gallagher, 2010: 209). Ireland is also an interesting country to examine in comparison to the UK, to as its nationalism and creation was partially a backlash against

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an oppressive elite that the British had installed to rule over the native Irish between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries – namely the Ascendancy (Whelan, 1996; Allen, 2002).

### **Research Focus**

We have chosen to focus upon the secondary schools attended by all of the cabinet ministers from Ireland and the UK in the period 1937-2012, in order to gain an insight into the influence, exclusiveness and most particularly the eliteness of these institutions. Being a cabinet minister in any democratic society immediately places one in a very exclusive club. In most countries it involves being elected as a member of parliament, being a member of the governing party/parties and finally a minister of senior rank, as opposed to what is referred to in Ireland as a junior minister, or Minister of State. Under the Irish Constitution, the Government of Ireland is the cabinet that exercises executive authority of the country. The cabinet can consists of between seven and 15 members, usually 15, who are referred to as Ministers of the Government. In the UK the cabinet is the collective decision making body of Her-Majesty's government and is made up of the Prime Minister and some 22 Cabinet Ministers - the most senior ministers.

### ***Studies of Irish and UK Elites***

Historically, due to the political links that arose, first from colonisation, and subsequently from the political union that existed between the two countries, a British propertied elite came to dominate both Irish and British societies. Towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, 'a very rapid fusing of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish elites through marriage and inheritance saw a convergence of perspectives and increased the cohesion of the British ruling class' (Moe, 2007: 64). Also assisting in this process of fusing the

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British ruling class was education. Whereas in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century the ruling classes in the kingdoms that constituted the state, had their children privately tutored, by the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the vast majority of the British elite received their educations at places like Eton, Westminster, Winchester and Harrow (Colley, 1992: 167). This class ruled Britain as it contributed ‘a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country’ (Domhoff, 1967: 5).

Following Irish independence in 1921, the Ascendancy class, the propertied elite associated with the former British regime, became socially marginalised (Collins and Cradden, 2001). Thereafter, the Irish gradually began developing their own indigenous elite, built upon the foundations of a rising mercantile class (Lee, 1989). In September 1966, Minister for Education, Donogh O’Malley announced that free post-primary education would be available throughout Ireland from 1967 onwards. This removed a huge obstacle in the path of children from poor families – namely the cost (Coolahan, 1981). That said, 56 Irish secondary schools remain as private educational institutions that still charged fees.

Following the end of the Second World War, secondary education in the UK was provided free up to the age of 14. The comprehensive secondary school was introduced to England and Wales in the mid 1960s, and now accounts for about 90 percent of UK secondary school students. Today there are still around 2,500 independent or private schools in the UK, of which about 10 percent are known, confusingly, as public schools. These public schools are generally the oldest and most expensive independent schools. They were initially called public schools as they were open to anyone who could pass entrance examinations and afford the fees, without religious or other restrictions. Most public schools developed significantly during the



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19th century, and came to play an important role in the development of the [Victorian](#) social elite, be they in politics, the military or the imperial service. Successful industrialists would send their sons to these institutions as a mark of their entry into polite society. Today, these fee paying schools continue to be extremely expensive, but unlike in the case of their Irish counterparts, the UK government does not subsidise them in terms of paying the salaries of the teachers.

#### Operationalizing the Measures

In order to operationalize our measure of eliteness (E-Index) of a system of formation institutions (for example, secondary schools) on a particular elite group (for example, cabinet ministers) we need to calculate both the influence and exclusiveness of that system. Influence in the system is measured by taking into account both the number (the lower the number, the greater the concentration of influence) and the share of each (the greater the share, the greater the concentration of influence) of formation institutions that supplies members of the elite group. Exclusiveness in the system is measured by taking into account both the share of the relevant general population that go to each particular formation institution (for example, the rarer it is to go to particular secondary school, the more exclusiveness there is in the system) and the equality of shares of the relevant population taken by the formation institutions (the smaller particular schools relative to other schools, the more exclusivity the system is). A school system can be very exclusive without having a high concentration of influence (for example, if all secondary schools had just one pupil then the system would be a very exclusive one but not necessarily one in which influence was concentrated). Likewise, a school system may be highly concentrated in terms of influence without being very exclusive (for example, if there was just one secondary school in a country that all pupils graduated from the system would highly concentrated in terms of influence but not very exclusive). For this reason our measure of system eliteness (the E-index) contains components of influence and eliteness for each particular school in the system.

