Cultural Policy and the Creative City: Legitimation Discourses, Culture and the State

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Cultural Policy and the Creative City:

Legitimation Discourses, Culture and the State

by

Tara Byrne, B.A., PGDip

A thesis submitted to the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) in fulfilment of the requirements for the Award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses cultural policy. It proposes that the creative city urban development paradigm is a useful perspective from which cultural policy can be analysed in order to reveal the imperatives, pressures, contingencies and deficits within it and the state, vis-à-vis the market. The thesis, therefore, rests on three analytical pillars: the general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city paradigm, and an investigation of relations between these domains through a study of policy texts in Scotland, Finland and Ireland. Using Michel Foucault’s discourse formation theory and Jurgen Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, system, legitimation and colonisation, the dissertation demonstrates that instrumental discourses like the creative city are used to legitimate cultural policies by providing tangible rationales for investment in culture and by addressing local state issues, though this process ultimately works to delegitimate cultural policy. The thesis also shows that cultural policies typically deploy conflicting and dual discourses that appeal to the interests of the state and the public, as well as obfuscating prevailing state ideologies. It is argued that this characteristic has developed because of difficulties with defining culture, the weakness of the policy sector and the state’s interest in sustaining itself. From the case material, therefore, it is firstly demonstrated that cultural policy does not have a tangible policy mandate, is not a sui generis area of public policy, and is primarily used to address central government agendas and other policy sectors. It is further shown that this understanding of cultural policy is held at the highest political levels and therefore constitutes the a priori purpose of contemporary cultural policy. Secondly, using Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason, this thesis demonstrates that the dependency and perpetual case-making of the cultural sector evident in rational instrumental discourses like the creative city, leads to a cynicism amongst the stakeholders of cultural policy
which impacts on the functioning of their relationships. Thirdly, though instrumentalism
is endemic to all policy, cultural policy’s dependency, weak status and relationship to
the market are reflexively linked and lead to a *structural* or cyclical instrumentalism in
cultural policy. This cycle of instrumentalism exacerbates difficulties amongst
stakeholder relationships, and can result in a colonisation or imbalance between
political-economic and socio-cultural imperatives in a policy sector that is already in
deficit, with implications for the state. This analysis, therefore, results in a new
consideration of the role and implications of the creative city paradigm in relation to
cultural policy, public policy and the state.
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis which I now submit for examination for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others, save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

This thesis was prepared according to the regulations for postgraduate study by research of the Dublin Institute of Technology and has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other institution.

The work reported on in this thesis conforms to the principles and requirements of the Institute’s guidelines for ethics in research.

Signature

Date

Tara Byrne
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“These are my principles. If you don’t like them I have others.”

Attributed to Groucho Marx (1890 – 1977)
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Cultural policy has been described as a “marginal” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217; Bennett, 2006, p. 118; Raunig, 2005, p. 16) and “marginalised” policy sector (European Commission, 2006a, p.10) carrying “little [electoral] weight” (Gray and Wingfield 2010, p. 7). Despite this, an investigation of cultural policies via its discourses,1 narratives or bodies of meaning, can reveal the wider imperatives and pressures of not only the politics of culture;2 but also the contingencies of governments and the state itself. This may be surprising to those lacking awareness as to why states have cultural policies in the first place or in relation to what cultural policies are putatively for. However, while an investigation of the discourses of cultural policies might struggle to ascertain the purpose of cultural policies, it can reveal the perpetual search for new and ever more persuasive stories to tell about the role of culture and the state, to the state itself and the outside public. These stories embody and expose profound contradictions and deficits at the heart of cultural policies and liberal democratic governments.3

1Discourse is central to this dissertation (see Chapter Two) and can be described in a number of ways: as a “linguistic practice that puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers, and themes” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 330); a “single utterance or speech act” as part of a “systematic ordering of language involving certain rules, terminology and conventions” not limited to any one format such as text, talk, or image, etc. (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 373), but is more specifically interpreted via Foucault’s discourse theories. This interpretation comprises discourse as varied systems of power and meaning-generation, or “statements different in form, and dispersed in time”...which “form a group if they refer to one and the same object” (Foucault, 1972, p 35). Chapter two contains an extended discussion of discourse and the rationale for selecting text-based discourses.

2Culture and Art are associated terms that comprise the relationship between the whole and the part, whereby the former refers to the wider context in which art is created in terms of a way of life, as well as a system of judgment, and the latter refers to general expression (Williams, 1965, p. 57). As a result of the tendency for governments to use the terms art and culture interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated and for consistency purposes, this research uses the term culture to indicate the narrower model of culture typically supported by governments (i.e. the arts). See Chapter Four in general and section 4.4.10

3Liberal democracy originated from the 18th century European tradition of Liberalism, and coalesced around rights, freedoms and obligations vis-à-vis the state, and, in particular, property and the market (Held, 2006, p. 56). It is based on the view that the “government exists to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens who are ultimately the best judges of their own interests” and “must be restricted in scope and constrained in practice to ensure the maximum possible freedom of each citizen (ibid., pp. 64-65).
The primary focus of this dissertation, therefore, is an interpretation and analysis of (explicit)\textsuperscript{4} nominal national cultural policy, via an exploration of its relationship with a popular urban development discourse and paradigm called the creative city. In order to consider this question, the research rests on three analytical pillars comprising the general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city paradigm (resting on the strategic use of culture in the growth of cities), and an investigation of the under-analysed relations between these domains. This analysis takes place through a survey of the historical and conceptual links between cultural policy and the creative city, a comparative study of policy environments and texts in Scotland, Finland and Ireland and an examination of the implications that arise.

The three northern European countries of Scotland, Finland and Ireland are not only typically neglected in cultural policy scholarship, but offer a number of similarities (similar economic and political agendas), and differences (socio-political traditions, languages) with which to consider and locate the specific role and value of the creative city paradigm within cultural policy. Specifically, the cases will show that the strategic use of culture represented by the creative city, via its “exchanges, its techniques, its values” (Foucault, 2002, p. xxii), or its situated claims to knowledge, can shed light on the discrete political, social and historical contexts of policy making in those countries, the nature of the cultural policy field itself, and the state. In doing this, the research also seeks to evaluate if, how and why, strategic discourses like the creative city paradigm

\textsuperscript{4} Explicit cultural policy is “any cultural policy that a government labels as such” (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143) and is the focus of this research. Implicit cultural policy is “any [effective] political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides” (ibid.). See also Chapter Four (4.4.11).
may be a helpful narrative or *legitimation*\(^5\) discourse, within continually advocating national cultural policies.

This introductory chapter, therefore, aims to link the creative city paradigm to cultural policy and build a case for their mutual investigation. It will set out the main claims for the research, as well as key issues within cultural policy. These claims comprise the role of cultural policy in addressing other government agendas, the impact of this on cultural policy stakeholder relationships and the balance of interests in cultural policies as represented through the discourses of cultural policy. The Chapter will contextualise these claims by referring to the correlation between the complexity, contestation and richness of culture; the difficult position of culture within governments; the functionality of culture to ruling elites; and the consequent dualism, conflict and lack of clarity in cultural policy rationales, in the context of the relationship between the state and the market. Following this, the chapter will touch on key terminologies relevant to this research and will then outline the creative city paradigm, its strategic positioning of culture, its value systems and the powerful discourses on which it depends. This introductory chapter will conclude by outlining the main rationale for the thesis, the contributions of the thesis to knowledge, and a summary of the chapters.

---

\(^5\) Legitimacy and legitimation are key concepts associated with critical theorist Jurgen Habermas (1973) and refer to the “mass [electoral] loyalty” or systems of trust and communication on which the survival of political establishments depend (Habermas, 1973, p. 46). This concept will be fully explored further in this chapter, Chapter Two and throughout the text.
1.2 Overview

1.2.1 Cultural policy: the problem of case-making

Cultural policy can be defined in various ways, from the “broad field of public processes involved in formulating, implementing, and contesting governmental intervention in, and support of, cultural activity” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 14), to “whatever it is that governments say it is” (Gray, 2010a, p. 222). However, Western European cultural policies such as those in Scotland, Finland and Ireland, typically use a range of narratives in various formats that make diverse claims about the complexity, value and uses of culture in society. These claims effectively comprise what gets constituted as cultural policy, thereby implicitly offering tangible rationales for democratically elected state interventions into culture.

Typical cultural policy assertions, therefore, include the role of culture in: “sustainable economic development”, “health, wellbeing, confidence... quality of life”, (national) “profile” (Scotland), “multiculturalism, international cooperation ... cultural exportation” (Finland), and “economic returns and employment” (Ireland). These claims can be summarised into three state uses for culture based around the economic, symbolic (and identity-based) and social needs of societies (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51-55). Accordingly, cultural policy rationales are typologised as market, state, and

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7 Specifically, these cultural uses refer to: job-creation and direct (from cultural events) and indirect (via spill-over spending in cafes/shops etc.) financial returns to the exchequer via the economy; symbolic articulation of the collective image of the nation via national identity; and the promotion of strong communities and social stability via social cohesion.
communicative, the latter in reference to discourses of the public sphere, democracy and social cohesion (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35).

These material accounts of culture’s uses are particularly necessary in relation to a policy area whose domain is constantly shifting and often described with reference to Raymond Williams’ analysis of it as “complicated” and difficult to define (Williams, 1976, p. 87). As such, models of culture can refer to particular ways of living, or the anthropological model of culture (Williams, 1965, p. 57), hierarchically-defined expressive activity associated with the arts, or high culture, and finally, a standard of “perfection”, or the representation of absolute or universal human values (ibid.).

Agreeing on culture, therefore, before any consideration of cultural policy, is value-laden, political and highly contested. This contestation, a priori, means that culture as an area of government activity is notoriously difficult to administer (Bennett, 1998, p. 198), is typically condensed to a more manageable (and less political) high culture interpretation (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 27) and is “impossible to live up to” (Mundy, 2000, p. 9).

The consequence and cause of these difficulties, as suggested by the various social, economic and symbolic applications for culture, are each reflected in definitions of cultural policy (as above) that appear to lack any identifiable or self-evident purpose for the sector. Instead, cultural policy serves both “broader and more specific interests and agendas” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 1) and tends not to be “justified on the grounds that it is a good-in-itself, but rather that it yields other good results” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 326). As a

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8 Communicative is a key Habermasian term concerning the use of free and unforced democratic debate to resolve differences and engage in the public sphere (Habermas, 1987, p. 32) and will be further discussed later in this chapter.

9 For a discussion of the public sphere, see below (1.2.1.1) and Chapter Two (2.5.1).
result, cultural policies’ “desired [policy] outcomes” or “goal-directed” purposes (Jones, 2009, p. 10) rarely concern culture. As a branch of public policy, therefore, which typically demands (and depends for its legitimacy on) a discernable “causal story”, policy problem or public issue which it can be seen to address (Burstein, 1991, p. 331), cultural policy can be understood as lacking.

Although this deficit can be linked to culture’s inherent complexities, the fragmented foundation period and structural differences of European cultural policy have also influenced current models of cultural policy (Quinn, 1998, pp. 97-99), as have changing policy climates and expectations. From the outset, however, these complexities and consequent difficulties within cultural policy have created a policy area that is patently different from other policy sectors, which represent more readily understood or self-evident areas of public and social need. As such, areas like Health, the Economy, or even Education (with which cultural policy is often linked both conceptually and ministerially), speak to more tangible, and, therefore, public or policy issues. These factors raise questions as to why states or governments, ab initio, support culture as an area of administration.

The economic concept of “public good” is often used to answer this question and describes a good that is “available to all”, “indivisible”, “non-excludable” and

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10 There are a number of parallels between culture and education (as demonstrated by the numerous references to education throughout this dissertation), not least of which is the putatively intangible and long-term impact of education, and consequently its approach to case-making and legitimacy-seeking. The Value of the Humanities is one such publication (forthcoming November 2013) by Helen Small, which “provides a critical account of the principal arguments used to defend the value” of education via the Humanities. The book makes the following claims: “that the Humanities study the meaning-making practices of culture, and bring to their work a distinctive understanding of what constitutes knowledge and understanding; that, though useful to society in many ways, they remain laudably at odds with, or at a remove from, instrumental use value; that they contribute to human happiness; that they are a force for democracy; and that they are a good in themselves, to be valued “for their own sake”. Available: http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780199683864.html [Accessed 9 May 2013]. See also Collini (2012).
“produced by the state” rather than the market, in contrast with private goods which are “consumed by choice” and only available to “those who pay for them” (Parsons, 1995, p. 10). These goods are understood as contributing to “well-being” (Moran et al., 2006, p. 635), despite there not necessarily being a public demand for those goods (Frey, 2003, p. 102; Pratt, 2005, p. 37). As such, the concept of “market failure” describes the failure of the market (due to insufficient demand) to supply that public good or commodity (ibid.). The linking of public good and well-being with culture, therefore, describes the value of cultural experiences, which can be enjoyed by many without a diminishment of the experience of others (Galloway and Dunlop, 2006, p. 46). Consequently, this “endangered species approach” to culture (Lewis and Miller, 2003, p. 4) typically frames state cultural intervention and is a common rationale for public policy in general.11

However, the lack of precision around the concept of well-being, together with contestations around the accuracy of these theories (Parsons, 1995, p. 11), render public good and market failure rationales for cultural policies, problematic. The description of public goods in terms of well-being can also be viewed as describing a cultural benefit rather than a purpose for cultural policy, and may conflict with prescribed outcomes such as social cohesion and economic return, while simultaneously disavowing increasingly industrial models of cultural production (and thus its market viability). In light, therefore, of the role of democratic public policy as representative of the public (ibid., pp. 3-4), the lack of a meta rationale for cultural policy and public need that it might be seen to address (consistent with other policy areas), implies a lack of consent and identifiable public mandate. These discrepancies are deeply problematic for cultural

11 For more on this, see (Frey, 2003, pp. 112-114).
policy in relation to its construction and perception by the state and the public, with implications beyond cultural policy itself.

1.2.1.1 The problem of rationale

As a result of these complexities and the low status of culture ministries in government (Vestheim, 2007; Gray and Wingfield, 2010; O’Regan, 2001), therefore, cultural policy is a sector that needs to generate prolific, continuous and renewed accounts of culture’s prescribed purpose, usefulness and value to societies, leading to a state of perpetual and often defensive advocacy. However, over the last thirty years or so, European advocacy campaigns and research projects have led to the development of a highly sophisticated range of narratives that resemble cultural policy causal stories (and consultancies to deliver these stories). These stories detail a wide range of uses for culture on that basis that for some at least, culture is “everybody’s business—a matter for the whole of government” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 28) and, further, that cultural policy is the “mother of democratic policies” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217).

The pressure on cultural policy narratives to perform for the whole of government, be it cognitive development, well-being, social cohesion or economic output, has intensified following the latest global recession and consequent retrenchment of world-wide government budgets. A notable outcome of this difficult financial climate has been the development of policy handbooks designed to arm culture ministers with “arguments” or rationales to use specifically with “Finance and Prime ministers”, in order to situate culture as central to “combating the effects of recession” and “leading the way back to
prosperity” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). In this climate, cultural policy as understood by politicians, has leaned heavily on the arts’ benign symbolic properties and led to claims that are designed to interest both fellow politicians and any electorate seeking tangible uses for culture. This is demonstrated in recent political statements concerning culture’s ability to offer national "relationship marketing" which helps "attract investment” ... and “drive[s] jobs and opportunities here at home” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.); claims that culture helps us be “robust in our advocacy of who we are, what we are, where we have come from and where we are going to” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.); and media reports claiming that a “reputation for cultural creativity is attractive to businesses considering investing” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.).

Similar claims for culture are made through the policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, who respectively claim that culture is the nation’s “‘r and d’ department” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 4); makes regions “dynamic” (Matarasso, 1998, n.p.); contributes to “sustainable economic development”; “arouse[s] interest” in nations (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p 14.); and (again) attracts international investment (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a). Social claims for culture are also made in reports of culture as “essential to societal welfare” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 6), the “prevention of social marginalisation” (ibid, p. 9) and a “key component in defining human identity at individual, community and national level” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.). In addition, though media accounts of culture are generally mixed, tangible accounts of culture’s uses have bled into reports of culture as

12 The following outcomes of cultural activities typically comprise the argument for culture within government: confidence, rebranding, long-term revenue, transforming spaces, social support, employment and worker flexibility, community expression, personal empowerment, and value for money (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). See footnote # 9above.

at the “heart” of “prosperity” (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.), giving a “significant” boost to a country’s economy (McDonald, 2011, n.p.), and “linked to economic productivity and the growth of jobs” (Ward, 2002, n.p.). Given the putatively marginal importance of cultural ministries and their lack of clear mandate or (cultural) policy problem, these discourses provide visible legitimacy, explication, rationales or causal stories for cultural policies.

Nevertheless, although these stories seem to be useful, offer persuasive rationales for publically funded culture and may appear to address or refer to a policy problem (i.e. the economy, or social cohesion), they do not represent a specifically cultural policy problem in the same way as other policies (who represent identifiable problems suggested by their domain). In addition, by attaching cultural policy objectives to “other [non-cultural] policy objectives” (Gray, 2002, p. 88), this practice raises questions as to whether these agendas might be better served by other dedicated policy portfolios (e.g. economic development or environment) and in relation to the eponymous role of the culture ministry. As such, the process of cultural attachment reflects a confusion underpinning cultural policies and has led to claims that cultural policy may a “victim of its own success” (O’Regan, 2001, p.1).

Equally, while policy arguments for culture are primarily directed at central government to assure the status or budget of the culture ministry, these arguments also target agencies funded by government (i.e. Arts Councils who are accountable to central government), the public (by way of an explanation for cultural policy) and the cultural sector seeking funding. These discourses, therefore, can result in implicit pressures on cultural agencies and practitioners to either deliver the economic and social benefits
referred to in those policies, or to appear to, via arguments made in funding applications, reports and evaluations, and thus can generate a cynicism. This dissertation will argue that these pressures have implications for the relationships between the stakeholders of cultural policy.

1.2.1.2 Culture, use value, rationalism and legitimacy

Nevertheless, accounts of culture’s uses can also be linked to a number of other factors, both historic and contemporary. Historically, culture has always been used strategically (and thus politically) by ruling elites, from ancient religious and monarchical administrations, to later emerging nation-states (McGuigan, 1996; Yúdice, n.d.). This was explicitly demonstrated after the founding of European cultural policies post-World War II, in the attempt to rebuild the democratic concept of Europe through the ideological\(^{14}\) use of abstract art as a symbolic “bulwark against totalitarian leanings” (Rosler, 2010, p. 10) associated with the Cold War (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51). More recently, narratives of culture’s usefulness takes place in the context of increasing pressures and demands for policy accountability that followed the European recessions of the 1970s and 1980s (Bianchini, 1993; Quinn, 1998), as well as a general increase in the professionalisation and articulacy of the cultural sector.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{14}\) Karl Marx has described ideology as based on the relations of production in society, where the “ideas of the ruling class [which] are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx and Engels, 1970, p. 64). Ideologists, therefore, have control over both material and “mental production” (ibid.) and express their “dominant idea” as “an ‘eternal law’” (ibid., p. 65). For Antonio Gramsci, ideology was “everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly” (Gramsci, 1985, p. 389) and always concerns the production of relations of domination and subordination. Ideology is strongly associated with hegemonies of various kinds and in capitalism, typically denotes liberalism, social democracy and neoliberalism.

\(^{15}\) Though there are potentially many definitions of the cultural sector, it has been described as a “rich, mixed economy, of large [culture-based] organisations with international horizons and commercial aims, through to amateur institutions with a more local focus” (Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2010, p. 5).
The narrative of culture’s use in society, however, takes place in the context of a historical continuum of moralising discourses on whether culture is good ("tonic") or bad ("poison") for us (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 33). More specifically, these accounts comprise a hierarchical and territorial “struggle” between competing discourses (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that has been taking place since the 17th and 18th centuries and concerns whether culture should have a use in the first place (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006). The essential imperative behind these discourses was the forging of hierarchical, economic and social distinctions between different types of cultural producers (namely artists and artisans) and was led by both cultural producers (artists) seeking increased status and remuneration (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145) and by those consuming their products (i.e. critics and the wealthy) (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, pp. 118 – 120).

The result of these dialectical debates is a binary discourse or dualism around culture, particularly encapsulated in 18th century social and cultural movements. These movements have had a lasting effect on the discourses of cultural policy and consist of representations of culture as either the soul of the nation (and thus not for sale), rejecting the notion of it having any particular function (Arendt, 1961, p. 200; Moylan, 2010, n.p.), and associated with the moral and aesthetic values of the Romantic movement, or a useful and adaptable commodity, concerned with its various uses.

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16 Belfiore and Bennett have identified nine historic improving and disimproving instrumental discourses in cultural policy (though some can represent both). Disimproving discourses include: corruption, distraction and political instrument. Improving discourses include: catharsis, personal well-being, education (and self-development), and moral improvement (and civilisation) (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006).

17 Dualism is a theory based on two opposing or distinct concepts or principles which represent a binary opposition. It is closely associated with 17th century philosopher René Descartes, whose Cartesian Dualism, represented a theory of the mind and body as one entity that is radically divided, such that a person is a “thing which thinks” (Descartes, 1960, p. 84) and bodies are “not properly known by the senses nor by the faculty of the imagination, but by the understanding alone” (ibid., pp. 90 – 91).
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b; Moylan, 2010) associated with the *Utilitarian* tradition.

The central tension or dualism enshrined by historic and contemporary valuations of culture in cultural policy discourses, therefore, is the question of how culture should be valued. This tension translates as the proposition that culture should be valued and therefore funded on its *own* cultural merits (or intrinsically) and counter propositions based around the need for the funding of culture to be based on the usefulness of culture (or extrinsically) in relation to its *non-cultural merits*. This latter proposal, though charged in relation to interpretations of non-cultural, is fundamentally based on the view that publicly-funded culture should be useful or *instrumental* to societies in a way that is accountable, identifiable and putatively reasonable to the taxpayer. The dichotomy and delicate balance of interests within cultural policy, therefore, has serious implications for how it generates trust, and can be described as comprising *cultural value* (Holden, 2006). The concept of cultural value essentially describes the reconciling of *needs* between “everyone involved” in cultural policy, including the public who pays for it, the government who administers it (and seeks quantifiable accountability), and the cultural sector, or the *stakeholders* of cultural policy (*ibid.*, p. 59). The permutations of these dichotomies will be further discussed in Chapter Four.

As the citations above have shown, in recent decades, the appeal of use-based or utilitarian models of cultural policy (as demonstrated above), where culture is used as an “instrument to achieve certain goals” (Vuyk, 2010, p. 178) in typically “non-arts [non cultural] areas” (McCarthy, Ondaatje and Zakaras, 2005, p. 3), has become known as *cultural instrumentalism*. Although this term has been critiqued as redundant in policy
terms – as it is claimed that all policy seeks an outcome (Gray, 2007, p 205), it remains a key concept in European cultural policy analysis and originates from these resistant and historical use/non-use discourses, and as such, attempts to describe the values of culture. By offering a tangible use or reason for culture, cultural instrumentalism can be seen as responding to culture’s apparent *uselessness* as a policy sector and thus its potential policy vacuum. Nevertheless, cultural instrumentalism is also a response to wider policy rationalisms, or modes of public policy efficiencies which involve the application of reason and technique (such as culture) to address *societal* problems, which, its critics claim (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397), obfuscates the root cause of those problems (such as urban development). Rationalism, therefore, is a key component of instrumentalism.

Rationality can be understood as “purposive” actions “directed at realising the *goals of expressed values*” (Parsons, 1995, p. 278), and thus focuses on outcomes rather than processes. The concept of rationalism has also been linked to the conflation of public and private interests associated with liberal democracies (represented by many EU countries), and a view of the market as a self-evident “public [rather than private] good” (Held, 2006, p. 76). As a result, rationalism is also associated with utilitarianism and capitalism’s attempt to “control ... nature” through “technical rules” (Habermas, 1973, p. 9) and has “less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects *acquire and use knowledge*” (ibid., 1984, p. 8). This particular theory of rationality is held by philosopher, sociologist and critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, whose work essentially concerns the use of reason and what makes laws or governing systems legitimate, rather than simply legally or coercively enforced. In Habermas’s view, means-end rationalism constitutes a form of “*instrumental reason*” (ibid, p. 366)
and leads to problems of administration and social trust, as well as problems with legitimacy (Habermas, 1973, p. 46).

However, Habermas sees reason as double-edged, having the potential to be technical (instrumental) and destructive, but also democratic and offering the possibility of “reconciliation and freedom” through “communicative action” (ibid., 1987, p. 1). As such, in contrast with means-end/instrumental reason, “communicative rationality” is geared towards “unconstrained mutual understanding among individuals” (ibid., p. 2) and is borne out of socio-cultural systems that enable the necessary “cultural reproduction of life” and make claims to “truth” on which healthy societies depend (ibid., 1973, p. 5). The positive basis for communicative reason comprises an ideal theory of how we should act based on a rational debate designed to generate a “ritually secured, basic normative agreement” in society (ibid., 1987, p. 2). The imperatives driving both instrumental and communicative reason in general (and in policy) are known as the political-economic system or steering media (representing the economy and electoral system) and the socio-cultural lifeworld (representing society and culture) (ibid., p. 113) and will be further discussed in Chapter Two.

Habermas’s concept of the public sphere (that arises out of civil society)\(^{18}\) is also linked to policy and discourse. The public sphere is where communicative action and discourse ethics are practiced through the process of deliberative democracy,\(^ {19}\) and represents the

\(^{18}\) Though considered “an almost purely Western concept” (Spurk, 2010, p. 8), civil society can be described as “a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state, political, private, and economic spheres”, despite permeable boundaries (ibid., p. 7), giving rise to the public sphere. It is generally understood to refer to voluntary associations and normative ideas of the “good society”, as well as legitimacy, as much as describing a social process of coming together (ibid., pp 20-21). In cultural policy discourse, as Chapter Five will demonstrate, in addition to the public sphere, it is associated with democracy and citizenship.

\(^{19}\) Deliberative democracy is concerned with “enhancing the nature and form of political participation, not just increasing it for its own sake” (Held, 2006, p. 232).
point at which the “sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas, 1989, p. 27) without the pressures of the state or the economy. While Chapter Two (2.5) will outline the idealised and thus contested nature of the public sphere (Fraser, 1990, p. 58), concepts such as the lifeworld, system and public sphere help to analyse the driving forces, competition and impact of cultural policy discourses on legitimacy or trust in the state.

As such, Habermas’s concept of legitimacy (Habermas, 1973) has become increasingly important in policy studies (Parsons, 1995, pp. 53 – 54) and government stability (Held, 2006, pp. 191 – 195), and is central to thinking through the function of discourse and reason in policy. Of critical importance in considering legitimacy in cultural policy, is Habermas’s view that the *a priori* need for legitimacy (and why crises are endemic to modern states) arises out of the dependence of the modern state on the (private) economy, which does not necessarily work in the public interest (Habermas, 1973, p. 13). Further, Habermas views the “goal values” of the state and the economy as essentially “irreconcilable” and therefore in need of legitimation to the public (*ibid.*). To Habermas, trust is generated through the lifeworld and activities such as policy-making, which symbolically communicates the reason of the state (relationship to the economy or to society) to the electorate (Parsons, 1995, p. 178).

This theory of legitimacy suggests that cultural policy both generates trust for (legitimates) the state *and* depends on trust for its own longevity in government. Since this theory also depends on reason, cultural policy’s claims for legitimacy are embodied in its use of reason or through its various discourses, which (as suggested), are typically social, economic, and symbolic. To generate legitimacy, therefore, these discourses
must reflect, or appear to reflect the value systems of the electorate. For this reason, cultural policy discourses deserve particular attention if cultural policy and the state are to be held to account or made “subject to public validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336). Consequently, the theory of legitimacy is central to considering what is at stake where there are competing claims and reasonings in policy discourses. Equally, given the crisis-driven nature of the capitalist state (Habermas, 1973) and the low status of cultural policy, legitimacy is a basis on which to evaluate the core goals of all policy discourse. However, this competition between claims in policy discourses can lead to the domination of socio-cultural or lifeworld values by political-economic or system values and can take the form of a colonisation (Habermas, 1987, p. 318).

In light of the close relationship between the state and the market (on whom it depends for taxes), and consequently discourses of culture’s usefulness (to the economy and/or social cohesion), the importance of rationality, reason, knowledge and cultural instrumentalism in policy, can be linked to the prospect of colonisation. This situation suggests negative consequences for both cultural policy and the state and will be expanded on in Chapter Seven. There are other concepts, however, with which to consider discourse and claims to legitimacy, and in particular, the work of philosopher Michel Foucault.

Though Foucault’s philosophical position differs to Habermas’s and will be dealt with in Chapter Two (2.5), his theory of discourse formation has become central to policy analysis. Foucault’s theory of “discourse formation” is essentially concerned with identifying the sources and contingencies of political power (and thus legitimacy) in discourse (Foucault, 1972, p. 34). Since cultural policy is concerned with legitimacy-
creation or claims upon the “truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) as much as communicating plans for government action (Parsons, 1995, p. 178) or practising the use of reason (as above), Foucault’s interest in discourse and the history of ideas helps interpret the imperatives, pressures and particularly, dependencies of policy discourse.

Discourse formation theory also helps to consider the use of discourse to assert who has the right to speak (Foucault, 1972, p. 55) and thus posits discourse as an inherently political and non-consensual activity that is dominating, self-sustaining and legitimates power-systems (Foucault, 1980, p. 81). Crucially, however, and in contrast with Habermas, Foucault presents discourse as data to be analysed rather than judged and “avoid[s]” being involved in arguments about whether discourse is “true”, or even whether “statements make sense” (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv).

In that sense, Foucault’s work offers an “interpretation” of data (ibid., p. xxvi) rather than a Habermasian judgment on either the process (of discourse ethics) or the implications of different positions. From the point of view of both Foucault and Habermas, therefore, policy legitimation is inescapable and domineering (Foucault, 1972), but necessary (Habermas, 1973) and thus a complex property of discourse. In this respect, Foucault’s work is used to identify and interpret the object of the research (i.e. discourse), rather than evaluate the impacts of discourse via the balancing of political/economic (system) and socio-cultural (lifeworld) mandates, as Chapter Two (2.5) will outline. One of the most useful and legitimising cultural strategies and uses of reason in public policy over the last four decades, and one that offers both social and economic benefits, are paradigms based on culture, urban development and regeneration.
1.2.2 The creative city: key principles and modes of justification

Though originating within urban and industrial policies, the last thirty years have seen urban development discourses become a central cultural policy narrative, rationality or claim in relation to culture’s usefulness and legitimacy within society. Specifically, these discourses have highlighted urban development, social and economic regeneration and increased private sector investment as linked to cities’ investments into culture. One of the most successful of these paradigms is the creative city movement (hereafter called the creative city), an international discourse of development and regeneration based on research findings from the 1980s (IFACCA, 2006, p. 7; Mulcahy, 2006, p. 326). Though primarily an urban paradigm, the creative city model of urban development operates across local, regional and national levels and has an international reach that spans Europe, North America and Asia where it has been benignly interpreted by city authorities and municipalities, as well as by cultural policymakers (Røyseng, 2008, p. 3).

While there is no one model, the creative city is essentially concerned with a theory of creativity as “the principal driving force in the growth and development of cities, regions and nations” (Florida, 2005, p. 1) on the basis that “place has become the central organising unit of our time” (ibid., 2002, p. 6). Through place-development, the core aim of the paradigm is to “pursue a collective vision of a better and more prosperous future for all” (ibid., p. xxx). By linking the attraction of creative workers (and therefore work) and business to the importance and individuality of place and development, using creative and cultural (amenities and regeneration) strategies (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002), the creative city places culture and individuality of place as pivotal to (economically) successful cities.
The discourse of the creative city, essentially inverts an “older corporate-centred system” focusing on attracting businesses to cities in pursuit of jobs, to a “people-driven one” focusing on workers (Florida, 2002, p. 6). Specifically, the creative city proposes that by attracting and nurturing flexible, highly skilled and mobile creative workers with high levels of human capital, known as the creative classes (Florida, 2002; 2005), which can be done through developing cultural and recreational amenities and an open and diverse environment, cities can attract major international companies and investment (Landry, 2000, p. 31; Florida, 2005, p. 99). Instead of attracting investment as a starting point therefore, creative workers must be attracted (through the right kind of cultural amenities), following which investment, community development and economic and social regeneration will take place (Comedia, 1991, p. 31; Florida, 2002, pp. 281-282). The creative city, therefore, involves a claim about culture and creativity (attracting workers and businesses), and a claim about the economy (the result of businesses investing in cities).

As a result of the confluence of cultural and economic imperatives, the paradigm has become “entangled” (Oakley, 2009a, p. 1) within a range of dominant and powerful political, economic, social, urban and cultural discourses, dominated by capitalism, as well as cultural sociology and post-industrial theory (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292). The authority conferred on the creative city through these discourses rests on the bridging of hard (and therefore rational or economic), and soft characteristics or the “soft power”

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20Human capital is the “knowledge, attitudes, and skills that are developed and valued primarily for their economically productive potential” (Baptiste, 2001, p. 184).

21The term post-industrial has passed into “common currency” (Bell, 1999, p. ix), and was coined by Daniel Bell in his seminal publication The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society. It describes the change from manufacturing to service industries, the dominance of professional employment, the decline of skilled and semi-skilled workers, the rise of meritocracies, the importance of financial and human capital, technology and “intellectual technology”, predicated on the “codification of theoretical knowledge and the new relation of science to technology” (ibid., p. xiv).
associated with culture (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.), legitimating and satisfying various constituencies in the process. Of paramount importance in the success of the paradigm is the meta or organising principle of capitalism and the market, central to many European economic policies. These capitalist/market discourses comprise narratives of: post-industrialism and the knowledge economy, or the “shift in class power from owners of capital to possessors of knowledge” (Garnham, 2001, n.p.); subsets of the knowledge economy such as the digital, weightless, new, and in particular, the creative economy “drawing together the spheres of innovation [technological creativity], business [economic creativity] and culture [artistic and cultural creativity]” (Florida, 2002, p. 201). Other discourses embedded throughout the creative city have achieved a significant degree of currency (and thus power) in contemporary policy, including: entrepreneurialism, one of the “fantasies of economic discourse” (Spicer and Jones, 2005, p. 19); innovation, a “watchword for post-industrial economies” (Cunningham, 2010, p. 20); and, in particular, the “rising cult” of creativity (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 558).

In addition to capitalism, these discourses are situated within the master framework of neoliberalism, a key concept in contemporary cultural policy scholarship. Neoliberalism is defined as a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). The concept or ideology of neoliberalism was coined by management consultant Peter Drucker in the 1960s (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 66). The knowledge economy describes knowledge-intensive industries predicated on the transfer and trade of intangibles such as information and knowledge, and is dependent on sophisticated societies (usually bigger cities) with high levels of education or human capital. Creative cities are claimed to be “cities of the knowledge economy”. Available: http://creativecities.britishcouncil.org/ [Accessed 15 January 2013].
has been linked to a number of phenomena and discourses of the advanced or late capitalism\textsuperscript{23} of the West, including: the flexible and transient organisation of production, labour and accumulation in capitalist societies (Harvey, 1989); competition; low taxation; place-promotion; consumer choice; entrepreneurialism; a casual labour market; and, crucially, a self-justifying, legitimising, and self-perpetuating “ethic” (Thompson, 2005, p. 23).

As a result of being positioned within this ideological framework, the creative city is as critiqued as it is successful, and as such has been described as: a neoliberal model of development (Peck, 2005) which uses flawed methodologies (Glaeser, 2005); an urban paradigm that reinforces social inequalities by privileging the professional classes (Peck, 2005); and that it is more concerned with understanding the “indicative conditions favourable to the creation of urban economic growth than it is in providing a critical appreciation of them” (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835). In addition, artists are divided in their opinion on the creative city, with some viewing it as a supportive and benign rationale for culture and creativity (Markusen, 2006, p. 1935), and others protesting against its inequitable and private urban development focus, paid for by publicly-funded cities (\textit{Not In Our Name} and the \textit{Creative Class Struggle})\textsuperscript{24} as will be detailed in Chapter Three (3.11).

\textsuperscript{23} Late or advanced capitalism is the subject of much of Habermas’s work and concerns “an organized or state-regulated capitalism” attributed to the “advanced stage of the accumulation process” (Habermas, 1973, p. 33). It involves the “process of economic concentration” or national and multinational corporations and the “organization of markets for goods, capital and labor”, the state intervening in the market as “functional gaps develop” and the “partial replacement of the market mechanism by state intervention” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{24} The Hamburg-based artists group, Not in Our Name, aimed to counteract gentrification and other creative class policies in Hamburg. Available: nionhh.wordpress.com/about [Accessed 1 March 2013] and http://www.signandsight.com/features/1961.html [Accessed 21 November 2012]. Similarly, the Toronto-based group, Creative Class Struggle, describe themselves as a “collective who are organizing a campaign challenging the presence of Richard Florida and the Martin Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto, as well as the wider policies and practices they represent.” Available:
The question of the beneficiaries and imperatives of tax-sponsored urban development initiatives (like the creative city) is another key source of unease (Harvey, 1989; Rosler, 2011a). Specifically, over the last thirty years in Europe, the close relationship between democratic municipalities (or the state), the private sector and large-scale urban development and investment, has largely been fostered by liberal democratic (and neoliberal) regimes of public/private partnerships. Given the careful balancing of private with public interests as a founding principle of policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 8 - 12) and a core characteristic (if often unrealised) of democracy (Held, 2006, p. 275), the prevalent role and contingency of the creative city on the private sector, is a major source of criticism. Links between cultural policies and urban development narratives, therefore, have implications beyond artists and culture, potentially highlighting underlying issues within the state and models of democracy. These issues will be further discussed in Chapters Three and, in relation to their implications, Chapter Seven.

Nevertheless, after three decades, the paradigm of the creative city remains a hugely successful and influential discourse of urban development that is “deeply embedded” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 75) and has had a “significant” impact on policymakers (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835). In its bridging of different concerns, the paradigm can be viewed as operating between industrial policy, and, through its positioning of culture and creativity, implicit cultural policy (e.g. cultural planning), with whom, it has been claimed, it shares “much the same logic” (Dowler, 2004, p. 26). Similarities between the strategic nature of the creative city paradigm and of cultural policy have also been highlighted in claims of confusion between cultural and creative

http://creativeclassstruggle.wordpress.com [Accessed 25 January 2010]. See also Chapter 5 (section 5.4) for reference to a similar Finnish group.  
25 Cultural planning has been defined as “the strategic use of cultural resources for the integrated development of cities, regions and countries” (DMU, cited in Evans, 2001, p. 7).
city strategies (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 68). As a result, notwithstanding opposition from certain artists’ groups (cited above), the creative city has been welcomed by many cultural practitioners “because they feel it makes them visible” (Lloyd, cited in Oakley, 2009a, p. 4) by appearing to place culture at the heart of influential debates about society and development.

The creative city, therefore, can be viewed as a significant source of reason and legitimation in cultural discourses, increasing the profile of culture, and suggesting tangible economic outputs and outcomes, indicative of democratic, accountable and efficient public returns. Similarly, the creative city provides a counterpoint to potentially obscure debates about culture’s innate or intrinsic values (via discourses of the arts) and thus rebuffs potential accusations of elitism. Further, the creative city fits the meta economic rationale of democratic capitalism and the market-justifying ethic of liberal democracies, giving it political legitimation and making it a persuasive cultural story that addresses a policy sector which does not meet an identifiable or visible public need. For that reason, although primarily situated within urban policy, the creative city appears to embody a constructive and useful rationale for not only local or urban cultural policies, but national cultural policies in general.

1.3 Rationale for thesis

Considering the similarities (claims to truth and strategic uses for culture), shared contingencies (the economy and state) and thus the legitimating role for the creative city within cultural policy, there has been little attempt to comprehensively analyse the two concepts in respect of each other to date. This neglect is surprising given the potential for rich exploration that the creative city affords cultural policy in relation to the role of
narrative, strategy, advocacy and obfuscation in policy discourses, and the tension between legitimacy and discourses of culture and utility. Although there has been a broad (and short) critique of the creative city in respect of cultural policy (McGuigan, 2009), creativity, the creative economy (Oakley, 2004; O’Connor, 2007; Holden, 2007; Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008; Oakley, 2009a; Creative Metropoles, 2010; etc.), culture-led regeneration, cultural policy and economics (Rosler, 2010; 2011a; 2011b), various accounts of the creative city in respect of culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2007; Oudenampsen, 2008; McGuigan, 2009; Oakley, 2009a; Vickery, 2011) and from a social science/geography perspective, there is a dearth of research that focuses in detail on the wider implications of the creative city for cultural policy specifically.

More specifically, interpreting the literatures, conceptual dependencies, trajectories and rationales of both cultural policy and the creative city, through discourse, can shed light on key questions for cultural policy, including: difficulties with establishing its meta rationale; the pressures on cultural policy in relation to the arguments and cases it makes for culture; the dualism or contested nature of culture; and the role and potential of utilitarian and private sector discourses to boost or legitimate cultural policy, as well as to potentially undermine it and the state. In short, the stakes at play in this research comprise: clarity over the role of cultural policy and the status of culture ministries, the relationship between cultural policy stakeholders who generate and are impacted by discourses, the impact of value systems embedded in certain models of culture (as proposed through discourse) and the balance of public/private interests in liberal democratic states.

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26 Some of the most influential social sciences texts are generated by British geographer Jamie Peck. See Peck (2007; 2005; 2009; Peck, and Tickell, 2002).
Equally, though the consideration of discourse as a methodology in public policy is an established influence on the policy sciences (Parsons, 1995, p. 151), and a scholarly area of interest in public policy generally (Shapiro, 1990; Cataldi, 2004; Jones, 2009), the use of discourse as a tool to create understanding around cultural policy in particular, is an emerging field of endeavour (Barbieri, 2012). The creative city and discourse theories, therefore, respectively offer a useful perspective from which to analyse cultural policy and contribute to a growing area of cultural policy enquiry.

Having outlined the conceptual relationship between cultural policy and the creative city and what might be gained from exploring both in relation to the other in terms of discourse, it remains necessary to outline the core contributions of this thesis to cultural policy studies.

1.4 Contributions of this thesis to the field of study

This dissertation aims to create knowledge in cultural policy by creating new understandings of an under-theorised relationship between it and the creative city paradigm, using an emerging method of investigation in cultural policy, specifically that of discourse theory. In order to do this, the research will apply these under-used (Foucauldian) methods with new (Peter Sloterdijk's concept of cynical reason) and established (Habermasian) concepts, which will allow for an original comparison and analysis of cultural policy and the creative city. The research will move beyond a broad analysis of key culture and cultural policy histories as outlined in this introduction, drawing on discourse as a shared source of meaning-production and legitimacy-creation within the two paradigms.
Specifically, this research will use the creative city paradigm to build an argument that there is a relative lack of clarity around cultural policy as an area of public policy despite a plethora of stories of culture’s uses; that instrumental discourses such as the creative city seem to reflect the pragmatic and often involuntary nature of policy making and may impact on cultural policy stakeholder relationships; that instrumentalism is endemic to cultural policy and can reveal its deficits; and that the consequences of instrumentalism may be problematic, not only for cultural policy, but also the state. In order to analyse these paradigms and what they can reveal about policy, the state and the market, therefore, the thesis will first draw on Foucault’s discourse formation theory (Foucault, 1972) and then call on discrete applications of Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, system, colonisation and legitimacy (Habermas, 1973, 1984, 1987) and Sloterdijk’s theory of cynical reason (1987).

1.5 Summary of chapters

Following this introduction, Chapter Two will consider the methodological framework used to approach the research question, and outline why the research is located within cultural policy studies, and is conducted using key concepts and methods from Foucault (establishing the object of investigation: discourse) and Habermas (analysing the impact of the investigation). This chapter will also detail the selection of text-based national cultural policies in Scotland, Finland and Ireland as situated cases, as well as looking at reflexive issues bearing on the research. Chapter Three offers a more detailed overview of the creative city paradigm, including its models, perceptions, applications, authors, key concepts and discursive histories. This chapter also outlines the emergence of the creative city as a major urban development discourse of the 21st century, its flexibility
of interpretation, and the particular role of persuasion within it, including the implicit and explicit presence of the private sector.

Chapter Four locates the research in the context of the key literatures and discourses of culture, creativity and cultural policy, looking at contested concepts, value-systems, rationalisms, histories, definitions, applications (including policy studies and governance) and critically, their intersections and links. This chapter will take a detailed look at how the contested and complex nature of culture creates difficulties for cultural policies and their definitions, and leads to instrumentalism and legitimation narratives, which manifest in multiple cultural rationales. Following this, the chapter will also outline the relatively recent economic discourse of creativity, posited as part of the discursive success of the creative city, and which, it is claimed, acts as a bridging discourse between the economic and industrial creative city and the putatively cultural concerns of cultural policy. The chapter will conclude with a detailed overview of policy in general and cultural policy in particular.

Chapter Five describes the national cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland through the policy frame of the creative city, in order to ground the research in specific contexts and locations. Specifically, this Chapter involves an overview of urban development and marketing initiatives in Scotland, showing how creative city discourse occurs there as part of wider creative economy and nationalist legitimising (championing uniqueness) discourses, focusing on place-development, success, triumphalism and competition. Similarly, the creative city concept in Finland is posited as supporting Finland’s need to bridge its social democratic legacies with its newer industrial and neoliberal policies, focusing on internationalism, cosmopolitanism,
diversity, tolerance, talent and the creative industries. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that Ireland, despite geo-political similarities to Scotland and Finland, does not show the same level of creative city discursive transfer, though it does position culture as a competitive branding and re-branding tool for the country.

Chapter Six analyses the discourses of the three cases with reference to discourse formation theory, looking at how and why this transfer has occurred. This chapter specifically constructs a series of conclusions about the trajectory of the discourse transfer that has occurred between the creative city and cultural policy and offers suggestions as to the sustainability of the creative city within cultural policy, touching on the role of cynicism in policy relationships. Following this, the chapter considers why the creative city has become embedded within the particular context of the three cases and more generally within cultural policy. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the role and appeal of an instrumental discourse such as the creative city in respect of policymakers more widely.

Chapter Seven addresses the impact and implications of the creative city for cultural policy and what it reveals about the state, using Habermas’s concepts of lifeworld, system, colonisation and legitimacy. Specifically, this chapter reveals the state of contemporary cultural policies by considering the longer-term issues of instrumentalism in the context of problematics and tensions already within cultural policy, and, in particular, a lack of clarity over what it is designed to achieve. This leads to a discussion of the potential for cultural policy to be perpetually dominated or colonised by instrumental discourses, implications for legitimacy and the various ironies and paradoxes this represents. The chapter further shows how colonisation embodies and
underlines key criticisms of liberal democratic policies, as well as core democratic principles. The research reaches its conclusion in Chapter Eight, with a summary of the main outcomes, reiterating the contributions to knowledge, and including a consideration of future directions arising from the research. The dissertation finishes with a short reflection on the research experience and points to remaining questions suggested by the dissertation.

1.6 Conclusions
This introduction has identified difficulties and pressures within, as well as various uses for cultural policy resulting from the complex and political nature of culture. As a result of these difficulties (within cultural policy and in respect of culture), this chapter has posited that there are problems identifying the purpose of cultural policy, and thus that there is an enduring role for advocacy, persuasion and narrative within it, raising the prospect of issues around trust in relation to argumentation and advocacy amongst its key stakeholders. This chapter has also established the imperatives and contingencies of legitimising discourses in cultural policy such as the urban policy paradigm of the creative city, which can operate as an identifiable rationale and strategy for cultural investment. Finally, the case was made that research needs to look more closely at cultural policy discourses, rationales and instrumentalism in general, in order to understand the function of culture within the state, but also the nature of wider state activity. In order to consider the relationship between the creative city paradigm as a justification and legitimation of investment in culture and cultural policy, the next chapter will consider how this question will be interpreted, approached and designed, the theoretical framework drawn upon to deepen the analysis of the thesis, and in particular, the basis for claims to knowledge about this issue.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One has outlined that this research concerns an analysis of the relationship between the general field of explicit cultural policy and the specific mode of urban development known as the creative city, through a comparative study of national policy texts and environments. It has proposed that an investigation of the discourses of cultural policy, via the discourses of the creative city, can help investigate the operations, political imperatives, pressures and constituencies of cultural policy and the state itself. In order to consider this relationship, the research proposes to look at the historical and familial links between cultural policy and the creative city in general, followed by an analysis of situated cultural policies in particular, and finish with an investigation of what this means for cultural policy and the state.

To contextualise the research question, the thesis has posited a reflexive relationship between the richness and malleability of culture, historic ruling-class uses for culture (and latterly explicit cultural ‘policies’), and confusion over the greater purpose or a priori aims of cultural policy as an arm of government. The stakes at play in this investigation, therefore, rest on: the pressures at work in determining and clarifying or obfuscating what cultural policy is for (the transparency of cultural policy); the impact of these pressures on the legitimacy, possibilities and status of cultural policy and its ministries; the effect of this on the communication and transparency of relationships between stakeholders of cultural policy; the impact of this on the diversity of cultural forms supported by the state (in particular the support of experimental cultural forms), and the stability, legitimacy and transparency of the state itself.
Having established the context and stakes in relation to the research question, this chapter will address the research’s methodological foundation, ontological approach and epistemology. In order to do this, the chapter will outline the main method of enquiry, the academic context in which the research is conducted and specifically, the approach to establishing the object (via Foucault’s discourse theories), analysis and implications (via Habermasian concepts) of the enquiry. In doing this, the chapter will describe and evaluate the broader conceptual framework of the research, outlining the discrete uses of Foucault and Habermas in the research and the rationale for that use. The chapter will conclude by detailing the research design and reasons behind selecting the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland and address key issues of reflexivity in the research.

2.2 Qualitative approach and interpretivism

The ontological approach of this dissertation, concerning the \textit{a priori} research assumptions around the “nature [and constitution] of the social world” (Seale, 2004, p. 294), or “what can be said to exist” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 508), is determined by its emphasis on the interpretation and construction of cultural policy texts and discourses rather than the building of empirical and measurable evidence or facts. The decision to analyse cultural policy words and actions in this work, therefore, disavows a positivist, “scientific” and testable objective reality with measurable properties (\textit{ibid.}, p. 80) “which we can know” and are “free of value” (Parsons, 1995, p. 71). As a result, the epistemology of the research is based on a qualitative approach which aims to reveal insights on “culture, society and behaviour” (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 3), helping to consider how cultural policy discourses “came to take the form they ultimately did” given that they could always be otherwise (\textit{ibid.}). The research, therefore, takes a “multifaceted” approach
(ibid.), drawing on the policy sciences, economic theory, cultural studies and philosophy, lending itself to “thick” or rich description and analysis (Geertz, 1973, cited in Flick, 2002, p. 18). Within this approach, an “interpretivist” method is used, concerned with notions of reality or truths as socially (and never neutrally) constructed through language and shared meanings (Seale, 2004, p. 75), as will be evident in references throughout the policy texts consulted. The research, therefore, fundamentally aims to promote “insight, understanding or dialogue” (Seale, 2004, p. 72) in relation to cultural policy, by generating “theoretical” as opposed to “empirical” knowledges (ibid., p. 76).

2.3 Locating the research: cultural studies and cultural policy studies

Given the interdisciplinary questions of culture, governance (and power), legitimacy, and urban development in determining the relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, the dissertation is situated within cultural studies. Cultural studies is concerned with the “production, circulation, deployment” and “effects” of cultural forms and activities (Bennett, 1998, p. 60) and has claimed for itself a key emancipatory role in academia (McGuigan, 2004, p. 7) in terms of its commitment to “social change” (Threadgold, 2003, n.p.). The key premise of cultural studies and one that is central to policy texts, is that “realities and subjectivities” as well as “power relations” are constructed and contested in and through language, the social and culture and that this activity is characterised by narrativity and thus could always be constructed differently (ibid.). Within the relatively new discipline of cultural studies (Hall, 1980, p. 58), this research is further specified as sitting within the newer interdisciplinary sub-domain of cultural policy studies (Belfiore, 2008, p. 24).
The critical intellectual study of cultural policy as an academic domain, or cultural policy studies, is an equally eclectic discipline to cultural studies (Gray, 2003, p. 1) and is “characterised by a diversity of subjects and research methods”27 which are chiefly framed by the humanities and social sciences. Specifically, cultural policy studies aims to investigate the “underlying theoretical assumptions and ideologies behind cultural policy and management”, eschewing predominantly descriptive, empirical, evidence-based or instrumental approaches (ibid.) Like cultural studies, however, in spite of significant work undertaken over the last thirty years,28 cultural policy studies remains an under-established object of academia (Belfiore, 2008), a factor also indicated by its omission from general policy handbooks consulted throughout this research (e.g. Burstein, 1991; Parsons, 1995; Compston, 2004; Dye, 2008).

A key tension in the study of cultural policy, and thus cultural policy studies, is how cultural policy is constituted as both an academic area of enquiry and as a professional and applied government sector. This gives it an “incorrigibly plural” (Gray, 2010a, p. 226) number of analytical approaches, imperatives and disciplinary identities, which includes: those who research and critique it (scholars); those who explicitly plan, implement and evaluate it (policy makers and politicians under the rubric of the state); those who implicitly make it (expert cultural agencies and other government


departments); those who shape it and are directly impacted by it (cultural practitioners), and critically, those in whose name it is made (the public).

This tension is underlined by criticisms of cultural policy studies as “compromised” by its proximity to the action of government and ungrounded in both history and theory (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 29). Academic legitimacy within (cultural) policy studies, therefore, is prone to ideological contest and “normative” views of the degree to which academics should be involved in such work (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 9). “Disinterest”, or “whether or not benefits [typically financial] are sought from advice [or research]”... or are a “prime motivating force”, in this case, choosing to conduct research (ibid.), is central to the debate over academic objectivity or independence. In contrast to artistic disinterest, concerned with apparently politically and commercially independent culture associated with contemplating art “for its own sake” (Woodmansee, 1984, p. 46), disinterest does not suggest a lack of interest, but rather a critical distance from state imperatives.

This desire for objectivity is particularly resonant in the increasingly “competitive” and “complex” shaping of policy (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 8), leading to assertions that the “single most crucial quality that any critical cultural policy researcher ought to possess is ‘a built-in, shock-proof crap detector’” (Ernest Hemingway paraphrased in Belfiore, 2008, p. 1). The concept of disinterest is also deployed to distance cultural policy studies from cultural policy research, an approach to cultural policy analysis that is viewed as less critically independent, more indebted to the social sciences, more concerned with “evidence” (Scullion and García, 2005, p. 120), and thus more closely
tied to government agendas (ibid., pp. 122-125). However, while a disinterested approach is the academic ideal, it can lead to the “crowding out” and down-grading of academics by non-academics perceived as working on more pertinent, policy-focused or “interested” government research (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 9), a critical issue in a “climate where policy influence is considered a relevant, or even a privileged, criterion for the allocation of research funds” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 25).

In addition, the difficulty with disinterestedness in terms of perceptions of research that is relevant, together with the poor status and funding of cultural policies, is that there is a problem with the concept of independence or objectivity in general, even within academia. This problem involves the tension between advocacy (which cannot claim to be neutral) and research (Selwood, 2002, n.p.) which originates from those seeking and dependent on funding from (interested) central culture ministries. Policy-based evidence (or research), which is concerned with shoe-horning evidence to existing policies, is perceived and decried in academic cultural policy circles as the opposite of disinterested research, and is often indistinguishable from advocacy (in terms of advocating for something). This approach to policy is supported by claims that “cultural statistics largely follow the sphere and focus of operations [as well as finances] of cultural policy” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 9) and that “evidence was [is] far more likely to be used if it fitted [fits] with the story that was [is] already being told” (Stevens, 2011a, n.p.).

In contrast, evidence-based policy is typically posited as the ideal with a stronger claim to independence or disinterestedness, through its putative adherence to objectivity.

29 A cultural policy research approach is consistent with much of the policy work done in Europe (European Commission, 2006a, 2009; Arts Council of Ireland, 2009; Scottish Executive, 2004b; Ministry of Education, 2009c).
However, evidence-based policy is also problematic and ideological on the basis that someone, limited by their own perspective and context, considers particular areas worthy of research or funding and not others. Further, the volume and type of data produced as *evidence* has been viewed as unwieldy and “unsuitable for answering policy questions” (Stevens, 2011a, n.p.). Evidence-based research, therefore, is both suggestive of empirical and scientific measurement, has difficulty with intrinsic (and intangible benefit) cultural discourses and is difficult for policymakers to use. As such, the key issue for this dissertation (situated within cultural policy studies), is to be critical and relevant to “current policy and management practice, but to remain detached from institutional imperatives”\(^\text{30}\) characterised as balancing “dissidence” with institutional “dialogue” (Sterne, 2002, p. 72). These issues also illustrate the apparent lack of academic legitimacy attached to cultural policy studies and the contested and case-making or legitimating nature of cultural research, arising out of the complexities, dependencies and proximity of culture to government (funding).

2.4 Establishing the object of enquiry: discourse approaches

Having established the approach and domain of the research, it is necessary to outline the object of the enquiry, as determined by the work of Michel Foucault. As Chapter One has indicated, though discourse is an important aspect of policy analysis, and though there are exceptions (Barbieri, 2012), discourse formation theory is a relatively under-developed method of investigating cultural policy in particular. This is despite the necessarily political (justifying, persuading, shaping), strategic and contingent character of cultural policy discourses (as posited in Chapter One), and the potential of

\(^{30}\) See The Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at Warwick University [online]. Available: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/theatre_s/ACP/study/phd/ [Accessed 3 October 2012].
“discursive formation” theory (Foucault, 1972, p. 34) to add to deeper understandings of the politics of culture.

This theory of discourse draws on Foucault’s interest in the history of ideas, or the “history of the order imposed on things” (Foucault, 2002, p xxvi), specifically, how knowledge (through discourse) comes to be formed and accepted, and how “new propositions were [are] produced, new facts isolated, or new concepts built up” (ibid., p. xiii). The aim of Foucault’s broad approach is to expose the “fundamental codes of a culture”—“the hierarchy of its practices” and explore “on what basis knowledge and theory became possible” (ibid., p xxii) in the first instance. Foucault, therefore, is interested in revealing what he calls the “positive unconscious of knowledge” that would otherwise “elude” consciousness (ibid., p. xi) and in creating understanding about the “rules” for making discourses appear “coherent and true in general” (ibid., p. iv). In respect of this research, this refers to the emergence of certain policy discourses (i.e. economic) over others (social or cultural).

This theory of discourse is separate to but builds on older forms of linguistic analysis such as structuralism and post-structuralism, concerned with the “role of language in shaping social life” (Filmer et al, 2004, p. 41). Post-structuralism, with which Foucault has sometimes been associated, is specifically interested in the formation of identity and realities through language, but stresses the basis for this as understanding life “not as something composed of identities, objects and subjects, but of difference, complex relations, and instability” (ibid., p. 42). However, Foucault disavows that his work is structuralist or post-structuralist (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv) and wrote of wishing to “free” himself from what he felt was an “inaccurate” label (Foucault, 2002,
This disassociation from structuralism arises out of the sealed or internal nature of its form of analysis, in contrast with the wider discursive connections made through Foucault’s discourse formation theory, which are never “exclusively linguistic” (Filmer et al., 2004, p. 41). Unlike post-structuralism, therefore, discourse formation is more concerned with the institutions, regulations and relations around discourse formations as much as the discourse itself (ibid., p. 41).

### 2.4.1 Discourse formation theory

Drawing on Foucault’s general theory of knowledge, discourse formation theory specifically concerns “statements” (Foucault, 1972, p. 35) or “great uninterrupted text[s]” (ibid., p. 41) which establish the “right” to “claim a field” of knowledge (ibid., p. 29) and comprise and operate from an “enunciative” power (ibid., p. 55). Foucault’s view is that words and ideas are caught up in a “system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences” (ibid., p. 25) and the a priori, assumed or “already-said” (ibid., p. 27). Discursive statements, therefore, operate through and depend on an “interplay of relations within it and outside it” (ibid., p. 32), though these knowledges may be “different in form, and dispersed in time” (ibid., p.35). In this way, discourse formation theory questions the discourse’s “mode of existence, [and] what it means to them to have come into existence” (ibid., p. 123).

The term “dispersion” is used to describe the trajectory of statements within discourse (ibid., p. 41) and is especially important for cultural policy in terms of the series of “uninterrupted” (ibid., p. 41) statements that it hosts (i.e. social cohesion, well-being, the economy) on behalf of broader government policies. The “field of concomitance” is another term within discourse formation and refers to the range of domains or “wider
fields” surrounding its systems of knowledge (ibid., p. 64). Equally, the concept of resistance, or “rupture” in discourse formation, which can be seen in conflicting and dichotomous policy discourses, helps to clarify the meaning of the “interstices” between sentences and demonstrates the transformation between one discourse and another (ibid., p. 36), on the basis that all discourses are always in competition with others.

As such, Foucault’s work centres on the correlative or reflexive construction of knowledge in discourse, given that knowledge cannot exist without discursive practice and that “discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms” (Foucault, 1972, p. 201). Using discourse formation theory, policy can be viewed as a linguistic form of discrete knowledge, whereby “things said say more than themselves” (ibid., p. 123) and meaning and power exist in the “relations between statements” (ibid., p. 34) and thus beyond the statements themselves. In considering cultural policy and the creative city through the framework of discourse formation theory, therefore, it can be inferred that the core discourses of culture, creativity and the economy depend for their authority and existence (and thus legitimacy) on a range of framing or meta discourses, which, it will be demonstrated, depend heavily on utilitarianism, romanticism, neoliberalism and capitalism. This network of relationships can be viewed as strengthening the discourse formation or authority of both cultural policy and the creative city, lending them a universal and assumed character, which comes to resemble “monuments” (ibid., p. 8).

These processes can be described in terms of “archaeology”, the “archive” (Foucault, 1972, p. 148) and “genealogy” (ibid., 1980, p. 83). Archaeology as a linguistic practice concerns an “abandonment of the history of ideas” and an “attempt to create a quite
different history of what men have said” (Foucault, 1972, p 154), rather than why and how they have said it. The process of archaeology, therefore, views “discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive” (ibid., p. 148) and speaks of “monuments” (ibid., p. 155) in reference to the process of sifting through the archive to reveal the gathering of discourse formations and knowledges over time. Archaeology is therefore not “interpretative” (ibid.), but is a “rewriting” of what has already been written (ibid., p 156) and therefore represents a general “methodology” (ibid., 1980, p. 85) and procedure for working through discourses, artefacts and data.

In contrast, Foucault’s later concept of “genealogy” (ibid., p. 83), represents the specific “tactics” (ibid., p.85) used within the methodology to comparatively understand the relation between discourses over time and how and why they are the way they are. This is done by “emancipate[ing] historical knowledges” from “subjection” to the “hierarchical order of power” (ibid., p. 85), leading to a better understanding of knowledge, truth and power. Genealogy, therefore, describes the “origins of a theory and a knowledge” (ibid., p. 78) and helps account for the “struggles” within discourses (or ruptures) and the processes of dispersion and union between “erudite knowledge and local memories” (ibid., p. 83).

However, subsequent discourse theorists have argued that the “causal power” attributed to Foucault’s archaeological method is “unintelligible” in terms of understanding the influence of the social institutions central to Foucault’s’ theory (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxiv), and that it “did not allow Foucault to pursue the range of problems and concerns which informed his work” (ibid., p. xxv). For this reason, genealogy is viewed as an improvement of Foucault’s theory and allows discourse to “thematize the
relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge” (ibid., p. xxv). As such, a broad archaeological approach is taken in this research, but it is Foucault’s genealogy in particular, that provides a way to think through the discourses of cultural policy and the creative city, as Chapter Four will demonstrate.

In summation, by seeking to address the relationship between cultural policy, as a meta body of meaning or discourse, and the creative city, discourse formation theory addresses their wider ecologies, conceptual dependencies, political imperatives and contexts, along with their governmentalities, or rational uses of knowledge and power in shaping behaviours (Foucault, 1994, pp. 201-207). Essentially, therefore, discourse formation theory helps consider “how is it that one particular statement appeared in a discourse rather than another?” (Foucault, 1972, p. 30), the origin of the “silent births” in discourse and why a particular theme might “emigrate” from one discipline to another (ibid., p. 154). In addition, discourse formation theory helps analyse the impact of discourse on “idea formation and, ultimately, on policy formulation” (Cataldi, 2004, p. 67).

2.4.2 Power and discourse

Though the role of knowledge in discourse formation and competing claims for dominance and justification are key to establishing power, Foucault is interested in understanding power, rather than transforming it (Kelly, 1994, p. 373). This is because Foucault views power as a “relation of force”, which is contingent, reflexive, “neither given, nor exchanged” and “only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980, p. 89). For Foucault, therefore, power has productive as well as oppressive potential (in being able to move
from one group to another) and works from the bottom up (Kelly, 1994, p. 374). This view of discourse/power as neither destructive nor constructive, opens up the space to consider cultural policy discourse as harbouring both the potential to do good, and to sustain or legitimate systems of power. There are other aspects of power, however, which Foucault brings to light and which help theorise both cultural policy and the creative city.

These exercises comprise “sovereign” or juridical power (based on an ancient form of power) and “non-sovereign” or disciplinary power, which assures and secures the “cohesion” of the sovereign or the juridical (Foucault, 1980, p. 106). Disciplinary power is both coercive and discipline-forming (ibid., p. 105), takes many forms, is a central feature of legitimating systems such as public policy, and as above, works from the bottom up (Kelly, 1994, p. 374). Cultural policy, conceived as the “management of populations through suggested behaviour” (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 14), is typically understood as a disciplinary power by representing a “collective public subjectivity” (ibid., p. 15). This refers to the incremental shaping of cultural attitudes, opinions and practices through various implicit and explicit government policies and underlines one of the key powers of policy in general and the creative city paradigm in particular and will be expanded on in Chapter Four (4.4.7).

However, though cultural policy and the creative city are disciplinary powers, they also constitute juridical powers in terms of their legal and administrative positions within government, which will be further explored in Chapters Five and Six. As a result, given the correlative relationship between knowledge and power in discourse, both cultural policy and the creative city can be viewed as an “instrument[s]” and “effect[s]” of
power (Richardson, 1996, n.p.), without which the “production, accumulation, circulation and functioning” of “relations of power” or legitimacy-creation in societies could not arise, survive or sustain themselves (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).

The knowledges leveraged by cultural policy and the creative city (post-industrialism, entrepreneurialism, neoliberalism etc.) can also be viewed as “regimes of thought” (ibid., p. 81) and deliberately “positioned truths” (Gray, 2003, p. 183) which confer legitimation on the paradigms. The problem with regimes which are ideological and situated, is that they fossilise and come to “stand for and function as the truth” (Schirato, Danaher and Webb, 2012, p. 17), and as before, become universal “monuments” (Foucault, 1972, p. 8) resistant to change. This resistance leads to “rules of right” which legitimate sovereignty and the consent of people to be governed (Foucault, 1980, p. 93). In Foucault’s view, this results in a highly effective and impervious triangle of power, right and truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) whose main interest is legitimacy and hegemony.

In addition to the influence of Foucault on policy analysis (Parsons, 1995, p. 178), other discourse theorists have developed Foucault’s work and include Paul Rabinow (Drefus and Rabinow, 1983) and Michael Shapiro (Shapiro, 1990), as referred to in this chapter and Chapter One. Shapiro has been particularly astute in relation to articulating the management and purpose of conflicting discourses, which he describes as “strategic containment” (Shapiro, 1990, p.332), concerned with controlling and thus managing “anomalies and contradictions” within ideologies (ibid., p. 333). Shapiro also stresses the ontological position of Foucault in opening up space “for the political analysis of statements” and providing a “strategic view of discourse within a metaphor of political
economy rather than epistemology” (ibid., p. 331). This view of discourse formation theory underlines the usefulness of Foucault to policy analysis in particular. However, the influence of Foucault can also be seen in media discourses, including a recent defence of criticality versus social action (a key point of difference between Foucault and Habermas) in claims that “you need to bring the buried argument out into the open in order to defeat it” (Poole, 2013, n.p.).

2.4.3 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis offers another approach to critically evaluate cultural policy texts and can be used flexibly alongside discourse formation theory. The origins of discourse analysis lie in analytical philosophy (concerned with ridding language of rhetoric to get to the “truth”) and “speech act theory” (concerned with the nature of spoken language), as well as psychoanalysis (O’Rourke, 2009, p. 211) and it has come to be associated with a number of authors (Van Dijk, 1985; Fairclough, 2003; Rose, 2007). As such, like discourse formation theory, discourse analysis treats “language as an object of enquiry” rather than a “neutral medium for communicating information” (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 373), is broadly concerned with “cognition, interaction, society, and culture” (Van Dijk, 1985, p. 10), and posits that language “produces the world as it understands it” (Rose, 2007, p. 143). In this way, discourse analysis constructs an “interpretation rather than revealing the truth” (ibid., p. 168).

The role of “expert language” is key to discourse analysis (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 375), and creates self-evident “justificatory regime[s]” (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002, p. 7) through conveying a “principle of justice” (ibid.) within the discourse. The

31 Scotland’s New Labour discourses of enterprise/competition (representative of neoliberalism) alongside partnership/cooperation discourses from the 1990s (representative of social cohesion) are a good example of this (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128; Hewitt, 2011, p. 33).
identification and analysis of conflicting regimes of thought is another key feature of this policy analysis. These conflicting regimes concern the co-existence of potentially irreconcilable concepts within the same discourse, and again, point to Shapiro’s “strategic containment” (Shapiro, 1990, p.332). This practice which is designed to obfuscate conflict, leads to a “covert semantic relation” between potentially oppositional views, with the “performative” power “to generate particular visions of the world” in order to “sustain or remake the world in their [a particular] image” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 130). This feature can be seen in the various narratives of culture’s uses as described in Chapter One, whereby intrinsic (romantic) value discourses appear to reconcile but operate in tension with extrinsic (utilitarian) value discourses, appealing to two distinct mandates. As indicated in Chapter One, these juxtaposed discourses can also be viewed as a policy dualism (or binary paradigm), and again, reflect the struggles within discourses.

The concept of “nominalising”, or the linguistic process that represents situated ideological concepts, often verbs, as distanciated, abstract, neutral and passive nouns (typically globalisation, enterprise, investment), without origin, agency or actors (ibid., p. 12), is also linked to the impact of expert language. This practice is used to disguise and disable accountability and obscure ideology in discourse (ibid.) and has come to be particularly associated with neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Neoliberalism embodies nominalisation by typically denying its political character and presenting itself as an economic rather than political (and therefore active rather than passive) or ideological model, and frames itself as a “metaregulation” while defining itself as a form of “antiregulation” (ibid., p. 400). Nominalisation is also linked to (Marxist) commodification, and the concept of “reification”, which transforms the social relations
involved in production into quantifiable things (such as money), hiding the nature of those relations in the market in the process (Lukacs, 1923, p. 1).32

The key nominalisation process used in cultural policy and the creative city, however, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, is the neutralisation, or disavowal of origin and abjuration of human agency that results from the co-presentation of particular words and concepts associated with capitalism (the economy, enterprise, competition, globalisation etc.), rather than the transformation of verbs into nouns (also associated with the term). This is demonstrated in (neoliberal) references to “market realities” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. iii), the “new entrepreneurial culture” (European Commission, 2010b, p. 2), the “knowledge-driven labour market” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 10) and the “creativity labour market demand” (ibid., p. 11). These discourses suggest the passive existence of inanimate, de-politicised forces (the market and entrepreneurialism) beyond the control of government, and omit reference to any particular origin, or beneficiary. These discourses also personify the market, distancing it from the state and obscuring its contingent nature and ideologies behind it.

The use and aggregation of passive nouns is also common within the policy texts and typically comprises the juxtaposition of concepts or the co-occurrence or collocation between words (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 3-6). Chapter Five demonstrates the three cases emphases on culture as an attractor for international investment and discourses of globalised competition and investment, linking culture, the creative economy (and creativity/innovation) and competition. Additionally, throughout the cultural policies, culture is posited as a commodity (cultural policy) and is used to promote the movement

32 See Chapter Four (4.2.3.2).
of flexible workers and investment in cities (the creative city) as self-evidently desirable. Again, these juxtapositions nominalise and contain the political character of capitalism and the choices continually being made to support and uphold it.

While discourse analysis is designed to reveal the underlying assumptions and ideologies, as well as power and social relations in discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p. 2), for the purposes of this research, it is particularly useful for categorising the dualisms and nominalisations, as well as structuring the identification and coding of key concepts, vocabularies and patterns within both discursive paradigms (i.e. uses of the term creative, creativity, creative classes etc.). In addition, since interpretations of discourse analysis are “contested” (O’Rourke, 2009, p. 209) and it has no “hard and fast rules” (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 378), models of discourse analysis can be built to suit various research approaches.

Having selected discourse analysis to accompany discourse formation theory as the key modes of analysis, therefore, it may be necessary to explain why other discourse and analytical approaches were not utilised. One of these is content analysis. This form of discourse analysis is from the empiricist and positivist tradition, posing the neutral position of the researcher, and concerned what is said in the text, rather than its relationships outside of the texts, and how it is said, or who says it, or how it is received, aiming to be generalisable and quantitative (Tonkiss, 2004, pp. 368-373).

Equally, critical discourse analysis is another approach which aims to be “transformational” in intention or motivation (Fairclough, 1995, p. 9) and has an overtly political agenda (Threadgold, 2003 n.p.) as well as being normative (Fairclough, 1995, p. 11).
Since this research requires an understanding of the network of relationships and histories that cultural policy has built on, and because this research aims to illuminate areas of enquiry rather than transform the political landscape, neither of these approaches was suitable for this dissertation. Similarly, despite the key concept of the economy and a concern with the creative classes in this research, and despite Habermas’s debt to Marx as a student of the Frankfurt school (Thomassen, 2010, pp. 16-18), the research does not draw on Marxist class analysis, concerned with the “dominant” mode of “those who can gain control of the means of production” (Held, 2006, p. 98). This approach, it was felt, would restrict the variety of perspectives possible through cultural studies. However, in weighing up the benefits and weaknesses of particular approaches, the role of individual preference in choosing one approach over another is central.

To conclude, the selection of discourse analysis and discourse formation theory offers two approaches out of many, but allows the texts to be broken down into their components on the one hand, while creating understanding around the emergence, contingencies, constituencies and subjectivities of the discourses, on the other hand. Discourse analysis specifically helps typologise various discourses within the creative city and cultural policy, identifying its core themes, vocabularies, metaphors, turns of phrase, repetitions and obfuscations, to create a base line of information (i.e., attraction, talent, harnessing etc.) as section 2.6 will demonstrate. This provides the material for, and a counterpoint to, the broader approach of discourse formation which follows, both archaeologically and genealogically. This approach helps to map the environment or context of cultural policy and the creative city and exposes their tensions, pressures, and
interdependencies. In summation, discourse formation theory and discourse analysis are utilised as broad interpretative guides rather than comprehensively applied analytical tools within the cases, working to “uncover [both] the facts” and the “larger political forces at work” (Cataldi, 2004, p. 65) in the discourses.

2.5 Theoretical perspective and conceptual framework

Having established the Foucauldian approach to determining the method of enquiry, it is necessary to outline the theoretical perspectives used to analyse the discourse material and return to the Habermasian concepts introduced in Chapter One. Habermas’s understanding of effective communication centres on his theory of discourse ethics, which are conducted through what he describes as competing “validity” claims within society, and concern an idealised claim based on the “truth”, “sincerity” and “legitimacy” of what is being said (Habermas, 1987, p. 26). To Habermas, therefore, the basis for discourse is not predicated on status, identity or power (ibid., 1989, p. xii), or the hegemonies that Foucault would posit as central to any discourse formation. Given Foucault’s conception of discourse as sui generis strategic and the role of strategy in cultural policy as it is, Habermas’s understanding of discourse as it might be, does not produce the insights needed for this research. The disavowal of discourse ethics, however, does not reject the potential for greater openness and communication in policy, however flawed the basis on which that discussion might take place, and consequently proposes a potentially positive (as well as negative) role for policy, as the later chapters will argue.

Nevertheless, Chapter One outlined other Habermasian concepts which allow the research to consider additional features of the relationship between cultural policy and
the creative city. These concepts are: the role and function of cultural policy as a particular expression of instrumental reason (beyond routine policy rationality concerned with outcome), power and the economy via the state (as representative of the system) and as a space of communication (via the lifeworld), which lends it a legitimacy and allows the state to function (rather than a wholly coercive imperative); the role of culture in creating spaces for debate (via a public sphere, though one that is not necessarily based on consensus); the tendency of cultural policy to be dominated by stronger policy areas and government agendas (colonisation); the blurring of public and private interests in cultural discourses (colonisation); and again, the impact of these on the authority of, and trust in the state (legitimacy). The concepts of the public sphere, the system, lifeworld, colonisation and legitimacy, are, therefore, central to the analysis of the cases.

2.5.1 The public sphere, system, lifeworld, colonisation and legitimacy

Though critiqued (Fraser, 1990; Mouffe; 2007), the public sphere remains a central concept in critical theory and is key to discourses of culture’s role in providing spaces for debate and democratic participation that are ostensibly outside of the influence of the state and the market, as the cases in Chapter Four will show. As Chapter One has outlined, Habermas’s public sphere generates “communicative action” on which cohesive societies depend (Habermas, 1987, p. 126), and is a space where people can represent themselves, free of coercion, to the state. As a result, given the problematic attribution of equal conditions for participation in communicative action and discourse ethics (Spurk, 2010, p. 5), the public sphere is widely critiqued for its unrealistic “bracketing” of status as a precondition for open debate (Fraser, 1990, p. 58); its disavowal of the “hegemonic nature of every form of consensus” (Mouffe, 2007, p.
153); and its abjuration of the fact that the “origin of antagonistic conflicts” lies in the pursuit of different interests by different publics (ibid.).

Other critiques of the public sphere concern the structure of the public sphere itself and comprise: Habermas’s focus on the *bourgeois* public sphere (ibid., p. 5); the *male* hegemony of the historical public sphere (Fraser, 1990, p. 58); and the underestimation of counter-publics and subsidiary public spheres (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 36-37) resulting in the suggestion of a singular, rather than subsidiary public spheres (ibid., p. 34). Habermas is also criticised for overestimating both the importance and the disintegration of the public sphere and the impact of the media on the public sphere (ibid., p. 33), the preclusion of private representation in the public sphere (Fraser, 1990, pp. 61 - 62) and thus the short-circuiting of important debate on the private sector, leading to an indirect defence of “classical liberalism” (ibid., p. 73).

However, while the public sphere is a normative and a problematic construct, it can be viewed as a “valuable” legacy of modernity (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40) by offering a useful vehicle for thinking about the values of and potential for culture (via public deliberation) in society. In this way, the public sphere can be interpreted in a wide sense and links culture, cultural policy (via the role of culture) and legitimating discourses of democracy and civil society.

Other Habermasian concepts with which to consider the relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, specifically, the relationship between the state, policy and capitalism (1973; 1987), are the political-economic system and the socio-cultural lifeworld. As Chapter One has indicated, the concepts of the system and lifeworld that
emerge from Habermas’s theory of society concern two organising and interdependent (but discrete) structures that need to be kept in balance (Habermas, 1987). The “system” represents the economic and political systems in society, or the “dominant steering mechanism[s]” (ibid., 1973, p. 21) representing the quantifiable interests and strategic imperatives of money and power (or votes), while the “lifeworld”, represents the socio-cultural system or “horizon-forming context of processes of reaching understanding” (ibid., 1987, p. 135) which “defines the pattern of the social system as a whole” (ibid., p. 154). These concepts can be considered as interdependent hard (strategic) and soft (communicative) power systems similar to Foucault’s theory of juridical and sovereign powers, as embodied by the creative city and cultural policy respectively.

As the system represents “capitalism and the apparatus of the modern state” (ibid., p. 318), or economics and politics (Habermas, 1973, p. 36), it can be aligned with the industrial, economic and political (via neoliberalism) imperatives of the creative city. In contrast, as the lifeworld is the “stock of knowledge” (culture) through which “legitimate orders” are mediated in order to secure “solidarity” (society) through the “competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting”....“to take part in processes of reaching understanding” (personality) (Habermas, 1987, p. 138), it can be aligned with culture and cultural policy.

Before leaving the lifeworld, however, it is important to note the sociological use of this term, as a construction based on communication, rather than a phenomenological conception of the lifeworld (lebenswelt) based on subjective lived experience, as determined by German philosopher Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 1970). Husserl’s concept of lifeworld focuses on the “field of perception” and “field of consciousness” which we
experience “through our living body” (Husserl, 1970, p. 108), prioritising the perceiving subject. This “subjective” consciousness is our “actually experienceable” perceived and lived world, which acts as foundation for all our experience (ibid., p. 127) rather than the broader communicative and deliberative frame in which trust is built (Habermas, 1987).

As Chapter One has indicated, the key research relevance of Habermas’s system and lifeworld concepts lies in how the terms illuminate both the hard and soft imperatives of and pressures on cultural policy and the creative city. The pressure of system imperatives on cultural policies, via quantitative and instrumental reasoning (as demonstrated in economic discourses), can result in an imbalance between the system and lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 318). This rupture can erode cultural discourses of communication (ibid., p. 149), threatening the lifeworld and thus social and state stability through a “colonization” (Habermas, 1987, p. 318) which results in legitimacy loss for the state (ibid., 1973).

An excess of instrumental reason through colonisation, as referred to in Chapter One, is consistent with advanced capitalism and can lead to a Habermasian “crisis of legitimacy” which is determined by the withdrawal of “mass [electoral] loyalty” needed by the political system to govern (Habermas, 1973, p. 46). A legitimation crisis specifically arises from the failure of existing institutions, the political order and other legitimising systems (such as policy) to meet the ethical (i.e., that they are just, benevolent and effective) rather than administrative criteria of the electorate (Habermas,

53 There are two theories of the 1970s crises, that of the loss of authority based on the failure of output, instanced by perceptions of an “overloaded [welfare] state” (Held, 2006, pp 190-191) and the loss of legitimacy based on the failure of input (as demonstrated by Habermas), or the continuous erosion of the existing order’s capacity to be reproduced (ibid., p. 196).
1973, p. 11). These ethical criteria (rightly or wrongly) depend on the lifeworld and concern the “truth and norms that require justification” (ibid.). Since trust and consent are needed for government and policies to be enacted (regardless of whether it is generated by discourse ethics or whether those policies are good or bad), and competing socio-cultural and political-economic claims need to be balanced, cultural policy actors (such as politicians, the public and cultural professionals) need to reach a common understanding, or a communicative action (Habermas, 1987).

However, Chapter One has shown that generating collective understanding in relation to cultural policy is highly problematic in light of extrinsic state imperatives and different expectations for culture from cultural policy stakeholders (the government, practitioners and the public) (Holden, 2006), and in terms of the tendency towards hegemony posed by Foucault’s discourse formation theory. Nevertheless, given that the necessity for legitimation arises ab initio from the too close alignment of the economic to the political system (Habermas, 1973, p. 13), whereby governments intervene in market and private sector regulation (typically seen in liberal democracies), policy, and thus cultural policy, needs to have a balance of lifeworld and system imperatives, if trust is to be generated and politicians re-elected (Habermas, 1973, p. 36).

Before leaving the concept of legitimation, it should be noted that this research posits two sources of legitimation in cultural policies, external and internal. While all policy requires legitimation from the public, given the obscure role of culture in government (Vestheim, 2007; Gray and Wingfield, 2010), cultural policy ministries or departments particularly depend on intergovernmental support, as demonstrated by policy and media reports cited in Chapter One (Mundy, 2009; Higgins, 2013a). The concept of
legitimation, therefore, though primarily referring to the input of \textit{external} public trust in policies and the state, also refers to \textit{internal} state legitimation, though this is ultimately linked to securing external public legitimation. The particular implications of these concepts will be explored in Chapters Five and Seven.

The benefits of concepts like the public sphere, system, lifeworld, legitimacy and colonisation, are that they allow this research to consider particular characteristics of both the creative city (money and power) and cultural policy (society and culture). These concepts also help the research to derive implications from these relationships, highlighting potential difficulties, as well as similarities (interdependencies) between them. Though legitimacy can be understood as a necessary requirement of government (in Habermas’s view), or a self-sustaining way of maintaining power (in Foucault’s view), for the purposes of this research, it is understood as having multiple rather than singular mandates and represents a way of securing trust or longevity in a policy, whether good or bad. This research, therefore, posits the \textit{potential for} legitimacy and understanding to be reached outside of consensus-based communicative action or discourse ethics and focuses on the \textit{balance} of competing claims or mandates within society as evidenced through cultural policies, rather than communicative action or discourse ethics.

\textbf{2.5.2 Specifying the terms of the discussion}

As such, while Foucault’s discourse formation theory has helped \textit{identify} the object of study (discourse), through a broad understanding of the genealogy of power in discourse and its role in legitimating knowledge systems (such as cultural policy and the creative city), Habermas’s concepts help consider the \textit{impact} of discourse on cultural policy (and
the creative city) and the state. Consequently, these philosophers’ approaches are interpreted and applied in discrete ways and given their different ontologies and philosophical traditions, clarification is required here.

As suggested, the chief difference between the work of Habermas and Foucault concerns the ontological nature of discourse, reason, power and legitimation (Kelly, 1994, p. 391) and centres on the following views: that discourse can provide a space for rational democratic debate, which can secure legitimacy through consensual communicative action and discourse ethics on the one hand (Habermas, 1987), and that discourse represents struggle and maintains and legitimates power systems, on the other (Foucault, 1972). As a result, the central dispute of Habermas and Foucault through the framework of critical theory, concerns how theory or critique, in which they are both engaged, can dissolve and negotiate illegitimate power through dominance-free debate (Habermas), and how critique can create understandings of systems of legitimation, which are self-sustaining and dominating (Foucault) (Kelly, 1994). This speaks to the role of critique in universalisability and transcendentalism.