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In this paper, we are comparing, using the E-index developed above, the eliteness of the UK system of secondary schools in the formation of UK cabinets (1937-2012) with eliteness of the Irish system of secondary school in the formation of Irish cabinets (1937-2012). To calculate the E-index we needed to gather data for both its influence and exclusiveness components.

It will be recalled from above that our proposed Institutional Influence Index of a systems of institutions is the I-Index

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left(\frac{m_i}{M}\right)^2$$

where  $m_i$  is the number of affiliates of institute  $i$  that are members of the elite in question and  $M$  is the total number of members of that elite. Though it appears straightforward there are different possible measures of membership. The most straightforward way is to count as one, every person in the elite who is an affiliate of an institute, regardless of how long that person was in the elite group. For example, this straight forward way of counting membership means that both Garret FitzGerald and Frank Cluskey, both members of the Irish cabinet, would enter our measure of institutional influence as one for Belvedere Secondary School and one for St. Vincents, Glasnevin Secondary School. This straightforward procedure is the one we adopted, however it is worth taking time to consider its implications. We have chosen the two particular Irish politicians, Garret FitzGerald and Frank Cluskey to illustrate rather dramatically how some issues with our membership measurement: Garret FitzGerald served for a total of about 10 years in cabinet . On the other hand, Frank Cluskey served just under one year as a cabinet minister. Yet these very differ experiences contribute to the influence index, and to the eliteness index, equally. The straightforward method in

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such cases would lead to an underestimation of the elite nature of the system. Despite such cases we have chosen to stick with the straight forward way of measuring membership for a number of reasons. Firstly, whereas data sources for our particular cases are rich and a more nuanced measures of membership are potentially attainable we are keen to show that the measures can be useful with the kind of data that would be attainable for many elite groups in many diverse cases. Secondly, since the elite-formation institutions we are studying are secondary schools, there is a sense in which their influence may tend to be swapped by the effect of making it to the elite group itself (here the cabinet), once a person has become a cabinet minister the first time. The membership counts for each secondary school in the Ireland and the United Kingdom with past pupils that have been members of cabinets in these two jurisdictions were gathered and tabulated by the authors.

In operationalizing our measure of exclusiveness (the X-Index), developed, we recall that it is calculated using the following formula:

$$X = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} \left[ 1 / \left( \frac{p_i}{P} \right) \right]$$

where  $P$  is the total number in the relevant general population and  $p_i$  is the number of the relevant general population in institution  $i$ , and  $n$  is the number of institutions. For our measure of  $P$ , we took the total secondary school going population in each jurisdiction in 2012 and for  $p_i$  we took the total number of students in each school in 2012. Whereas it would be possible to construct arguments for other measures of relevant general populations and numbers in each school (for example, by using moving averages) we have again chosen the most straightforward measures. Again this choice

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show the indices working as calculated with easily available data. The use of current data, rather than moving averages, also shows the most up to date state of affairs. The figures used for calculating the Influence indices in these two jurisdictions are detailed in Appendices A and B.

As explained above the overall Elite index (E-index) of a system of institutions is not a simple product of their exclusiveness and their influence indices, but rather requires a measure linked at the level of each institution, so that

$$E = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} I_i X_i \right) - 1$$

Where E is the E-index,  $I_i = \left( \frac{m_i}{M} \right)^2$ , where  $X_i = [1 / (p_i / P)]$  and where, as above,  $m_i$  is the number of affiliates of institute  $i$  that are members of the elite in question and  $M$  is the total number of members of that elite.  $P$  is the total number in the relevant general population and  $p_i$  is the number of the relevant general population in institution  $i$ . Again the calculations for each jurisdiction are detailed in Appendices A and B.