Specifically, for Foucault, since there is no “free use of reason” and reason cannot “take the public form that it requires” (Foucault, 1984, n.p.), there is no power-free discourse or critique (as discourse). Discourse, therefore, cannot be used by Habermas to criticise and overcome power (Kelly, 1994., p. 5). As a result, Foucault views Habermas’s work on discourse ethics and the public sphere as based on a flawed (Enlightenment) ideal of reason and the inevitability of progress (affirming his normative position on discourse) (Kelly, 1994; Richardson, 1996). Equally, Habermas criticises Foucault’s work in terms of: using discourse to transcend his own critique (Simon, 1994, p. 959); its
“cryptonormative” approach to theories of power (Daniels, 2002, n.p.); its nebulosity (ibid.); its lack of transformative capacity (Richardson, 1996, n.p.); its conflation of knowledge with power, its mobile power structures (i.e., not belonging to any one person or structure) and assertion that power is a productive as well as repressive force (Daniels, 2002, n.p.).

The debate between Foucault and Habermas, therefore, can partly be characterised as ontological in terms of their different understandings of what constitutes discourse in the first instance, embodying both power systems and the possibility of emancipation. More specifically, disparities between the two thinkers can also be described as the difference between a universal (Habermas) and a particular (Foucault) critique; contexts free from power (Habermas) and contexts of power (Foucault) (Daniels, 2002, n.p.); a “reforming modernist” (Habermas) and (for some) a post-structuralist (Foucault) (Richardson, 1996, n.p.); and, fundamentally, the “normative explication of the validity and acceptability of discourses” in contrast with an “investigation of the influence of power and bodily discipline on historical discourses” (Stahl, 2004, p. 4331).

In summation, therefore, by considering Foucault and Habermas together, this research takes the view that power and legitimacy can be good or bad depending on how they are used (Foucault), but that discourse is not solely based on consensus (contrary to Habermas). Similarly, the thesis views legitimacy as not necessarily concerned with maintaining power alone (contrary to Foucault), but that it also has the potential to open up a space of communication (contrary to Foucault) as part of its role in the public sphere (Habermas). In this way, the research disavows Habermas’s discourse ethics for Foucault’ discourse formation theory and takes a broad view of Habermas’s concept of
legitimacy and the public sphere, acknowledging the centrality of debate and dialogue as central to culture and discourse and the potential for policy to improve the relationship between the state and electorate.

2.6 Interpreting discourse theories via the creative city paradigm

Having described the overall approach to this research, the academic domain in which it is located, and the conceptual basis and contingencies in relation to the work of Foucault and Habermas, it is necessary to look at the interpretation and modelling of these particular methods in respect of analysing cultural policy through the discourse of the creative city (see Appendix). Though genealogically embedded in the historical discourse of urban regeneration (within cultural and urban policies), the creative city primary texts (i.e. those by authors like Landry and Florida) have a number of identifiable themes and lexicons that can be said to constitute a discrete discursive formation, as well as highly branded concepts specifically associated with Richard Florida’s model (these discourses will be more fully explored in Chapter Three).

These discourses promote a number of discrete ideas and ideologies and can be summarised into three broad themes based on the premise that culture, creativity and creative workers are reflexively important for driving economies and competition, place-development, and attracting investment and flexible skilled workers (all of which are desirable situations). If these discourses can be traced through various cultural policies, important questions can be raised about policy development, policy priorities and policy assumptions. As a result, given the persuasive dependence of the creative city on particular discourse formations and the simplicity of its themes, the paradigm offers the potential to be categorised and thus to yield material for tracking and later
analysis. The analytical framework constructed for this research, therefore, results in the tracking of cultural policy texts via explicit citations of creative cities and creative city authors (Appendix # 1), alongside the mapping of individual discursive strands (Appendix # 2–4) and lexicons (Appendix # 5-9).

In addition to explicit citations of the creative city such as direct references to the ‘creative city’ or ‘creative cities’, (primary thematic # one), therefore, the main discursive strands comprise the following discursive truths: creative workers and creative environments drive economies and make them more competitive (ibid. # two); culture and creativity make places unique and symbolically communicate that those places are interesting and vibrant, as well as tolerant (ibid. # three); and that skilled creative workers with high human capital are attracted to cultural and tolerant places and in turn attract businesses and investment who drive economies and competition (ibid. # four). In addition, creatives are both the source and object of attraction (Florida).

In terms of specific lexicons and vocabularies, Florida’s branded acronym and heurism, the 3 Ts (talent, technology and tolerance) model of urban development (cited in Chapter Two) is also central, and allows for discrete keyword identification. However, attention is also paid to the broad vocabulary and repetition of creativity, creative class, attraction, harnessing, retaining and/or nurturing, talent and/or human capital, openness/diversity and/or tolerance (or synonyms such as diversity/openness), technology, place and competition/competitive (ibid. # 5-9). The use of metaphor in discourse, as a “trope of resemblance” and “displacement “ as much as an extension of the “meaning of words” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 3), is particularly interesting in this regard, in respect of the concept of harnessing.
This term has military connotations and suggests both taking control and ring-fencing (and thus owning) an unwieldy talent/creativity that already exists (in tandem with attracting and nurturing talent/creativity, see 5.3.1, 5.4.5.2 and 5.5.6). This interpretation is further enriched by the view of metaphor as “grounded in a theory of substitution” (ibid.), and representing a “strategy of discourse” which “preserves and develops the heuristic power wielded by fiction” (ibid., p. 6). The use of concepts such as displacement, substitution, fiction and strategy in this interpretation of metaphor, therefore, like discourse, indicates its use in persuasion and ideology, as well as its potential to obscure other underlying meanings such as those suggested above.

However, though there are interdependencies between these core creative city ideas, they occur in three broad ways throughout the texts, mobilised around economies and competition, regeneration and place-development (and uniqueness) and attraction of skilled creative workers and investment (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2007). These ideas are evaluated in respect of each case (see Chapters Five and Six), seeking both the occurrence of the thematic across different documents, and particular variations of it. Secondary thematics concern concomitant concepts and discourses, including: creativity and innovation (knowledge economy, entrepreneurialism etc.), the creative industries (as a central model) and finally, culture. Analysing the texts against these thematics and lexicons anchors the research to a wider consideration of cultural policy discourse, and is not an end in itself.

2.7 Research design, text-based discourses and cases

The research design for this dissertation centres on desk-based work that includes the collection and analysis of primary textual data (policy documents, memos, press releases,
media reports – see Appendix), as well as secondary analytical literature. The selection of discourse analysis and discourse formation theory as modes of analysis, together with the public availability of the texts, rendered the prospect of fieldwork within the “everyday” situation of a given cultural policy context (Seale, 2004, p. 75), redundant. Equally, given the difficulties posed by the proximity of cultural policy studies to governance and the previous location of the researcher within the field of arts policy, an ethnographic approach may have compromised the distance needed to conduct the research. Despite this, in the early stages of the research, interviews were conducted with senior policymakers in Scotland, Finland and Ireland designed to ascertain senior policy views on the creative city phenomenon. While interesting, problems with attribution and the broad and anecdotal nature of the interview material led to the decision not to include it.

Cultural policy texts and statements, which were explicit, traceable and publicly available, were selected as offering the most prevalent source of official policy assertions of the state’s role in culture. These texts were selected on the following basis: while discourse concerns a wide range of communication formats (including image), explicit cultural policies typically (though not exclusively) occur textually and provided sufficient material for the deep analysis needed (ibid.); published cultural policy texts were publicly identifiable, more formal, more-government sanctioned, more permanent and more indicative of the formal construction and reflection of ideology than the statements of government committees and debates. National policy texts also allowed the research to track and interpret the creative city’s influence beyond localised or urban policies, which had been the locus for other research.
The research also selected a number of texts to allow for comparison within each case and to gather sufficient data for analysis, but a limited number to allow for sufficiently deep interpretation (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 5). Texts selected were produced between 2000 and 2010, a period which represented the sedimentation of the creative city paradigm (which emerged in the late 1980s and was in use by the 1990s), spanning the publication of Landry’s key handbook on the Creative City (2000) through to the launch of the European Union’s Lisbon Agenda (which had a span of ten years to 2010). This period also offered a substantial timeframe in which to trace creative city discourses.

In selecting three Northern European countries as the basis for this research: Scotland, Finland and Ireland, this dissertation addresses a number of issues. These issues are: a response to calls for more information on European cultural policy in general (Cliché et al., 1999-2001); the potential for inter-case comparison; and the creation of a new base of knowledge on under-researched cultural policies when compared with the “cultural hegemony” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 66) and scholarship surrounding other countries (such as Britain, France and Germany). The role of Austria as a potential case was given particular consideration due to its active creative economy (suggesting a creative city) agenda, however, its documents were exclusively available in German, which would have necessitated a particularly expert language facility, as well as prohibitive financial resources in terms of translating the large numbers of documents.

34 In certain cases (Scotland), documents up to 2011 were consulted in order to include Creative Scotland’s first policy statement.
35 An overview of entries for the International Journal of Cultural Policy Research on 10th September, 2013 produces 144 and 28 articles for the UK and France respectively. This compares with 7 entries for Scotland, 12 for Finland and 4 for the Republic of Ireland. Though the journal is produced in the UK, given Britain’s early development of explicit cultural policy post-World War II, it has been a prolific producer of research.
Additionally, these countries had tangible creative city or city-marketing activity, suggesting the potential for discursive transfer between the creative city and cultural policy. Finally, these countries have both similarities (political systems, economies, nationalism etc.) and contrasts (language, culture, histories) which offer a good basis for considering the local contexts of discourse formation and thus provided material for individual and broader analysis of specific national contexts. Chapters Five and Six will demonstrate how this approach has delivered interesting historical and social insights that suggest the usefulness and flexibility of the creative city paradigm to particular countries with particular concerns.

Though there were sufficient explicit cultural policy texts to yield information in all three countries (though far less in Ireland), certain implicit texts (usually Arts Council or industrial policy) were included to flesh out particular themes or to provide a background context to the analysis. These texts illuminated the discursive context around the cultural policy documents and helped to ascertain the thinking and discourse at a senior national level. Finland also provided challenges, mostly relating to those documents that did not have English translations, although the high number of translations available for other documents minimised this issue. Also, the term sample case rather than case study is deliberately used in the research to indicate a more interpretive approach, offering “puzzles and clues” for further inquiry and interpretation, rather than “accomplished facts” or universal truths (McGuigan, 1997, p. 182).

2.8 Policy nomenclature

One of the initial observations made by the research in relation to cultural policy discourses was the array of formats and functions comprising and addressed by policy
documents. These cultural policy vehicles represented plans, strategies, briefings, information, research, literature reviews, operations and annual reports. Regardless of names and functions, as publicly available documents, and policy communications, these documents were collectively interpreted as policy per se. However, given the approach to this research, the omission of the term policy from most of the documents’ titles was notable. Other than one Scottish text (Scottish Executive, 2004a) and the websites, few documents bore the nomenclature of policy or even used the term policy within the texts. Rather, policy was inferred in formats such as business plans, strategies (particularly in Ireland) and statements (Scotland) which were clearly informed by policy, rather than representing the principal policies themselves (which were equally hard to discern on the websites). Ireland had no designated policy documents but a lot of business plans.37 Similarly, Finland had strategies for cultural policy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b), and discrete cultural policies in relation to specific agendas such as development or innovation (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture 2010a; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b), but no explicit designated expression of its cultural policy, other than the statement on its website.

The lack of policy nomenclature in the documents in general and the unevenness of the website formats, may indicate that the status of the documents as policy is implicit on the understanding that the documents emanate from central government (policy); however, the fact that these documents were described in other terms (e.g., strategy, plan, etc.) erroneously suggests that a policy might be located elsewhere. The exception

37 There was no link to policy or visible policy heading on the Irish Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht website (www.ahg.gov.ie/) on 10 October 2013. Instead policy was listed under publications. This contrasts with other policy areas such as the Department of Health (and Children), the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Finance, whose policy sections are on their homepages and highly visible. Available: http://www.dohc.ie/; http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx and http://www.finance.gov.ie/ [All Accessed 10 October 2013].
of Scotland in this regard in 2004 (Scottish Executive, 2004a) may relate to the self-determination of the newly elected Scottish National Party (at this time), setting out its first independent cultural policies.

This reluctance to use the term policy more generally, or conversely, the willingness to use other terms such as plans or strategies, may represent a managerialist concern with projecting dynamism and efficiency (as opposed to the more passive policy), but may also be a simple lack of willingness to pin point the state’s intentions in relation to the difficult portfolio of culture. Whatever the reason for this omission, the lack of policy nomenclature nominalises policy itself and disables accountability in the covert process of presenting policy, as a more distant and transient plan or strategy. This makes it difficult for the public to identify the political through policy, in terms of monitoring the work of elected governments. In addition, the omission of policy from cultural policy texts, may point to the “interstices” or gaps between texts (Foucault, 1972, p. 36), suggesting the defeat of the term policy at the hands of the more powerful plan or strategy.

2.9 Locating the researcher: issues of reflexivity

The “relationship between the knowledge and the knower” (Parsons, 1995, p. 71) and the transcendence of discourse, are central to the epistemology of the research, and have respectively arisen already in relation to both disinterest (2.3) and the debate between Habermas and Foucault (see 2.5.2). Reflexivity, or positionality, aims to avoid the trap of imagining the researcher “immune to the effects of their own analyses” (Bennett, 1998, p. 6), and situates the ideological values of the researcher as central to all choices.

38 Managerialism is “the improvement of the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of the public sector by the utilisation of techniques which were once regarded as purely appropriate for the private/for profit sector” (Parsons, 1995, p. 38).
made within the research. This is particularly important in the context of the small policy sector and practice of culture. Reflexivity can also be described as deliberate “falsification” in the hope of producing “paradigm shifts” (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 17), through problematising (and thus helping to clarify) particular processes (such as research), as well as by revealing the personal biases and imperatives of the author. While there is a need to bracket this reflexivity in order to avoid immobility, there is also a need to reflect on how these influences may have affected the final research.

As such and firstly, taking into account the use of discourse analysis and discourse theory in relation to constructions of reality and power (as outlined by both Habermas and Foucault), this research necessarily adds to the body of discourse and power relations it seeks to investigate (Rose, 2007, p. 167). The research therefore seeks to analyse discourse and language, through discourse and language. For this reason, the research avoids claims of objectivity or truth and does not aim to transcend the problem of its own inescapable discourse, instead offering a located view, which is simply one, out of many possible views. Additionally, given that nominalisation is a key focus of discourse analysis, the prevailing academic style of passive sentence construction in the research risks being interpreted as disengagement. However, the use of passive rather than active language in this text is necessary to address the body of work and opinions preceding and outside of this particular research.

Secondly, this study is produced from the perspective of someone operating within the artworld, and the cultural sector more broadly, with a background in the development, application and evaluation of art and arts policy (the Arts Council of Ireland). The challenge of the research, therefore, is to recognise the personal assumptions, biases and
power relations built up during a time of immense change in arts policy in Ireland (in the 1990s and 2000s), and in particular the turn to managerialism that characterised those changes. Equally, there is a need to challenge previously taken-for-granted value systems and assumptions at play in understandings of culture and the arts, primarily: culture and the arts being inherently and unquestioningly of value, and particular insights and experiences of how culture is produced and how the culture sector operates.

Thirdly, the researcher’s professional background needs to be considered in relation to criticality, independence and career sustainability. Future ambitions to re-enter the professional culture sector in order to potentially “legislate” rather than simply interpret culture (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 11), in the context of the precariousness of making a living and the clientelist nature of the culture sector in general, are a consideration in relation to the independence of critique within the research. This is particularly relevant in relation to certain implicit criticisms of both policymakers and cultural practitioners (including the researcher), in terms of prevalent cultural sector practices (such as cynical reason), despite an outline of the coercive imperatives driving these practices, and, it is argued, their endemic and inescapable nature, as will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Nevertheless, though the pursuit of objectivity was neither possible nor a goal for this research, this level of criticality indicates the distance created between the researcher and the research. Ultimately, by drawing these issues to attention (the creation of a new discourse, the position of the researcher within the artworld, the impact of this and career imperatives on the critical distance of the research), it was hoped to question and interrogate problem areas and enter in the research with as open a mind as was possible.
2.10 Conclusions

This chapter established a way of approaching and interpreting the question of the relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, the implications of that relationship and the basis on which claims to knowledge will be made, both from the perspective of the academic domain and philosophically. In particular, the chapter addressed the use of Foucault’s discourse theories and Habermas’s key analytical concepts, separating out the object of the enquiry (discourse) from the implications of the enquiry (the philosophical framework). The next chapter will expand on the narrative constructed around and ideologies embedded in the creative city, in terms of the genealogies and strategic uses of culture and creativity. This detailed outline and analysis of the creative city will illuminate its compelling rationale for cultural investment and development, and will provide the grounds for considering its place within cultural policy meta discourses, particularly in terms of its positioning of culture, the economy and the market (private sector).
CHAPTER THREE: THE CREATIVE CITY PARADIGM

3.1 Introduction

Having established the methodology for this research, this chapter sets out the background to and genealogy of the creative city urban paradigm vis-à-vis the role of culture (in the narrow arts sense) in cities. This will locate the individual cultural policy cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland in the context of urban development models in general and the creative city in particular, allowing the relationship of the creative city to the cases to be clearly and critically determined and to provide a basis for the detailed analysis in the following chapters. Specifically, this chapter will look at the various typologies, manifestations and “fundamental codes” (Foucault, 2002, p. xxii) of the creative city which underline its flexible nature and thus wide range of interpretations and applications. Common perceptions of the model will also be considered in order to highlight the successful branding and dissemination capacities of the creative city, alongside a genealogy of urban development discourses within the context of culture and cultural policy, and a description and analysis of the key discourses, linguistic references and legitimation principles of the paradigm.

This chapter will also bring together the significant body of critique that has developed in response to the creative city, highlighting the role of the private sector within it (particularly as it relates to the state), and argue for a new and critical consideration of the role played by culture and cultural practitioners within the paradigm. It will be argued that key to the appeal and legitimation of the creative city, is the juxtaposition of hard (economic) and soft (creative/cultural) power, suggested and embodied by the flexible and productive creative worker. It will also be argued that the paradigm is the
latest international urban regeneration discourse to “migrate” (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) to cultural policy, and indicate issues raised by this, most particularly the question of who benefits from such a publicly funded paradigm within a putatively democratic context.

3.2 The creative city: core principles

Historically, the role of cities as the locus for the cultural, political and, in particular, economic life of nations has ensured continued interest in the concept of the city. In particular, the interest in the city as a symbolic and organising concept has been increasing since the 18th century and the later industrial revolutions. However, the history of city development in general,¹ and, critically, the marketing of cities as successful and competitive drivers of economies, has been of central interest to national policymakers, political economists, and urban strategists. More recently, the creative city paradigm of urban development, and in particular, Richard Florida’s paradigm (2002; 2005; 2007), has put an emphasis on applied creativity in cities, profoundly impacting policymakers (Miles and Paddison, 2005, p. 835) and reputing to ameliorate the recession throughout the advanced capitalist world.² In particular, this model has impacted the Anglophone countries of the UK, Canada, Australia, the US, and Australasia, becoming an international brand of successful post-industrial cities that trade on the benign tropes of creativity and culture (e.g. Creative Helsinki, Creative Birmingham, etc.).³ Such is the success of the model (and Florida’s model in particular),

¹ Bavaria is reported to have used culture for branding as one of the “first conscious long-term” regional marketing initiatives in the 19th century (Lind, 2007, p. 56).
² In January 2009, Richard Florida discussed the creative city in respect of the global financial recession, stating that: “regions with high scores on my creativity index, a measure of long-term economic potential based on the 3 Ts – technology, talent and tolerance – are much more resilient than others on average.” From his Creative Class Blog [online]. Available: www.creativeclass.com [Accessed 21 January 2009].
³ For more on Creative Helsinki, see Mustonen (2010). Creative Birmingham was announced in May, 2012 and has commissioned KEA consultants to create the project Creative Spin, Creative Spillovers for Innovation. This is a “3- year URBACT project aimed at setting up tools and methods to trigger innovation and creativity in businesses and other kinds of public and private organisations” [online].
and the attention it has generated from the academic, enterprise and cultural sector, that local authorities have been described as “Floridazed” (Malanga, 2004, n.p.), few places lack a “creativity campaign” (Knell and Fleming, 2008, p. 25), and a vast industry of creative city consultants has arisen.4

Originating within the social and political sciences, and combining a number of domains including urban studies and geography, the creative city is essentially an urban and industrial economic strategy, concerned with the growth and development of cities in a competitive global environment, working on the premise that the city is a key driver of national and international economies (Florida, 2002), and that creativity is a “fundamental source of economic growth” (ibid., p. 317). As outlined in Chapter One, to Florida, creative workers are needed by cities, and attracting these workers rather than attracting businesses, is how to achieve success in the creative economy. This factor locates the paradigm within a late-capitalist model concerned with flexible paradigms of mobile labour or talent. Attracting the creative classes, Florida’s name for these workers, can be done by developing cultural and recreational amenities, as well as by encouraging open and tolerant atmospheres (which also involve the presence of those workers), securing knowledge-intensive, high-yielding businesses (ibid.). Florida positions these classes as the fastest-growing economic group in the world, a saviour of the post-industrial age and an exemplary economic model for emergent nations that are overly dependent on the service economy and that have few natural resources (ibid., 2007, p. 35).


4 There are countless international agencies and companies offering creative city work, these include: BOP consulting (bop.co.uk), Noema Research and Planning (noema.org.uk), Creative Cities Consulting/Illuminomics (www.creativecitiesconsulting.com), Creative Class (creativeclass.com), Creative Clusters (creativeclusters.com), (the former) Creative Partnerships (creative-partnerships.com), amongst others [Accessed 5 June 2013].
3.3 Identifying the creative city model

Despite claims that the creative city resembles a “metaphor, [with] many interpretations” (Landry et al, 1996, p. 5) and that there are “many ways to be a creative city” (Landry, 2000, p. 66), the aims of the creative city are clear: to make a city a “better place to live, work and play in” and crucially, to make a “better and more prosperous future for all” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx). The creative city is posited as a “society that taps and rewards [its] our full creative potential” (ibid., p. xiii); is a “learning organism” responding to change (Landry, 2000, p. vi); and a city that embraces success, creativity, and cultural, economic and social development (British Council and UNESCO). These broad descriptions, as indicated by the various models of the creative city, illustrate a highly malleable paradigm. Typical categorisations and models therefore comprise: place-marketing (synonymous with signature buildings and identity creation), emphasising general market development and local events directed at inward investment - associated with Richard Florida (Knell and Fleming, 2008, p. 25); policy-making, embedding creativity and culture in city decisions - identified with Charles Landry; and a focus on the cultural and creative industries, promoting and developing cultural quarters and clusters (concerning agglomerated cultural businesses) as both commercial enterprises and attractive place-making initiatives (Pratt, 2008; Creative Metropoles, 2010).

3.4 Marketing, boosterism, creative branding and urban entrepreneurialism

Marketing, therefore, is central to the creative city, and campaigns designating particular cities as creative, vibrant, hip, lively and innovative places to live and work, are widely used to present attractive images to workers, tourists, and to a secondary

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extent, citizens. These campaigns are particularly aimed at encouraging investors and companies (through the creative workers) to move to, recruit and spend in particular places. As such, the lineage of the creative city reaches back to the 19th century tradition of civic boosterism,6 exemplified in the I Love New York campaign of the 1970s (appealing to pride and community, using stimulating visuals, etc.) which was credited with transforming negative perceptions of New York at the time. The success of this campaign underlines the role of branding in the “displacement” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 3) of undesirable city perceptions and is enshrined in the current branding and metaphorical capacity of the “creative” prefix in cities names’ (i.e. Creative Birmingham, Creative Bradford, and Creative Helsinki)7. Creative (city) branding, therefore, connotes up-and-coming places to invest in and visit and suggests success and industrial dynamism.

Consequently, in addition to the various models of the creative city, the creative trademark is used in a number of ways, including: urban development/branding (above); national branding (e.g., Creative Britain);8 creative industries’ and arts’ supports (Creative Berlin,9 Creative Edinburgh,10 Melbourne Creative,11 Creative Dundee,12 Creativity Australia,13 Creative Choices,14 European Creative Industries Alliance15);

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6 Boosterism is a concept associated with giving something a boost or talking it ‘up’, usually in relation to a town or city and with the aim of attracting investment or residents. Civic boosterism is particularly associated with the expansion of the American West in the 19th century and consequently has “long been a major feature of [US] urban systems”, as well as latterly associated with an entrepreneurial approach to city development, postmodern festival and spectacle directed at the professional-managerial classes (Harvey, 1989, p. 4).


creative industries and regeneration companies (Creative Europe, Creative Scotland, Creative London, Creative Metropoles, Creative Partnerships); networks, events and competitive designations (European Year of Creativity and Innovation, Creative Sydney, British Council Creative Cities; UNESCO’s Creative Cities, Districts of Creativity) and competitive creativity indices measuring various interpretations of creativity in cities and countries. As such, the use of the term creative (or concomitant terms) in the nomenclature of cities’ indicates a bewilderingly wide range of activities.

16 “Europe needs to invest more in its cultural and creative sectors because they significantly contribute to economic growth, employment, innovation and social cohesion”. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/ [Accessed 30 August 2012].
20 Creative Partnerships was the UK’s “flagship creative learning programme running throughout England from 2002 until 30 September 201, when funding was withdrawn by Arts Council England.” Available: www.creative-partnerships.com [Accessed 5 June 2013].
21 See The European Year of Creativity and Innovation (2009).
22 Creative Sydney was a “mini-agency” within the London Development Authority that emerged out of the Mayor’s Commission on the Creative Industries from 2003 – 2006, with a “strong focus on regeneration, clusters and place making”. Available: http://directionalthinking.net/creative-london/ [Accessed 11 March 2013].
25 Districts of Creativity is an international network that “unites 12 of the most creative and innovative regions around the world”, putting “creativity and innovation high on our agendas as multiply factor for sustainable growth and development” (sic) in order to “advance a creative and entrepreneurial culture, http://www.districtsofcreativity.org/view/nl/49999430-Districts+Of+Creativity.html [Accessed 7 February 2012].
27 The broad marketing appeal of what might loosely be called creativity discourses (suggesting knowledge economy interests) has also spread to related concepts including talent, a term closely associated with the high human capital workers of Florida’s creative city (Hamburg, City of Talent), cool (Michigan’s Cool cities initiative of 2003; New Labour’s Cool Britannia of the 1990s) and culture (Culture Montreal) promoting “the central role of the arts and culture in all areas of Montreal’s
which collectively draw on the currency and appeal of the wider discourse of creativity. The genealogy of this discourse will be further discussed in Chapter Four (4.3).

Nevertheless, the trademark of the creative city presents a number of problems: these are that the moniker is typically self-designated and aspirational, rather than descriptive or awarded, and city campaigns noted as always in the process of *becoming* (but never quite reaching) the state of being a “‘true’ metropolitan [or creative] city” (Palonen, 2012, p. 11). In addition, the packaging of “too many” cities and regions as creative, not only “cancels each out but confuses and annoys the intended recipients” (Power, 2009, p. 456). The interest in the cultural marketing of cities has also resulted in tourist agencies (rather than cultural organisations) being the most visible champions of the culture of cities (Garcia, 2004, p. 316), with potential implications for the type of culture championed, and endorsements of the joint endeavour of place-making and place-marketing (Musterd et al., 2010, p. 12).

This competitive marketing of cities as “exciting, creative, and [importantly] safe place[s] to live or to visit, to play and consume” (Harvey, 1989, p. 9) has also become synonymous with “urban entrepreneurialism”, an activity typically pursued by city authorities in late capitalist societies who treat cities as businesses offering a series of opportunities to be maximised (ibid., p. 4). The success of “urban entrepreneurialism” depends on the leveraging of “monopoly rents” or reputational income from the sale of the city’s “unique and non-replicable” assets (in this case, attractive cultural and recreational amenities) in the form of increased property rates, as well as land and property values (Harvey, 2006, n.p.). Since culture reinforces and helps create

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marketable place identities, notions of authenticity and uniqueness embodied by culture
exact this monopoly rent “so as to better ground their claims to uniqueness” (Harvey,
2006, n.p.). In a reference to Ireland, Florida has described this process as a “clever and
forward-looking strategy”... that leverages “authentic cultural assets” (Florida, 2002, p.
302). This activity is particularly attractive to municipalities through its promise of
generating income for cities and thus theoretically the public (purse), but is equally of
interest to private developers and speculators assessing the potential financial return on
one city developments or land purchase when compared with another. As a result, the
investment of a city in cultural and recreational amenities and the marketing strategies
tied to this (as demonstrated in creative cities) can indirectly result in greater incomes
for private developers (as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, section 5.3.1 in relation
to Glasgow’s developments).

Nevertheless, the pursuit of a “good local business climate” (ibid., 1989, p. 11) under
the rubric of urban entrepreneurialism, ironically engages in the “serial reproduction”
(ibid., p. 10) of types of cultural and recreational amenities that make cities “uniquely
different by much the same techniques” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 73). This unsurprisingly
results in a loss of the sought-for uniqueness and competition in those cities (Harvey,
2006, n.p.), demonstrating the blindness of policy in recognising the way “sameness is
reconstituted” (Dowler, 2004, p. 27). This replication of cities can be seen in the re-
creation of visual tropes of success, including commissioning landmark and large-scale
visual projects that suggest cultural, dynamic places (such as the success of Anthony
Gormley’s Angel of the North sculpture in Newcastle), infrastructures (e.g., Santiago
Calatrava’s bridges) and the widespread engagement of Starchitects (the term used to
describe the work of celebrated architects) in the mould of Daniel Libeskind, Richard

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Rogers, Zaha Hadid and Frank Gehry. As such, an ironic outcome of the widespread use of the creative brand, engaging the same designers and monumental scales in city development, is a conflation of cities and their erstwhile individuality. In order to further understand and identify the discrete influence of the creative city paradigm, its discourses, thematics and lexicons need analysis.

3.5 Identifying creative city discourses

Though there are a number of versions (and many authors) of the creative city, Richard Florida and the founder of the think tank Comedia, Charles Landry (formerly working with urbanist Franco Bianchini) have come to dominate much of its discourses, offering two similar, though differently emphasised typologies, to which policymakers “have particularly turned” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 65). These typologies comprise an economic development focus in Florida’s case (place marketing and inward investment), and an economic, social and cultural development focus (policy-making) in Landry’s (Bianchini and Landry, 1994; Landry, 2000; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2007), though both paradigms ultimately pursue prosperity. While Landry’s work precedes Florida’s by at least ten years (via Comedia), Florida’s model, which reads economic history “as a succession of new and better ways to harness creativity” (Florida, 2002, p.

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28 Antony Gormley’s Angel of the North (1998) sculpture, though not the first large-scale monumental sculpture to brand a place, was widely perceived as placing Gateshead (Tyne and Wear, England) on the map. Subsequent sculptural installations have attempted to replicate Gormley’s effect and become brand identifiers. As such, in 2007, Dublin’s Docklands Authority received planning permission for a 48-metre high sculpture by Gormley before the recession resulted in these plans being abandoned (Hegarty, 2007). More recently, two large-scale attention-grabbing sculptures have pointed to similar spectacular ambitions: Damien Hirst’s giant sculpture Verity (2012) at Ilfracombe in the south of England (BBC, 2012) and Anish Kapoor’s Olympic Tower in London (See Higgins, 2012d). Bridge builder Santiago Calatrava has also created numerous, city-defining and monumental bridges around the world, including Newcastle, Manchester, Dublin (two), Spain, Toronto, Dallas, etc. (See www.calatrava.com). The work of “starchitect” and designer Daniel Libeskind, like Frank Gehry (responsible for the Bilbao Guggenheim), is also common in international cities. Available: http://daniel-libeskind.com/search/node/buildings [Accessed 12 November 2012].
56) has particularly captured the attention of academics,29 municipal authorities and think tanks and, this research will show, cultural policymakers.

The Florida model of the creative city is chiefly distinguished by his 3 Ts correlation (ibid., 2007, p. 37). This is a simple moniker and acronym that represents a three-pronged strategy for attracting mobile and skilled creative workers as well as major corporations, in order to develop “creative capital” in cities (ibid., pp. 37-39). The 3 Ts comprise: technology as a function of innovation in cities to drive industry and generate innovation and skills; talent (you need an educated, knowledge-based and skilled creative workforce); and tolerance (you need an open-minded society capable of accepting diverse social groups and ideas).

Meanwhile, Landry’s vision of the creative city holds that culture is central to urban planning for quality-of-life reasons, but also business, competition (Landry, 2000, p. 14) and, again, attracting flexible and mobile creative workers (ibid., p. 33). For Landry in particular, creative cities must have an “appreciation of cultural issues” which express the “values and identity” of a place (Landry, 2000 p. 3) and therefore need to be “culturally rich” (ibid., p. 75) with a “critical mass of cultural activity” (ibid.). These creative cities must have creativity at their “core” and “identity, distinctiveness and confidence” (ibid.), in order to create a “greater chance of discovering the uniqueness and specialness of a place” (ibid., p. 71). This creative city must be led by “visionary individuals, creative organisations and a political culture sharing [a] clarity of purpose”,

29The breadth of issues comprising the creative city paradigm has given rise to a sizeable body of literature, mostly dominated by geographers, sociologists, urban planners and cultural economists including seminal work by Gunnar Tornqvist (1983) and Ake Andersson (1985), Klaus Kunzmann, urbanists Michael Parkinson and Peter Hall, Richard Sennett, Terry Clarke, Philip Cooke, David E. Andresson, Ann Markusen, Jonathan Vickery, Trine Bille, Allen J Scott, Jayne and Bell (cities, regeneration, cultural quarters, etc.), but also those examining new work practices and patterns in these cities, including John Howkins, David Throsby and Charles Leadbetter.
necessitating “new types of alliances” (Landry, 2000 p. 3) and “networking dynamics” (ibid., p. 124). These attributes can be considered a mix of tangible or hard (location, skills-base, and companies) and intangible or soft (confidence, image, perception, workers and amenities) “creative assets” (ibid., p. 167). Consequently, in contrast to Florida, Landry sees creativity as a social process as much as an economic outcome, or a “journey” rather than a “destination” (ibid., p. 14), demanding “open-mindedness and imagination” (Landry, 2006, p. 2). At the heart of this model of the creative city, however, the theme of cities in competition remains.

Nevertheless, civil society discourses also emerge throughout Landry’s (and Comedia’s) texts, with the creative city posited as an artefact of community and society, a place, an economy and, crucially, distinguishing Landry’s paradigm from Florida’s, a “living organism” and “polity” actively contributing to civil society and the public sphere (Comedia, 1991, p. 31). “Civic creativity” (Landry, 2000, p. 69), “cooperative space[s]” (ibid., p. 66) and “neutral” territories for “commonality” (ibid., p. 120), according to Landry, will build social capital,30 and a tolerant, “lively” (ibid., p. 111) and, again, “vibrant civil society” (ibid., p. 244). This emphasis on communication in cities and the need for spaces for debate, marks Landry’s creative city as contributing to the public sphere, a concept he conflates with “public space” and the “public realm” and critically, describes as a “multifaceted concept at the heart of the innovative milieu” (ibid., p. 119) which is “central to urban life” (ibid., p. 252).

30 Social capital is a concept synonymous with sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and refers to a form of value that concerns the “aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or in other words, to membership in a group” which offers each member a “credential” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248). See also Chapter Four for a discussion on cultural capital (4.2.2.3).
Florida similarly borrows community and social discourses, underlining the role of “sustainable” and “humane” economies, to make our lives “more complete” (Florida, 2002, pxiii), the need for “new, more accepting” communities with the “potential to combine innovation and economic growth with authentic community” (ibid., p. 282), and the need for “new mechanisms for building social cohesion” (ibid., p. 323). Despite the benign connotations of this community model of the creative city, however, the juxtaposition of potentially conflicting goals (the economy v community) shows how peripheral civil society is to Florida’s economic paradigm.

Nevertheless, as suggested, though Landry’s creative city may be more culture-centric, and more overtly references civic or civil society discourses, its dominant goal, like Florida’s, is competition and success, requesting that cities reassess their “resources and potential” and undertake a “re-invention on all fronts” in order to compete internationally (Landry, 2006, p. 4). The competitive thrust of Landry’s creative city is also embodied in his championing of flexible creative workers. In Landry’s view, competitiveness is no longer to be found in “immobile, physical resources like coal, timber or gold, but in highly mobile brain power and creativity” (ibid., p. 33). Creative workers represent the “specific qualities that chime well with the needs of the ‘ideas-driven economy’”, constituting a “highly skilled and flexible labour force [of] dynamic thinkers, creators and implementers” (Landry, 2006, p. 11) which provide “role models” on which a “cult” of the creative can be based, so that new “consumer products” can be developed (Comedia, 1991, p. 20). This model of the ideal 21st century worker, a flexible, mobile, entrepreneurial, and a skilled manipulator of symbols or knowledges (which Florida calls the creative classes), represents a core trope of the creative city by drawing on the late capitalist discourse of the knowledge economy.
3.6 The creative classes and Floridian discourse

However, though clearly building on the work of Landry and other urbanists, Florida’s particular model of the creative city foregrounds the role of creative labour or highly educated mobile workers, and brands them the creative classes (Florida, 2002; 2005; 2007). The “basis” of this class is economic (Florida, 2002, p. 68), and draws on historical labour hierarchies aligned with the concept of skill, talent or human capital.\(^{31}\) This interest in creative workers and specifically their grouping and clustering, reflects 19\(^{th}\) century economic and geographic agglomeration theories concerning the deliberate co-location of particular businesses for “productive efficiencies”, as coined by economist Alfred Marshall (Florida, 2002, p. 220). The clustering of particular workers in “global cities” wishing to “expose their novelty to the public” (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008, p. 175), therefore, has had a long tradition.\(^{32}\) To Florida, the essential mission of these cities is to learn how to be attractive, or how to compete for this mobile talent (Landry, 2000; Florida, 2005).

The structure of the creative classes is carefully delineated and refers to a specific, though disparate, grouping of mostly professional individuals who are “primarily paid to create” and involved in “complex problem solving” using “independent judgment and high levels of education or human capital”, valuing “creativity, individuality, difference and merit” (Florida, 2002, p. 8). These workers range from doctors, solicitors and health workers, to scientists, engineers, IT workers and the more traditional creative occupations of artists/designers, known as the “super creative core” (ibid., p. 9).

\(^{31}\) Capital in this respect can be viewed as “any resource which confers an advantage on those who hold it and which, further, can be accumulated and passed on through mechanisms of inheritance” (Bennett and Silva, 2011, p. 430).

\(^{32}\) For further reading on cultural planning and artists clustering, see Markusen et al. (2006; 2009) and; Evans (2001).
Although Florida talks of a creative class, it is only certain less well-paid members of this super-creative core (artists/designers/performers), and what he calls bohemians (those with alternative lifestyles including artists and the gay community), who act as important signifiers or attractors for the rest of the better-paid creative classes. What artists/designers/bohemians signify, as well as create, is a “flourishing artistic and cultural environment” (ibid., p. 261), which indicates tolerance (diversity) and (consequently) economic growth, factors deemed attractive to other creative workers (Clifton, 2008, pp. 66-67). For critics of the creative city, however, rather than positive harbingers or benign symbols of the creative economy, the arrival or central positioning of these creative groups has ironically come to represent a “staged gentrification” and softening up of neighbourhoods for raised rents and capital development (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 71). For many, this is indicative of “late Capitalist urbanism” (Deutsche, 1996, p. xiii).

Ironically, despite the associations of the creative classes with the knowledge economy, Florida distinguishes the creative classes from the “knowledge worker”, which he sees as an exclusive and an inaccurate term in relation to “defining the real source of economic value-creation – that is, human creativity” (Florida, 2005, p. 4). For Florida, therefore, this creativity is not limited to knowledge, but extends to “all forms of human potential” (ibid., 2007, p. 61). Nevertheless, the link between the creative classes is their means of earning a living exclusively from knowledge rather than through manual labour (though as above, the living that they earn vastly differs depending on which creative class grouping is in question), a key hierarchical theory of cultural production in labour and intellectual property discourses (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145). In short, the
creative classes are: high-earning and yielding (with the exception of artists/designers etc.), semi-vocational (driven by internal motivation rather than commercial gain), highly mobile (adaptable), peer-motivated (self-sufficient), and hard workers that blur the distinction between work and home (Florida, 2002, p. 13). As such, the creative classes are flexible and autonomous, or ideal 21st century labourers (and highly conscious of their identity as such). These characteristics unequivocally point to the attractive historical figure of the artist (independent, self-motivated etc.), but also the more recent and even more attractive figure of the entrepreneur, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Crucially, however, though presented as wholly meritocratic, the financially and thus hierarchically weak position of the cultural or artistic creative classes in respect of their co-creative classes, is wholly ignored by Florida. The situation of these workers, who are chiefly important to the creative city for their symbolic value, is amplified in a number of late 20th century critical labour terms, dominated by the precariat and the concept of precarity. This term refers to the analysis of flexible, insecure and vulnerable workers typically demonstrated within creative occupations of “self-chosen” cultural producers (Lorey, 2006, n.p.). These workers have emerged from the neoliberal capitalist reorganisation of work and class relations and the fragmentation of work practices (part-time/contract/insecure) since the 1970s (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002). This reorganisation of work has predominantly represented the interests of the capitalist classes, and is consistent with an “urban entrepreneurialism” unwedded to place or worker (Harvey, 1989, p. 4).
Equally, the concept of “immaterial labour”, or the “labor that produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity” but which is not generally recompensed (Lazzarato, 1996, pp. 132-133) also represents many of the super creative classes.³³ Specifically, the immaterial labourer leverages their social networks and tastes, as well as their creative aura for professional purposes (Arvidsson, 2007, p. 11). This flexible, unattached and self-employed worker, therefore, who mines their symbolic potential in the service of work, offers maximum flexibility with a diminishment of responsibility to the employer, and has few securities and rights. As these terms indicate, the creative class is highly contested, in terms of not only its disparate grouping, but also its disingenuous championing of a vulnerable and exploited model of labour.

3.7 The lexicon of the creative city

Having established the core concepts and tropes of the creative city, including its flexibility, the terms of its wide appeal (branding, symbolism, malleability) and its basis in and championing of educated, mobile workers, it is necessary to consider the specific lexicon and discursive structure of the paradigm as touched on in Chapter Two. In the first instance, both Landry and Florida make significant use of the broad vocabulary of “creative/s” and “creativity”,³⁴ and specifically: the “creative economy” (Landry, 2000, p. xxi; Florida, 2002, p. 201), the “creative furnace” (Florida, 2005, p. 4), and the “creative age” (ibid., 2002, p. 317). However, a number of additional mobilising and defining creative city terms reappear throughout both of their texts. These are the concepts of “attracting” (Landry, 2000, p. xxiii, p. xxvi, p. xxxii, p. xxxvi, p. 31, p. 100;

³³ Immaterial labour is consistent with an advanced capitalism, which has “pulled off the improbable trick of naturalising its own forms of life by appealing not to their permanence but to their perishability” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 126).