Before proceeding to present and discuss our results it is worth briefly commenting on an interesting feature of the data. Between 1937 (when Ireland adopted its current form of cabinet government, a one very similar to that operated in the UK post 1918 (Farrell, 1971)) and 2012, 157 people occupied ministerial cabinet office in Ireland, while 336 held ministerial portfolios in UK governments. While it might have been expected that these figures would have been higher, given that there have been 29 governments in Ireland and 19 in the UK over the 75 years between 1937 and 2012, it tends to be the case that senior politicians are often reappointed as ministers in a number of governments. Turnover at the senior ministerial level tends to be lower than intuition would suggest, with some of the politicians we examined - such as Kenneth

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Clarke in the UK – having had 11 portfolios in a range of Conservative governments over 3 decades and under three different prime ministers.

Although these 493 individuals, males and females, came from a wide variety of backgrounds, having worked in a vast array of careers and have represented a diversity of constituencies, we specifically wish to compare and contrast, using the indices that we have developed, the two secondary school educational systems that produced them. By examining the secondary school educational systems in this way – providing aggregate summary measures for its eliteness and also aggregate summary measures for its components of influence and exclusiveness we provide a potentially powerful tool for international comparisons of elite formation systems, along with both an illustration that power and a more nuanced discussion of the details behind those aggregates.

## **Results and Discussion**

In Appendix A we set out our calculations of the Eliteness Index (E-Index), the Influence Index (I-Index) and the Exclusiveness Index (X-Index) system of the secondary schools that have provided Irish government ministers since 1937. In Appendix B we can see similar calculations for the UK. The E-Index, the I-Index and the X-Index are comparable across both countries. In a broader context, this approach will enable the comparison of elite institutions in jurisdictions around the world. Although, not the focus of this work, it should be noted that each of the index scores for the individual schools are also comparable against each other, as well as against other schools in other countries.

In Table 1 we set out the values for the E-index for the secondary school systems in Ireland and the UK that supply ministers to Irish and British cabinets between 1937 and 2012.

**Table 1:** Elite Indices for the systems of Irish and UK secondary schools supplying Cabinet Ministers.

		E-index
	Ireland	8.7
	United Kingdom	96.4

Note: These rounded values are taken from the calculations detailed in Appendices A and B.

### **E-Index Scores for Ireland and the UK**

From Table 1 we can see that the E-index for Ireland was 8.7, while it stood at 96.4 for the UK. In terms of our index, the secondary school system in the UK that produced the cabinet ministers in that country was more than 10 times more elite than the comparable Irish system. The general finding that the UK secondary school system for supplying cabinet ministers is much more elite than the Irish, one that agrees with more nuanced investigations, including our own investigations carried out in the courses of this work and of previous researchers (for example, Hartmann, 2009). Thus our E-index, at least in the case of comparing the UK and Ireland secondary school systems, reflects the reality captured by more detailed descriptions.

Using the same data as used in the calculation for the overall E-index we also provide, below, indices of the influence and exclusiveness components of eliteness in the two systems. Thus we provide further insight into the comparison between the two systems without having to immerse such discussions in dizzying detail.

### **I-index Scores for Ireland and the UK**

From Table 2 below we can see that the I-index for Ireland was 0.012, while it stood at 0.026 for the UK.

**Table 2:** Elite and Influence Indices for the systems of Irish and UK secondary schools supplying Cabinet Ministers.

	E-index	I-index
Ireland	8.7	0.012
United Kingdom	96.4	0.026

Note: These rounded values are taken from the calculations detailed in Appendices A and B.

In terms of influence, we can there see that the I-index for the UK systems, is over twice that for Ireland. While this again reflects the impression one gets from a more intimate reading of the situation, it also shows clearly that the influence component of eliteness is not what is driving the bulk of the considerably more elite nature of the UK system relative to the Irish one. Before exploring that further it is worth considering how the measures of influence compare to other contexts.