³⁴ Since there are so many instances of these terms, in particular variations of creative/creativity, only a selection will be cited.

The term *harnessing*, which was touched on in section 2.6, is often used in conjunction with creativity, but usually with an economic context, and as a metaphor, can be seen as a “strategy of discourse” which “preserves and develops the heuristic power wielded by fiction” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 6). “Talent” is also used as an economic term synonymous with the creative classes, and is a key focus (Landry, 2000, p. xi, p. xviii, p. 111; Florida, 2002, p. 298, 2005, p. 82). When used together, however, these concepts refer to the potentially conflicting (economic) capturing (harnessing/attaching/retaining) of pre-existing creativity or talent, as well the encouragement and shaping of new creativity (nurturing).

### 3.8 Dispersions, media and public perceptions of the creative city

The “dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 42) or dissemination of creative city discourses such as these, have primarily worked through the “many-to-many, low-cost, decentralised, mutual and reciprocal interactive system” of the web (O’Brien, 2007, p. 10). In addition and as referenced earlier (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.; Higgins, 2013a, In this instance a synonym (keeping) is used.

n.p), the globalised success of the creative city has created a wholly benign and universal conception, that has successfully circulated beyond academia (McGuigan, 2009; Oakley, 2009a; Markusen and Gadwa, 2010) and policy, to media reports. These reports can be viewed as “representational strategies” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 329) that wittingly or unwittingly endorse official discourses of cultural and industrial policy. The prevailing media representations of creative city discourses, however, concern the economic, scientific/technological model of creativity, with innovation, enterprise and competition, as well as tourism discourses of culture (Ward, 2002; McWilliams, 2006; Irish Independent, 2007; Irish Times, 2008; Connolly, 2010; O’ Dwyer, 2010; Fogarty, 2012), rather than autonomous discourses of culture’s proposed intrinsic value.

These accounts typically comprise claims that: a “reputation for cultural creativity is attractive to businesses considering investing”...because it “suggests a climate of innovation and counterintuitive thinking” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.); “the presence of ‘artists and bohemians’ may be linked to economic productivity and the growth of jobs” (Ward, 2002, n.p.); English cities are “using creative industries to emerge from grim recession-dominated pasts” (ibid.); there is a “close correlation between how receptive a region is to artists and its potential to create wealth” (The Guardian, 2010, n.p.); a “large, thriving creative community indicates a tolerant, diverse, pluralistic society, which in turn attracts the sort of knowledge-workers who power post-modern economies” (ibid.); visitors are “lured by” ... “sizzling creativity” (Connolly, 2007, n.p.); culture makes a city an “interesting place to live [which] is a good prescription for economic development” (Ozimek, 2012, n.p.),37 and again (reporting on government views), that the arts help “attract investment which will drive jobs and opportunities” (Higgins, 2012).

37 While this article is critical of these creative city ideas, it demonstrates the pervasive dissemination of the paradigm amongst the media.
Similarly, benign accounts of culture’s role in city regeneration are demonstrated in accounts of “coffee shops, restaurants, bookstores, an aesthetically pleasant downtown” (Paquette, 2008, p. 307). “vibrant” places, and discourses of creativity as “raising and changing the profile of the city” and “rejuvenating entire neighbourhoods” (O’Dwyer, 2010, n.p.). This has cumulatively resulted in a meritocratic and sustainable media narrative of positive urban development, with a focus on liveability and optimism (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009).

Further, though there has been opposition to the creative city among certain artists’ groups (as detailed in Chapter One: 1.2.2), the positive perception of the creative city is upheld by many artists and arts administrators, who, though they may not have read Florida’s work, appear “enthusiastic” about it (Markusen, 2006, p. 1935). Artists are also claimed to be appreciative of the access to international work that a creative city can bring (ibid., p. 1936), and acknowledge the visibility and status the paradigm affords them (Oakley, 2009a, p. 4). Though this approval is likely influenced by the dependence of artists on public subsidy and their need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public (by appearing to be useful for city development), the active participation of artists and arts workers creates a wide base of policy and practitioner support for the creative city concept. The outlay of benefits arising from the creative city, therefore, essentially suggests tangible and identifiable (and defensible) uses for culture, increasing the legitimacy of the discourse and an apparent public return on investment.

38 See also Starr (2008)
3.9 The persuasiveness of the creative city

Taken together, in light of the creative city’s key themes (culture as attraction factor, investment) and historical and contemporary genealogies of post-industrialism (neoliberalism, the economy, society, lifestyle, well-being, creativity, development, innovation, entrepreneurialism, etc.), it can be viewed as operating within the *meta* and nominalising (see 2.4.3) discourse of capitalism. This *meta* discourse frames economic and market-oriented discussions of creativity in cities as neutral processes with “silent births” (Foucault, 1972, p. 154), comprising “already speaking” or prepared concepts (*ibid.*, 1981, p. 48) without any apparent source. The genealogy of the terms investment, success, prosperity and mobility associated with the creative city, can be viewed as concomitant with the principle of accumulation embodied in the ideology of capitalism.

Equally, the use of repetitive and particular lexicons (attraction, talent, harnessing, etc.) provide instantly recognisable and branded creative city concepts, reassuring in their familiarity and talismanic in their impact. These discourses also leverage often competing (as above) optimistic, meritocratic and neoliberal ideologies, centring on attracting private investment, workers and talent, through the symbolic glamour of culture, within a compelling and legitimising hybrid of creativity (as both a value system, process and a brand), the economy, society and the civic community. Additionally, the formulaic nature of the creative city offers an easy-to-follow and memorable model (i.e., the three Ts, develop cultural amenities and you will attract business, tourists and workers), with charismatic champions (Florida), and, compared with tackling embedded social problems, is cheap, ensuring a “fast policy transfer” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397). This analysis will be further developed in Chapter Six.
The persuasiveness of the creative city, however, is also dependent on the genealogy of the creative city.

3.10 Urban development discourses and histories, explicit and implicit cultural policies

As such, the creative city can be viewed as part of the archaeology of city discourses originating in ancient Greek scholarship (e.g., Plato’s Republic) concerning the role and ethical life of the city and the origins of democracy and the citizen (also referred to in Landry’s civil society and public sphere iterations). However, the creative city paradigm as a model of aspirational urban life, finds expression that is more contemporary in moral accounts from the 19th century industrial revolution in Britain. These accounts span Enlightenment discourses of progress and cosmopolitanism, to counter-discourses of chaotic, rapidly expanding and increasingly complex urban life. Moralising discourses of the city first arose out of fears of the massive influx of workers into cities that accompanied the industrial revolution and the profound social and cultural changes that the revolution represented (Sennett, 2006), creating a new movement of writers and thinkers concerned with how people should live (ibid., p. 328).

As with many discourses of the time, however, these discourses were dichotomously positioned along romantic and utilitarian lines, chiefly characterised by disapproving narratives of unhealthy cities and the perceived loss of nature (in the face of massive industrialisation). This was reflected in “mythicised” narratives “of a dystopia in the metropolises and mega-cities” (Jayne, 2004, p. 135) and was amplified in discourses of the 19th century utopian “garden city”, linking alternative ways of living to morally inscribed purer and better ways of life (ibid.). Both of these discourses can be viewed as
romantic and quasi-moral and were in competition with rational or utilitarian pro-revolution accounts of industrial progress and benefit. More particularly, these accounts foreground urban planning and the benign premise and possibility of *creative cities*.

The contemporary precursor to the paradigm, however, lies in the interest shown in cities following the devastation of World War II, and the consequent response to negative perceptions of cities as degraded, depleted and crime-ridden (as exemplified by New York) (Bianchini, 1993). Post-war urban devastation followed a combination of de-industrialisation and the exceptional growth of, the US (at first) and European suburban model (*ibid.*). In the US, the 1970s saw community development and urban design groups respond to this neglect by considering the wider creative potential of cities in community development (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008). These movements were synonymous with the pioneering work of urban planner Jane Jacobs (who was highly influential on Florida) who proposed new ways to organise and negotiate urban space and buildings (*ibid.*, p. 3). However, there were major political and economic developments at this time which also impacted on urban development narratives in the West.

These were the global recessions of the 1970s and 1980s and concomitant social changes that reflected new consumer demands and framings of city *lifestyles* (Bianchini, 1993, p. 1). The context to these changes was the emergence of neoliberalism and urban entrepreneurialism in the US and Europe which contributed to a renewed interest in cities as income generators, and reflected the demand for new spaces in which to live, spend leisure time, or play. This movement was met by a combination of city authorities working with private developers, and in some cities (New York), cultural interests, led
by a patrician elite who had discovered the social prestige of modern art (Zukin, 1988). Along with broader policy rationalisms that also emerged from the recessions, this new urban movement drove an interest in economic valuations of culture, and in particular, its strategic usefulness to cities “for the benefit of the middle and upper classes” (Rosler, 2010, p. 3). This new valuation was led by the recognition of culture’s ability to lend symbolic glamour and allure to property developers’ projects, which ultimately resulted in monopoly rents. This activity was characterised by the privatisation of public spaces through property development and slum clearances, publicly subsidised city development and critically, the state facilitating the generation of private sector wealth (Harvey, 1989, p. 7). Effectively, therefore, these events highlighted the delicate balance of city investment and development for the benefit of citizens and putative taxpayers, and the private wealth-creation of developers and investors, in new models of public/private partnerships.

In the 1980s, this interest in the city and its economic and cultural potential (as well as the relationship between the two) became of central interest to municipal authorities, shifting from the US to Europe and then Australia (Landry, 2006; Cherbo, Stewart, and Wyzsomirski, 2008). Like concepts of lifestyle, new concepts such as the “night-time economy” (Wynne, 1992, p. 15) and “24-hour city” (O’Connor, 2007, p. 34) mobilised around culture, along with EU-influenced “quality of life” discourses (Vickery, 2011, p. 7). The growth of urban think tanks such as Comedia also reflected this movement (established in 1978), and was key to the initial popularisation of the creative city concept in the UK, though the term itself was first iterated in Australia in the late 1980s (Landry, 2006).

39Quality of life discourses are reputed to have been influenced by the urban regeneration policies of the Council of Europe in the late 1970s, through the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance: 1982 – 1986 (Vickery, 2011, p. 7).
The role of the cultural industries within cities and regions was also central to the positioning of culture and creativity in urban and place development, particularly in the UK, and became representative of sustainable and entrepreneurial development, as well as key to place-making strategies. The growth of these industries in the 1980s and the role of cities in promoting them, has been linked to neoliberalism’s meritocratic championing of individualism, the centrality of the market, heroically-framed freelancers, the self-employed (such as the precariat), the growth of micro-businesses, and the broader enforced DIY culture of the impoverished Thatcher era (O’Connor, 2007, pp. 26-31). This benign narrative of dynamism, professionalism and entrepreneurialism, therefore, was essentially born out of necessity and severe economic hardship (Harvey, 1989, p. 4; O’Connor, 2007, p. 36). The result of these difficulties was a reassessment of the role of culture in society by policymakers and a new demand for a return on public investment beyond that of symbolically representing the patrician state. This demand drove the need for greater advocacy and research into the economic value of culture, which, together with the cultural industries and urban and regional development, fed directly into discourses of culture and the economy in city development.

By the early 1990s in the UK, the nomenclature of the creative city had been proposed by think-tank Comedia (for which Landry worked), who had instigated a formal creative city strategy for Glasgow in 1991 to coincide with its City of Culture status (Comedia, 1991). However, the EU was equally instrumental in driving (and funding) regional development discourses via its Structural Funds, directed at the more depressed parts of Europe (Evans and Foord, 1999), as Chapter Six will demonstrate. The place-development focus of the Structural Funds complemented the EU’s new role
in European cultural policy (via the Maastricht Treaty of 1993),\footnote{With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, cultural policy acquired a legal basis on a complementary and subsidiary basis in European policy terms under Article 151. Available: \url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_17_0_en.htm} [Accessed 29 June 2011].} and the central role of the Knowledge Economy in Europe’s Lisbon Agenda (2000). This agenda reflects many of the targets of the creative city (and trope of the creative worker) in aiming to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Commission, 2006a, p1).\footnote{See also Europe’s Digital Competitiveness Report (European Commission, 2010c).} The Lisbon treaty was also notable for its championing of public and private initiatives, the development of new funding streams and consequently the creation of semi-state bodies. More recently, the \textit{United Nations Agenda 21 for Culture}, has aimed to make culture an “indispensable dimension for [sustainable] development” (United Cities and Local Governments, 2004, p. 1) and made a “commitment to ensure that culture takes a key role in urban policies” (ibid., p.2).\footnote{The Agenda 21 for Culture report also underlines that “culture lies at the heart of urban strategies, not just due to its intrinsic vocation of promoting human rights, shaping the knowledge society and improving quality of life for all, but also on account of its role in the creation of employment, urban regeneration and social inclusion” (United Cities and Local Governments, 2004, p. 1).} Equally, the blueprint “\textit{Europe 2020}” report, a “strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (European Commission, 2010a), has continued the Lisbon Treaty’s linking of knowledge and innovation as part of the evolving genealogy between culture, creativity, knowledge, and innovation, though it omits explicit references to culture or the arts.\footnote{See \textit{The Contribution of Culture to the Implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, Conference held in Budapest, 28 February – 1 March, 2011, Budapest. Available: \url{http://www.kulturpont.hu/culture2020/HANDBOOK.pdf} [Accessed 18 September 2012]. See also Chapter Four (4.3.4).} These events gave added impetus to culture and development discourses and ensured the traction, sustainability and “dispersion” (\textit{Foucault}, 1972, p. 41) of the creative city.\footnote{More recent EU initiatives include the \textit{Livelocities project} which aimed to “reclaim public space for public use”, funded through the EU INTERREG IVB programme. Available: \url{http://www.livelocities.eu/urban-lifestyle-point-ulp-rubrique-15.htm} [Accessed 31 July 2012].}
In aggregate, a number of factors point to the development of the creative city. These factors were: post-war urban revivalism; economic pressures created by the consecutive recessions of the 1970s and 1980s; the growth of neoliberalism and urban entrepreneurialism; the development of public/private partnerships; the growth in consumer demand for lifestyle products and liveable cities; new concepts such as quality of life; the growth of community development organisations; the emergence of the cultural industries and regional development agenda; the emergence and influence of managerialism in governments; EU and UN funding-led developments, and, ultimately, the coalition of economic, urban, cultural and geographic discourses. By the late 1990s therefore, the term creative was sedimented and monumentalised within documents, projects and policy proposals, in both cultural and non-cultural contexts such that the relationship between urban and cultural policy had been described as “inseparable” (Worpole, 1991, p. 143, cited in McGuigan, 1996, p. 95). This took place in tandem with evolving concepts of culture-led regeneration, cultural regeneration and cultural planning (Landry, 2006), creating powerful “regimes of thought” (Foucault, 1980, p. 81) with discursive “rules of right” (ibid., p. 93). 45

By 2000 (as Landry’s seminal work “The Creative City” was published), the creative city paradigm was established in municipal and academic contexts as a flexible, persuasive and relatively cheap approach to city marketing, development and competition, privileging private sector investment on the pretext of innovative urban development and vibrant creative economies. This paradigm of urban development offered a tangible economic rationale for investing in culture and creativity - or a cultural rationale for investing in the economy - promising uniquely attractive (both

45 Culture-led regeneration refers to cultural activity acting as “the catalyst and engine of regeneration.” Cultural regeneration, by contrast, refers to the integration of cultural activity into an area strategy “alongside other activities in the environmental, social and economic sphere” (IFACCA, 2006, p. 6).
socially and culturally) cities, with competitive and flexible workers, mobilised around a lucrative knowledge economy and healthy international investment. The international success and reach of the creative (city) brand was reflected in signposting initiatives by diplomatic agencies such as UNESCO’s Creative Cities Network, the British Council’s Creative Cities’ programme, and as referred to earlier, UNESCO’s Districts of Creativity. The creative city, therefore, though a specific example of urban development, can be viewed as a specific and dominant cultural / and or economic discourse that aims to influence and instrumentally work on the “culture of the territory over which it presides” in order to create attractive places that appeal to creative workers and businesses (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143). As such, the creative city paradigm can be viewed as an “implicit” mode of cultural policy (ibid.).

3.11 Key criticisms
Despite this success and approval from certain artistic quarters, the creative city has generated a number of criticisms from what Florida has called “squelchers” (Florida, 2007, p. 44). These criticisms can be categorised as social, methodological and economic, and come from both the political right and left. Criticisms of the creative city from the right, which are mainly directed at Florida, underline the equivocal and nominalising nature of creative city discourses and relate to what are viewed as implausible and unproven economic claims for cities (Malanga, 2004, n.p.). These claims are: that the creative city equivocates between incompatible right and left ideologies of free markets and competition, with investment in amenities and services, talking the “economic-development talk while walking the familiar big-spending walk” (ibid.); that it promotes high-income jobs without lowering taxes or depleting services,

the “equivalent of an eat-all-you-want-and-still-lose-weight diet” (ibid.); and that the creative city presents “liberal havens as models of growth” (Lovink and Rossiter, 2007, p. 30). Many of these criticisms, therefore, concern the juxtaposing of competing but legitimising regimes of thought. The greatest volume of dissent, however, has come from the left.

Central to these (left) criticisms of the creative city, is the representation of creativity as offering “almost any solution to perceived urban problems” and thereby glossing over deeper social issues (McRobbie, 2004, p. 189). Equally, the paradigm is charged with compounding social inequalities by its exclusion of non-creatives (Markusen, 2006, p. 1922; Bayliss, 2007, p. 892) and that it “bowdlerises social-scientific reasoning” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292). The paradigm is also criticised for its promotion of a “zero-sum” competition for “mobile public and private investments” (Peck, 2005, p. 761); its focus on the young and privileged middle classes (Bayliss, 2007, p. 892); its celebration of late 20th century atomisation and singularity (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Atkinson and Easthope, 2009); its avoidance of fundamental issues of “citizenship and democracy” (Scott, 2006, p. 15) despite its discourse of public space and participation; its focus on tourists, rather than citizens (Markusen, 2006, p. 1924); its nominalised representation of contingent neoliberal values and processes through discourses of urban entrepreneurialism, monopoly rent and tropes of “collective symbolic capital” (Pasquinelli, 2007, p. 20) and, given the role of culture in the paradigm, that Florida is “not much at all interested in cultural policy itself” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292).

This emphasis on the mining of symbolic capital in cities (Harvey, 1990, p. 256), as represented through urban entrepreneurialism (depending on visual architectural and
cultural tropes).\textsuperscript{47} refers to the concept of \textit{simulacra} and is one of the key ideological criticisms of the creative city. The simulacrum is derived from Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulation based on the generation of a “real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” ... “map” that determines and “precedes” the real (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 2). Simulacrum in this respect refers to societies having lost touch with the real world due to the gradual replacement of reality with superficial image, where representation comes to \textit{determine} rather than \textit{reflect} the real and there is a “state of such near perfect replication that the difference between the original and the copy becomes almost impossible to spot” (David Harvey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 183). The simulacrum, therefore, obfuscates some cultural forms in favour of others.

The \textit{spectacle} is another key term associated with urban entrepreneurialism and was coined by Guy Debord (1970).\textsuperscript{48} In contrast to the \textit{replacement} of the real and deception implied by the simulacrum, the spectacle refers to a \textit{distraction} from the real in the form of mediated social relationships, as posited by Adorno and Horkheimer’s theories of the spectacularisation of culture through the perpetual, and always unrealised, promise of mass culture (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 139).

The creative city is also criticised on epistemological grounds (as levelled by criticisms from the right) for its “unsubstantiated” claims (O’Connor, 2007, p. 39) and lack of “evidence” (Glaesar, 2005, p. 596); misunderstandings between correlation and causality, especially in relation to the 3 Ts (Clark, 2004, p. 15; Musterd et al., 2010, p. 271; Ozimek, 2012); its avoidance of the question of whether attracting people to one

\textsuperscript{47} See also Chapter Three (3.4, footnote #28).
\textsuperscript{48} As a concept, the \textit{spectacle} is closely associated with Guy Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle” concerned with how the “entire life” of societies that are driven by the capitalist principle of production, “announce[s] itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles” which distract from reality, in lieu of “representation” (Debord, 1970, 1).
place is at the expense of another (Bille, 2006, p. 1068); being simplistic or “fast” (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397); reducing and simplifying problems of work, labour and capital (Prichard et al., 2006, p. 519) and “too intuitively appealing for the good of our[its] cities” (Jayne, 2004, p. 239).

Finally, other criticisms of the creative city ironically constitute its strengths, which are that Florida is “skilled at combining the ideas of others” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 292) and his paradigm: breathes “new life into an old argument” (Malanga, 2005, n.p.); is successful not because it is “revolutionary” but because it is “so modest” (Peck, 2005, p. 760) and equally, that it “would hardly be spreading like wildfire if they [it] represented a revolutionary challenge to the neoliberal status quo” (ibid., 2007, n.p.). This is particularly the case in relation to Florida’s championing of human capital through the creative classes (reflecting concepts such as Robert Reich’s symbol analysts, Daniel Bell’s information workers and Peter Drucker’s knowledge workers), the use of industrial clustering and agglomeration theories (originally pioneered by Alfred Marshall), spatial regeneration discourses more generally (Jane Jacobs and later the EU) and the concept of linking culture to city regeneration (earlier advanced in Myerscough, 1988 and Wynne, 1992).

An interesting outcome of this critical debate has been Florida’s rejoinder to his critics, in claims that their “heated rhetoric” baffles him (Florida, 2007, p. 41), but also his tacit though equivocal acknowledgment of social critiques of the creative city. This is demonstrated in Florida’s statements calling for “new forms of social cohesion appropriate to the new Creative age” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx) and his acceptance that there are inequalities in “leading creative regions” which he, nevertheless, calls
“externalities of the creative age” (Florida, 2005, p. 171). This equivocal recognition of the creative city’s problematics, in the context of persuasion and pragmatism will be further discussed in Chapter Six (6.3).

3.12 Artists and culture in the creative city

Notwithstanding these critiques, however, there are significant and under-represented problems with how the paradigm positions artists and culture more generally, with implications for how the discourse is used in cultural circles to legitimate cultural activity. One of the key criticisms of artists in relation to the creative city is their association with, if not links to, regeneration initiatives (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 2010). The link between artists and regeneration has led some to focus their ire on artists as much as Florida, in claims that cultural workers have little connection to economic development or job creation, but a lot to do with gentrification, driving up the cost of living, furnishing “bobo-friendly” amenities” (Malanga, 2004, n.p.), softening up the neighbourhood for capital development and diverting funding away from more deserving community funding, with the effect of polarising cultural and community groups (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p 71).

Similarly, criticisms of the role of creative workers in helping to develop and prop up new strains of capitalism have grown over the past decades (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 2010), and are exemplified in the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002). These authors argue that it was partly the precarity or economic vulnerability of artists or cultural workers willing to support their own artistic

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49 Bobo refers to bourgeois bohemian or bohemian bourgeois, made popular by David Brooks in 2000 to refer to liberal, tolerant and corporate groups, that reconcile “the Protestant work ethic and the bohemian ethic” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 293).
production, and demanding more flexible models of labour, which led to the “New Spirit of Capitalism” (ibid.). This movement was characterised by self-inscribed autonomy, self-regulation and entrepreneurialism, represented by the precarious model of creative labour of the “super-creative” classes (Florida, 2002, p. 9). The result of this was a social transformation and new “connexionist” or “network” variant of capital (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2002, p. 9), constituting a “third form of capitalism” (ibid., p. 4). This variant of capitalism, via the creative city, depends on precarity to make a profit, and produces and champions this model as a “justificatory regime” for its (capitalism’s) continued existence (ibid., p. 7).

Nevertheless, as suggested above, though artists have supported the creative city concept (Oakley, 2009a, p. 4), were active in the development of the New York loft movement and consequently the displacement of tenants in the 1970s (Zukin, 1988), have often been “pressed into service” by governments (Fanning, 2011, n.p.) and have even “produced according to command” (Rosler, 2010, p. 10), the exception is more typically the case. This was demonstrated in Hamburg and Toronto through anti-Florida urban development groups respectively called Not in Our Name and Creative Class Struggle as Chapter One outlined, comprising artists and other workers protesting at socially inequitable regeneration initiatives and the symbolic harnessing of the creative brand to advance a fundamentally private sector and exclusive initiative. As such, some have pointed out that artists themselves are caught up in and more adversely affected by the rises in living costs associated with “gentrification” (Rosler, 2010, p. 6) and are rarely the beneficiaries of such urban strategies (Rosler, 2010); that “being conscripted to the creative class has not yielded to artists the economic privilege that their presence is said to breed” (Daly, 2004, n.p.); that “arts trophy-focused expenditures and
strategies” place artists at the centre of key government and municipal decision-making, ascribing them far greater power than they in reality possess, but that equally that they are “unwitting, individualized dupes” of neoliberal competitive cities (Markusen, 2006, pp. 1935-1936); and conversely, that “artists and art businesses do have the ability to enhance local economies and transform neighbourhoods” without compromising communities but need the right “regulatory practices to address market forces” (Stewart, 2008, p. 125).

Other problems with Florida’s creative classes are the circular logic of positing that “artists are included in the creative class, as those to be attracted, but they're also positioned as the bait to attract themselves as part of that class” (Daly, 2004, n.p.); the professional disparity of the creative classes (as indicated by precarity versus stability); and Florida’s lack of acknowledgment of the creative class’s potential to lead urban and social transformation rather than merely signify it (Markusen, 2006). Ironically, research also suggests the super-creative classes in the US “disproportionately work and live in suburbs” rather than cities, further undermining Florida’s core argument (ibid., p. 1923).

Despite criticisms of the relationship between the creative city and simulacra and spectacle (Harvey, 1990), the exclusivity of the creative classes (McGuigan, 2009) and the complicity of artists and designers in private developments in relation to gentrification and regeneration (Zukin, 1988; Rosler, 2010), however, little critical attention has been paid to Florida’s attitude to culture and cultural practitioners within the creative city. Florida harbours a negative romanticism towards artists, of whom by his own admission, he lacks understanding (Florida, 2007, p. 41). This is demonstrated
by his view of artists as essentially uninterested in money, mainly wanting to “hone their skills and do their art” and “if they can make money in the process, that’s wonderful” (Florida, 2002, p. 201). Essentially, this shows how Florida is “content to imagine that artists just want to practice, without much aspiration toward a living wage” (Daly, 2004, n.p.), emphasising again the financially-disparate nature of the creative class. More critically, this factor points to Florida’s lack of interest in the sustainability of creativity, i.e., how artists actually make a living and how a place can be creative without providing professional opportunities for creatives. Additionally, by focusing on the outcome rather than production or process of creativity, this approach lacks interest in the process of cultural production. As such, while it has been claimed that Florida is not “motivated at all by the usual concerns of cultural policy” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 295), it is not clear that the usual concerns of cultural policy are so different from Florida’s work. This has implications for culture which will be further discussed in Chapter Seven.

3.13 Private development in the creative city

While these criticisms are diverse, a significant problem with the creative city paradigm and thus public policy, is the political, social and democratic implications of a paradigm that positions culture as representing a “particular set of class interests and [a] reading of the world” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 298) by strategically working to achieve urban competition. The collusion of these interests comprising property developers and capital owners with marketers and public authorities (and sometimes artists), therefore, is

50Florida’s negligent attitude to artists is supported by his response to a comment on the high ranking of Austin (Texas) on his Creative Class website, in light of the lack of opportunities for most musicians there. Florida pointed out that the index only indicated the presence (or spectacle) of creativity, not what professional opportunities might exist for artists/ musicians, a secondary concern. Available: www.creativeclass.com [Accessed 20 March 2009].
central to the creative city, leading many to view the funding of urban development programmes as constructed specifically for private, rather than public, gain.  

Urban development practices, urban entrepreneurialism and civic boosterism are typically facilitated through models of public subsidy and tax incentives, as well as public-private partnerships working in tandem with the process of “flexible accumulation” (Harvey, 1989, p. 5). These partnerships involve the speculative movement of private capital, investment and workers (such as the creative classes) from one competing city to another. This movement of investment from city to city is consistent with globalisation (and businesses moving according to whichever tax regime suits) and the transition from location-based Fordist, to post-industrial mobile manufacturing or production, in the context of intense competition (from countries and cities) for development capital and the perceived need to create a “‘good business climate’ ” (ibid., p. 11). This process will be demonstrated to be a driving factor in the cultural policies of the sample cases.

The speculative, unplanned, flexible and uncommitted nature of this investment, results in an uneven development, that devalues the city’s community assets, and, crucially, its public goods, as well as generally promoting diversionary “urban spectacles” and “display”, as referred to earlier (ibid., p. 9). As above (see 3.4), these city spectacles are often delivered through cultural trophies that include Starchitecture and intentionally monumental, iconic and emblematic landmarks (and large in scale). Key to understanding problems with the concept of the spectacle (rather than simulacrum), are

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51 Dublin has plans for a new cultural quarter that is being largely financed by US based private international property company, Kennedy Wilson. See Chapter Five (5.5.2) and Reilly (2013).

52 Low corporate taxation directed at attracting major international knowledge economy businesses such as Google and Facebook, has been central to Ireland’s industrial policies and is a major source of criticism from the international community (also competing for investment). See Irish Examiner (2013).
comparisons with the “ancient Roman formula for social pacification of the restless plebs”, using visual displays as instruments of “social control” designed to distract, distort and eschew criticism (Harvey, 1990, p. 257). The role of spectacle, therefore, vis-à-vis private development in the creative city, is linked to creating “dramatized visual environments” in cities (Scott, 2006, p. 15). This frames the state as a distorher of reality and again, as a “facilitator” for the strategic interests of capitalist development, where “the public sector assumes the risk and the private sector takes the benefits”, rather than constructions of the state as a “stabilizer of capitalist society” (Harvey, 1989, p. 7). As the role of the state is to balance the rights of the public with the markets and private sector (Parsons, 1995, pp. 8 - 12), this precarious balancing of the state and market is at the heart of democratic capitalism, \(^{53}\) liberal democracies and legitimation of the state, as well as debates about the creative city.

This alludes to a further implication that arises from the dependence of the creative city on the private sector in respect of its devaluing of public goods, as indicated above (Harvey, 1989, p. 9). While the “‘pure’ public good” has been “subject to (growing) impurity” (Parsons, 1995, p. 11), one of the key principles of liberalism (and liberal democracies) is that those who challenge the security of property or the market threaten the “realization of the public good” (Held, 2006, p 76), or the freedom of the market. As the creative city endorses urban development and thus private interests and securities, the suggestion is that these entities represent a public good, despite not being “available to all” (Parsons, 1995, p. 10). This issue will be further explored in Chapter Seven.

\(^{53}\) Democratic capitalism is defined as “a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles, or regimes, of resource allocation: one operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a ‘free play of market forces’, and the other based on social need or entitlement, as certified by the collective choices of democratic politics” (Streeck, 2011, p. 7).
3.14 Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that the creative city paradigm is a broad, flexible and highly successful discourse and model of urban development whose genealogy draws on a range of persuasive and often conflicting culture and creativity discourse formations and economic “regimes of thought” (Foucault, 1980, p. 81). Though heavily critiqued and with potentially negative implications for culture, this chapter has investigated the “archive” (Foucault, 1972, p. 148) of the creative city and demonstrated genealogically how the paradigm has built on earlier historical discourses (via national and EU policies) that intersect with culture. These discourses were argued to be based around urban and regional development narratives working in tandem with culture and creativity and in the context of capitalism, to create successful and competitive places by building attractive cultural amenities and attracting high earning creative classes and therefore investment. This discourse works to make culture more visible (tangible) and to make artists appear more useful by embedding their respective narratives within capitalist and neoliberal frameworks A new criticism of the paradigm’s negative approach to culture was also posited in this chapter, focusing on its neglect of the conditions necessary to sustain cultural creativity in particular.

This chapter has also indicated that the power and legitimacy of the creative city lies in its simplicity, branding appeal, strategic and apparently progressive and enlightenment-influenced discourses of culture, creativity and the economy (as well as attraction, harnessing and talent), effectively leveraging both utilitarian and romantic models of culture, which juxtapose conflicting values and regimes. Similarly, this chapter has shown how the creative city paradigm simultaneously draws on benign civil society creativity discourses, positing creativity as free, democratic and a “great leveller”
(Florida, 2007, p. 35) and is a nominalising and dominating economic discourse that equates private interests with the public good. This regime of thought, therefore, promulgates the compelling blend of (private) competitive economic development with (publically funded) social and cultural activity. In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated that the creative city is a key urban development, post-industrial and knowledge economy discourse with significant benefits for a marginal policy sector in need of new narratives. Having established the imperatives and economic and social appeal of the creative city, the next chapter will consider the connections between, and research warrant for, the precise relationship between the creative city and cultural policy, vis-à-vis culture, discourses of creativity and policy/the state.
CHAPTER FOUR: CULTURE, CREATIVITY AND CULTURAL POLICY

4.1 General introduction

The last chapter discussed the creative city paradigm in detail and introduced the confluence of political-economic and socio-cultural forces that led to the alignment of urban development discourses with implicit and explicit cultural policies. As part of this, the chapter described and analysed the flexible creative city narrative of culture, creativity, industrial development and city prosperity, outlining its appeal to various constituencies and legitimacy sources, in the context of neoliberal development and cultural investment. This chapter addresses the extent of current knowledge and debate, as well as the inconsistencies and gaps in relation to the three analytical pillars of the research: the general field of cultural policy, the specific construct of the creative city paradigm and the relationship between the two. In order to do this, the chapter considers the terminologies, discourses and contingencies of cultural policy, through analysing the literatures and genealogies of culture and creativity.

This chapter will build on concepts introduced in Chapter One by describing the contested nature of culture, in order to understand difficulties in its interpretation, relationship to, and administration by, the state, and its role in paradigms such as the creative city. Following an investigation of key conceptions of culture, this chapter will point out the shifting discourse and trajectory of creativity, which, it is claimed, acts as a bridging discourse between the creative city and cultural policy. It will assert that, like culture, creativity offers an attractive discourse of both hard (economic) and soft (cultural) power. The chapter will then outline the key principles of cultural policy, with a strong emphasis on its varied definitions, the position of the state, the principles of
policy in general, the role of the private sector, and public and bureaucratic legitimations, rationales and uses for culture. To conclude, the chapter will consider the significance and inevitabilities of rational discourses, variously advocating for (and against) and justifying culture in different ways at different times and its relationship to the often compromised and cynical relationship between the state, the cultural sector and the public. In doing this, the chapter will highlight the complexities, shifts, and interdependencies between cultural policy and the creative city, contemplating what is at stake in their relationship, the various value systems that determine the support of culture by the state, and in particular, the role of utility, instrumentalism, autonomy, hierarchies and the private sector.

4.2 Culture

4.2.1 Introduction to culture

Chapter Three has argued that the creative city paradigm speaks to a number of persuasive propositions around the utility of culture and creativity. It has also been suggested in Chapter Two, that discourses of cultural policy and the creative city embody dialectical and resistant discourses on questions of use and ethical value in relation to culture (in particular that of goods), and are driven by a hierarchical and political territorialism. The “struggle” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that this discourse represents contrasts a sacred (and moral), with a utilitarian, understanding of culture or cultural value and defines the intersection of, and stakes in relation to, the creative city and cultural policy. Before considering cultural policy in detail, therefore, it is necessary to outline the precise nature of resistance around the term culture.
The extraordinary collision of concepts, discourses and struggles surrounding understandings of culture (and creativity) is testament to the commonly cited claim that culture is an “exceptionally complex term” (Williams, 1981, p. 10). As such, discourses of culture are part of a “long-running, shifting, international discourse” (Kuper, 1999, p. ix), spanning a number of disciplines (Gray, 2010a, p. 219), as well as “incompatible systems of thought” (Williams, 1976, p. 87). Descriptions of culture also refer to its “richness” (Hall, 1980, p. 58) and multi-functionality, pointing to culture as historically invaluable to the ruling classes through providing malleable “vehicle[s] for government programs of one sort or another” (O’Regan, 2001, p. 30).

4.2.2 Culture Part I: concepts of culture

Though there are a number of models of culture, three interpretations are dominant: the arts or expressive culture (currently the most dominant), a way of life (customs and habits, etc.), and a standard of perfection (Williams, 1965).  Specifically, expressive culture concerns the “body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human thought and experience are variously recorded” (also called the documentary approach and consistent with the arts) (ibid., p. 57); a way of life involves the creation of “certain meanings and values implicit and explicit” (also called the anthropological or social approach) (ibid.); and, finally, a standard of perfection refers to the representation of absolute or universal human values or the “state or process of human perfection” (also called the ideal approach) (ibid.).

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1 There are a number of significant historic and contemporary scholars concerned with culture, including: Adorno and Horkheimer (1940s), Hannah Arendt (1960s), and more recently, Terry Eagleton (2000), Tony Bennett (1998), and Jim McGuigan (1992; 1996; 1997), amongst others.  
2 Eagleton suggests that Williams had not three but four models: the arts, a way of life, a habit of mind, and the state of intellectual development of a whole society (Eagleton, 2000, p. 34).
This latter interpretation represents the moralising or ethical view (and discourses) of culture and is synonymous with the work of 19th century English critic (and teacher) Mathew Arnold (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 29). Arnold viewed culture as the antithesis of and a necessary moral response to anarchy and the social crises of his time (Williams, 2005, p. 3) and his writings have had a huge impact on common understandings of culture as separate from the everyday and from ordinary activity. As a result, it has been claimed that enduring perceptions of culture as an elite term or practice, are linked to the “hostility” that developed in the 19th and 20th centuries towards Arnold’s view of culture, as well as unwelcome post-World War I associations with German Kultur (Williams, 1976, p. 92; Eagleton, 2000, p. 82).

This view of culture as extra-ordinary, or as perfection, however, is synonymous with the expressive or arts-based model of culture and, as section 4.4.10 will outline, is the model of culture generally targeted within governments (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 27). As a result, these paradigms are interdependent and mutually implicit,3 and typically conflate to two apparently simple models, high culture (documented expressions), retaining overtones of the ideal and elite approach, and culture as a way of life, representing the anthropological approach (Hall, 1980, p. 59). These understandings of culture represent common views of what culture is.

Wider definitions of culture refer to its applications, benefits and characteristics, or what it does, though both categories (is and does) overlap. As such, many descriptions of

3 The claim that Williams rejected Mathew Arnold’s view of culture as a form of human perfection is challenged by Bennett who says that Williams does not replace Arnold’s view of high culture, as many say, but situates culture as a way of life within a “social evolutionary version of the view that culture constitutes a norm of human perfection” (Bennett, 1998, p. 95). Eagleton also posits that “culture as a way of life is also a product of high art thinking – it is a product of intellectuals and represents the ‘primordial other’ they need to revitalise their societies” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 24).
culture refer to its \textit{symbolic} properties, and thus emphasise \textit{meaning-generation} and \textit{communication}, including: the “production and circulation of symbolic meanings” (McGuigan, 1996, p. 1); “the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences” (Hall, 1980, p. 58); a “wide range of signifying practices that include the products of the media, the arts and various forms of government or religious display” (The International Conference on Cultural Policy Research);\textsuperscript{4} and even more broadly, a “standard of perfection, a habit of mind, the arts, general intellectual development, whole way of life, a signifying system, a structure of feeling, the interrelation of elements in a way of life, and everything from economic production and the family to political institutions” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 36). This description of culture underlines definitional difficulties, and reflects UNESCO’s equally wide definition which comprises “the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group ... not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO, 1982, n.p.).

While these definitions and descriptions of culture are diverse, they situate culture centrally in Habermas’s theory of the public sphere and communicative action (Habermas, 1987, p. 126). However, the wideness of the anthropological model of culture (as above) has led to irritated claims that it is “too loose to enable any actual rights or duties to be built upon it” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 25), needs a more “limited definition of aspects of some overall, aggregate culture” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, pp. 26-27) and is thus “slippery” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 28). These statements point to the difficulties of government intervention in the wider

\textsuperscript{4}Available: \url{http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/10286632.asp} [Accessed 14 September 2011].
cultural area and raise questions of capacity, but also political will (in terms of the ethnic differences, multiple cultures etc.), and thus only partly explain the common practice of using the narrower arts model of culture in government.

4.2.2.1 Contestations around culture and culture’s dualism

As a result of these discourses, therefore, culture lacks any one universal concept and has “no single, unproblematic definition” (Hall, 1980, p. 59). This nebulosity has led to a dialectical and ideological dualism within models of culture, again, symptomatic of resistance and a discursive struggle (Foucault, 1980, p. 83). The struggle within culture is also highlighted in understandings of culture as always facing “both ways” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 5), embodying two apparently irreconcilable or resistant concepts. This is demonstrated in claims that “if politics is what unifies, culture is what differentiates” (ibid., p. 58), and, equally, that if culture is part of the problem, it is also part of the solution (ibid., p. 21) and thus “symptomatic of a division which it offers to overcome” (ibid., p. 31).

Other framings of culture comprise: culture versus nature (Bennett, 1998, p. 78) or the “dialectic between artificial and the natural” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 2); culture as a spiritual artistic value versus culture as civilisation/a way of life, progress, and reason; culture versus anarchy (culture as control or civilisation and culture as resistant, both working for and through its resistant self against the state); high versus low culture (Bennett, 1998, p. 78), and, for the purposes of this research, aestheticism, or a valuing of
autonomous culture for its own inherent qualities versus utility or functionality (Kuper, 1999, p. 6).

These definitions have led to a lack of clarity around what is primarily cultural and what is not (McGuigan, 2004, p. 13; Gray, 2010a, p. 220), based on the acknowledgment that if culture is part of everything, then there is “no way in which the communication of descriptions, understood in this way, can be set aside and compared externally with other things” (Hall, 1980, p. 59), and thus that there is no such thing as cultural, or non-cultural. As indicated in the criticisms above, this frustration has led to claims that cultural definitions are “disablingly wide” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 32), “immodest and overweening”, and that culture should be put “back into its [their] place” (ibid., p. 131).

The concept of uselessness however, is central to unlocking the mobilisation, territorialism and uniqueness of culture. It is the (apparent) uselessness, or lack of singular or consensual functionality of culture, which paradoxically and simultaneously connotes culture’s very usefulness (and politicalness) in terms of its multiple symbolic effects. Though culture’s multiplicity and ability to be deployed to any number of functions (O’Regan, 2001, p. 30) may not represent what culture is, paradoxically, it can be viewed as culture’s intangible but “real” coherence (Sewell, 2005, p. 52). Together,

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5 This theme of dichotomy is also explored in struggles over the arts’ spiritual (universalism of culture) vs material values (the consumption of culture); and the arts vs science and technology (exemplars of reason and utility); as well as emotion vs reason (Kuper, 1999, p. 6).

6 The concept of art’s uselessness, and indeed the struggle between romanticism and utilitarianism, has interesting parallels in Oscar Wilde’s reference to the useful uselessness of art (as an aspect of culture) in the preface of The Picture of Dorian Gray: “the work of art is useless as a flower is useless. A flower blossoms for its own joy. We gain a moment of joy by looking at it. That is all that is to be said about our relations to flowers. Of course man may sell the flower, and so make it useful to him, but this has nothing to do with the flower. It is not part of its essence. It is accidental. It is a misuse” (from a letter following the publication of the novel). See Letters of note (2013) http://www.lettersofnote.com/2010/01/art-is-useless-because.html [Accessed 1 October 2013].
these discourses speak to culture as a flexible, porous, resistant, shifting, and ill-defined concept that is political, ideological, and though hugely useful, difficult for the state to administer, as section 4.4.1 will demonstrate.

4.2.2.2 The history and genealogy of the terms culture, civilisation and art

The genealogy of the term culture helps reveal the source of many of these tensions, and arises from its linguistic origin in agriculture from the Latin *colere*, meaning “to cultivate or tend nature” (Williams, 1976, p. 87). Culture, therefore, has shifted from a manual to an intellectual proposition (cultivating the mind) such that it traces “humanity’s own historic shift from [a] rural to [an] urban existence” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 1). The etymology of culture, which was only understood as an “independent noun” in the 18th century (Williams, 1976, p. 88), has resulted in its close association with the term *civilisation*, originating from the civil/citizens and broadly meaning the “condition of organised life” (Williams, 1976, p. 48).

Civilisation was another 18th century term (ibid., p. 89) which connoted both the process and achieved state of *self-development* and the “general spirit of the Enlightenment” (ibid., pp 48 – 49). As a consequence of this understanding, the “main use” of the term culture in the 18th century was as a synonym for civilisation in respect of understandings of culture as the cultivation of the mind and the “process of becoming civilised” (ibid., p. 89). Civilisation later became associated with the binary (us and them) and hierarchical approach of European colonialism (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 98), the patriarchal process of civilising, and later again, the concept of multiple cultures (Williams, 1976, pp. 87-89). As a result, civilisation has become a central theme of
cultural discourses and is synonymous with positive Enlightenment narratives of rationalism and “progress” (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 43).  

These links have resulted in a “triad” of concepts comprising Europe (culture), civilisation, and progress (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 26), and, via progress, truth and liberty (Foucault, 1984, n.p.). More recently, progress has been linked to (liberal democratic) discourses of innovation and economic development (Kenny, Larkin, MacSíthigh and Thijssen, 2009, p. 52; Schirato et al., 2012, p. 43), which has resulted in discursive “monument[s]” (Foucault, 1972, p. 8) and self-justifying genealogies between *culture, civilisation, Europe, progress, truth, liberty, innovation* and, as will be demonstrated (see 4.3), *creativity*.

Similarly, the term *art*, though now synonymous with high culture, used to refer to “any kind of skill” (Williams, 1976, p. 32). As such, art had an even wider range of applications than culture, from poetry to shipbuilding and carpentry (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, pp. 18-19), to the liberal arts in medieval times (including grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy), before its transformation into its narrower meaning from the 17th and 18th centuries (Williams, 1976, p. 33). As suggested in Chapter One, part of this transformation rested on hierarchical “changes in the practical division of labour and to fundamental changes in practical definitions of the *purposes* of the exercise of skill” (ibid., p. 34).

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7 The tradition of conflating or associating culture and civilisation has continued in Scotland, where culture is claimed to contribute to “civilised living” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.) and Finland where culture is repeatedly claimed to “underpin[s] civilisation” (Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 7).
4.2.2.3 The politics of culture: hierarchies, high culture, fine arts, art, utilitarianism and romanticism

The legitimising imperatives behind the new 18th century category of art, therefore, emerged out of defensive fine versus useful arts discourses (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, pp. 20-21). These discourses ultimately shaped understandings of instrumentalism as a moral issue for culture and comprised oppositional or dialectical narratives of improving, ethical or humanising (high) culture, alongside disimproving (low) discourses of culture (ibid., p. 179). Though originating in earlier centuries (ibid.), the popularisation of the term “fine arts” in the 18th century, in tandem with technological changes in cultural production, aimed to connote the “fruits of a special inspiration and of genius” and thus distinguish (and thus legitimate) artistic (connoting important, intellectual and moral) from “useful” (connoting unimportant, manual) cultural forms (ibid., p. 20). This ultimately resulted in the hierarchical separation of the (intellectual) artist from the (manual) artisan (ibid., Stapleton, 2002). The term high culture, therefore, as synonymous with the fine (moral) arts, emerged in the 18th century, having resisted other discourses, and fragmented earlier and wider understandings of culture (Woodmansee, 1984, p. 24).

However, the separation of the artisan, or skilled (useful) technician, from the work of the (intellectual) artist, was also part of this struggle and originated as early as the 17th century (Williams, 1976, p. 33). This shift away from understandings of the artisan followed the development of artists’ practice (rather than concept of the arts) in the 14th and 15th centuries as part of early intellectual property discourses (Stapleton, 2002, p. 89). By the 18th century, therefore, the new hierarchy of high culture and fine art had bedded down, and understandings of art became tied to concepts of “disinterested” and
autonomous contemplation (Woodmansee, 1984, p. 22). This resulted in interpretations of art/high culture as the “sensuous expression of perfection” (ibid., p. 28), and the “creation of a beautiful object” (ibid., p. 29) irrelevant to or autonomous from its “reception [or use] by the audience” (ibid., p. 33). In addition, the pleasure that came to be considered “refined or contemplative” began to be called aesthetic (Shiner, cited in Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 20).

Nevertheless, it wasn’t until the mid 19th century that the tacit understanding of high culture as referring to the “independent and abstract noun” art (as separate from fine art), where it describes the “the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” become widely popular (Williams, 1976, p. 89). This was partly precipitated by advancements in technology which attenuated cultural territorialism, exemplified in Arnold’s moral and “ideal” approach to culture (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 28). As suggested in the history of the creative city, the explosion of technology through the industrial revolution, together with the influence of the burgeoning market economy, led to strenuous and resistant debates and struggles about beauty and morality versus function. These debates rested on the political dialogues of the previous century between the rational Utilitarians, concerned with culture’s usefulness and the “ideal” Romantics, who wanted to separate art from industrial capitalism and thus use (Kuper, 1999, p. 49). These discourses came to define cultural discourses of the 19th and 20th centuries (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 121).

Utilitarianism was originally a political and social movement which emerged in the 18th century with political thinker Jeremy Bentham, but became synonymous the following century with John Stuart Mill (also associated with representative democracy) (Held,
2006, p. 76). It was a theory based on rational debate and the principle of maximising utility, working towards achieving the “greatest happiness for the greatest number”, and was therefore associated with rationalism, science and accountability (ibid.) and later functionalism.

In contrast, Romanticism was a disparate “Europewide phenomenon” that emerged out of the social, political and cultural traditions of the 18th century, which theorised the “moral and civilising powers of art” and was concerned with the “pleasure that contact with the arts gives men” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 121) rather than “the baser and less noble pleasures” (ibid., p. 122) of use. The romantic model of art, therefore, posited the artist as heroic and moral, and, critically, ethical rather than functional. The 19th century “art for art’s sake” movement carried on this romantic tradition through artistic stereotypes of the bohemian outsider and purveyor of higher truths (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 172).

These 19th century hierarchical and ideological interpretations of culture ultimately pitted high culture and art against craft, entertainment and the popular arts, cultural forms more associated with the artisan (ibid., p. 20) and later, the working classes. The discourses also marked the final rhetorical separation of art from utility and contributed to exclusive discourses of taste and distinction, using culture to legitimate and maintain the ruling classes (in patronage) and later the developing bourgeoisie. The creation of social distinctions between classes through culture was sustained through the concept of “cultural capital”, which further aligned art and high culture with hierarchies, social class, distinction, taste and refinement (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 7). These polarisations and dichotomous discourses, therefore, are marked by utilitarian views of art/high culture as
useful commodities on the one hand, and romantic views of the artist (synonymous with high culture) as a noble “truth teller” (Oakley, 2009b, p. 281) and “authentic producer” of the “highest cultural objects”, providing a “lasting testimony of the spirit” (Arendt, 1961, p. 200), on the other.

4.2.3 Culture Part II: culture and the economy

4.2.3.1 Popular culture, mass culture and the 20th century

Utilitarian and romantic discourses were also responsible for other discursive “struggles” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) which developed in the early 20th century, with implications for culture’s position within the creative city. The first of these discourses was the concept of “popular culture” (often conflated with commercial culture as well as low and “mass culture”), a concept pejoratively referring to “inferior kinds of work”, work that sets out to “gain favor” and work that is simply “well-liked” (Williams, 1976, p. 198). Similarly, “mass culture”, which emerged as a response to 19th and 20th century industrialisation and the growth of technology as it applied to culture (e.g. cinema, music), led to debates over culture’s economic role within industry and capitalism. Mass culture specifically concerned culture produced for, rather than by, a mass public, originating with sociologists and theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer from the Marxist-influenced Frankfurt School of philosophy (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944).

The work of Adorno and Horkheimer on the commercialisation and industrialisation of cultural production in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the development of the culture industry (and culture as a market and consumer good like any other), reflected what
they saw as a mass deception and illusion perpetrated on the public by the growth of entertainment-oriented and passive culture (exemplified by music and cinema), which was driven by technologically-driven capitalism (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 121). In their view, mass culture was inseparable from the machinery of corporate domination and thus represented “the coercive nature of society alienated from itself” (ibid.). The result of mass culture, therefore, was claimed to be cultural homogeneity (ibid., p. 121), a withdrawal from the world and ultimately, cultural “impoverishment” (ibid., p. 124). These ideas align mass culture with concepts of the spectacle and cultural simulacra referred to in Chapter Three (3.1), cheating “consumers of what it [they] perpetually promise[s]” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 139).

These discourses can be viewed as romantic in positing culture as separate from, and crucially, more important than, utility. As such, Adorno and Horkheimer’s work has been highly critiqued, chiefly from the perspective that culture has always and consciously served a power, function or utility, and that commodification in the 20th and 21st century was and is simply the latest function or use for culture (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006). Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer defended their critique of cultural commodification by pointing out that their concern was with the willingness of culture to accept its commodified status, rather than the commodification itself (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 157). Adorno and Horkheimer, therefore, continue to be hugely influential (Lash and Urry; Flew; Arendt; McGuigan), and the concepts of

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8 This process was later called Technocapitalism, as coined by Douglas Kellner to describe the happy marriage between technology and capitalism (McGuigan, 2004, p. 28).

9 Other criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer concern: their underestimation of the criticality of consumers; the inappropriateness of the singular term culture industry (O’Connor, 2007, p. 21; O’Regan, 2001, p. 18) given the range of processes and production systems involved in the culture sector; the elitist presumption of high culture in their work (Garnham, 2005, p. 18); their “cultural pessimism” (Cowen, 2000, p. 1), or Kulturpessimismus (Eagleton, 2000, p. 124); their lack of understanding (and consequently appreciation) of newer artforms (such as jazz and cinema), and for taking the view that an artwork cannot have cultural value and be entertaining.
alienation, degradation, simulacrum and spectacle (which they linked to mass culture) remain key to discourses surrounding the *creative industries* (the latest manifestation of the cultural industry), utilitarian views of culture, as well as the cultural strategies of urban developments.

Various historic discourse formations, therefore, essentially reclassified culture and cultural workers (from artisan to artist, fine artist, etc.), fore-grounding discourses that would later become associated with the “aesthetic dematerialisation” of art in the 1960s when art entered its conceptual phase (Stapleton, 2002, p. 145). This dematerialisation further separated the artist from technical or utilitarian skills through exclusive intellectual, knowledge and economic discourses (*ibid*). As such, contestation over the perceived purpose of culture, as embodied in the creative city, is embedded in recurring dialectical discourses of different (improving and disimproving) kinds of culture, fundamentally driven by status and legitimacy-seeking, remuneration, ideological positions on technology (usually anti) and defensive or resistant responses to other discourses.

4.2.3.2 Use, exchange value and reification

One of the chief discursive resistances in relation to culture is the economic concept of commodification. This concept is linked to the marketisation or *thingification* of culture (Oakley, 2009c, p. 406) associated with mass culture and spectacle. The making of something into a commodity, or commodification in Marxist terms, when applied to culture, reduces its “sign value” (the symbolic or pure meaning-making value of something), to *use value*, and then to “economic exchange value, in the pure form of its general equivalent, money” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 1). Since sign value is primarily
associated with “ideological labor” (ibid.), the recasting of culture from sign, to use, to exchange value, essentially represents a historical development mirroring earlier shifts and struggles in relation to reclassifications around intellectual and manual labour. The difficulty with attaching culture to utility and/or the desire for profit, concerns the obscuring of (typically unequal) social relations and conditions under which culture or its commodities are produced, assuming the “fantastic form of a relation between things” instead of people (who had made them) (Lukacs, 1923, p. 1). This process is known as “reification” (ibid.) and was claimed to deceitfully deprive “men of precisely that liberation from the principle of utility which it should inaugurate” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944, p. 158) and to lead to a deformed and “rationalised” lifeworld (Habermas, 1987, p. 147).

4.2.3.3 The cultural and creative industries

Industrialisation, commodification and reification are key concepts in discourses surrounding the cultural and creative industries. These industries, increasingly referred to as simply the creative industries (though the former typically denotes both subsidised cultural activities and unsubsidised creative and commercial sectors), represents a hugely successful discursive construct currently “circling the globe” (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 11) and is central to models of the creative city. The coining of the “creative industries”, popularly defined as “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property”,¹⁰ was driven by the desire to ring-fence a wide variety of cultural activities within a “key organising

concept” (Flew, 2009, p. 1). This imperative originated through the cultural sector and political establishment in the UK, who both wanted to increase the traction of the sector in the context of increasing economic pressures, by leveraging “the unquestioned prestige” of the *information society*11 and “any policy that supposedly favours its development” (Garnham, 2005, p. 20).

Paradoxically, however, despite the conflation of the commercial with the non-commercial or subsidised cultural/creative sectors which was inferred through the creative industries, the term was also designed to differentiate the former from the more cushioned and less powerful “subsidised” cultural sector (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008, p. 1). Though the term, therefore, lacks “specificity and distinctiveness” (O’Connor, 2007, p. 44), it has been particularly adept at allowing cultural policymakers “to legitimize their concerns” at national level and instrumentally promote a “much larger and more significant part of the economy than would otherwise have been possible” (Hesmondhalgh, 2007, p. 9). This is demonstrated in the use of creative industries statistics and its leverage in arguments developed by Arts Councils, despite their funding of only a small percentage of the implied sectors (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009).

Similarly, another concept which is larger than but often conflated with the creative industries and central to the creative city, is *the creative economy* (Florida, 2002, p. 201). The creative economy is defined as a “set of knowledge-based economic activities with a development dimension” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 4), which generate “tremendous

11 The information society is based on post-industrial theories developed by Daniel Bell. It concerns the move from capitalism and industrialism “based upon the exploitation of matter and human energy to a post-industrial stage based upon the exploitation of what Bell called “organised knowledge” with resources “shifted from monetary capital to knowledge” (Garnham, 2001, n.p.).
innovative, wealth-creating, and productive promise” (Florida, 2005, p. 171), and is described as an “evolving” concept which is wider than the creative sector with which it interacts (UNCTAD, 2008, p. iii).\(^\text{12}\) This concept is genealogically linked to other post-industrial and knowledge economy discourse formations, including the \textit{thin air economy} (Leadbetter, 1999); the \textit{copyright economies} (Howkins, 2001); Daniel Bell’s \textit{information economy} (Bell, 1999); Robert Reich’s 1990s “symbol analysts” (\textit{symbolic economy}) (Rosler, 2011a, p. 3); and the \textit{weightless and dematerialised economy} of the 1990s (Stapleton, 2002, p. 140).

\subsection*{4.2.4 Binaries, oppositions and instrumentalism}

These discourses of artist (intellectual), artisan (manual), high culture, popular and mass culture, use, sign value and reification, the culture industry/industries/creative industries, and knowledge/creative/copyright economies, cumulatively point to the dialectics and “binary” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 115) modes of aesthetic versus utilitarian or functional characterisations of culture, and again, the discursive “struggles” that define accepted knowledges (Foucault, 1980, p. 83). This binary model is especially significant in relation to understanding the politics and difficulties of culture as managed within \textit{the reason of state}\(^\text{13}\) (as well as industrial policy) and reflects the tonic and poison/ “positive” and “negative” discursive tradition (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, \hspace{1em} 12The creative economy encompasses “designer products, ‘experiences’ and services that have captured increasing proportions of consumer surplus through ‘distinction’” (Evans, 2009, p. 1030), as well as denoting immaterial and intangible (or “thin air”) economic models, where wealth is derived from the free movement of knowledge where “nothing [that] can be weighed, touched or easily measured” (Leadbetter, 1999, p. vii).

\(^\text{13}\)\hspace{1em} The \textit{Reason of State} was defined by 16\textsuperscript{th} century Italian thinker Giovanni Botero in his book of the same name in response to Machiavelli’s \textit{The Prince}, describing it as the “knowledge of the means by which [a state]such a dominion may be \textit{founded, preserved and extended}.” See Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutionalism. Available: http://www.nhrac.org/critics/machiavelli/primary-source-documents/the-reason-of-state[Accessed 3April 2013].
p. 10) referred to earlier. It is out of this tradition, chiefly responses to 18th and 19th century discourses surrounding the fine and useful arts and 20th century theories of rationalisation (as indicated above), that the key concept of instrumentalism, arises, which will be discussed in section 4.4.12.

4.3 Creativity

4.3.1 Introduction to creativity

More recently, however, another concept has arisen within the utilitarian discourses of culture’s usefulness which links cultural policy to the creative city. This concept is creativity, about which it has been asserted, “no word in English carries a more consistently positive reference” (Williams, 1965, p. 19). Creativity can be defined as the capacity of individuals to “think inventively and imaginatively and to go beyond traditional ways of solving problems” (Howkins, 2001, p. 13), or simply “the capacity to generate new ideas” (European Commission, 2009, p. 74). However, there are thought to be four distinct creative models which outline the histories, genealogies, trajectories and imperatives of creativity: scientific, cultural, technological and economic (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 3). As will be discussed below, these understandings and uses for creativity underline the extreme flexibility of the term and how their sectoral values work with each other to increase the overall value of generic uses of the term. However, this range of models also illustrates the successful discursive campaigns wrought by each competing sector, culminating in the dominance of the economic sector.

14 Culture’s intellectual history has also been described as coming from both an “honourable” and “dishonourable” tradition, in reference to the enlightened European tradition “from modernism onwards” and the social engineering experiments conducted by Fascist Europe in the early 20th century (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 10).
As such, like culture, the adaptability of the term and wide range of uses to which it is put, together with its etymology in religion, has led to claims that creativity occupies a “central role in contemporary capitalist society, with a genealogy in processes of secularisation and the emergence of a modern subjectivity” (Miller, 2007, p. 510). As a wholly positive and quasi-cultural/quasi-economic term therefore, creativity can be viewed as a legitimising and bridging discourse between culture and the creative city (and cultural policy). However, though central to competitive city discourses, and, it will be demonstrated, cultural policy, creativity is distinctly new to the “continuum” of traditional cultural policy (O’Regan, 2001, p. 1).

4.3.2 Creativity discourses, shifts and use values

Though create/creative was originally an exclusively religious concept (pre 16th century), the process of Western secularisation led to its application within an artistic (post 17th century) and scientific context, which came to dominate understandings of creativity in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the 20th century (Williams, 1976, pp. 82-85). From the mid 20th century, however, creativity became strongly associated with another use, that of business, managerial and capitalist or economic applications (Sternberg, 1999, p. 5). More recently, these applications have linked creativity to wider discourses of innovation, copyright, and the global creative economy (Caves, 2000; Howkins, 2001). These concepts have in turn been influenced by 19th and 20th century theories of agglomeration and clustering, concerned with the deliberate co-location of businesses for mutual benefit and increased competition (Porter, 1990). “Creative destruction” is another key creative term of the 20th century and was coined by Joseph Schumpeter to refer to the necessary breaking and making
comprising business cycles under capitalism, a process that for many is synonymous with neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005, p. 3).

In this way, over the last twenty years or so, discourses of creativity have settled less on cultural creativity, and more on economic, industrial and entrepreneurial creativity (Sternberg, 1999, p. 5; Miller, 2007, p. 510), with Landry exhorting us to get “beyond the idea that creativity is the exclusive domain of artists” (Landry, 2000, p. xv). These events have made creativity a master signifier for the economy in general,15 as well as presaging the adoption of creativity as a solution to a variety of issues relating to declining industrial societies, the central premise on which the creative city is based (as critiqued above). As described in Chapter Three, today creativity is central to discourses of city development, urban planning, marketing (such as the creative city paradigm), the creative industries, cultural policy (leveraging its industrial applications), and, latterly, post-industrial knowledge/information society agendas, with the EU (and its Lisbon agenda) particularly active in its discourse (European Commission, 2006a, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). From a discursive point of view, therefore, the use of creative within policy or public nomenclature invokes both a benign and utilitarian/economic application.

Despite this, the ubiquity of positive creative discourses has led many to criticise the unquestioning nature of these benign interpretations, with claims that creativity is destructive as well as constructive (Vickery, 2011, p. 12), and that the current “fascination” with creativity results in a tendency to “discard projects and people before they achieve their potential” (Bilton, 2012, n.p.). Also, as a result of the many utilitarian

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applications of creativity, cultural discourses have sought to uncouple creativity from culture, in claims that creative skills are not necessarily consistent with artistic (or cultural) processes, which often depend on “intuitive” and ...“quite uncritical leaps” without much heed to contributing to the “desirable, [and] socially acceptable norms” often associated with creativity and innovation (Czerkawska, 2010, n.p.).

4.3.3 Models and politics of creativity

As Chapter Three has outlined, Florida’s single-minded focus on the activities of the (mostly) middle (class) and professional creative classes, has added to this positioning of creativity as “exclusive”, class-based, “dangerous” (Markusen, 2006, p. 1924), and part of the bourgeoisie’s “capitalistic appropriation” (Harvey, 2006, n.p.). This has raised questions as to whether creativity is a socially-driven and collective process (to be nurtured), or is innate to particular individuals and even countries (and thus can be harnessed). Though the creative classes undoubtedly proscribe a narrow view of creativity, Florida has pointed out, somewhat equivocally, that creativity cannot be “owned in the traditional sense” (Florida, 2002, p. xiv), is a “basic element of human existence” (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 11), that it is “biologically and intellectually innate” to everyone (ibid., 2005, p. 4) and that it is the harnessing (implying existing creativity) of this creativity (for economic purposes) that matters.

Florida therefore suggests a free creativity that requires “little” (ibid., 2008, p. 122), and only needs to be ring-fenced (or harnessed), indicating that creativity is a renewable and “non-rivalrous” resource that is available to all (Howkins, 2001, p. 120). This free source of potential capital is a critical factor in the success and appeal of creativity discourses, creating a new source of value and public good. Creativity discourses within
the creative city, therefore, are collectively defined in terms of key legitimising tropes such as democracy and equality.

However, as suggested above, there is a tension between Florida’s creative class thesis, the positing of creativity as “biologically and intellectually innate” (Florida, 2005, p. 4), and the discourse of collective creativity and “nurture/nurturing” (Landry and Bianchini, 1995, p. 1; Landry, 2000, p. xxvi, p. xxxvi, p. 36, p. 191; Florida, 2007, p. 33). Equally, the nomenclature of the creative classes, and the need to attract them, necessarily indicates that creativity is not innate to everyone (suggesting the uncreative classes), but is particular to some. Further, the designation or branding of one city as a creative city has the implication that another is not (i.e., with no designation or branding). As Chapter Five will demonstrate, the positioning of creativity in national cultural policies as competitively particular to one country (the most creative country etc.), suggests a dichotomy between its collective positioning (belonging to every human being and needing to be nurtured) and particular (limited to certain countries) characterisations.

Though not mutually exclusive, the view of creativity as both belonging to the creative classes and as belonging to everyone, would seem to suggest two diverging models of creativity: creativity as a resource and process located and to be nurtured in the collective, and a biologically, intellectually, geographically or professionally determined individual attribution. Though this obfuscation over where creativity is located reflects a wider disagreement as to “whether creativity is an attribute of people or a process by which original ideas are generated” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 9), these
discourses can be viewed as strategically containing and comprising covertly conflicting concepts (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128).

Perhaps surprisingly, the use of creativity in business and economic contexts has tended to favour the democratically-framed, process-driven, socially-networked or collective model of creativity (Oakley, 2004, p. 70). This paradigm has been described as the “semiotic/network” variety, in reference to the location of creativity between networks of individuals (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12) and directly challenges artistic concepts of located uniqueness or originality. However, this model is not socially or benignly driven, but aligns itself with industrial and scientific (and thus economic) applications for remunerative and legitimation reasons. The networked or “structural” model of creativity consistent with collaborative creativity structures (such as the creative industries), is intended to engender or promote creative environments rather than individuals (Bilton, 2010, p. 258) which avoids intellectual property (remunerative) issues linked to individual creativity (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12).

In contrast, artistic discourses of innate creativity (Anholt, 2007, p. 36) are based on concepts of originality and invention, and have been described as the “heroic” (Stapleton, 2002, p. 135) and “rhetorical” model of creativity (ibid., p. 2), aligned with the romantic tradition. The coexistence and simultaneous disavowal of tension between the rhetorical and semiotic/network model of creativity typically seen in cultural policies, and demonstrated in the following chapter, has been particularly linked to maintaining the “identity” of the knowledge economy (ibid., p. 12) and thus the intellectual property rights status quo as well as more romantic autonomous models of
production. There are other terms however, which occupy the hinterland of creativity discourses and which have equal claims to economic legitimation.

4.3.4 Knowledge economy discourses of creativity, entrepreneurialism and innovation

One of these terms is the discourse of entrepreneurialism, a primarily economic term that shares a reflexive genealogy with creativity and culture, as indicated by its uses in 1980s discourses of freelance cultural practitioners (O’Connor, 2007, p. 35) and connotations of (Joseph) Schumpeterian creative destruction. The popular usage and traction of entrepreneurialism in a variety of settings has led to it being described as one of the “fantasies of economic discourse” (Spicer and Jones, 2005, p. 19), which like creativity, has a potency arising from its promise of a “solution” to both economic and social problems (ibid., p. 1). In addition to the economy, entrepreneurialism operates as a “master signifier” of democracy and freedom, suggesting independence, self-determination and merit, but with a moral value associated with the good life\footnote{Though it originated through Aristotle, the concept of the “Good Life” or the life worth living (which is distinguished from the virtues of civic life, with good citizens separate from good persons) is often associated with citizenship (Knell and Taylor, 2011, p. 36).} (ibid., p. 3). The origin and specific value of the entrepreneur, however, lies in its representation and creation of a new, free and discrete (economic) value system, separate to (and sitting between) the historical labourer, land-owner and capitalist (ibid., p. 12).

Recently, however, there has been another shift in discourses of creativity consistent with claims that the creative classes are “at the very heart of the process of innovation and economic growth” (Florida, 2002, p. 6). While by the early 2000s, cultural policy and cultural industries’ discourses had begun to replace or accompany the term culture with creative (Cunningham, 2010, p. 20), creativity has latterly been conflated with, as
well as partly replaced by, the more commercial, applied and industrial term “innovation” (Oakley, 2009c, p. 406). This term, which has been described as the “visible tip of the iceberg of everyday creativity” (Caves, 2000, p. 202), has come to represent one of the most powerful and persistent economic concepts to have emerged in recent years, particularly in the context of the ongoing global recession.

However, the “overlapping” (The Work Foundation, 2007, p. 6) of the concepts of creativity and innovation has led to attempts to distinguish between the two. This is demonstrated in descriptions of creativity as “not so much the production of new worldly objects, but simply an innovative action ... both process and product” (Smith and Warfield, 2007, p. 287). Other characterisations underline the contingent and nebulous nature of the concepts, in claims that “creativity is the mythical process of inspiration and cognition, while innovation is the copyrighting and marketing” (Carrotworkers Collective, 2008, n.p.). This view of innovation recalls the claim that “if culture can be ‘thingified’, innovation enthusiasts are keen to ‘thingify it as speedily and efficiently as possible’” (Oakley, 2009c, p. 406).

The shift from discourses of creativity to innovation (Oakley, 2009c, p. 404) and the role of innovation as an outcome of creativity can also be seen in EU and UN cultural policy documents. The cultural sections of these international bodies have expended significant effort in gathering evidence and reports to demonstrate that culture (and the creative industries) creates economies and can work to economically or industrially-focused creativity and innovation agendas (UNCTAD, 2008; European Commission,
a factor underlined at the EU’s recent launch of the Creative Europe Fund (see Chapter Three, footnote #16).

Examples of creativity and innovation discourses include the following statements: the “European vision of culture, creativity and innovation” (European Commission, 2010b, p. 4); creativity is a “positive word in a society constantly aspiring to innovation and progress” (European Commission, 2009, p. 3); “the role of culture in supporting and fostering creativity and innovation must be explored and promoted” (European Commission, 2007a, p. 9); creativity is “a key resource in the knowledge economy, leading to innovation and technological change and conferring competitive advantage on businesses and national economies” (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 202); culture is a “motor of economic and social innovation” and “culture-based creativity” “nurture[ing]s innovation” (European Commission, 2009, p. 3).

Other EU reports cite the need to “put in place the right conditions for creativity and innovation to flourish in a new entrepreneurial culture” (European Commission, 2010b, p. 2), again making the point that culture and creativity are distinct but interlinked entities, that creativity and innovation can be nurtured and that the subsidised cultural sector is part of the ecology and food chain of creativity. In addition, innovation is often positioned threateningly, in relation to how “essential” the innovation agenda is, in terms of how we can’t afford not to pursue innovation agendas (O’Connor, 2007, p. 44), a core persuasive feature of discourse.

These discourses also occur in Europe’s economic policies (European Commission, 2010a; 2010b), national development agendas (Government of Ireland, 2010), and national arts policies (Arts Council of Ireland, 2002). However, innovation remains more typically and closely tied to industrial policies of science and technology (European Commission, 2009, p. 8; European Commission, 2010b; Hazelkorn, Ryan, Gibson and Ward, 2013, p. 8), with serious consequences for the cultural sector. The importance of linking culture with industrial policies was highlighted recently by the response to culture’s omission from the Europe 2020 Strategy (European Commission, 2010a). This response involved unsuccessful retrospective attempts to insert culture into the strategy under the rubric of innovation in order to legitimate the EU’s cultural agenda, through a conference specifically designed to produce evidences of this (Kulturpont Hungary Conference, 2011). The perception of innovation as a primarily industrial or scientific (and therefore non-cultural) term, has serious policy (political) and funding consequences for those making the case for cultural innovation.

Discourses of creativity, therefore, demonstrate and emerge from a number of paradigm shifts and applications, from religious creation, to artistic and scientific applications, and, finally, in the 20th and early 21st centuries, to predominantly technological and economic applications (particularly in policy contexts). Like culture therefore, the appeal and authority of creativity depends on a historic genealogy of artistic or symbolic discourses working with scientific and knowledge-economy discourses, connoting the promise of entrepreneurialism and economic outputs. This discursive appeal adds to the creative city’s “apple-pie” phenomenon (Bayliss, 2007, p. 893; Peck, 2007, p. 765), prompting the question of who would not want their city to be creative? Equally, the

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18 See also the Irish Forfás reports 2010a, b, 2009b, 2007a, b, 2006a, b. Government of Ireland, 2010; Mc Sweeney, 2009; Government of Ireland, 2008.
combination of heroic or “rhetorical” discourses of creativity (Stapleton, 2002, p. 2) with collective or “networked” models, gains maximum legitimacy with a focus on intellectual property benefits (ibid., p. 12).

Conversely, though the turn to economicism may have led some to uncouple creativity from culture, as suggested above (Czerkawska, 2011, n.p.), in cultural policy, the continued coupling of culture with (industrial) creativity is a central preoccupation (Oakley, 2009c, p. 404). While creativity and innovation are key to linking culture with industrial discourses for the political sake of culture, therefore, culture and the arts are equally deployed in industrial discourses of creativity (and culture) to lend currency and allure (Forfás, 2010a; 2010b; Government of Ireland, 2010). Consequently, the use of culture, creativity and innovation discourses in national and international industrial policies (as seen above), inverts cultural legitimation (in an industrial context), and suggests the exoticised appeal of the other in legitimation narratives, a factor illustrated in the next chapter. Having looked at the dualisms and genealogies of culture and creativity, in respect of strategy, argument, justification, and legitimacy in policy, this chapter must now turn to these factors as they apply to cultural policy.

4.4 Cultural policy

4.4.1 Introduction to cultural policy

The dichotomies and discursive legacies of culture, creativity, entrepreneurialism and innovation have demonstrated the value systems, historic tensions, territorial stake-making and genealogy of legitimations in relation to culture’s role in state utility. It has particularly highlighted the role of justification and struggle in discourse and the
parasitic nature of discourse in general (and cultural policy in particular), seeking conceptual alignments with stronger sectors and ideologies. The legitimation in these discourses underline a deeply governmentalised and dependent cultural sphere such that it is difficult and “makes no sense” to talk of culture (particularly high culture) outside of government and thus political involvement (McGuigan, 1997, p. 54).

Much has been written about the nature and purpose of government intervention in culture, or, more specifically, the politics of culture (McGuigan, 1996, p. 1; Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 29; Sar, 2009, p. 52), including: the “tension” of shoe-horning such a complex activity within the “requirements of bureaucratic calculation and measurement” (Bennett, 2007, p. 112); the management of culture using “norms not inherent to it” (Adorno, cited in Bennett, 2007, p. 113); the administration of a sector which stands “opposed to planning in [its] their innermost substance” (Bennett, 2007, p. 114); and how wide interpretations of culture (from a government point of view) are “deeply irritating” and “impossible to live up to” (Mundy, 2000, p. 9). While some of these claims reflect a degree of romanticism in proposing the impossibility of managing an ethical activity, the shifting and political/apolitical nature of culture provides particular challenges for the state. In order to look at cultural policy as a bureaucratic state action and how it relates to the creative city, therefore, a broad understanding of policy in general is necessary, as well as historical resonances underpinning the term.
4.4.2 Principles of governance and government

The term policy derives from early distinctions between the core realms of the public or “res publica”, and the private, “res priva” (Parsons, 1995, p. 3). Specifically, policy emerged from the ancient Greek Polis or city-state, which came to mean the civilised and free life “that only existed in the city” (Vincent, 1987, p. 167). The Polis as an entity, therefore, specifically referred to a higher order of (male) citizens, where private individuals came together to form a public (Habermas, 1989, p. 3). This was exemplified in Plato’s Republic, which was concerned with the organisation of society, where the virtue of the individual was consequent with the justice of the state (Plato, 1955) and significantly (in relation to discourse), good was the “ultimate object of knowledge” (ibid., p. 299).

In addition to public debate, key to the development of policy and the polis, is the “problematic of government” as an exercise of organised, though transient, knowledge and power, and an enactment of the principle (or art) of governance (Foucault, 1994, p. 201). This separates governance/government from the universal and more permanent state. Foucault identifies contemporary understandings of government as originating in the application of a secular version of Christianity or pastoral power, and part of the 18th century’s development of organised knowledge systems (Smart, 1985, p. 132). However, the central question of “how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods” (Foucault, 1994, p. 202) can be interpreted around two understandings of government, one as a force for good and the other as a coercive and self-sustaining power.

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19 Politics and policy also constitute the same word in a number of European countries (French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish).
The first of these understandings is the representation of government as “society’s better self” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35), working towards the “welfare of the population, the improvement of its conditions, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health” (Foucault, 1994, p. 217), a place where conflict can be “harmoniously reconciled” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 6), and a body working for the collective common good. While the liberal democratic goal of government (consistent with the utilitarians) may seem to reflect this common good model in its concern for the pursuit of “subsistence”, “abundance” and “equality”, in liberal democracies, these principles are contingent on the “security of [private] goods and wealth” and minimal state interference (Held, 2006, p. 76).

However, liberal democratic models of government also contrast with what might be described as a second model of government, which represents a strong and coercive government (or greater state) whose power is “constituted by men and things” (Smart, 1985, p. 128). This view of government represents “obedience to the law” (Foucault, 1994, p. 210) and thus coercion, “if only the coercive use of the taxing power” (Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006, p. 624). For Foucault, as a form of discourse, the concept of governance necessarily involves a soft and hard coercion and concerns the management of relations between different interests, including the public (society and community), the state (or government) and the market (Foucault, 1994, p. 201). This management of

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20 There are both positive and negative models of the common good, where it is conceived of as the “best law” as described through the Nordic legal tradition (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 42) on the one hand, and the securing of individual rights and freedoms, on the other hand (Skinner, 1992, pp. 213-222). In addition, Foucault writes of the common good as “submission to the sovereign” (Foucault, 1994, p. 210). These models arise from the Aristotelian tradition and liberal individualism. Though somewhat reflexive, the former broadly posits that there is some objective concept of the Good, and thus common good, which must be pursued for a healthy public life and the latter that there can be no common good without the securing of individual rights and freedoms. There is also the view that these premises are interdependent. Recent liberal and neoliberal views have equated the common good with assertions of individual rights over collective rights or goods, rendering the common good an equivocal term (Skinner, 1992, pp. 213-222).
relations gives rise to core debates on democracy, legitimacy, the common good and good governance.21

4.4.3 The principles and apparatuses of policy

The knowledge and technologies exercised by government are called policies and can be defined in a number of ways: as a deliberate “plan of action to guide decisions and achieve desired outcomes” (Jones, 2009, p. 10); as a “neutral” (Parsons, 1995, p. 16) and “rational basis for action or inaction” (ibid., p. 14); “what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes” (Dye, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. xv); the “public and its problems” (Dewey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 6); issues amenable to human solution where social gain is maximised beyond the costs (Burstein, 1991; Jones, 2009, p. 11); an “expression of political rationality” (Parsons, 1995, p. 15); and “authoritative decisions made by government to tackle societal issues which clog up its agenda” (Quinn, 1998, p. 15). Clearly, therefore, the uses of policy are administrative, pragmatic symbolic, and rational, representing the public reason of state.

The “complex form of power” enlisted and embodied by the state, through the rational use of knowledge by government, with the population as its target, has been called governmentality (Foucault, 1994). This term represents a disciplinary power that works on shaping behaviours, and contrasts with (hard) coercive sovereign or juridical power,
deriving from the 18th century developments in political economy (Foucault, 1994, pp. 219-220). To Foucault, governmentality is core to the development of policy as part of governmental “apparatus[es]” designed to create obedient citizens, by approaching those citizens as a resource to be managed through the production of knowledge about those citizens (Foucault, 1978, p. 86). The view of policy as knowledge is key to the development of the policy sciences which followed World War II, and aimed to enlist policy to address the new “intelligence needs” of that time (Parsons, 1995, p. 18) to bring about a “less distorted, more rational decision-making process in conditions of growing [i.e. post-war] complexity” (ibid., p. 445).

Policy analysts such as H. D. Lasswell and John Dewey were hugely influential on the development of the policy sciences and stressed the technical efficiencies and scientific experimentalism possible through policy, while also viewing policy as the formation of values whose “true source and focus [was] in the personal and in the self” (ibid., p. 614). This paternal policy championing of reason and knowledge toward informed, educated citizens, is synonymous with economist John Maynard Keynes’s “progressive modernist” agenda (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4), viewing policy as a series of “technical questions which were resolvable by the systematic application of technical expertise” (ibid.).

Other functions of policy are linked to the concept of public goods and market failure (as detailed in Chapter One) and aim to reconcile and balance the rights and freedoms of the private individual against the public collective, “so as to deal with those aspects of social and economic life which markets were[are] no longer capable of solving” (Parsons, 1995, p. 6). This consideration of the constitution of the public and private in
government, the virtuous and coercive imperatives at work, and governmental and policy reliance on knowledge systems, points to the importance of representation and discourse formation in policy and thus the role of policy discourse in government legitimacy.

4.4.4 Policy, discourse, symbolism and legitimacy

As discourse, therefore, policy is primarily a “linguistically constituted ‘activity’” (Laffin and Young, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 177) which is deemed “essential to understanding what is going on” (Parsons, 1995, p. 181). As such, by the 16th century, policy had been linked to disciplinary apparatuses and the securing of consensus through a “set of technologies and institutions responsible for internal security, stability and prosperity” distinct from diplomatic or military control (Schirato et al., 2012, p. 72). Other historical references to policy (from Shakespeare’s play The Jew of Malta) refer to it as a kind of craftiness, a manipulation of facts and a creator of political illusions (Parsons, 1995, pp. 14-15), made by “symbol specialists” such as politicians and policymakers (ibid., p. 178). The symbolic discourse of policy, therefore, suggests the potential for manipulation, where “problems are ‘constructed’ in order to justify solutions” (ibid., p. 180) and its prospective role is as a “placebo[s]” or an “illusion” to “public concern” through its creation of “condensational or emotional symbols” (ibid., p. 180).

This view effectively charges policy with conferring a sense of safety and well-being in the electorate and illustrates how policy has/had “more to do with [managing] our personal and collective need for security and order than with our desire for solutions” (Parsons, 1995, p. 612). This again reveals the ability of policy to both distort and
conceal (*ibid.*, p. 178), recalling the covert and often conflicting symbols with which discourse analysis is concerned (Fairclough, 2003, p. 130). As suggested in Chapter Two therefore, in this understanding of discourse, distortion is available for all to see, and in that sense cannot be revealed (Foucault, 1972, p. 123), a factor that the next chapter will demonstrate.

As a disciplinary or governmentalised power, therefore, policy “cannot be sustained purely with [juridical] force” (Parsons, 1995, p. 14) but critically, is a “theory upon which a claim for legitimacy is made” (*ibid.*, p. 15), often “after the decision” has taken place (Jones, 2009, p. 11). Consequently, policy regulates an irrational world by representing the “orderly state” and provides a visible rationale for politicians and government decisions (Dye, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 612). For that reason, policy operates as an exceptional, symbolic but substantive embodiment of power, ideology and legitimation (Parsons, 1995, p. 178).

The role of policy as legitimation and consensus therefore, whether those policies are working towards the collective common good and can be viewed as legitimate or not, underlines the role of policy in the lifeworld (though it also has a role in the system). As Chapter Two has outlined, the loss of legitimacy can arise from policy distortions or imbalances (between system and lifeworld imperatives) if they lead to a colonisation or domination of policy (Habermas, 1987). In considering policy at its simplest, therefore, the concept comprises a number of conflicting (and covert) principles, including *ab initio*, a representation of the *polis* or public (and what constitutes that), the use of

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22 Parsons cites Francis Bacon here, or the “founding father” of policy analysis, here (Parsons, 1995, p. 178).
23 As suggested in Chapter Two, Foucault has influenced the policy sciences and Parsons cites Murray Edelman as a specific and influential example of Foucauldian policy analysis (Parsons, 1995, p. 180).
reason, knowledge and technical problem-solving processes, the reconciling of public and private interests, the not-for-profit imperative, and the simultaneous distortion of information and conferring of legitimacy/security through symbolism and explication.24

Having considered key policy principles, a more detailed discussion on the nature of the public, as invoked through policy, is necessary in order to preface a consideration of cultural policy.