Should the I-index value of 0.026, or even the lower Irish value of 0.012 be considered high? The answer to this question lies in comparison. This UK value is clearly high relative to the Irish one. Application of the index to other systems will provide comparators to allow a more holistic judgement. We can also make judgements by drawing from the detailed studies of each system available in the empirical literature.

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Our construction of the index, drawing as it did on the industrial economics measures also means we have another source of comparative values for the I-index.

As was discussed above, the I-index can be viewed as an application of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (H-Index), commonly used in industrial economics. Thus I-index values can be compared to values of the Herfindahl values for different markets. The I-index scores for Ireland and the UK are effectively a measurement of supplier (secondary school) concentration in the production of the political elite in both countries. In the industrial economics context markets with a H-index of less than 0.2 would be considered competitive. Thus, if cabinets were buying ministers from the elite supplying schools there would be no need to be concerned about the UK or Irish cabinets 1937-2012, as consumers of the supply schools product, being subject to the monopoly power of their secondary schools systems. Of course, concerns about elitist schools are broader than merely the possession of monopoly power by particular schools: there are concerns the lack of diversity in the processes of elite formation within those schools, there are concerns about representative in elites of experiences in the general population and there are concerns about exclusiveness of those schools. The first two concerns - about the lack of diversity in the processes of elite formation and about representative in elites of experiences in the general population are dealt with by in depth studies of those processes and experiences such as Khan (2011). However the other component of our eliteness measure, the exclusives or X-index addresses the concern about exclusiveness of those schools that have such influence in the formation of elites.

### **X-index Scores for Ireland and the UK**



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Whereas the I-index was used to measure the influence of the elite-formation institutions (here secondary schools) , the X-index seeks to measure the exclusivity of those institutions. From Table 2 below we can see that the I-index for Ireland was approximately 81,000 while the comparable for the UK system stood at 932,000.

**Table 3:** Influence Indices for the systems of Irish and UK secondary schools supplying Cabinet Ministers.

	E-index	I-index	X-index (to the nearest 1,000)
Ireland	8.6	0.012	81
United Kingdom	96.4	0.026	932

Note: These rounded values are taken from the calculations done by the authors.

According to our E-index the secondary school system supplying cabinet ministers in the UK between 1937 and 2012 is over 11 times more exclusiveness than its comparable Irish system. Clearly it is the exclusive nature, rather than influence dimension of the UK secondary, system that it is driving much of its much elite nature, relative to the comparable system in Ireland. This identification the UK's elite as being driven by the exclusiveness of its secondary school system is confirmed by Hartmann (2009: 66) much more nuanced analysis which concludes that the UK's "...crucial narrow gate access to the country's important elites..." is its 'public' secondary school system.

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Our X-index captures not only the how exclusiveness the set of schools that supply an elite are taken as a single entity but also captures the variability of exclusiveness within that set. A measure that might appear more intuitive would be simply to see how exclusive or unusual it is for members of a relevant general population to be part of an elite forming institution. For example, we can calculate that in Ireland 1 in every 7.5 students are attending a school that has supplied a cabinet minister in the past 75 years, while in the UK only 1 in every 27 students is attending such a school. While such figures give an intuitive feel of exclusiveness they do not tell us if a system of elite secondary schools is characterised by further exclusiveness within that system or if within that exclusive set all schools are equally accessible. For example, consider two scenarios A and B. Imagine that in A you had identified an exclusive set of 100 secondary schools whose past-pupils became cabinet ministers and each of those schools were equally sized, say 1,000 each. Contrast that with scenario B where you again had 100 secondary schools whose past-pupils became cabinet ministers but in this scenario B while 20 of them had 100 pupils each, and the other 80 had 1225 pupils . Our X-index has the desirable property of giving a higher measure exclusiveness for the B than the A scenario, whereas mere ratios of pupils attending the exclusive 100 schools to the relevant cohort of the general population would show no difference. In the detailed and careful comparisons provided by Hartman (2009) the rich context provided ensure that his definitions of the elite set of schools overcomes any such scenarios. This is done however at the expense of making the comparisons between systems harder to grasp, so that Hartman (2009: 66) tells that a set of 29 exclusive schools in the UK, the Eton and Rugby groups, “are attended by only 0.5 per mill of a cohort”, and later that two exclusive secondary schools (Phillips Exeter and Phillips Andover) in the United States of America “produce no more than 600 to 700