4.4.5 The constitution of the public and private

The concept of the public, as suggested through the etymology of policy, is claimed as the “starting point” for any discussion of governance or public policy (Parsons, 1995 p. 2). Given that the public is inextricably bound up with the private, the constitution of the public is highly contested, despite being normatively invoked (and leveraged) in democracy discourses (Held, 2006, p. 14). Within this context, the public has been described as: the “sphere or domain of life which is not private or purely individual, but held in common” (Parsons, 1995, p. 3); the “collective life” that exists “outside of market transactions and power” (Giorgi et al, 2006, p. 5) and in Habermas’s public sphere, is “open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs” (Habermas, 1989, p. 1). Like the public sphere, the concept of the “common good” or “common life” (Pericles, cited in Held, 2006, p. 14) in theories of government (Foucault, 1994, p. 210), is also conceptually aligned with the public, though it can connote both an idealised conception of “general will” (Held, 2006, p. 47) and the less noble aggregation of personal desires associated with liberalism (Skinner, 1992, p. 215).

24 Other bureaucratic understandings of public policy arise from philosophical differences and can be viewed from managerial and utilitarian (is it efficient), social justice (is it fair or equitable, whether this is viewed as equality of opportunity or of outcome?) or neoliberal/minimal state perspectives - does it lessen or extend individual rights? (Parsons, 1995, p. 521).
This focus on distinguishing between and separating the interests of the public and private has been referred to in Chapter Three as a central critique of the creative city and is a key focus of Habermas’s work (1989). The concern to separate the interests of the public and private stems from 20th century Western fears of the state’s increasing role in the life of its citizens (Parsons, 1995, p. 5). As such, the relationship between the public (where harm could be done and therefore defined appropriateness for policy/government) and the private (which in essence defines it) is central to Foucault’s interest in apparatuses of state security, the growth of political economy, government, governmentality (Foucault, 1994, p. 17) and the administration of hitherto private areas such as birth rates (ibid., 1978, p. 140). Foucault called this 18th century technical application of knowledge on the body “biopower” (ibid.), which treated the public as a singular and “knowable” resource to be managed and quantified (rather than a fragmented and contested construct) and which could be defended through discourses of the “public interest” (Parsons, 1995, p. 171).

The importance of knowledge-focused policy-making and the bureaucratisation that followed World War II, further added to this view of the public as representative of a discernable “body of views held to a defined group” to which the state knew and attached “significance” (ibid., p. 111). Cumulatively, the model of a known and discrete public remains the foundation for most administrations and service (consumer) models of (public) value, disavowing the public as an “indeterminate, empirically counterfactual body” (Fraser, 1990, p. 66). The passive and nominalising view of the public that is inferred by these representations, can be seen in typical (policy) framings of the public as “responsible citizens” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 31) and (via the
media) more passively, “conscientious receivers of public investment” (West, 2012, n.p.).

4.4.6 The public and its terminology

Tensions surrounding discrete understandings of the public also apply to other popular (public) terminologies including that of public opinion. Despite Habermas’s prescription for equal status as a basis for communicative reason (Habermas, 1987, p. 126), he has described the singular interpretation of public opinion as a “fiction” (Habermas, 1989, p. 245), which can necessarily only be attributed to members of the “same social group” (ibid., p. 241). For Habermas, this term is negative and works to “modify or preserve the structures, practices, and goals of the system of domination” (ibid., p. 245), in other words, invoking public opinion, legitimates hegemonies. As suggested in Chapter One (1.2.1), the concept of the public good, though equally normative, is similarly problematic, essentially “ideological” and thus invariably “beneficial to one social group but detrimental to another” (Hewitt, 2011, p. 20). The concepts of knowledge, the public and the common good, therefore, while problematic, underpin understandings of policy and legitimacy.

In light of the normative principles of policy, therefore, it might be assumed that as an arm of government, cultural policy represents (at least aspirationally): culture (and or the culture sector); the public (and not the private) and public goods (freely available to all and non-rivalrous); the collective and common good (not the individual good); problem solving through expert knowledge and reason (rather than obfuscating and distorting); a not-for-profit ethos; the neutral mediation of public and private interests; and the explication of government decisions and actions. Chapters Five and Seven will
test these suppositions. However, having evaluated the imperatives and principles of policy more generally, it is important to look at how cultural policy is more specifically understood.

### 4.4.7 Concepts and understandings of cultural policy

As a branch of public policy, cultural policy can be defined in a number of ways, including: the “cultural knowledges and practices that determine the formation and governance of subjects” (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 2); a “field of social management” (T. Bennett paraphrased in O’Regan, 2001, p. 30); the “regularization, promotion, and discouragement of practices and values by institutions and individuals, public and private” (The International Conference on Cultural Policy Research); and more explicitly, “technologies” of domination, determining the “conduct of individuals” (Bennett, 1998 p. 71). These definitions draw on Foucauldian theories of governmentality (exemplified historically by the policies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany which aimed to shape the thinking and behaviour of their populaces through exhibition, civic monumentalism and censorship) and explicitly refer to the discipline-forming features of culture. For some, however, this view of cultural policy is hard to reconcile with the pragmatic and often pedestrian nature of policymaking in practice (Gray, 2010a, p. 222) and confers excessive power on a weak policy sector (Gray and Wingfield, 2010; Mundy, 2000). For this reason, Foucauldian models of cultural policy might be viewed as more pertinent to implicit (non-stated) models of policy.

Other descriptions of cultural policy emphasise the administration or management of culture and include: promoting the “public and private exploration[s] of culture, in all

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its forms and variations” (Mundy, 2000, p. 8); carefully managing and stewarding culture through democratic frameworks (balancing past and present cultural forms) by helping the “cultural sector do its job as seamlessly as possible” (ibid., p 18); and as in Chapter One, the “broad field of public processes involved in formulating, implementing, and contesting governmental intervention in, and support of, cultural activity” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 14).

Another interpretation of the “concerns” of cultural policy is the implication that it should “facilitate something differently pleasurable and meaningfully better for most people than the usual produce of [commodified] cool capitalism (McGuigan, 2009, p. 299). While this interpretation is open to interrogation as to what the terms different, pleasurable, meaningful, or better might mean, more prosaic descriptions of cultural policy infer the transient nature of political and policy processes in the claim that it is “whatever it is that governments say it is” (Gray, 2010a, p. 222) and that ultimately, it is a “series of ‘texts’ that are subject to the interpretations of the individual analyst rather than a set of concrete organisational practices to be analysed” (ibid.). These statements underline the disciplining, contingent, symbolic and management function of cultural policies, but also the lack of consensus as to the greater purpose of cultural policy per se. As such, these statements might be understood as detailing the outcomes, tasks, characteristics or concerns rather than state principles behind cultural policies, a factor which will be returned to in Chapters Seven and Eight.

This missing policy rationale or principle is reflected in the interstitial location of cultural policy as a subset of public policy, between sectoral policy aimed at specific sectors such as transport and communications etc. (in contrast with what might be
considered pure economic policies) and social (health, education) policy, though it can also be viewed outside of these alongside sport and religion (Compston, 2004, p. 2). Cultural policies can also be described as explicit, or, like the creative city, implicit, depending on whether they are stated as cultural policies or not (Ahearne, 2009). As Chapter One has intimated, the relative nebulousness of where cultural policy sits within government and the policy sector, is of central importance in how culture is viewed by government, and may explain the variety of uses to which culture is put, as well as difficulties with cultural policy rationales. This situation is reflected in the claim that cultural policy is “not a national public policy category as such” but only exists in its fragmented format via other policies, i.e. arts policy, media policy, sport policy etc. (Vickery, 2011, p.13).

### 4.4.8 The development of cultural policy and culture’s usefulness to the state

The variety of uses to which culture is put in cultural policies is a legacy of historically, administered or managed culture (and latterly education), which has always been an instrument of disciplinary power through public consent (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 10; Yúdice, n.d., n.p.). As Chapter One has indicated, this is borne out by the deployment of symbols, buildings and artefacts in the service of legitimacy, instruction and the communication of divine power by various religions, and later national unity and identity in 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} century monarchies and secular states (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 5). By the 17\textsuperscript{th} and particularly 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries, Enlightenment France had a paradigm of proto cultural policy-making (Ahearne, 2003, p. 128) which worked from a paternal noblesse oblige or “duty of care” approach conferred by position and status (Miller and Yúdice, 2002, p. 5). This approach was concerned with the transformative or “tonic” powers of culture (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p 33).
Equally, from the 19th century, the perceived spiritual, moral and civilising (perceived) functions of culture grew with developments in political economy and cultural governmentality, and were exemplified in the Victorians’ deployment of state apparatuses aimed at subduing (distracting and entertaining) the mass public. Following the further decline of colonialism in the early 20th century, and coinciding with the rise of nation states, as well as the Great Depression of the 1920s, culture was harnessed to create unified and homogenous self-images and articulations of nations, which skilfully bypassed “social and economic barriers” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 141).26

For many, however, Britain’s establishing of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) in 1945 was the first explicit European cultural policy as a legitimate arm of official government and had a lasting effect on the development of international cultural governance. The creation of the ACGB initially came out of the realignment of values that followed the ravages of World War II and was driven by a number of factors: the desire for a new egalitarianism and healing of divisions (McGuigan, 2004, p. 33; Matarasso, 2010, p. 3); the need to rebuild the infrastructure and democratic idea of Europe (ibid.); and the necessary replacement of questions of “material entitlement” with questions of “identity and social belonging” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 34). Key concepts such as democratising culture, or the mass distribution and availability of culture developed during this time and reflected the new welfare state ideology which had begun to permeate all aspects of public policy (Edgar, 2012a, n.p.). Though benignly conceived, these imperatives were led by the same patrician (and noblesse

26 The most egregious application of this governmentalised use of culture was the “reengineering” of citizens (Yüdice, n.d., n.p.) in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 32).
oblige) and romantic values of transforming, civilising and improving culture as France’s noblesse oblige.

As Chapter One suggested, the emergence (and sedimenting) of explicit cultural policy at this time of crisis, has been described as fraught and even “ludicrous” (Quinn, 1998, p. 97), giving rise to a view of the field of cultural policy as “doomed” from the outset (ibid., p. 98). Confusions around the purpose and target of the first arts councils, as well as their location (at the time) outside of central ministerial policy-making, has also been perceived as making cultural policy different to other policy areas (ibid. p. 26) and therefore that it could never assume the same status as other policy sectors in government.

4.4.9 Shifting historical models and uses

From the 20th century onwards, and in particular from World War II, cultural policy can be categorised into three phases. These phases concern historic uses and the development of cultural value systems, and comprise: the post-war period to the 1960s, characterised by the creation and growth of social and cultural agencies, promoting “excellence and democratisation” (Menger, 2012, n.p.), the nation, sovereignty and diplomacy28 and known as the “national prestige” (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51), “great nation” (Szántó, 2010, n.p.), “welfare state” and “Good Neighbor” period (Yúdice, n.d., n.p.); the period spanning the 1960s – 1980s, characterised as a mapping-oriented phase, concerned with gathering data on the size and scope of cultural activities, pressures to increase audience numbers as a measure of relevance, as well as decentralisation, and

27 These problems will be covered in Chapter Seven but consist of a lack of government knowledge of the arts, lack of a public mandate, lack of clarity over a definition of the arts, lack of clear target (artists/public), lack of clarity over how decisions are made, lack of evaluation frameworks, and (originally) a lack of role for civil servants (Quinn, 1998, p. 243).

28 Cultural diplomacy continues in various state initiatives, see Taylor (2010)
known as the “access” period (Bianchini, 1993, p. 2); and the period that emerged out of the 1980s alongside the growth of managerialism and neoliberalism, with an emphasis on accountability, evaluation and the free market (Menger, 2012, n.p.), and known as the “economic” (McGuigan, 1996, p. 51) or “competitiveness society” (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p. 185) period.

This last characterisation has been re-described as the “industrial” policy phase of cultural policy (O’Regan, 2001; Menger, 2012, n.p.), pointing to the wholesale change in culture as no longer perceived as either high culture or as a way of life, but as a form of industrial policy and thus not a policy area in its own right. This covert change from cultural to industrial policy can be interpreted as reflecting the “increasing pressure” of counter-discourses “through which states reproduce their political and economic practices” through other policies, and typically arises where the “policy operates on behalf of specific commercial interests” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 331).

This current economic and industrial period, therefore, has been perceived as a “crisis”, undermining previous Western “assumptions of aesthetic authority and hierarchy” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 94), and reflects a general unease with publicly funded culture that is no “longer self-evidently justified” (ibid.). Through the introduction of public private partnerships and new privatised ways of funding culture, this period has been criticised as representing an apolitical and market-centred consensus on culture, where the Fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union (which had been associated with prestige policies) and the opening up of Western European influences has led to a view of culture as no longer being “a contested political issue” (McGuigan, 2005, p. 230).
These periods essentially illustrate a shift in culture’s “use-values” (Lukacs, 1923, p. 2), from the engineering of citizens, social control and governmentality (19th and early 20th centuries), representations of sovereignty, identity and power (15th century to the early 20th century), international relations and diplomacy (early 20th century to World War II), decolonisation and sovereignty (1950s to late 1970s), to globalisation (from the 1970s onwards), industrialisation and the economy (Yúdice, n.d., n.p.). These latter uses also represent a further shift from use to exchange value. More importantly, however, these shifts in uses, exchange-values, policies and rationales, demonstrate that using culture as an instrument to achieve something else, i.e. instrumentalism, is endemic to the state’s relationship with culture, and may be a cultural policy default, rather than a “crisis” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 94).

4.4.10 Government, cultural policy and arts policy

Further legitimations, hierarchies and difficulties with interpreting the terms culture and the arts, are pointed to in the nomenclature and models of culture supported by cultural ministries. As indicated earlier, publicly-funded cultural institutions and programmes remain predominantly mobilised around high culture or the arts (Bennett, 1998, p. 90; Higgins, 2012a, n.p), leading to enduring accusations of elitism and “class-bound aesthetics” (McGuigan, 2003, p. 175). Critiques of overly reverent and traditional models of high culture typically claim: that it represents the concerns of a “tiny proportion of men and women” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 16); that the “greatness” to which it aspires is facilitated “by virtue of not being embedded in the urban everyday through which social reproduction is mediated” (Vickery, 2011, p. 14); and that it occupies a “pointlessly self-delighting existence as a silent critique of exchange-value and instrumental rationality” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 16). This has led to the view that
“attempting to entice the public into the art world is not a rationally defensible objective” (Vickery, 2011, p. 14).

Despite these claims, cultural agencies have been active in disavowing any association with elitism, claiming that they have “considerably broadened its [their] view” of culture and have “moved beyond” ... “elitist” associations (Scottish Arts Council, 2004, p. 3). This determination to appear beyond elitism may have contributed to the popular references to (though not applications of) the anthropological and diplomatic model of culture embodied by UNESCO, as demonstrated in the cultural policies of Scotland and Finland (as will be more fully explored in Chapter Five). The references to ordinary or everyday culture rather than the arts in these cultural policies, suggests democracy (in terms of its implied inclusivity), but also make way for the inclusion of the economically seductive and much wider creative industries (see 4.2.3.3), benefitting from two legitimations despite the covert/overt support of high culture.29

Though these statements undoubtedly increase the democratic mandate for cultural agencies and align their policies with a more powerful agenda (ordinariness and the creative industries), as Chapter Four (4.2.2) has outlined, “problems” with the word culture, and “general perception[s]” of elitism persist (in a Scottish context), and are acknowledged as a “barrier” for most people (Bonnar Keenleyside, 2000, p. 3). Ironically, therefore, the replacing of arts policies/ministries with cultural

29 Though Scotland uses the definition (Scottish Executive, 2000a), like its former culture ministry, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, its funding relationships continue to balance subsidies to high culture with developmental support to the creative industries. Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts/CulturalPolicy [Accessed 6 December 2012]. See also Finland, which uses the UNESCO definition of culture, but whose cultural portfolio is much narrower, comprising “national cultural institutions; publicly funded and subsidised museums, theatres and orchestras; local cultural provision; and subsidised organisational and civic activities.” Available: http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Kulttuuri/?lang=en [Accessed 6 December 2012].
policies/ministries in recent decades, is an attempt to move away from lingering perceptions (of elitism), and increase legitimacy. The reasons for this are complex, but again, revolve around legitimation, complexity and confusion as to the role of either arts or cultural ministries.

4.4.11 Understanding the terms: values; purposes; benefits; rationales; intrinsic and extrinsic value

One of the key challenges in understanding cultural policy, and in particular, why states have cultural policies, is the array of policy terms and uses of terms in relation to its positioning and valuing by the state. This refers to the relative conflation of concepts such as value, role, purpose, benefit and rationale. While some of these terms aim to address what cultural policy is, more often than not, they constitute what cultural policy does, leaving a gap in relation to what might be called policy principles. For example, the use of concepts such as value, an a priori economic concept, is typically used to describe a feature or characteristic of cultural policy that is personally held. Similarly, policy purposes/functions (to either have use or not have use) are often used interchangeably with policy benefits to describe an outcome of culture or cultural policy.

However, as used, these terms do not clearly articulate the policy principles behind culture as an arm of government and are both imprecise and contingent. As such, social and economic legitimation discourses within cultural policies demonstrate a value

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30 The use of the arts in ministerial nomenclature in Europe continues in Scotland (under cultural policy), Northern Ireland, Austria and the Republic of Ireland. Ireland’s cultural ministry adopted the term culture, as opposed to arts, for the first time in 2010, when it changed from the Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism to Dept. of Tourism, Culture and Sport. In 2011, after a general election, it changed back to the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht. In the UK, arts policy was replaced by cultural policy in 1997 (Bennett, 2006 p. 122).
system that infers a “justificatory” (Chiapello and Boltanski, 2002, p. 7) rationale behind investing in culture, but also articulates the benefits of culture to societies. Though Jesuitical, while these concepts might be viewed in aggregate as inferring the principle or purpose for cultural policy (or what cultural policy is), discrepancies can be determined between the philosophical basis on which culture is funded (arguably the moral or series of values on which cultural policy is based), the benefits of culture to societies (the advantages or profits of culture), and the purpose of cultural policies or what they are designed to do as public policies (the ultimate aim or function of cultural policies). This use of these terms, therefore, illustrates the difficulties with generating more precise understandings of government support of cultural policy.

In addition, further categorisations of cultural values/uses/benefits into extrinsic, external or secondary, and intrinsic, internal or primary, and contestations around those terms, compounds these complicated characterisations of cultural policy, as Chapter One has outlined. To illustrate this, it is worth reconsidering descriptions of the nature of these value systems. Extrinsic value discourses are usually associated with instrumentalism and have been linked to the non-personal, secondary “externalities” (Towse, 2003, p. 22), benefits, outcomes, or spill-over effects of culture (Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 2009, p. 422). However, while intrinsic value has been described as the “subjective experience of culture, intellectually, emotionally and spiritually” (Holden, 2006, p. 14), confusion arises where it is defined as embodying three separate benefits: as purely “private”, with benefits for the individual alone; as having “spill over” and extended benefits to the public; or as purely “public”, with direct and publicly beneficial outcomes (McCarthy et al., 2005, pp. xv – xvi).
These categories, particularly the last one, highlight difficulties with separating out the characteristics of culture as either intrinsic or extrinsic. As such, the capturing of various characteristics which may seem intrinsic (i.e., cognition, health, social, communication), can equally be viewed as a strategic output with spill-over public benefits and, critically, at some level has a measurable economic value. Aesthetic benefits (often equated with intrinsic values) have also been described as “artistic instrumentalism” (Knell and Taylor, 2011, p. 18) which offer “individual and societal outcomes”, as well as “public good instrumentalism” (ibid., p. 23), further problematising distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic.

Policymakers and theorists have responded to these debates by asserting that as all values are “socially constructed”, it is “unsustainable to argue that objects, practices or institutions have intrinsic qualities that subsist within them” (DCMS, 2010, p. 20) and that instrumentalism, closely associated with extrinsic values, is simply an “interpretation” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5). Equally, it is also claimed that policy problems arise where intrinsic values are interpreted in a strictly romantic, autonomous and artistically disinterested tradition (rather than the strategic ones listed above), in light of policy’s de facto role as a public instrument (as indicated historically) putatively pursuing public value (Vickery, 2011). Discourses around intrinsic value, therefore, are a “consistent philosophical [and political] problem” for cultural policy (ibid., p. 21) and are central to debates between Arnoldian moralising fine arts (see 4.2.2) and functional economic and social interests.

While for some, therefore, romantic discourses represent the benign intention to “insulate art from demands that it be useful”, an “unintended” consequence of romantic
values, as indicated above, has been the perception of the arts as elite and thus “remote, esoteric, and removed from life” (McCarthy et al., 2005, p. 38). These struggles are reflected in calls to find the “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) to describe or evaluate culture in terms that cultural practitioners and policymakers can support, though there is an emphasis on the cultural sector’s “own terms” and search for its “unique language of the arts” (ibid.). What the “unique language of the arts” is, remains unclear, but is hinted at in moves for cultural practitioners to avoid “alien” (economic and social) valuations which “belong to a different world” (ibid.) and represent the “language and function” of others (Variant Editorial Group, 2011, n.p.). It can be said therefore, that intrinsic and extrinsic discourses of culture are interdependent and emerge from a genealogy of reflexive, historical and defensive categorisations of culture, and latterly, the need for legitimation of publicly funded culture. As such, intrinsic and extrinsic value discourses appeal to different mandates and constituencies, and when used together, draw on the persuasive power of covertly conflicting discourses (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128).

4.4.12 Positive and negative instrumentalism, and legitimation

Multiple rationales, purposes, benefits and values, necessarily raise the prospect of instrumentalism once again, a term unavoidably linked to the search for legitimacy and thus the weak status of cultural policy. The emergence of cultural instrumentalism from 18th and 19th century discourses was explicitly articulated through the Victorians’ concern with public order and the skilful use of culture to support it (Nisbett, 2013, p. 85). Instrumentalism, therefore, has been perceived as a particularly UK preoccupation (Sar, 2009) and like extrinsic and intrinsic discourses, understandings of it are complex and often divided - often within the same commentator/statement. The source of this
division essentially concerns whether instrumentalism is simply a description of how things are in policy, and/or whether it is a moral position describing how things should be, vis-à-vis the potential for putting culture to work.

By far the greater force of scholarship has been directed at the “well rehearsed” (Nisbett, 2012, p. 2) critiques of instrumentalism that focus on its “harmful aspects” (ibid.), viewing it as essentially driven by pernicious market forces with negative consequences for culture (McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Vestheim, 2007, etc.). Negative views of instrumentalism involve claims that expectations for and pressures on culture to deliver economically and socially, contribute to a number of harmful scenarios. These scenarios are claimed to be: the funding of mainstream, unchallenging and homogenous culture, which reduces cultural democracy as well as cultural or creative career opportunities (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p. 218); the promotion of “conservative values of prudence, anti-innovation and a nervousness of being disruptive” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 71); the dulling of the critical capacity of culture (O’Connor, 2007, p. 52; Vestheim, 2007, p. 218; Gray, 2008; Hewitt, 2011, p. 10); the indifferentiation of the market to the “specific quality” of culture (O’Connor, cited in Flew, 2009, p. 4); the co-opting of artists into “already settled” cultural planning processes (O’Regan, 2001, p. 16); the presentation of the city as a space of uncontested, passive and manufactured consumption (Pasquinelli, 2007; McGuigan, 2009; Rosler, 2010, 2011a, 2011b); and the promotion of creative initiatives at the expense of projects directed at “poorer social groups” (Atkinson and Easthope, 2009, p. 72).
Equally, the often “defensive” justification of culture (Belfiore, 2012, p. 103) associated with instrumentalism is primarily concerned with the outcome rather than process of cultural activity and specifically, quantifiable and managed outcomes (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 33). In this way, instrumentalism can be viewed as a form of instrumental reason, treating people and things (in this case culture) as a means to an end (usually social or economic), concerning the use of knowledge for particular ends (Habermas, 1984, p. 8).

There are other problems with instrumentalism, however. It has been claimed that the emphasis on quantitative measurement and evidence-based policy in instrumentalism not only undervalues culture, but is unable to deal with the “thorny” issue of the greater value of culture in society and political life (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105). Further and critically, it is also claimed that arguing for, or depending on, “non-cultural benefits that are meant to flow from [the] investment” makes it harder to justify specifically cultural spending (Mundy, 2000, p. 23). This is a key factor in the political positioning of culture and highlights the dangers of framing and judging it in terms of other “already crowded” (Gray, 2002, p. 87) ministerial agendas. This situation also raises the question of whether non-cultural outcomes are better addressed through other government portfolios and suggest that if cultural policy is “merely a reflection of other areas”, there are questions as to the “role and purpose” of the ministry or department in the first place (Nishett, 2013, p. 97).

Over the past decade or so, however, in response to this overwhelmingly negative view of instrumentalism (and mirroring the utilitarian/romantic debate), counter discourses of positive instrumentalism have developed. These discourses invert “traditional” (ibid., p.
views of instrumentalism by combining a pragmatic acknowledgment of it, with supportive and positive rationales. This view has been acknowledged as “unorthodox” (ibid., p 84) and is aligned with the view of instrumentalism as a “constructive and creative attempt[s] to elaborate a coherent theory of art and an intellectually sophisticated view of the effects of the arts on individuals and societies” consistent with the understanding that art/culture has always served a ruling class agenda (Belfiore, 2012, p. 103).

This discourse underlines the role of instrumentalism in fulfilling a function in society, and how it facilitates culture being “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). This view also works off the basis that the “attribution of cultural value” is to a certain extent dependant on instrumentalism (Belfiore, 2012, p. 105) and that “ideology-free policy-making”, or policy-making without values and purpose, is a myth (ibid., p. 107). This assessment is supported by claims that policy is endemically and intrinsically instrumental, given that it is clearly “designed to achieve something” (Gray, 2007, p. 205) and that instrumentalism is inevitable in a bureaucratic context (McGuigan, 2004, p. 53).

In addition, some argue that instrumentalism is simply a useful discursive construct that gives “certain initiatives in cultural policy a name” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5), and that the “diagnosis” of instrumentalism in cultural policies is a positive and resistant act, which calls to attention key issues and operates as a kind of “cleansing process” (ibid., p. 12). It is also claimed that discourses of instrumentalism in cultural policy are exaggerated and distracting (ibid., p. 11), (as above) confined to English language countries (Sar, 2009, p. 54), lead to a “sterile dichotomy” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 7) and need to
be tested “against empirical evidence”, rather than debated “abstractly” in scholarly journals (Nisbett, 2012, p 17). Some also feel that the issue is not instrumentalism per se, but the particular function to which the arts (or culture) is put (Vuyk, 2010, p. 178).

This concept of positive instrumentalism, though clearly a legitimation of particular cultural practices (i.e. working with other government agendas), is closely linked to the concept of attachment policies (Gray, 2002), as introduced in Chapter One. Attachment policies are a “mechanism for achieving policy ends” (ibid., p. 81) by attaching “solutions to other sets of policy objectives which are seen as being more worthy or which have higher levels of political importance” and can shift to suit “differing sets of priorities over time” (ibid.). Critically, these strategies are a “conscious approach to the fulfilment of long-term plans which could not otherwise be achieved”, aim to secure the “necessary political support” for the sector (ibid.) and to provide “parameters for the assessment of the validity and utility” of cultural objectives (ibid., p. 80). The concept of attachment derives from a policy vacuum in UK local government cultural policies, whereby there were no “clear set of priorities for the [cultural] sector as a whole” so that in pursuing other local objectives, cultural priorities could be left to national cultural bodies (ibid., p. 79). Attachment, therefore, is presented as a conscious and it is suggested, voluntary strategy of a weak sector in need of legitimation.

While some view instrumentalism as inevitable but either largely or potentially negative (i.e. McGuigan, Belfiore respectively), therefore, others view it as a wholly positive mechanism that offers “highly beneficial” artistic opportunities for practitioners,  

31 This concept follows Oliver Bennett’s concept of the “attachment of the arts to a governmental agenda in the XIX century” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 145).
allowing them to “forge partnerships, generate income” and expand artistic possibilities (Nisbett, 2012, p. 1), as suggested in the concept of attachment. Consequently, it can be argued, that there are two or perhaps three types of instrumentalisms, a pragmatic view of its inevitability, a negative instrumentalism and a positive instrumentalism. Whether instrumentalism is viewed as a pragmatic response to non-negotiable pressures from central governments, a genuine engagement with the possibilities of other agendas, or a negative and limiting force in cultural policy, however, it is a central process in legitimacy-creation, a factor acknowledged by linking it to “self-protection” and “survival” (Nisbett, 2013, p. 97). Equally, a positive or negative approach to instrumentalism is determined by ideological factors, and, it is argued, the level of trust in and perceived independence (from outside pressures) of those making policy. The issue of trust (amongst the stakeholders), autonomy or voluntarism (in terms of attaching non-cultural agendas to cultural policy), is a key consideration in relation to instrumental and attached discourses like the creative city and will be discussed below.

Nevertheless, given the dominance and normative status of the economy in most policy discourses, as the following chapter will demonstrate, there are questions as to whether attachment or instrumentalism is always conscious (given the now normative status of instrumentalism) or voluntary (given the dependency of culture on wider political approval). As the concept of attachment implies, cultural practitioners are typically indentured to other government ministries and priorities, as well as the general precariousness of changes in political administrations. Equally, it has been acknowledged that attachment may “imply the absence of any clear long-term Strategy” for cultural policy, that it involves an element of “band-wagon jumping” (Gray, 2002, p. 80) and that it may not represent a “workable solution” (ibid., p. 82). Similarly, since
attachment has migrated from local to national cultural policies, there is a vacuum in cultural policymaking.

The continued lack of autonomy of cultural policy has been underlined in recent comments from the UK’s culture secretary who spoke of the need to use economic arguments for culture in order to get “traction” (or legitimacy) from the Secretary’s other colleagues, as much as the “country at large” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.). This comment reflects other views of the need for culture ministries to make stronger arguments to more important “Finance and Prime Ministers” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). This deferral to other government colleagues introduces a second group from whom legitimacy must be secured, that of central government, as referred to in Chapter Two. This lack of voluntary engagement with other government agendas is an important consideration in relation to the endemic nature of instrumentalism and the question of cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987).

4.4.13 The structure and cycle of instrumentalism and cynical reason

One of the outcomes of pressures on cultural policy and thus instrumentalism and attachment, is the cyclical and self-reinforcing nature of justificatory narratives in cultural policies. As Chapter Five will indicate, like all government ministries, departments of culture are expected to tie their policies to national plans (e.g. Government of Ireland, 2009; Scotland’s National Performance Framework),\(^\text{32}\) which exert downward pressures on those funded by culture ministries (ie Arts Councils or national cultural institutions), as well as further down, other funded organisations and artists. This downward chain of pressure, though putatively democratic, is driven by

legitimation and results in not only instrumentalism, but a cyclical discursive effect whereby instrumental discourse formations are reflected back up to those from whom they originate, in order to achieve legitimacy and a better chance of funding. The dependency of most cultural practitioners on state funding and the intense competition for this, means that many approach funding with a necessary expediency and pragmatism, and are careful to use the right language or discourse to frame their proposals (and avoid the wrong language). This process can at best occlude the (primary) cultural or artistic motivations behind projects, and at worst, instrumentally modify their proposals and compromise their funding relationships.

This discursive exchange can be viewed as a mutual deception, disingenuousness, or even “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298) that moves up and down the hierarchical policy chain according to how “fruitful” (ibid.) the discourses prove to be. The longer the argument is reflected upstream, the more normative it becomes, creating a cycle of expectation and a self-justifying instrumentalism. Although this process is usually involuntary, given the pressures on cultural policy and in particular cultural practitioners, this situation can be described in terms of cynical reason, a central concept in the work of German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1987).

Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason refers to the phenomenon of a “modernized, unhappy consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 5) or “chic bitterness” (ibid.) associated with survival, that has increasingly afflicted the discontented Western world. This process has been linked to the change from the “naive consciousness” of ideology to a “cynical wisdom” (Zizek, 1989, n.p.) characterised by those who “know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the
instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them that it has to be so” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 5). Those engaged in cynical reason via structural instrumentalism, are both those administering and applying for cultural funding who are aware of the game, but uphold and maintain an “ideological mask” (Zizek, 1989, n.p.) in a “well mannered rationality” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 3).

This capitulation, as demonstrated in references to “self-protection” and “survival” (Nisbett, 2013, p. 97) in relation to attachment and instrumentalism, is driven by the “self-preservation” to which Sloterdijk refers. Moreover, this emphasis on survival further indicates how involuntary attachment and instrumentalism is, reflecting an extreme pragmatism driven by the competitive and precarious conditions of the cultural sector, and ultimately the desire of policymakers for the state or government to endure. Sloterdijk writes of cynical reason, therefore, as an “enlightened false consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 6), driven by a “compulsion to survive” despite the “better knowledge” that those practising cynical reason have of “preestablished relations” which they find “dubious” (ibid.).

Consequently, the attribution of cynical reason to the cultural sector must be understood in relation to the extreme financial pressures on and disempowered state of the sector in general. Though these practices may seem like bad faith on the part of both policymakers and funded practitioners, they are simply a response to a sector which is “hostage to instrumental concerns” that they have “limited control over” (Gray and Wingfield, 2010, p. 11) and thus where instrumental benefit-arguments represent the only game in town. Though these pressures have been viewed as providing cultural practitioners with the opportunity to diversify (Nisbett, 2012, 2013), it is questionable
whether, given the choice, other more creative or at least independent cultural choices would not be made (and thus how beneficial they really are).

These questions further support the view of both policy and indeed funding applications as purely legitimation and symbolic devices, rather than effective mechanisms for planning or influencing behaviour. At best, cynical reason can be viewed as a utilitarian pragmatism and compromise, and at worst, a disempowerment, coercion, disingenuousness, and example of extreme cognitive dissonance. Cynical reason, therefore, is essentially borne out of a lack of power and support for the culture sector, a lack of trust between policy stakeholders, but also a lack of agreement on what cultural policy is for. The impact of this will be returned to in Chapter Seven

4.4.14 Value systems: public value and cultural value

The other question at the heart of justifications, legitimations and cynical reasonings, is the question of how instrumentalism putatively pursues public value, the “ultimate end of public policy” (Moran et al., 2006, p. 390). Public value is a key legitimation discourse in public policy and often appears concomitantly with equally legitimising terms such as public services, public goods, the public domain (“citizenship, equity and service”), the public interest, and of course, the public sphere (Parsons, 1995, p. 12). Public value, however, is typically and tautologically described (via the Work Foundation) as simply “what the public values” (Oakley et al., 2006, p. 2), but also the willingness to pay via “contingent valuation” (Frey, 2003, p. 20) and the capability and legitimacy of a service (Keaney, 2006, p. 13; Lee, Oakley and Naylor, 2011, p. 291). Given the contested nature of the public ab initio, the concept has been described as a “messy hybrid” (Oakley et al., 2006, p. 3) and as “chronic” (Vickery, 2011, p. 21).
The term originated in the US during the 1990s (and later the UK) as part of the New Public Management project (NPM), which aimed to deliver efficiency and effectiveness to public services, reflecting a wider notion of value beyond measurement (Keaney, 2006, p. 3). Like policy and rationalism, however, NPM reflected managerial approaches which viewed problems as technical, rather than deeply rooted, social and political issues and as a result the term public value has suffered a “backlash” in recent years (Lee et al., 2011, p. 297). For some, therefore, public value has come to represent the “new planetary vulgate” of neoliberalism (McGuigan, 2005, p. 233), techniques of upbeat and “‘postmodern’ business” (ibid., p. 237), and from the point of view of cultural policy in particular, has been strategically “embraced by think tanks, politicians and cultural organizations” as part of the “restless marketplace” of policy (Lee et al., 2011, p. 297).

The concept of cultural value has similarly emerged from bureaucratic attempts to determine value outside of simple measurement, and specifically, the need for an identifiable value system for cultural policy “commensurable with other calls on the public purse” (DCMS, 2010, p. 9). The term was developed in the early to mid 2000s and, like public value, has a “relativism” (ibid., p. 21) that makes it “difficult to define or codify” (Oakley, 2004, p. 74). Holden’s concept of cultural value relies on the securing of legitimacy through an agreement between what he claims are the [instrumental] needs of the politician and the policymaker, the [intrinsic] needs of the cultural practitioner and the [audience] needs of the public (Holden, 2006, p. 59).

This definition of cultural value aligns with economist David Throsby’s account which rests on a balance between economic value and (tautologically) cultural value (Throsby
Throsby defines the cultural component of cultural value with reference to putatively *intrinsic* characteristics, including “aesthetic, spiritual, social, historical, symbolic and authenticity value” as well as “pricelessness” (Throsby referenced in Keaney, 2006, p. 31). In summary, therefore, models of cultural value like Holden’s or Throsby’s, create an “acceptable” framework for funding decisions (DCMS, 2010, p. 5) and as with public value, create legitimacy for cultural policy.

The pitting of intrinsic against extrinsic values of culture (and to an extent positive and negative instrumentalism), and cultural value systems, though somewhat inconsistent and ultimately ideological, again highlights the tensions at play in relation to cultural policies when compared with other areas of government. Though intrinsic cultural values have been demonstrated as problematic and extrinsic values have obvious policy appeal (or public value), Holden has convincingly argued that cultural engagement is rarely driven by the latter (i.e. for social or economic reasons), which underlines the problem with advocacy and campaigns that are solely based on extrinsic value arguments (Holden, 2006). The ultimate implication of these complicated valuations of culture is the separation or separateness of cultural policy from other policy sectors, regardless of how policy analysts might want to disavow this (as indicated in comments by Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 13). This issue will be further considered in Chapter Seven.

33 These views of cultural value contrast with models which emphasise cultural rights (ethics) and sustainability (Reeves, 2002, pp. 36-37; Ministry of Education and Culture 2010c).
4.3.15 Conclusions

This review has outlined a genealogy of terminologies, trajectories and “silent births” (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) within the discourses of cultural policy and the creative city. It has described their shared histories and understandings in relation to utility and argumentation vis-à-vis culture, creativity and cultural policy, and illustrated the stakes at play in relation to choosing one model over another. This genealogy has been conducted in the context of discourse, legitimation, instrumentalism and cynical reason. In doing this, the chapter has suggested that political and ideological conflicts over the utility, strategic use, and ownership of culture and creativity, particularly in respect of the economy, are historical and have created resistant and dichotomous discourses (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) that are deeply embedded in the specific trajectories and histories of each term. This chapter has also shown that the consistently positive resonances of creativity and culture, armoured by links to discourses of innovation and entrepreneurialism (as well as science, technology and economics), embody apparently progressive and rational economic and knowledge (or creative) economy values, which play a major part in the success, longevity, apparent public value and legitimacy of the creative city paradigm. This has created clashing and dual systems of intrinsic/sign/autonomous/romantic and extrinsic/use/instrumental/utilitarian values, which continue to resonate in discourses of both the creative city and cultural policy and impact on legitimation and trust between the stakeholders of cultural policy.

This chapter has also demonstrated the ideological, contested, dependent, and self-perpetuating nature of instrumentalism and its positive (tangible, accountable policies) and negative (cynical, exploitative) interpretations. The concept of cynical reason has been raised in respect of questions over the autonomy, agency and consequently
sincerity of instrumental discourses such as the creative city, with potentially serious implications for legitimacy (in terms of Habermasian consensus). Moreover, this review has suggested that the malleability and richness of culture and creativity in relation to both cultural policy and the creative city, has facilitated their appropriation for historic and emerging models of the state, knowledge and the economy, driving and resulting in instrumental discourses and difficult stakeholder relationships, raising questions over the public function of cultural policies. This is particularly profound in the context of the dependency of urban development on the private sector and the beneficiaries of policy in putatively democratic societies. In order to locate this context and creative city discourse as it relates to cultural policies, through the lens of culture, creativity and cultural policy, this dissertation must now turn to the discrete and located cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland. What follows, therefore, is a discourse analysis of three national cultural policies as a basis for later consideration of the state, capital and colonisation.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASES OF SCOTLAND, FINLAND AND IRELAND

5.1 General introduction

The last four chapters have outlined the rationale, approach and context of the research question. Specifically, these chapters have underlined the role of legitimation in discourse and indicated what is at stake in the relationships between the creative city, culture, creativity, cultural policy and the state (hierarchies/status, ideologies, relationships). This chapter comprises a detailed consideration of the national cultural policy discourses of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, typologising their general and specific characteristics vis-à-vis discourse formation theory and the creative city. It will demonstrate the prevalence of conflicting discourses, the lack of any one clear rationale for their cultural policies other than to meet localised and discrete government agendas, the consequent lack of control they have in relation to wider government priorities and the containment strategies and survival tactics deployed to deal with this.

Key to the exploration of creative city discourses within these cases will be a consideration of the struggle of discourse, the concepts of flexibility and usefulness of narrative, the fit with national priorities and political/historical contexts, the simultaneous endorsement and disavowal of claims to truth (like the creative city), the role of trust and legitimation in policy, and the state’s representation of public and private interests. Essentially, this chapter will establish to what extent and how the creative city has emigrated to (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) or materialised within the discourses of specific, located cultural policy documents, grounding the work of the previous chapters and providing material for analysis and extrapolation.
The cases constitute three national cultural policies of Northern Europe, two predominantly English-speaking countries historically tied to the British model of cultural policy (Scotland and Ireland), and one Nordic country with a very different social and cultural tradition (Finland). Each case is introduced with a brief outline of its political, economic and social context, in order to gauge prevailing ideologies and approaches to culture, creativity and the state, and to identify other potentially influencing factors. The first case will explore Scotland, the second Finland and the third Ireland, attempting to locate the particular circumstances and manifestations of their individual cultural discourses, and then specifically situate the creative city paradigm amongst them.

Each case will look at particular issues in those countries, including: self-determination and identity, the creative economy vis-à-vis the knowledge economy, place-development and boosterism, privatisation and the need for workers and residents (in the case of Scotland); the reconciliation of political and social traditions with industrial positions (Finland); countries’ dependencies on international reputation; and pejorative political attitudes to the culture ministry (Ireland). This chapter will conclude with an overview of how creative city discourses constitute normative policy narratives in Europe.

5.2 National contexts

Scotland, Finland and Ireland are small countries on the Northern periphery of Europe, with modest populations of 5.2, 5.2, and 4.5 million respectively. Politically,
Despite Finland’s Nordic legacy and social democratic and welfare principles, these countries represent liberal democracies, with neoliberal approaches to economic issues. As such, each country has an open mixed economy, and follows a knowledge economy model with a competitive interest in attracting international investment and skilled labour. There are a number of other historical and social factors, however, that have also had a profound impact on all three policies.