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of a total of over two million high school graduates a year” (Hartman, 2009: 71). While Hartman (2009) thick description provides a richness missed by summary measures such as our X-index, it also makes comparison much more dependent on sound judgement and detailed knowledge that is not always possible when trying to make international comparisons.

**Table 2:** Influence Indices for the systems of Irish and UK secondary schools supplying Cabinet Ministers.

	E-index	X-index (to the nearest 1,000)	I-index
Ireland	8.6	81	0.012
United Kingdom	96.4	932	0.026

Note: These rounded values are taken from the calculations done by the authors.

## **Conclusions**

Despite the condemnation heaped upon the banking and financial elites during the current economic crisis and the existence of a wide-ranging literature on the elites in society that dates back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, no study has previously sought to set out a series of measures for influence, exclusiveness and eliteness that is broadly applicable and comparable. Nor have there been any studies of this nature regarding elites, where

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the influence, exclusiveness and eliteness of the educational institutions attended by the senior politicians in two countries over 75 years were compared and contrasted. The fact that this approach allows us measure three separate indices that combined provide an overarching picture of eliteness means constituent elements that equate to eliteness can be identified, quantified and compared. Thus, at the macro level we can see how each of the constituents of eliteness varies between all of the secondary schools supplying ministers in Ireland and the UK; while at the micro level it is also possible to see how the indices differ between individual schools both within and between the two countries.

The article initially examines the evolution of the literature on elites. It tracks the development of thinking on this topic from the ideas of Mosca in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century through to Kivisto, Rothkopf and Hartmann at the beginning of this century. It then sets out the reasoning and the formula behind measuring the I-index, X-Index and E-index. What is import here is underrating how influence and exclusiveness together contribute to the measuring of eliteness.

The article then discusses the counties selected for examination and the focus upon the secondary schools attended by ministers in both of these countries in the period from 1937 to 2012. The article provided a brief overview of the literature on the political elites in Ireland and the UK from the 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards and the crucial role education has played in their formation.

Thereafter, the article examines the I-index, X-Index and E-Index for the schools that supplied cabinet ministers in Ireland the UK in the 75 year period between 1937 and 2012. This involved examining the educational history of each cabinet minister and identifying the secondary schools they attended. As could clearly be seen, a few schools provided many ministers, while the majority provided a much smaller number.

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That said, only a small percentage of all schools in Ireland and the UK provided ministers. What was particularly striking was that the I, X and E Indices for the UK secondary schools that provided ministers was much higher than for their Irish counterparts. Thus, in comparison to Irish secondary schools that produced cabinet ministers, their UK counterparts are far more elite.

Boring down into this data, at an individual school level, or dividing the schools into free and fee paying, may enable future researchers to shed light on the main reasons for the wide disparity between the two countries. In comparing and contrasting the various indices for the various types of secondary schools in both countries interesting findings should be produced. This prospect highlights both the macro and micro applicability of the indices – they can be used to compare the influence, exclusiveness and eliteness of a whole range of schools, or other kinds of institutions, as well as that of individual institutions.

Thus, this study has been concerned with presenting a means of measuring eliteness and doing so in a manner that permits comparison across countries, institutions and at multiple levels within those countries and institutions. But, going beyond this, the study had sought to identify, in a measurable manner, the components that constitute the E-Index. As issues concerning the elite of whatever kind, and what eliteness means, is a subject of concern in all societies, the measures set out here will enable researcher provide a better means of understanding and comparing the eliteness that is of concerns to them.

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