The role of nationalism and self-determination arises in all three cases (and in Scotland and Ireland in particular) and can be linked to the decline of empire-building, the impact of colonisation (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5) and the rise of nation states. This is reflected in Scotland’s uneasy constitutional monarchy, and relationship to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, despite its devolved independence and the ascendance of the Scottish National Party government since 1999. In contrast, Finland and Ireland constitute independent republics, having respectively achieved different forms of independence, following Finland’s assertion of autonomy from the Kingdom

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38 Social democracy, which is the reconciling of ideals of social justice with capitalism, associated with the welfare state and economic democracy, is strongly associated with the Nordic countries ("an essential part of Nordic legal tradition and ethical orientation") and in Finland is historically linked to the “people’s general sense of justice” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 42).
39 Scotland, “as a small open economy, has extensive trade links with not only the rest of the UK, but also with the global economy” (Scottish Government, 2002, n.p.). “The Republic of Ireland has become one of the most open economies in the world” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 1). For Finland, see http://www.eurochallenge.org/doc/Finland.pdf [Accessed 2nd August 2013].
41 Through devolution, Scotland has its own government (formerly called the Scottish Executive) taking charge of “day-to-day” portfolios of health, education, justice, rural affairs and transport, as well as economic development, housing, environment, agriculture, tourism, culture and the arts. Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/ [Accessed 12 June 2012].
of Sweden (19th century) and ultimate independence from Russia (1917)\(^{42}\) and the end of British rule in Ireland (1921).\(^{43}\) Like Scotland and to an extent Finland, nationalism in Ireland has been a defining and complex force throughout the 20th century, which continues to impact on its politics/policies.

Similarly, although all three countries have significant intellectual histories, Scotland’s key role in the Enlightenment,\(^ {44}\) as well as the industrial revolution and large-scale urbanisation, population growth and the subsequent decline that accompanied it (Kidd, 2011), has had a major impact on its national psyche and urban development policies. Specifically, the social (depopulation) and economic devastation that followed Scotland’s urbanisation in the 19th century exacerbated into the 20th century and has defined Scotland’s urban-focused industrial policies, helping to resurrect Scottish nationalism\(^ {45}\) but leaving social and economic scars.

Likewise, Finland’s management of its relationship with its former rulers and extremely powerful neighbours (Sweden and Russia) profoundly informs its national self-image and sense of pride, and is deeply embedded in its current diplomatic and cultural relations (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c),\(^ {46}\) as well as its diversity policies

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\(^{43}\) After the civil war, partial independence was achieved in 1921 and consolidated in 1937 when the Irish constitution was established. In 1998, as part of an agreement with Britain, the claiming of sovereignty of the whole country was relinquished, signalling an accord with Britain and a new political and cultural reality for Ireland.


\(^{45}\) Scottish nationalism re-emerged in the 1920s after the founding of the National Party of Scotland, and was augmented by the discovery of oil off the coast of Aberdeen (late 1960s/70s) and the 1998 Scotland Act, culminating in devolution and partial independence within the State of Great Britain in 1999 (Hibberd, 2008, p. 10).

(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b, 2009b, 2009c, 2010b). Moreover, since the 1980s and early 1990s, despite a persistent monoculturalism in Finland, recent immigration and the arrival of the New Finns (non-ethnic or indigenous Finnish residents who have settled or have citizenship in Finland) coupled with the mix of indigenous Finns, Swedes (the second national language) and to a lesser degree the Saamis (who are culturally autonomous and have protected status), has made Finland more culturally diverse, and has therefore had a major impact on its diversity politics.

More recently however, though Finland’s Nordic tradition depends on and stresses legal protection and a “common commitment to equality, egalitarianism, and equity” (Mulcahy, 2004, p. 157), the position and approach of the social democratic welfare state has changed, along with recessions and the rise of the nationalist True Finns. As such and following a general rise in Finnish nationalism and the decline of social democracy across Europe, there has been a weakening of Finland’s newly integrationist policies (Ward, 2011, n.p.). This rise in nationalism has resulted in tensions between Finland’s older and highly prized social democratic and collaborative model and newer exclusive discourses from the “conservative right” brought on by the latest recession’s “profound crisis of neo-liberal capitalism” (O’Toole, 2012, n.p.). This change can be seen in reversals of earlier, more open policies, as well as media reports of an increase in negative attitudes to immigration more generally (Helsinki Times, 2011a, 2011b).

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47 In 2007, the Social Democrats went into opposition for the first time in many years, ceding to a coalition. This situation changed in May 2011 when the nationalist True Finn party won almost a fifth of the election vote, but declined to participate in government following a pro EU bailout agreed by other parties (Ward, 2011, n.p.).

48 The handling of refugees in Finland has been described as “restrictive” (Koenis and Saukkonen, 2006, p. 7).
Like Finland (in terms of Sweden and Russia), despite independence, Ireland remains socially, economically, politically and culturally tied to its closest neighbour and former ruler, maintained through its English-speaking population and its historical “replication” of “British structures and ideologies” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). Though described as a “nationalistic, conservative and insular country on the margins of Europe” (Boyle, 2006, p. 411), however, Ireland has undergone a significant transformation over the last century, from a historically agricultural, rural, Catholic and monocultural, to a predominantly urban, increasingly secularised, less homogenous, and relatively new country and state. More recently again, Ireland has moved from “one of the fastest-growing economies in the world”, with “full employment and for the first time in over 150 years, population growth and immigration” (Kerr, 2007 p. 112), to one of the worst international recessions of the recent economic downturn and since the foundation of the state. 

Notwithstanding these historic factors, the economic policies of all three countries have had a defining impact on their national and specifically cultural policies. Scotland’s history as a major centre of the industrial revolution has meant that it has long been a post-industrial country, demonstrated more recently in its strong creative economy and

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49 Ireland is now a predominantly urban country, with more than 25 per cent of all residents living in its capital city and an additional 7.5 per cent in the cities of Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford. Dublin has a population of nearly 1.2 million and Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford have cumulative populations of approximately 300,000. Both figures from Irish Census 2006 [online]. Available: http://www.cso.ie/census [Accessed 23 June 2011].

50 Though “secularism is a relatively recent development for Ireland”, in the 2011 census, “269,800 people declared themselves as having ‘no religion’, an increase of 44.8 per cent on the 2006 figure” (Grimes, 2012, n.p.).


52 In 2012, it was reported that “those born outside the State account for some 17 per cent of the population”. See Irish Times (2012a).

53 Ireland has been the worst hit of the three countries by the latest international recession. With rising emigration (Nicholl, 2009, n.p.), and unemployment rates between 15 per cent in 2011 (O’Brien, 2011, n.p.) and 13.6 per cent in 2013 (O’Brien, 2013), it is in significant debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU (Reuters, 2011, n.p.), leading some to surmise that “anything resembling democracy [in Ireland] will be effectively suspended for many years” (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). See also Flynn (2011).
creativity agenda (Scottish Government, 2009a). This places Scotland’s post-industrialism within a historical, as much as, economic and political frame and distinguishes it from Finland and Ireland, who have only latterly, though enthusiastically, adopted knowledge economy and service industry models (Government of Ireland, 2008; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a). Like Ireland, Finland’s shift from a primarily agricultural to a highly industrialised and mixed economy in the mid 20th century, has centred on technology and the information society (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, 2010b). Equally, innovation policies and the drive for skilled knowledge labour have been particularly influential agendas in Finland since advanced manufacturing processes began to move to China (Comedia, 2010, p. 16), and have been a national strategy/priority since the mid 1990s (Hautamäki, 2002; Himanen, 2004).

Similarly, Ireland has moved from a predominantly agricultural economy (for most of the 20th century), to a knowledge and service economy dominated by a local variant called the *Smart Economy*, highly dependent on the science and technology sector. Neoliberalism has been particularly central to Ireland’s economic development, promoting an unrestricted pursuit of inward investment characterised by a pervasive “ideology of low [corporate] taxation” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 2), as well as poor social and health services, and the general embrace of an Anglo-American corporate model. Ireland is thus a highly globalised country, with a well-educated and English-speaking

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54 The Smart Economy is defined as one which “…combines the successful elements of the enterprise economy and the innovation or ‘ideas’ economy while promoting a high-quality environment, improving energy security and promoting social cohesion” (Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 7).

55 In 2011, Ireland was ranked as the 29th most competitive and 11th most prosperous nation in the world as well as the 7th strongest economy for entrepreneurship and opportunity (increasing from 12th in 2009). See the Legatum Prosperity Index. Available: http://www.prosperity.com/ [Accessed 29 July 2011].

56 Ireland took second place in the globalisation index of 2010 on the basis of “its openness to global trade, global capital movements, global exchange of technology and ideas, global labour movements and cultural integration” (Hennigan, 2011, n.p.).
workforce (opening up a number of English-speaking markets), offering “speedy delivery of information-rich and design-rich goods and services in the network-based economy” (ibid., p. 8). The relative success of Ireland in pursuing this agenda is evidenced by choice of the country as the location for the headquarters of major US technology giants such as Google, Twitter, Apple and Facebook, the latter of whom described Ireland as a “great hub of international tech talent” (Irish Times, 2013, n.p.).

All three countries, therefore, share a particular relationship to nationalism and to a degree, colonisation, with patchy economic histories, resulting in issues of confidence, self-esteem and the importance of diplomacy. Equally, the cases have developed strong cultural identities and traditions, are small in population (and thus seek residents and workers) and occupy a relatively peripheral geo-political location in northern Europe. Of greater importance in relation to analysing the cases in respect of the creative city, however, is the shared political and economic models and national agendas of the three countries (neoliberalism and the knowledge economy), of increasing importance since the onset of the international recession.

Taken together, these factors have resulted in a series of cultural policy discourses that will be shown to comprise: nationalism, competition, knowledge-building, creativity, the creative economy (and post-industrialism), welfare, civilisation, place-development, mobile workers, international investment, tolerance, reputation and national branding. In order to look more deeply at these discourses and how these factors have specifically impacted on urban development discourses and cultural polices in each country, it is time to turn to Scotland, beginning with an overview of city branding and marketing there.
5.3 Scotland

5.3.1 Introduction to the creative city in Scotland: city branding, future-casting and reinvention

Over the last thirty years, the global interest in urban regeneration initiatives and discourses, in the context of Scotland’s continued economic and population decline, has led to a number of place-development and uniqueness (of place) discourses in Scotland’s policies. As such, Scotland’s cities have been exemplars of city marketing and development campaigns, expressed in a wide-ranging programme of social, cultural and tourism events. Specifically, Scotland has been awarded two international UNESCO creative city designations (literature and music), and hosts a plethora of national, city and place-branding initiatives,57 national and international cultural events,58 and other creatively branded projects.59 Particular to Scotland however, and


defining much of this activity, is a focus on both traditionalism (looking to the past) and modernity (looking to the future), and thus an emphasis on identity, invention and reinvention. This activity is represented by a range of Enlightenment narratives with an emphasis on the theme of the imagination, tasked with national progress and renewal and attempts to shape perceptions in and of Scotland through community think-ins. This alliance between local, national and cultural initiatives, it will be demonstrated, is a defining feature of Scotland’s cultural policies.

Scotland’s Futures Forum is one of these projects, and was established (by the Scottish Executive in 2005) as a scenario-building project aiming to inspire new thinking about Scotland’s future, civic agency, democracy, and sustainability, within a cultural context. Similarly, the “mass imagination exercise” of Glasgow 2020 (Hassan, 2007, n.p) devised by think-tank DEMOS (a major contributor to creative city discourse), aimed to use stories or narrative to explore “the possibilities of people thinking, conceiving and developing their own futures” (ibid.). This project culminated in the publication, The Dreaming City and The Power of Mass Imagination (2007), though like many urban projects, it had been discussed in the context of the dangers of "formulic city regeneration" (Leask, 2007, n.p.). Additionally, the 2009 project A Scottish Wave of Change (part of the Cultural Olympiad), also run by DEMOS in

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99 Other creative marketing events comprise Creative Dundee (http://www.creativedundee.com/ [Accessed 28 June 2012], regeneration projects such as Dundee (http://www.dunedinwaterfront.com/) and Speirs Lock (http://www.glasgowarchitecture.co.uk/speirs_locks_development.htm), creative city-themed lectures and conferences such as the Edinburgh Lectures Talking Cities programme, Scotland Naturally. Available: http://www.edinburghlectures.wordpress.com [Accessed 28 March 2010] and dedicated academic programmes such as St Andrews Institute for Capitalising on Creativity which offers a course based on “one of the fastest growing economic sectors”, the creative industries. Available: http://www.standrews.ac.uk/icc/research/grantprojects/esrccapitalisingoncreativity/ [Accessed 21 February 2012].
partnership with a number of public service organisations, echoed these projects, and, like Glasgow 2020, was described as a “mass imagination project” aimed at “people bringing about change.” More recently, these exercises have been joined by initiatives such as the British Council’s Urban Ideas Bakery and Future City Game, an offshoot of its branded British Council Creative Cities programme (as referred to above). This initiative ran in Stirling (2010), and urged “innovative” communities to “bake urban ideas”, turning them into “practical solutions to improve the quality of life in cities”. Scotland is also a member of the Districts of Creativity network, claiming that the country is a “world-class contributor in the spheres of innovation and creativity.”

These collective imagination projects, together with aggressive city and regional marketing campaigns, are aimed at creating positive perceptions of Scotland to itself, and critically, to the outside world. However, these events are equally directed at erasing negative stereotypes of Scotland as depressed and economically depleted, and in this way share a lineage with earlier urban marketing/development initiatives from the 1980s. The Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign (1983) is an example of this and was directly inspired by New York’s 1970s (I love NY) reinvention project. This project represented an urban entrepreneurialism that centred on correcting outdated ideas of Glasgow as dangerous, dilapidated and dirty in an effort to generate and attract tourism, business and investment, and more specifically, to “make Glasgow more attractive to commercial and residential developers” (Trettet, 2009, p. 121).

However, like many boosterist initiatives, views are divided between benign assessments of the campaign (mostly by the Council who devised it), as a major plank of the “cultural renaissance” of Glasgow City Council, designed to “attract dispersed businesses and inward investment” and negative assessments aligned with the “fast policy” criticisms of the creative city (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 397). From this perspective, key problems with Glasgow’s Miles Better was the event’s obfuscation of deeply entrenched problems within the city (Gray, N, 2009), its raid on and enclosing of the city’s commons (or collective wealth), and the plundering of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure in order to “revalorise property values and land rents” (ibid., 2010, n.p.), in other words, urban entrepreneurialism.

Equally, the Glasgow Garden Festival of 1988 aimed to promote Glasgow (in highly creative city mode) as a place to “invest in, visit, live or work”, and prepared the ground for Glasgow’s 1990 City of Culture. This benchmark event catapulted Glasgow’s status as a cultural centre and galvanised countless national and international regeneration discourses around the compatibility and possibility of culture, the economy, industrial policy, tourism, branding and transformation. The divisiveness which characterised responses to Glasgow City of Culture eclipsed even that of Glasgow’s Miles Better. As such, the event was positioned, on the one hand (again by officials), as an acclaimed model of culture-led urban regeneration, a “magnificent success”, a “revolutionary model”, responsible for “setting future agendas for city change” (European Communities, 2009, p. 16), receiving sustained positive media.
attention (BBC Newsnight, 2011), academic studies and comment,\textsuperscript{67} and, on the other, an egregious example of expense, uneven development, with "questionable" regeneration benefits (Hibberd, 2008, p. 30).

Equally, from a political point of view, the organisation set up to bid for it (Glasgow Action), was pejoratively referred to as the “first clearly defined public-private partnership in Scotland” (Boyle cited in Gray, N., 2010, n.p.) and made up of “local business personalities, many of them with direct ties to local banks and other real-estate related industries” (Tretter, 2009, p. 120). These claims raised questions around the uses of and influences on public funding in cities. Despite these criticisms, however, the dispersed impact of this campaign continues to resonate in the media, in reports of Scotland as “one of the UK’s leading ‘creative hotspots’” (Fergusen, 2010, n.p.), and claims that Glasgow hasn’t lost its “creative edge” (Brennan, 2010, n.p.).

This range of place-development and marketing activity, linking the private sector and the economy, with culture and creativity discourses, is embodied and exemplified in Glasgow Life, Glasgow City Council’s devolved culture department.\textsuperscript{68} Also known as Culture Services Glasgow (CSG), this new model of devolved public service was rebranded as Glasgow Life in 2009 (Gordon Neshbett, 2011, p. 17). As a putatively public service body, the nomenclature of Glasgow Life was significant and took a “bit of coming to terms with” (ibid., p. 16), ultimately being viewed as a deliberately “generic” signifier that would “facilitate trading” (ibid., p. 17). Like the other campaigns, the development of Glasgow Life was intended to “make Glasgow more

\textsuperscript{67} See Garcia (2009) and Palmet/RAE Associated (2004). This latter report involves a number of key authors who have studied the impact of Glasgow’s City of Culture, including its chief author, Robert Palmer, Beatriz Garcia, Rod Fisher and Francois Matarasso. See also weblinks Available: http://www.beatrizgarcia.net; www.impacts08.net [Accessed 31 August 2012].

vibrant” (ibid., p. 16) and counteract images of its “world-beating inequality” (ibid., p. 17) by creating new and more positive images of Glasgow. However, the new agency quickly became a source of controversy in relation to accusations of “cronyism” (ibid., p. 15), political patronage, corruption, a disregard for local activities in favour of international business and brands, a “deprioritisation of the people of Glasgow” and, again, a primarily “entrepreneurial attitude towards culture” (ibid., p. 17). The conflation of public/private interests within Glasgow Life was explicitly underlined in City Council statements stressing Glasgow’s need to “develop a new model for delivering public services in partnership with the private sector” (Glasgow City Council, 2006, p. 2). Like Glasgow Action, therefore (above), these statements conferred the sense of a “private company” (Gordon Neshitt, 2011, p. 15), which to some suggested a lack of “democratic accountability” (ibid., p. 18).

The history, frequency and range of these marketing events, designations, imagination exercises, cultural festivals, and public-private models of cultural delivery in Scotland, collectively point to an active neoliberal urban entrepreneurialism, adept at manipulating Scotland’s profile in the service of national as well as international consumption. More so, however, these campaigns point to a deficit, national defensiveness or need for reinvention, in order to legitimate, address, or possibly reframe, the country’s prevailing social and economic issues. One of the key sources of this deficit, in Glasgow at least, has been the impact of the Glasgow Effect, a name given to the ongoing health problems, long-term poverty and social degradation of Glasgow. Nevertheless, the enlightenment tone of the projects (signifying progress, the future, internationalism etc.) also reflect Scotland’s intellectual legacy (as well as

Landry and Comedia’s creative city consultancy work there: Comedia, 1991; Landry et al., 1996).70 Taken together, therefore, the entrepreneurial approach to culture and city development in Scotland can be interpreted as located in its intellectual and industrial history as well as Scotland’s subsequent economic and demographic decline.

5.3.2 Nationalism, national psyches and cultural policies

Before outlining the development of cultural policy in Scotland, it is important to return to the role of nationalism in the Scottish psyche with a view to considering its influence on Scotland’s cultural policy discourses. Scotland’s devolved independence in 1999 created a fragmented and contested political situation, resulting in three changes of government, four first ministers (as premiers), and ten culture ministers to date.71 However, recent changes in the independence movement, spearheaded by the SNP, in power since 2007 and a majority government since 2011, have led to the prospect of complete independence from the Union through a referendum planned for 2014 (Press Association, 2012, n.p.; Irish Times, 2012d). Like many countries subjected to external administrations, therefore, nationalism is a recurring and contested discourse in Scotland, fed by an “aberrant identity code of fake Celticism” (McCrone, 2001, p. 146), prone to “regressive” (ibid., p. 139) and romantic tropes of “tartanry” and myth, and 19th century “appropriation[s] of highland symbolism” (ibid., p. 132). These national tropes and discourses arose as a way to address fears of the mass industrialisation of Scotland in the 19th century, and the view that its “economic, social and cultural identity was ebbing away” (ibid., p. 135).

70 This publication details a seminal creative city workshop held in Glasgow in 1994, involving Comedia, Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, Peter Hall from the Bartlett School Demos, Klaus R. Kunzmann at the University of Dortmund and Lia Ghilardi (Landry et al., 1996).

As a result of the emigration that followed industrialisation, Scotland’s diaspora has become a major part of its identity construction, leading to narratives of “romanticism, self-invention and a measure of ignorant assumption” (Kidd, 2011, p.5). Equally, Scotland's “Anglophobia” and “toxic” “anti-English feeling” (Higgins, 2013b, n.p.) is symptomatic of its fraught relationship with Great Britain and the United Kingdom, and has in some way come to define Scotland through an ongoing “inferiorism” (McCrone, 2001, p. 140) and an oppressive mode of what has been described as “self-colonisation” (ibid., p. 146).

Scholars view this relationship with England as having given rise to images of Scottish culture as “deformed” (McCrone, 2001, p. 131) and resulting in an enduring cultural pessimism as well as a subsequent fragmentation (ibid., p. 138) within the national psyche. The divided nature of this position is characterised by the desire to project modernity with a contemporary identity, alongside an obsession with tradition and the past (ibid.). In turn, this rootedness in the past has led to a “standardised and idealised model” of Scottish life (Humes, 2011, n.p.) and an essentialist and “internalist” reading of Scotland to itself (McCrone, 2001, p. 145). The result of these factors is a complicated self-image defined by a pessimism (and inferiorism) mixed with a bombastic nationalism, and the development of a binary past/present discursive typology. This typology, therefore, is driven by a mode of national self-protection that speaks to a Scotland that is “post-national” but not “post-nationalist” (McCrone, 2001,
p. 148) and moreover, speaks to Scotland’s self-colonisation (ibid., p. 146). These issues will be shown to have had a profound impact on Scotland’s cultural policy.\textsuperscript{72}

A positive outcome of nationalism in Scotland has been the high degree of autonomy it has traditionally had in relation to cultural matters, despite being historically bound to the UK (Chávez-Aguayo, 2010). This autonomy was apparent in the establishment of the Scottish Advisory Committee in 1942 as part of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), the Scottish Committee of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) in 1945, the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1948, and the Scottish Arts Council in 1994 as part of the dissolution of the ACGB (Quinn, 1998, p. 260). Between 1999 and 2010, however, despite devolution and a degree of national autonomy, as well as frequent changes in government, there has been some dependence on, and a continuity of, central UK cultural policies, as will be demonstrated via Scotland’s continued focus on the creative industries agenda (i.e. Creative Scotland).

This dependence refers to the continuation of New Labour’s erstwhile creative industries agenda. Like many post-industrial countries, the interest in the creative industries is a response to Scotland’s industrial dispossession after the closure of its formerly successful dockyards, and the subsequent place-development agenda that aimed to reverse this. However, the SNP’s persistence with the creative economy\textsuperscript{73} has

\textsuperscript{72} Broadcasting as a reserved power has caused particular issues for Scottish nationalism (as well as cultural policy) and highlighted the irony of Scottish attempts “to establish a national cultural strategy without including a discussion of the most popular and influential cultural forms of the twentieth century” (Hibberd, 2008, p. 37).

\textsuperscript{73} The founding of Cultural Enterprise Office in 2002, establishing of Cultural and Creative Cultures Scotland (dedicated the North East of Scotland) in 2006, the continued work of the Scottish Enterprise Office and the Highland and Islands Enterprise office, together indicate the significant (and for many confusing) support for the creative industries in Scotland. Available: www.culturalenterpriseoffice.co.uk/; www.creativeculturescotland.co.uk/; www.scottish-enterprise.com/; www.hie.co.uk [Accessed 10 October 2013].

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been critically perceived as an imported English cultural agenda (Scullion and Garcia, 2005, p. 119), that undervalues the historical role played by artists in driving independence (Hamilton and Scullion, 2002, n.p.) and Scotland’s former cultural autonomy.

Though the closeness between former Labour policies and Scotland is changing with the longevity of the SNP and the independence movement, the consensus between Scotland and central Westminster (via New Labour) over the last twenty years has been described as the greatest “accord” between Scottish and wider UK politics “than at any other time” (Hibberd, 2008, p. 12), an alignment of “policy and style” (Schlesinger, 2000, p. 318) and more pejoratively (in relation to Scottish cultural policy), as reeking of “New Labour’s wrongs” (Mulholland, 2008, p. 41). For some, therefore, Scotland’s interest in the creative industries has reflected the desire to retain devolution as an “undisguised tactic for keeping the union in being” (Schlesinger, 2000, p. 314).

For others, however, the creative industries have represented a “genuine route to meet the aspirations of Scotland’s distinct [and reinvented] ‘civil society’” (ibid.) or more simply, the product of a “coherent, coordinated” national policy (Knell and Fleming, 2008, p. 6). Whether a way to increase the link with the central (at least currently) source of UK power or an attempt to reinvigorate civil society, both interpretations of Scotland’s interest in the creative industries suggest the importance of legitimation to the state. That importance is, legitimating Scotland as a central part of the United Kingdom, and/or legitimating Scotland as an independent state. The persistence of the creative industries agenda in Scotland has taken a dramatic turn in the last couple of
years with the development of Creative Scotland, Scotland’s first arts and creative industries agency.

5.3.3 Creative Scotland and government agendas: an overview

The long-awaited arrival of Creative Scotland in 2010 signalled both change and continuity in Scotland. Specifically, this new agency, representing both the creative industries and the subsidised arts, signposted the end of the Scottish Arts Council and traditional post-war model of high culture-focused support (change), in favour of a development agency for the creative economy that championed the “unique contribution of places to a creative Scotland” (continuity) (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 36). As a bold though contested model of cultural development and management, Creative Scotland represents a watershed in the first ten years of independent cultural policy in Scotland (1999 to 2009), as well as European cultural policy more generally and symbolises the culmination of political, economic and cultural change.

Like Glasgow Life, the development of Creative Scotland has been a drawn-out and heavily contested process, critiqued in both the media (Hutcheon, 2006; Macaskill, 2008; Macleod, 2008; Various artists, 2009; Kane, 2010; Sweeney, 2010a; Higgins, 2012b) and the blogosphere. In particular, as suggested above, Creative Scotland has been viewed as ideologically English, adopting unreflexive (Schlesinger, 2009a) and “ready-made” (ibid., p. 11) strategies for making creativity more profitable. However, Creative Scotland has also put a primary focus on place-development and private sector/investment and return, while explicitly aligning itself with central government (non-cultural) priorities and strategies. It will also be argued that this activity has

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contributed to a profound crisis within the body recalling a Habermasian crisis of legitimacy (1973).

In order to understand the origin of some of these criticisms, however, it is necessary to look at how Creative Scotland has emerged and developed. A new body amalgamating a number of existing cultural agencies in Scotland was first mentioned in 2004 (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 1) as part of discussions over the need for cultural reform and fewer cultural quangos and the proposal for a National Council for the Creative Individual (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 149), a name that already indicated the growing change in discourses of culture to the broader concept of creativity. In 2006, however, a proposal for Creative Scotland emerged as part of plans for a development-oriented agency charged with helping cultural delivery organisations specifically leverage the “contributions of the private and voluntary sectors” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 54).

From the outset, this agency was expected to position culture as an “important contribution to the Executive’s top priority of growing the economy, through the creative industries” (ibid., p. 31), as well as to play a “central role in delivering the Executive’s wider cultural policy”, which was essentially to work “with business to realise the benefits of the arts and culture in the private sector” (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 7). By 2007, after the election of the SNP, few changes were made to the proposal for Creative Scotland and its reliance on the private sector was reasserted.

This private sector agenda was indicated in iterations from the new Scottish government which comprised market-led conceptualisations of cultural subsidy and discourses of
“non-repayable grants” and “loans” (Scottish National Party, 2007, p. 55). These statements also concerned the government taking a “stake in the artist’s next work” (ibid.). This was followed in 2009 by the (pre) Creative Scotland Innovation Fund, based on a £5 million “investment” in various cultural initiatives (Creative Scotland, 2010a, n.p.). By 2010, Creative Scotland had been established under the auspices of the ex chief executive of the Newcastle Gateshead urban development initiative. The appointment of an urban development specialist as the head of Creative Scotland, had a significant symbolism in the context of traditional cultural policy models, as well as in relation to Scotland’s history of urban marketing, and, it will be shown, had a major impact on the discourse, direction and interim fate of the body, before his resignation in 2012. 75

Though there have been many criticisms of Creative Scotland, one of the key issues has been (and continues to be) how it represents an apparent loss of cultural independence from government, and in particular, the [double] arm’s length principle historically enjoyed by the country (Chávez-Aguayo, 2010). The arm’s length principle, which is now a staple of European cultural policies (although routinely challenged), was developed by economist John Maynard Keynes (an economist and first chairman of the new Arts Council in Britain in 1945) in order to safeguard freedom of expression and to discourage political interference (and avoid their culpability) in artistic judgements about quality (Schlesinger, 2009b, pp. 5-6). Though Scotland’s historic cultural autonomy had already receded by 1997 with New Labour’s establishing of the central Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), devolution brought about an

75 Andrew Dixon was appointed Director of Creative Scotland in early 2010 after much speculation about the role. Available: http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/1/latestnews/1007015.aspx [Accessed 31 August 2012]. Dixon later resigned in 2012, and in a change of direction for the body, has been replaced by Janet Archer, an arts manager, dancer and choreographer. See (Miller, 2013) and below 5.5.3.
increased urge for ministerial control of cultural matters. As the former Scottish Arts Council had originally been a committee of the ACGB (and thus doubly independent from government), its dissolution meant that the double autonomy of Scotland’s cultural policy had eroded (Garcia, 2004; Chávez-Aguayo, 2010).

However, the loss of independent cultural judgment associated with Creative Scotland, also stems from the 2006 proposal to transfer support for the national performing companies previously affected through the SAC to the Scottish Executive (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 29). This development coincided with Executive attempts to rein in what was perceived as the chaotic development of the nascent agency (Chávez-Aguayo, 2010), but was also a desire to control an increasingly disparate cultural body without being seen to do so (as below). As a result of this, justifications, mixed messages and equivocation characterised government statements in relation to its role in Creative Scotland.

This was demonstrated in political claims that Creative Scotland needed a “close relationship[s] with Ministers” and was subject to directions which must be followed (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 7), on the one hand, and an acknowledgment that “Ministers will not use such powers to intervene in the decisions of Creative Scotland that are essentially about artistic judgement” and would “remain strongly committed to the principle that decisions of this kind should not be taken by them” (ibid.), on the other. Equally, ministers demanded that Creative Scotland “pursue a consistent strategy” (suggesting a claim on that strategy) and asserted directional powers “which they must follow” (ibid.), while again claiming non-interference in “artistic judgment” (ibid.). This equivocation, as well as the enforced closeness between the ministry and
artists, was made apparent in SNP statements on taking a share of artists’ “profits”, as referred to above (Scottish National Party, 2007, p.55), a concept suggesting the creative industries rather than subsidised cultural model (which would be unlikely to yield profit).

The erosion of the arm’s length principle, although reaffirmed in 2007, was ultimately acknowledged as leaving the cultural sector in Scotland “closer to Ministers and politicians than had ever previously been the case” (Scullion and Garcia, 2005, p. 120), and quashed earlier hopes for Creative Scotland to be an “important voice expressing what the arts can achieve in their own right” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 36). In addition, despite media reports of ministerial claims that Creative Scotland and artists “will have the freedom and power to determine their own creative direction – a firm sign from this government that we will not interfere in artistic decisions” (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.), proximity to government objectives has become a hallmark of Creative Scotland. This is demonstrated in the robust assertion of the agency’s primary role in delivering the Scottish Government’s programme, vis-à-vis Scotland’s National Outcomes (Creative Scotland, 2011, pp. 55-56), and its fit with other SNP government priorities, as will be discussed below.

However, there have been other criticisms of Creative Scotland beyond its proximity to government. These criticisms are: the lack of “meaningful consultation” prior to its establishment (Various Artists, 2009, n.p.); its use of the “discredited” creative industries model and its emphasis on an economically-oriented championing of intellectual property (Gordon Nesbitt, 2009, n.p.); its “ill-conceived” decision-making

76 Though Creative Scotland has robustly rebutted these criticisms, claiming that they simply want to
and obscure corporate language (Higgins, 2012b, n.p.); its US-modelled philanthropic (Creative Scotland Blogspot, 2010, n.p.) and rights-sharing venture capitalism model (Kane, 2010, n.p.), congruent with privatisation and the language of investment and (profit) return; its general instrumentalism (Holloway, 2008); and this research would assert, its move to dissolve funding responsibilities in the move from grants to loans as suggested in the SNP’s manifesto (2007). Equally, there have been criticisms that Creative Scotland is “vague and confused”, that its progress is slow and painful (Sweeney 2010a; 2010b), that it is overly promotional (e.g. Creative Places), and, in a potentially hierarchical mode, that its wide interpretation of culture is populist.77

These criticisms have led to an “unbreachable rift” between Creative Scotland and the Scottish arts community, who have characterised the body as showing a “lack of empathy and regard for Scottish culture” (Higgins, 2012b, n.p.). Some of these responses have been strongly framed by romantic (or at least intrinsic value-led) views of the artist’s independence from the workings and concerns of the state, comprising criticisms of: Scotland’s erosion of the “right of pure artists to maintain a creative distance from their funders” (Kane, 2010, n.p.); its eschewal of the “ultimate function” of funding “creative imaginations” by freeing them from “the usual pressure of consumer or investor expectations” (ibid.), on whom, it is ironically asserted, “the nation's hopes of economic recovery rest” (Gordon Nesbitt, 2009, n.p.).

77 Investment is defined by Creative Scotland as devoting “time, effort or resources to a particular undertaking with the expectation of a worthwhile result” and is used as “the basis” for a range of objectives (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 5) and levers “more resources into Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 28). “Investment” is also a key heading on its website (though in most cases it refers to arts funding), as well as former management terms such as “investment portfolio”, “resources” and various references to corporate plans. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com/ [Accessed 6 October 2012].

These discourses clearly place the state in the traditional role of patron (funder) and
simultaneously invoke the idealised tradition of the artist as holder of the nation’s soul,
disavowing the pragmatic and strategic aspects of policy-making. However, despite
Creative Scotland’s assertions of its continued role in subsidising traditional artforms,
these discourses signal unease with its explicit development approach and marketing
language in the context of an increasingly declining subsidy environment, raising
concerns as to whether these artforms and the creative industries could be equally
prioritised.

The cumulative significance of these statements has been the gradual but sustained
undermining of the agency’s legitimacy in the eyes of practising artists and managers,
with the result that its “embattled” (and first ever) Chief Executive was forced to resign
in 2012, just two years after his appointment (Higgins, 2012c, n.p.). The “fatal lack of
trust” generated in Creative Scotland (Miller, 2012, n.p.) can be viewed as the critical
failure of necessary lifeworld input (from the sector) and was indirectly acknowledged
by the (ex) Chief Executive who outlined regret that he had not secured the necessary
“respect and support” of the arts community (Higgins, 2012c, n.p).

The impact of this overwhelming negativity has been the appointment of a new Chief
Executive from an artistic (dance) rather than development background, a restructuring
of the staff of Creative Scotland,⁷⁹ and a modification of its public discourses. However,
there has been an equivocation characterising these changes. While Creative Scotland’s

⁷⁹ See Faull (2013) Creative Scotland to undergo a major management shake-up, says newly appointed
head Janet Archer, The Drum, 2 October [online]. Available:
http://www.thedrum.com/news/2013/10/02/creative-scotland-undergo-major-management-shake-says-
newly-appointed-head-janet [Accessed 4 October 2013].
new plan is now called an Annual rather than Corporate Plan and aims to “reset the overall purpose of Creative Scotland and our values in line with the feedback we have received” (Creative Scotland, 2013, n.p.) in critical recognition of past events, there has also been a re-assertion of the need to “make the best use of the fantastic resources of intellectual and human capital available”...to “unlock talent, drive opportunity, and grow artistic and cultural capital for this amazingly ambitious nation” (Miller, 2013, n.p.). While the consequences of the failure of trust create a difficult future for Creative Scotland, its reflection on the effectiveness of Scottish government appointments and decisions in light of the fractious emergence of Creative Scotland in the first place, is damaging and has been described as “embarrassing” (Miller, 2012, n.p.), indicating the importance of the lifeworld and the broader reach and impact of its withdrawal.

Notwithstanding these criticisms and this interim instability, Creative Scotland, though to some extent a New Labour agency, skilfully reconciles economic with nationalist (SNP) objectives, most particularly the marketing of Scotland’s culture, as part of a nationalist triumphalism and boosterism. By putatively bridging tradition (in the form of supporting high culture) with apparently progressive creative economy discourses (and industries), Creative Scotland epitomises a central feature of broader Scottish policy referred to earlier, that of simultaneously projecting the past (including the visual discourse of its logo) alongside tropes or rhetorics of modernity (McCrone, 2001, p. 135), progress, cosmopolitanism, innovation and the future (Creative Scotland, 2011, 80–81). Scotland’s incredible influence on the world has encouraged invention, inspired creativity and fired imaginations for generations” [online]. Available: http://www.creativescotland.com [Accessed 6 October 2012]. The UK’s policy focus on “Britain’s international prestige”, “British talent” as part of a general “Britain is Best” thematic, has also been noted in Nisbett (2013).


More significantly, the discourses of Creative Scotland are directly linked to key national priorities, with an emphasis on urban development and investment, and a recognition of “places and their contribution to a creative Scotland”. The next section will contextualise these criticisms, in respect of the creative city paradigm.

5.3.4 Scottish cultural policy discourses

5.3.4.1 The past/present dichotomy and cosmopolitanism

Before considering how the creative city influences Scottish cultural policies as a specific variety of place-development discourse, it is necessary to consider the range of discourses operating within Scotland’s cultural policy texts. A key influence on Scotland’s cultural policies is the country’s first autonomous cultural policy statement, a pre-devolution text setting out aims and priorities for Scotland in its newly devolved state (Matarasso, 1998). From the outset, this document states the need for culture and creativity to lobby at this critical (decision-making) time in Scotland (just prior to devolution), for fear that “cultural affairs may appear less important” than other political portfolios (ibid., n.p.).

In setting out the argument for cultural policies, the text also draws on a number of discourses: culture as a competitive national asset, marking out the distinctiveness and autonomy of Scotland; culture as a way to reconcile the past with the present (by presenting tradition with modernity); culture as a way to cope with relentlessly advancing change; culture as an support to democracy and citizenship (the latter two typical of New Labour discourses); creative societies, culture and creativity;

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84 This report was completed by consultant Francois Matarasso, who had worked on a number of other public reports during New Labour’s time in power, including the think tank Comedia. Available:
innovation and competition; and specifically, culture as “the nation's R and D department” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 4). Within these themes and statements are clear evidences of discursive “struggle[s]” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) in the reconciling of complicated positions on Scotland, such as identity, history and authenticity (looking to the past or present for inspiration and finding a unifying or discrete culture to celebrate Scottishness) and in terms of models of creativity (already existing or needing to be developed and for individual social benefit or for the economy).

These discourses (modernity, cosmopolitan, change and the future) embody the “struggle[s]” (Foucault, 1980, p. 83) involved in Scotland’s historical “obsession with what has ended” (McCrone, 2001, p. 143) and thus draw on the juxtaposition of potentially conflicting discourses (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128). This dialectic is particularly present in images of Scotland as a bridge between the past and the present, simultaneously host to “tradition and innovation” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 2), “giving due emphasis to Scotland's indigenous traditions” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.), being a “modern, dynamic and forward-looking society” (Scottish Executive, 2000a, n.p.) and positing culture as about “Creating Our Future … Minding Our Past” (ibid.; 2000b).

As section 5.3.4.1 has outlined, this represents a discourse of the future and the Enlightenment and is particularly linked to internationalism and the trope of cosmopolitanism. The theme of cosmopolitanism is another key Scottish discourse demonstrated in the desire to establish a “culturally cosmopolitan Scotland” (Scottish National Party, 2007, n.p.; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.) and to be a “vibrant, cosmopolitan, competitive country” (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 1). Though ideals of

http://web.me.com/matarasso/one/consultancy_files/Matarasso%20CV%202011%20web.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2012].

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modernity and the future have also been linked to New Labour discourses (Mulholland, 2008, p. 35), the binary paradigm suggested by discourses of improvement/modernity/cosmopolitanism, as well as tradition and history, reflects a specific post-nationalist “fragmentation” in Scotland (McCrone, 2001, p. 138).

5.3.4.2 Defensive and competitive nationalism and identity discourses

This dual emphasis on tradition and modernity and Scotland’s strong concern with its image, is strongly linked to Scotland’s meta discourse of nationalism in general and its competitive brand of nationalism in particular. As such, these statements can be seen as legitimations of Scottish independence both before and after the rise of the SNP in Scottish government, and draw on culture’s symbolic or sign value in claims that: Parliament is a “cultural act responding to the unique character of Scots identity, values and creativity” (Matarasso, 1998, n.p.); culture contributes to the “distillation of historical identity and the expression – social and economic – of contemporary Scottish society” (ibid., p. 1); Scottish culture is “dynamic”; full of “richness and diversity” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.); culture is the “key component in defining human identity at individual, community and national level ... the sense of being a whole person and a whole people” (Extract from the Charter for Culture, ibid.); culture has the ability to “generate self-respect, win the respect of others and contribute to civilised living” (ibid.); Scotland needs to “maintain and strengthen [its] our Scottish base, not in the interests of parochialism, but to nourish the particular as a means of giving universal expression to what is uniquely Scottish” (ibid.); and that culture and the arts are central to promoting “Scotland’s identity” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 36).
However, in addition to policymakers, politicians in Scotland have been vocal in their desire to explicitly and publicly leverage culture to a particular political agenda, notably Scottish independence. To illustrate this, a 2009 newspaper interview with a former culture minister reported his view of the “entwined” links between Scotland’s political and cultural identities, calling on artists to embrace the SNP's independence agenda, or in his words, the “National Conversation”, and appealing for them to “work more closely” with Scottish ministers, adding that “as a country we all need to be vigorous and robust in our advocacy of who we are, what we are, where we have come from and where we are going to” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.). This is a rare insight into how politicians view the role of artists in society and not only seamlessly ties cultural policy to a core political and government agenda, as reiterated in other reports (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 3), but conflates Scotland’s political identities/identity (which is transient) with Scotland’s national identity (which is arguably less transient), as well as assuming and brokering consensus around that through the use of “we”.

Defining a “national culture” for Scotland was also part of the founding rationale for Creative Scotland (Earle, 2009, p. 4), and resulted in a view of it as: any “form of creativity which adds to our collective understanding of our distinctive national culture in its broadest sense – as a way of life” and which “describes, explores, responds to and sometimes challenges Scotland’s culture” (ibid.). Though broad ranging, this exercise involved an essentialising of culture in Scotland, aimed at legitimising the independent identity of the nation by reflecting a discrete image of Scotland to itself, and raises questions over interpretations of collective understanding. This idea of a national culture has been critically linked to the proposition that a discrete culture lays “waiting to be discovered” rather than something that is essentially dynamic (McCrone, 2001, p.
A particularly triumphant and competitive nationalism is exemplified in the seminal 2003 St. Andrew’s Day speech, by the then, new First Minister, Jack McConnell. This speech outlined how successful, imaginative, diverse, contemporary and creative Scotland is, positing her potential to be a “creative hub”, “a powerhouse of innovation” and describing the “extraordinary creativity of Scots” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). This manifesto was followed by equally triumphant cultural policies referring to the fact that Scotland is “recognised as one of the world's most creative nations – one that attracts, develops and retains talent, where the arts and the creative industries are supported and celebrated and their economic contribution fully captured” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4), that its “diverse and vibrant cultural life, with its international reputation, is a defining feature of a successful and confident nation” and a “vital ingredient in [its] our success, here and abroad” (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 2), and that Scotland is “renowned for our [its] research and innovation” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5).

This discourse explicitly places creativity as sourced and located in Scotland as a competitive asset and again, is one of the tropes of a cosmopolitan nation, which in turn boosts and legitimates a sense of Scottish national identity, increasing the legitimacy and economic viability of the Scottish Government. As such, discourses of the talent,

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85 Simplistic attempts to develop criteria for national status and national qualities were also posited for the national cultural institutions (Scottish Executive, 2006a; 2006b) though this was later dropped.

86 This sentence is repeated verbatim in Scotland’s Creative Industries Partnership Report (Scottish Government, 2009a, n.p.) and Creative Scotland’s 2011 Corporate plan (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 20).
creativity and the attractiveness of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5; Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 10, p. 20), and, in particular, boosterist descriptions of Scotland as “culturally minted” (Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 34), and more recently, “rich [in] creative talent” (Miller, 2013, n.p.), point to a rhetorical or located model of creativity (in Scotland), as well as the role of culture in facilitating the globalised competition for mobile and flexible workers and businesses, as much as creating a strong national identity. These statements essentially appeal to indigenous local traditions and political affiliations, a competitive international cosmopolitanism, and an investment-led industrial agenda.

Discourses such as these also represent the triumph of “ideological arguments and developmental imperatives that couple cultural sovereignty with political sovereignty” (Mulcahy, 2008, p. 4) and are again, symptomatic of resistant discourses dealing with Scotland’s historic subjugation to England. Also embodied within these statements are neoliberal values, positing countries as competing, tradable places (representing the best of culture and creativity), needing to win over people (legitimacy), business and money as much as independence or authenticity. This appeal to discourses of responsibility (the artist’s, as suggested above), uniqueness, difference (Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 2; Scottish Government 2008, p. 8), talent (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 4, p. 10), success, heroism, authenticity, prosperity and confidence, as well as triumphalism (Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.; 2010a, p. 34; Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 8, p. 12), can be viewed as a specific discourse of competitive nationalism in Scotland.
5.3.4.3 The creative economy, culture and the economy and competition discourses

Other dominant discourses in Scottish cultural policy show how culture is tied (or attached) to wider ministerial imperatives, and most specifically the economy. In the discourse of culture as an economic catalyst and national brander, therefore, culture: is a “driver[s] of change”; (as before) represents the nation’s “R and D department” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 4); makes Scotland “one of the most dynamic regions of Europe” (ibid., n.p.); creates “successful and sustainable [creative] communities” (ibid., n.p.); responds to a “changing world” (ibid., p. 1); and offers Scotland the “best chance of success” (ibid., p. 1). More recently, Scotland’s main cultural policy website continues to claim that culture is “where our creative community is supported and their contribution to the economy is maximised”, helps “raise the profile of Scotland at home and abroad”, and makes the “strongest contribution that we [Scotland] can to sustainable economic development.”

The central positioning of the creative industries within Creative Scotland and the culture ministry is the Executive’s “top priority” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 32) and central to growing the economy (McConnell, 2003, n.p.; Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 6; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.; Scottish Government, 2009c, section 44).

5.3.4.4 Creativity discourses

The frequency of creativity discourses in Scottish cultural policy, however, dwarfs even that of the creative industries. In the majority of documents under consideration, there is a liberal and at times obsessive and repetitive use of the creative prefix. Creativity is

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57 Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts [Accessed 5 July 2013 and throughout the research period].
58 Specifically, within Scottish cultural policy over these years, we see the following variations of creative nomenclature too numerous to include the individual pages. These are: ‘the creative economy’ (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, the Scottish Executive 1999 and 2004, The Scottish Government, 2009c); descriptions of creative attributes: ‘creative spirit’ (Scottish Arts Council, 2004), ‘creative potential’
also posited as intrinsically (in terms of the needs of the individual) and extrinsically (the needs of the state) key to the “future” of children and young people, in dual discourses claiming that creativity can: benefit “significantly Scotland’s business and enterprise sectors” (Scottish Government, 2010b, p. 1), give “children the best possible start in life and ready[ing] them for future success as creative individuals”, and produce “well-rounded individuals” with “imagination” and “capacity for original thought and understanding of meaningful innovations, contributing effectively to the world at large” (ibid., p. 2). These statements skilfully align positive and (intrinsic) discourses of children’s development and welfare, with their (extrinsic) ultimate contribution to the Scottish economy. Government ministers are also keen to endorse creativity through the media (conflating it with culture), in claims that it is at the “heart of the nation’s life” and that the government is “committed to putting culture at the heart of our[its] plans to develop Scotland’s overall prosperity” (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.).

However, as above, the creativity that is posited in Scottish cultural policy is competitively situated in Scotland in particular, with the implication that it is not located in other countries (O’Connell, 2003, n.p.; Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 3; Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4). Creativity therefore, simultaneously belongs to and benefits the Scottish community, nation and society (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.; Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 5; Scottish Executive; 2006b, p. 5). Many of these


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creativity discourses use the rhetorical model of creativity typically associated with the artist in references to “individual creativity” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 189), “talented individuals” (ibid., p. 1, p. 10), the “creator” (ibid., p. 11), and specific reference to “individuals who originate” (ibid., p. 140). These terms are conspicuous in their avoidance of the term artist, and therefore connote a wider group of creative workers. The use of words such as “innate” in reference to (creative) spirit, energy and drive (ibid.; McConnell, 2003, n.p.), also draws on artistic tropes by pointing to a divinely appointed creativity, and thus again, that creativity competitively belongs to one specific group (such as the Scottish creative nation) and not another.

Other discourses consist of nurturing creativity, suggesting the need to create a context for creativity to occur and invoking the collective model of creativity. This is seen in words such as fostering/supporting/building/stimulating/protecting (Cultural Commission, 2005; Scottish Government, 2010a, 2009c), as well as more dynamic terms such as driving, maximising and investing, all of which suggest the construction of creativity (Scottish Executive, 2000b; 2006a; Cultural Commission, 2005; Creative Scotland 2011). As a result, there is a straddling of both individual and collective models of creativity, maximising persuasion by appealing to different constituencies, those interested in collective models of creativity for intellectual property reasons (governmental interests) and those ideologically wedded to the singular artistic and romantic model (as detailed earlier). In this respect, like culture, creativity is posited as part of intrinsic and internal development, recalling the positive concepts of individual benefit, but has external benefits to the state via economic output. Creativity is also located in particular places (like Scotland), but at the same time can be fostered. Many
of these discourses, therefore, rely for their effectiveness on the apparent balancing of positions.

5.3.5 The creative city and Scottish cultural policy discourse

Cumulatively, the creative economy, creativity, competition and uniqueness of place/nationalism discourses, as demonstrated, against the backdrop of traditionalism and heritage, contextualise the explicit urban development narratives that run throughout Scottish cultural policies. While these narratives might fit a generic creative economy model, as well as reflect older urban discourses (the role of cultural amenities, the competitive identity of cities, regeneration through culture, etc.), they are accompanied and amplified by specifically Floridian discourses of attraction and talent, competition, investment, and human capital, tied to place-development, uniqueness and identity. The most explicit and numerous references to the creative city paradigm take place in 2005 (Cultural Commission, 2005) and 2008 (Scottish Government, 2008), a period which coincides with New Labour’s administration and a key point in creative city publishing (Florida, 2005; 2008).

The Cultural Commission (2005), a consultation group of cultural practitioners, has been a major contributor to creative city discourses in Scotland, producing a key report on culture in Scotland for the Scottish Government. This document set out an explicit argument for Creative Scotland, making sustained use of creative city discourses (Cultural Commission, 2005, pp. 18-19), the creative class (ibid., p. 6, p. 13), Richard Florida (ibid., p. 6, p. 13, p. 189, etc.), Charles Landry (ibid., p. 171), as well as, more broadly, cultural planning (ibid., p. 169) and regeneration (ibid., p. 24 etc.). The report is evangelical about culture’s role in wider government and proudly claims that
“Scotland’s economic success in the long term will rest on the creativity, innovation and entrepreneurial spirit of its workers” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 68). The significance of these discourses lie in the fact that they originate from cultural practitioners (albeit ones that are dependent on government funding) and show the reach of economic rationalism beyond policymaking circles, the drive for legitimacy, a kind of self-instrumentalisation akin to attachment (underlining the difficulty of separating out those concepts), and the suggestion of cynical reason. The advocacy-based Culture Counts (similar to National Campaigns for the Arts),\(^\text{89}\) has been involved in similar discourses and reflects these similar pressures to be on-message in terms of central government objectives.

5.3.5.1 Discourses of success, competition, attraction, place development, investment, human capital, and harnessing

One of the key creative city discourses within Scottish cultural policy, however, is the lexicon of attraction, creative workers and investment, reaching a high point mid-decade with the Commission’s report (2005) and again more recently, Creative Scotland (2011, p. 5). This is demonstrated in references to “attracting and retaining gifted” (Scottish National Party, 2007, p.55; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.), as well as “innovative and creative people” (Scottish Executive, 1999, n.p.) in one of the first instances of a thematic that continued to grow throughout the decade (Scottish Government 2009a, b, c).

\(^\text{89}\)Culture Counts was set up in 2011 and is a group of “arts, media, culture, heritage, cultural industries and museums” representatives “positively and progressively highlighting the value of arts, culture and creative industries”. They aim to ensure that the importance of culture is “reflected in the stated policies and objectives of both the Scottish Government and local government.” Available: http://culturecounts.wordpress.com/home/ [Accessed 11 October 2013].
This theme is further amplified and linked to explicit branding discourses in claims that the Scottish government “wants to see a culturally cosmopolitan Scotland, capable of [again] attracting and retaining gifted people, where our creative community is supported and their contribution to the economy is maximised” (Scottish National Party, 2007, p. 55; Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.); that “with creativity as a driver, the ability of nations to compete becomes increasingly tied to their ability to attract, retain and develop creative people” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 6); that “a place becomes more attractive to international partners and new talent when it has a thriving creative sector, and can provide a high quality cultural infrastructure and diverse recreation and participation opportunities” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5); and a corollary of this thematic, that “the arts and their more commercial counterparts face financial constraints that make it difficult to keep talent in Scotland” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 8).

The related metaphor of harnessing or controlling this attractiveness or creativity (suggesting the individual model of creativity) is also a key creative city metaphor and is present in statements of how “vital” it is that Scotland can “harness the power of culture and creativity” (Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 23) and that “culture’s contribution is harnessed in all departments of local government” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 18). Again, the discourse of “talent” is also located in claims that “new ideas and talented people are essential to a dynamic and healthy creative sector” (Creative Scotland, 2010c, n.p.). These discourses represent culture as a national asset and resource that needs to be managed, controlled and monetised.
The use of culture and creativity to attract international investment (and presumably other events) is also present in claims that culture: makes places “more attractive to international partners” (Scottish Government, 2008, p5); helps Scotland to “build a strong cultural brand and compete globally in the creative economy” (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 8); can “attract and develop the necessary number and quality of creative entrepreneurs and creative companies” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 14), and enhances “the attractiveness of Scotland as a place to live, work, learn and visit” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 10).

This discourse of attraction hosts internal and latent contradictions: it posits that Scotland wishes to become more attractive through its cultural offer, and at the same time that it is already an attractive place (in fact the most attractive place) and deserves (or needs) international recognition. The discourse, therefore, points to a future Scotland which: aims to be a “globally attractive location”, working towards increasing numbers of those who choose to “live and work in Scotland” (Scottish Executive, 2001, p. 12, p. 13); wishes to “foster the creativity and ingenuity of all its people” (Scottish Executive, 2000a, n.p.); will use culture to give Scotland the “edge we [they] need in a competitive world” (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 5); and to ensure that Scotland “can exploit its advantages to attract international events” (Scottish Executive, 2000a, n.p.).

The need for international recognition is also key to the discourse of attraction and is reflected in the following statements: that Scotland needs to “play on the world stage” (Scottish Executive, 2000b, p. 2); to be “recognised as one of the world’s most creative nations” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4); to be a “vibrant, cosmopolitan, competitive country and an internationally recognised creative hub” (Scottish
Executive, 2004a, p. 1); to have international acknowledgement of the “creativity of [the] Scots” (ibid., p. 5); and to “increase the appreciation and celebration of Scotland’s cultural achievements and rich creative talent, both in this country and internationally” (Miller, 2013, n.p.).

This desire to be more attractive is then contrasted with other discourse formations set in the present tense suggesting Scotland is already attractive and is in fact: the “most attractive place for doing business in Europe” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5), with a “long-established talent for innovation and entrepreneurial skill” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 35); a “leading creative nation” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 5); “one of the world’s most creative nations” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 20); a country with “talent in abundance” (Scottish Government, 2009b, n.p.); and is “culturally minted” (The Scottish Government, 2010a, p. 34). These sentiments follow the unprecedented creativity thematic and competitive nationalism seen in the St. Andrew’s Day speech of 2003, claiming the “extraordinary creativity of the Scots” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). Ultimately, in positing how Scotland is the most attractive (and entrepreneurial) country in the world (for business), these statements demonstrate Scotland’s use of discourse to “remake the world” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 130), in its desired rather than actual image, a view supported by the statement that Scotland is in fact one of the “least entrepreneurial parts of the UK” (Smith, 2013, p. 4).

5.3.5.2 Place development discourses

While it has been demonstrated that discourses of culture’s role in attracting workers and businesses is a key part of Scottish cultural policy (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 3, p. 6, p. 13, p. 24; Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5), and one of Creative Scotland’s
central rationales, this narrative also reflects Scotland’s culture and regeneration discourse from the 1980s as referred to earlier. The discourse of culture in place differentiation occurs throughout Scotland’s cultural policy documents, most specifically in references to: the “key part played by culture in creating vibrant communities, and driving and enlivening economic and social regeneration” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 11); the “key role [of culture] as part of the economic drawing power which is central to the transformation of an area” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5); discourses of “talent, ideas, education and places” (Creative Scotland, 2010d, p.1); specific place-development initiatives (Creative Places and Place Partnerships); and the need for “conversations to identify the unique contribution of places to a creative Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 36).

More recently, Creative Scotland has endorsed the “contribution that places make to a creative Scotland” (ibid., p. 30, p. 36), the “significant role that creativity plays in Scotland’s major cities by redefining a city’s – and its residents – identity” (Dixon, 2010, n.p.), claims that Creative Scotland will “deliver a more strategic engagement with the geography of Scotland and work closely with local authorities and others to realise the potential of all parts of Scotland” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 30) and that creativity is the “essential ingredient for successful cities, it’s what makes them unique” (Dixon, 2010, n.p.). The strategic alliance with local authorities referred to above reflects Creative Scotland’s “key role” to “inform and influence national Policy” (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 26). This demonstrates the fit or attachment of Scottish cultural policy (and urban discourses) with central (and local) government agendas.

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5.3.5.3 Scotland, government agendas and instrumentalism

This aggregation of nationalism, competition, identity, creativity, economy and urban development discourses, in light of approaches to the various (extra-cultural) needs of the state, therefore, can be seen as an attached or instrumental approach to culture (see 4.4.12). In effect, despite the equivocation shown in relation to whether ministers should or shouldn’t be involved in decision-making within Creative Scotland, the explicit delivery of government priorities through culture, and, specifically, how culture (needs) to make “common cause in negotiation with government” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2), is a dominant theme in Scottish cultural policy (Matarasso, 1998; McConnell, 2003). More recently, cultural policy in Scotland has tied itself (or been tied) to the delivery of government plans more closely than ever (Scottish Government, 2008; Creative Scotland, 2011; Culture Counts, 2013). This is reflected in discourses of culture’s contribution to Scotland as based on “sustainable economic development”, “health, well-being, confidence and quality of life”, raising the “profile of Scotland at home and abroad” (Scottish Government, 2009b) and contributing to a “successful and prosperous Scotland” whose “success story” can contribute to the “opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish” as part of Scotland’s national plans (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 2).

Creative Scotland has been particularly active in this regard by outlining its plans as a central part of Scotland’s National Performance Framework (which monitors the government’s progress) and explicitly endorsing the “various roles” appointed it by government (Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 3). Creative Scotland also claims that culture

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delivers and maps itself against “many of the national outcomes” (ibid.) and that the
nation is its “primary customer” (ibid.), referencing both the delivery of non-cultural
services (and suggesting these are what the customer wants) and the impact of
managerialism.

More recently, in 2012, the representative group Culture Counts (set up in 2011 to lobby
for cultural organisations), successfully campaigned for culture to become a National
Indicator under the theme “cultural engagement” as part of Scotland’s National
Performance Framework. This indicator was aimed at measuring the level of general
“well-being” and “resilience” in Scotland, as well as pointing to benefits in learning and
education, health and satisfaction with life, cultural tourism, Scotland’s creative
economy, “maintaining and growing [its] city economies” and, in keeping with earlier
themes of cosmopolitanism, promoting Scotland “on an international stage as a modern
dynamic nation”.92 This activity on the part of Creative Scotland and Culture Counts,
again demonstrates the development of justificatory regimes in respect of culture’s
internal government legitimacy.

The lobbying activity in respect of the cultural indicator is particularly interesting.
Though the indicator can be viewed as positive instrumentalism and/or strategic
attachment and was perceived as a “coming of age of culture” in cultural policy in
Scotland, finally putting culture “on a par” with other government portfolios,93 the
dependence of the sector on the legitimacy conferred by the indicator raises questions as
to the voluntary nature of this attachment, and thus the issue of structural
instrumentalism and cycle of expectation (see 4.4.13). The acknowledged success of

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92 Ibid.
linking culture to the health and well-being discourses of the National Indicator suggests that for some, these discourses represent the “necessary language” to describe the value of culture (Tusa, 2011, n.p.).

Both Creative Scotland and Culture Counts therefore, endorse the view that cultural policy should serve other policy sectors and that all policy is necessarily instrumental (which are not necessarily the same thing), a situation underlined during the foundation of Scotland’s first independent cultural policy. This founding text stated that the “priorities of Parliament and people can be addressed through cultural action” (Matarasso, 1998, n.p.), though at least the use of “can” makes this statement less prescriptive than later statements. A few years later, First Minister Jack O’Connell went further and outlined his vision of cultural policy as an unequivocal instrument for other policy sectors, stating that “this is about how Ministers use arts and culture to achieve more effectively their policy objectives. It’s not about the arts and culture being a different policy objective” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.). This was followed in 2005 by an approving comment from the Cultural Commission (representing the cultural sector) stating that “cultural activity has been increasingly used to deliver the policy objectives of other areas of government” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 8) and, the following year, a comment on the “positive impact culture can have in every area of Government” (Scottish Executive, 2006b, p. 2). More recently, the last culture minister joined with these statements by calling for “artists to work more closely with Scottish Ministers” and articulated culture’s central role in advancing Scotland’s “aspirations for constitutional change” (Johnson, 2009, n.p.).
In light of McConnell’s speech, illustrating the contingent nature of cultural policy, the contemporaneous response from senior cultural practitioners is revelatory. To understand its impact, it is worth quoting at length from the blog spot of senior consultant (and former transition director for Creative Scotland) Anne Bonnar. She describes those in the arts as being “flabbergasted to hear our senior politician committed and passionate about the importance of culture, having spent years advocating to seemingly deaf ears” and added that: “the centrality of the arts, creativity and culture to Scotland is now a truth, forming a core part of political manifestos before the last election and is promoted by the First Minister. Our creative talent and our engagement in arts and culture are vital elements of our global and local success, for the expression of our cultural identity and the competitiveness of Scotland’s creative economy (Bonnar, 2009, n.p.).” Though there are questions as to whether McConnell’s speech concerned culture in the first place (as opposed to nationalism), the greater issue would seem to be how “passionate” and “committed” a minister could be in relation to culture (ibid.), given his statement that culture should not have its own policy objective. This view appears to undermine the very premise of a Scottish cultural policy.

Other non-ministerial cultural bodies are also notable for making “common cause” with government (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2). Though now defunct, in the years immediately preceding its dissolution, the Scottish Arts Council referred approvingly to the “major business sector” of the arts (Scottish Arts Council, 2004, p. 4), remarked on “the social and economic benefits that accrue” from culture (ibid., p. 3), the need for a shift from grants and supports to “subsidy to investment” (ibid., p. 5), the “need to consider the returns” from culture (ibid., p. 10), for incentive schemes linking grants with assets and resources, and, most significantly, suggestions that an endowment could
replace central Scottish Executive funding (*ibid.*, p. 11), relinquishing Scottish administrations from traditional funding responsibilities. Additionally, this report also proposed a wider definition of the arts, and added that “only some” artforms required “public funding” (*ibid.*, p. 7).

Again, this is significant for acknowledging not only difficulties with maintaining the traditional scope of the arts vis-à-vis cultural policy (as part of the creative industries), but also the advent of more dominating and legitimating political-economic agendas (e.g. the creative industries and enterprise). These statements may reflect the soon-to-be-disbanded Arts Council’s unsuccessful ambitions not to be left behind in the development of a new (creative industries) and more alluring (than high culture) policy area, and its simultaneous desire to distance itself from perceptions of elitism, given the increasingly predatory development of Creative Scotland at the time. ⁹⁴ However, in line with other competing discourses and equivocations, the Scottish Arts Council (through the Artist’s Charter) also champions the guaranteeing of the artist’s “right to choose to engage, or not to engage, with social, economic and political agendas” (Scottish Arts Council, 2004, p. 16). In light of *structural instrumentalism*, the strategic nature of policy and the Council’s own apparent lack of independence, there is a question of how independent any cultural or artistic decisions are, or can be, from politicians or central government plans.

These creative city discourses are also significant in relation to how unreflexive they are vis-à-vis critiques of the paradigm prevalent at that time (Daly, 2004; Malanga, 2004; Glaeser, 2005) and even within government itself (Rogerson et al., 2006; Scottish

⁹⁴ The appointment of a creative industries specialist to the SAC was made in 2007 (Scottish Arts Council, 2009, p. 8) and might be interpreted as a defensive attempt to stay policy-relevant.
Government, 2009a). In 2006, Florida’s work was described in a government report as “criticised on a number of grounds, not least in terms of whether migrants really do come to places for their culture as much as for their capacity to offer career opportunities” and in terms of how it promotes “overly simplistic readings of how culture might be utilised to promote local economic development” (Rogerson et al., 2006, p. 34). Florida’s creative city was also acknowledged as “widely critiqued” in a key document from 2009 (Scottish Government, 2009a, p. 8).

It is difficult to know whether this equivocation is a deliberate obfuscation of difficulties with the creative city model in order to embrace certain aspects of Florida’s thesis, but it does recall once again the strategic containment (Shapiro, 1990, p. 332) of uncomfortable compromises (disagreeing with Florida’s work but nevertheless using his paradigm), and thus cynical reason. In this light, Scottish creative city discourses clearly and deliberately make “common cause” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with central government agendas, despite fears of their potential “inability” to do so (ibid.), and offer conscious, strategic, and cross-cutting integrations of culture into other ministerial briefs (or justification for other government briefs). While these outcomes are undoubtedly positive for Scottish cultural policy in the short-term, the discourses detailed here can also be described as contradictory, defensive, involuntary, cynical, and potentially, self-defeating responses to rationalising governments who view cultural policy as a toolkit for other government departments.

5.3.6 Scotland conclusions

This section has outlined a prolific and contested history of urban development, marketing and reinvention initiatives and discourses in Scotland, with a focus on
Enlightenment and boosterist narratives of a sophisticated, cosmopolitan and international country which is a good location for business, workers and residents (and will be even better soon), and which values its heritage. The materialisation of creative city discourse in Scotland’s cultural policies was demonstrated in: explicit references to Richard Florida; the creative city itself and the creative classes; the narrative of attraction and retention of talent (though not the promotion of tolerance or technology); the promotion of private investment and businesses as a result of cultural investment; the competitive branding of culture; the creative industries (and its exemplar Creative Scotland); a broader economic rationalism; and the general lexicon of creativity. Equally, discourses promoting the cosmopolitanism/internationalism, as well as uniqueness, difference and creativity (and attractiveness) of Scotland, though indicative of neoliberalism and the regional promotion associated with the creative city, also read as a competitive discourse consistent with Scotland’s nationalist movement and a response to the “lack of confidence to which Scots can be disposed” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 3).

This narrative has been posited as: a riposte to Scotland’s economic and social problems; a fragmented self-image and lack of confidence in relation to its autonomy from England; the need to satisfy different electoral mandates or potentially to avoid making difficult choices; and the need for Scotland to prove itself both nationally and internationally. This case has also considered the role of contradictory discourses and struggles as part of cultural policy’s legitimacy-creation and as part of an explicit instrumentalism. In particular, this chapter has detailed the role of Creative Scotland in cultural, industrial and local development policy and put forward the argument that it operates (or has operated) as a bridging agency between a place-development and
creative industries agenda, and a more traditional model of (high) cultural subsidy. It was also demonstrated that Creative Scotland operates as an agent of government, seeking to deliver government objectives in line with groups like Culture Counts, and that this has threatened the legitimacy of the body and led to a change in its administration.

Specifically, the case of Scotland has shown the overwhelming endorsement of both the wider creative economy and of creativity rhetoric in the UK, and the utilisation of creative city discourses as an authoritative but locally-constituted, economic and nationalist/boosterist paradigm. These themes will be taken up in the following chapters. In order to further enrich understandings of cultural policy and urban development discourses in Europe, and to address the question of whether social democratic countries take a different approach to economic instrumentalism, the case of Finland will be considered next.

5.4 Finland

5.4.1 Introduction
Finland is a northern European country that has received significant international attention as a small but successful nation. Specifically, Finland is synonymous with the international “brand” of Scandinavian design (Power, 2009, p. 45) and associated with a “stable egalitarian democracy, a relatively sound economy, an advanced platform of technology and innovation and a deep well of popular goodwill” (Comedia, 2010, p. 58). This success is an outcome of Finland’s economic transformation since World War II (from an agricultural economy), and following its last recession in the 1990s, can be
viewed in relation to its competitive industrial agenda, high degree of economic freedom and its emphasis on export and innovation.

Discourses in Finland link these economic, social and cultural achievements to Finland’s: “high-level education, research and creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p.); emphasis on “education, well-being, democracy and creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010c, n.p.); “individual self-determination” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12); “national culture, parliamentarianism, democracy, equality and tolerance” (ibid.); and critically claim that these factors result in a “welfare society resting on world-class knowledge and know-how and on a strong innovation system” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14). These statements reflect Finland’s self-perceptions, but also international views of Finland as: an “international leader” in education (OECD, 2010, p. 117); a successful innovator (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 122; Comedia 2010, p. 27); a country of “successful international traders” (Comedia, 2010, p. 10) and a place where “economic thinking” is a national characteristic (Power, 2009, p. 447). This case will show that

95 In 2011, Finland ranked as the 7th most competitive and 3rd most prosperous nation in the world (falling from 1st in 2009) as well as the 4th strongest economy for entrepreneurship and opportunity (increasing from 9th in 2009). The “Legatum Prosperity index is the world’s only global assessment of wealth and well-being”, which ranks countries by “actual levels of wealth, life satisfaction or development” “to help drive economic growth and produce happy citizens over the long term.” See the Legatum Prosperity index. Available: http://www.prosperity.com/ [Accessed 28 July 2011].

96 Available http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Finland/economic-freedom [Accessed 10 October 2013]. Also, Florida has asserted that “economic freedom is tied to material economic and social conditions”, ... that “richer countries are, on average, freer”, ... that this freedom is “tied to post-industrial economic structures”, ... a “larger creative class”,... and that “economic freedom goes hand in hand with higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction.” See, Free, Tolerant, and Happy, 20 April 2010. Available: http://www.creativclass.com/creative_class/2010/04/20/free-tolerant-and-happy/ [Accessed 28 July 2011].

97 “Countries like Finland, South Korea, Israel and Taiwan have made innovation a priority” (Westlake, 2012, n.p.). See also the Global Innovation Index 2012 produced by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), where Finland ranks fourth globally in terms of innovation, based on human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication and business sophistication as well as knowledge and technology and creative outputs. Available: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf [Accessed 8 October 2012].

98 Finland’s reputation as innovative has been linked to the success of Nokia. See (Ali-Yrkkö and Hermans, 2002).
these internal and external discourses speak to Finland’s dual mandate in terms of its complex representations of the welfare-state and social democracy on the one hand (openness, diversity and tolerance; and civilisation, social democracy and egalitarianism), and competition, internationalism, investment, human capital and the economy, on the other.

5.4.2 Introduction to the creative city in Finland: city branding, internationalism, social democracy and trade

Before looking at the impact of these factors on Finnish cultural policies, however, Finland’s urban marketing activity reveals attachments to urban development paradigms. Like many countries, Finland is host to a number of city and regional branding initiatives (directed at international investment), including Creative Helsinki (Mustonen, 2010; Fortune, 2012), Creative Tampere, design-rich public/private developments using discourses of well-being and happiness, international designations such as World Design Capital in 2012 and City of Culture in 2011.

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99 Helsinki’s innovation strategy (Culminatum Innovation Ltd., 2005) emphasises the role of the city-region, and the small size and insularity of Finland in its competitiveness and rests its innovation strategy on the knowledge economy/information society, the knowledge base (education and research), culture (including city marketing) and internationalisation. In addition, it stresses the need to “globalise the Helsinki Region” (ibid., p. 8), creating an “atmosphere that is tolerant and conducive to international activity” (ibid., p. 10) and the need for “diversified, pluralistic and increasingly international cultural provisions [so] that foreigners will also come to appreciate that the Region provides a satisfying living environment” (ibid., p. 22).

100 Creative Tampere, or Inova Tampere is a project whose themes include the creative industries, innovation, entrepreneurship and an attractive city. Available: http://www.luovatampere.fi/eng [Accessed 15 November 2011].


and (like Scotland) participation in the *British Council Creative Cities* and the international *Districts of Creativity* networks. This promotional activity can be viewed as part of Finland’s national creativity strategies, and more specifically *Creative Finland* (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b), but is also reflected in its participation in the *Creative Metropoles* (Public Policies and Instruments in Support of Creative Industries) and ACRE research projects (Accommodating Creative Knowledge-Competitiveness of Metropolitan Regions) aiming to assess the impact of Florida’s creative class in Europe. Creative Helsinki is a key force in this creative drive, branding Helsinki as inherently creative and cool, as well an innovative, exciting, diverse, and a cultural place to do business, visit and live (Fortune, 2012).

Not surprisingly, therefore, Finland has been lauded by creative city authors (Landry, 2000, p. 28; Comedia 2010), as one of the key northern creative nations, with a creative class membership of nearly 30 per cent of its overall workforce in 2004 (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 5), and by 2011, one of the highest percentages in the

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104. The aim of this is to share “experience across Europe on the ways creativity, entrepreneurship and innovation can help to improve people’s lives - making cities better places to live, work and play.” The project involved was in Dodory. Available: [http://www.britishcouncil.org/czechrepublic-projects-creative-cities.htm](http://www.britishcouncil.org/czechrepublic-projects-creative-cities.htm) [Accessed 15 November 2011].


106. *Creative Finland or Luova Suomi* appears to have been incompletely made public, and is still not available on the Ministry’s website. The copy referred to by this author was directly emailed from the Ministry following its citation in another document and a direct request.


108. ACRE was a four-year EU research project which stands for Accommodating Creative Knowledge-Competitiveness of Metropolitan Regions within the Enlarged Union. It was funded under the priority 7 Citizens and Governance in a knowledge-based society within the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU. Available: [http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/](http://acre.socsci.uva.nl/) [Accessed 8 October 2012]. The project was designed to research the creative class thesis in relation to a number of European cities, including Helsinki.

109. *This is Finland* is a Finnish government website aiming to provide “an attractive window on Finland for everyone interested in our country, its culture and its people”. See That’s Finland for you: Cool, creative, contrasting and credible. Available: [http://finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=178504](http://finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=178504) [Accessed 14 November 2012].

110. Comedia’s report speaks of concepts of tolerance, creativity and innovation, “talent attraction and retention” (Comedia 2010, p. 20), “civic innovation” (*ibid.*, p. 27), and diversity, branding and “cosmopolitanism” (*ibid.*, p. 18).
world (between 40 and 45 per cent).\textsuperscript{111} Equally, Helsinki has consistently scored high on Florida’s creativity index, including a recent ranking as “best for technology and talent” (Helsinki Times, 2011c, n.p.). As referred to above, Finland’s internationally respected education system (linked through creative city discourse to talent, human capital and the creative classes) has also been praised by Florida, helping Finland to “churn[ing] out stellar products” (Florida 2004, p. 122) by creating “distinctive assets with which to compete” (ibid., p. 5) and making Finland “well-positioned to compete in the Creative Age with a high level of overall creative competitiveness” (ibid., p. 6).

Finland’s emphasis on city marketing has not avoided criticism however. Helsinki’s failed and controversial bid for the Katajanokka Design Hotel as part of the World Design Capital event in 2012, and its subsequent unsuccessful negotiations concerning the use of the site as home to one of the “galaxy” (Vogel, 2011, n.p.) of brand-heavy Guggenheims (Palonen, 2012), underlines a particular form of urban entrepreneurialism.\textsuperscript{112} Like many developments, the project to create a Helsinki Guggenheim was intended to attract tourists (despite the lack of uniqueness in this cultural offer) and offer “significant regeneration” benefits to Helsinki (Vogel, 2011, n.p.). However, like events in Scotland, this proposal created tensions between those who viewed it as an accolade for the city on the one hand (ibid.), and empty city marketing, focused on optics and an economic focus, rather than meeting indigenous cultural needs (Chayka, 2011, n.p.) on the other. Much of this dissent was led by artists’ opposition group Checkpoint Helsinki,\textsuperscript{113} who were set up to oppose what they


\textsuperscript{112} See Guggenheim Museum (2011). See also www.investinfinland.fi [Accessed 4 June 2013].

\textsuperscript{113} Checkpoint Helsinki was “initially born out of opposition to the Guggenheim foundation’s intent to set up shop in Helsinki” based on what they felt was the city’s paying for a tired “global brand”, which
perceived as a blatant internationalism (at the expense of localism), branding focus and a lack of concern for Finland’s indigenous cultural sector. While this movement provides a counterbalance to accusations of artists being complicit in these developments (see 3.10), it can also be viewed as symptomatic of Finland’s culture of self-determination and its pride in the locale, a tradition reaching back to the struggle for Finnish independence throughout the 19th and early 20th century.

5.4.3 Finnish nationalism and development of early cultural policies

The tradition of nationalism that emerged in the 18th century in Finland, where ideas of Finland and Finnishness were mobilised around an idealised “folk education ideology”, primarily aimed to promote an “idealised conception of the people as part of the nation state project” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 33). This movement deployed a “linguistic nationalism”\(^{114}\) to assert Finland’s geographic and cultural difference from its former rulers, despite the assertion of Swedish rights as co-founders of the nation and Russia’s tolerance of the Finnish language movement at the time (Saukkonen and Pyykkönen, 2008, p. 53). Over the following century, the “first generation of intellectuals” together with the development of “Fennoman” politics (a political movement promoting the Finnish language and traditional agrarian values) created a new national ideal, and were perceived as “keepers of the national flame” (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p. 189). Language, education, culture and folk politics (via the concept of civilisation) became interwoven with the granting of independence and later the creation of an autonomous Finnish cultural policy.

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The emergence of the new Finnish state and the project of building a cohesive nation and culture, specifically rested on 19th century discourses of a homogenous Finnish “common culture”\(^{115}\) (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p.31). This common culture, as suggested by linguistic nationalism, was intended to serve as the nucleus of a Finnish “cultural policy ethos” \(\text{(ibid.)}\) and was based on the concept of harmony, cooperation, civilisation and Finland’s self-proclaimed “civilising ethos” (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p. 190), which linked culture to public enlightenment and education. This emphasis on civilisation has remained in Finnish policies and has resulted in a “legitimized idea of culture and hegemony in society” embodied in a high culture model, designed to articulate what is “genuinely Finnish” (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p.191).

In more recent times, the emphasis on a common culture in Finnish cultural policy has given way to a focus on the “competitiveness society” \(\text{(ibid., p. 185)}\), the “late modernist” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34),\(^{116}\) or the “economic and political colonisation” period (1995 – 2007) (Dueland, 2008, p. 14). In a similar move to the development of Creative Scotland, this change has been demonstrated in the shift from The Arts Council of Finland (originally set up in 1968) to the Arts Promotion Centre Finland (2013).\(^{117}\) This period, therefore, by the government’s own admission, has been viewed as consistent with “cultural consumption and paying consumers” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34), and reflects the changes in Finnish political and social culture via neoliberalism. This shift concerns the disintegration of the welfare state (in line with other European countries), the decline of the social

\(^{115}\) The idea of common culture was reflected in the Maastricht treaty (Evans and Foord, 1999).

\(^{116}\) In this respect modernism refers to extreme rationalisation in relation to policies. See (Dueland, 2008).

democratic model, the growth of privatisation, and the concomitant withdrawal of the state from the cultural sector in Finland (Kangas, 2001, p. 63). More broadly, the Finnish competitiveness society period can be viewed as part of the international reach of economic rationalism and post-industrial discourses of the knowledge economy (and in Finland, the information society), as well as the growth of creative industries policies, in part financed and influenced by EU Structural Funds in Finland (European Commission, 2010d). These imperatives have profoundly shaped Finland’s branding, creative industries, and creative city discourses, as will be demonstrated in the next section.

5.4.4 Finnish cultural policy discourses

A broad typology of Finnish cultural policy comprises three sets of over 90 documents produced between 2000 and 2010, most of which are also available in English. These documents represent strategies across the arts and creative industries (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, 2006b, 2009b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a-d; 2011), research and information (reports) concerning particular art forms and issues, and annual reports. The “commercialisation of culture” is a dominant discourse and is usually presented as a legitimate mechanism driving Finland’s success through generating “ethical benefits” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 104). Intrinsic discourses of (high) culture’s (and in particular the artist’s) value, though subservient to other discourses, also persist, and are reflected in claims that culture “cannot be

118 One half of the research documents concern particular and specific areas of interest based on discrete issues (e.g., architecture or visual art) and strategic policy issues (e.g., media, regional access, sign language, etc.), and another third are those more broadly linked to a creative economy and internationalist agenda. Specifically (in order of their predominance), they break down as follows: 1) measurement and evidence-based reports, cultural tourism, 2) cultural advocacy, surveys of economic impacts, internationalism, 3) cultural exports, the creative economy, and 4) singular research on cultural issues such as cultural rights, multiculturalism, legal issues, copyright and heritage. Other documents concern culture as foreign policy (7), strategy documents concerning libraries, the creative economy and cultural policy (4), culture as spatial policy (2), annual reports (5), broad cultural policies (2), and an arts policy document (1). Nine are left uncategorised.
measured in financial terms” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 7) and must be “financed in absolute terms” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 35). These intrinsic discourses often co-exist with benign narratives of civilisation, education and democracy.

Other thematics within Finland’s cultural policies serve and are “successfully exploited” by Finland’s national agenda (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16) and can be categorised as follows: the creative economy, creativity and the creative industries (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c; p. 83, 2009a, 2009b) via industrial policy (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, 2010b; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006a, 2006b, 2010b, 2009b); foreign policy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c); cultural export and tourism (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003b, 2005, 2008a); immigration and diversity/multiculturalism (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2009b; 2010a); cultural rights, welfare and civil society (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 2009a); the concept of Finnishness and identity (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 30); and again, the status of artists and high culture (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a). How these discourses occur, conflate, interact and struggle against one another, will be considered next.

5.4.4.1 Internationalisation and branding discourses

The use of culture to internationalise the “image and brand” of Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 13) and to diversify its “international influence” as the centre of the information economy in Europe (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006c, p. 1), is a key narrative within Finnish cultural policy. This is a discourse of promotion designed to sell Brand Finland, as much as Finnish products, and may be addressing
commercial fears that Finland’s image is too “clinical, clean and safe” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 57). This concern with how Finland is perceived internationally is demonstrated in a number of claims that state: the “success of a state is increasingly dependent on its ability to manage its brand” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14); that Finland’s cultural exportation is “not so much to make business as to make Finnish culture known and to arouse interest in Finland and Finnishness” (ibid., p. 15); and (in explicit creative city mode) that the Nordic region in general needs to present itself “internationally as a place that is receptive to new ideas; is tolerant, indeed embracing, of diverse cultures” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 38). Like Scotland, this interest in internationalism is clearly economic, but may also reflect the strong travel culture in Finland (Wright et al., 2012, p. 6) and the consequent interest in cosmopolitanism amongst its young, well-educated and “high status” citizens (ibid., p. 13), a factor attributed to Finland’s isolated location and small population.

5.4.4.2 The creativity economy, creativity and the creative industries discourses

Creativity, along with the creative economy, is another key discourse and a central feature of Finland’s competitiveness society period. Though creativity is widely interpreted, it is usually linked with knowledge (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, n.p; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, n.p.), and the creative economy and creative industries are core cultural export strategies that promote Finnishness (see 5.4.3). These industries are described as being: in a phase of “robust development” with “significance for the Finnish national economy” (Finnish Ministry

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119 Creativity is defined as “self-expression, every-day life, creative professions, working life, education and training, commumality, the state of culture, operational environments and the creative economy and innovation policy” (http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/?lang=en [Accessed 13 February 2013].

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of Education and Culture, 2011); a key arm of Finland’s diplomatic affairs (ibid.); increasing Finland’s regional and international competitiveness (Finnish Ministry of Education 2010b, p. 4); and powered by the “engine[s]” of the “art industries” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12). The Creativity Strategy Finland (Ministry of Education, 2006b) uses social definitions of creativity as part of “day-to-day life”, a “resource of work communities” (referencing the collective/networked model, see 4.3.3), and states that creativity is “intrinsic to human beings” (ibid., n.p.), but also serves the “growing demand for competitiveness and efficiency” (ibid.).

5.4.4.3 Creative welfare society and citizenship discourses

The “covert hierarchy” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 128) represented by these social and economic discourses of creativity is further amplified in the Finnish concept of the “creative welfare society” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, p. 5; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 23). The concept of the creative welfare society is a central legitimising discourse in Finnish cultural policy that skilfully bridges state, communicative and market narratives by mobilising key terms (creative, welfare and society). In line with discourses cited above, this concept leverages Finland’s social democratic ethos (and state identity) and its industrial innovation and commercial agenda by leaning on a number of compelling genealogical factors.

Firstly, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, though the term creative straddles culture and the economy, it has developed predominantly economic connotations which place the concept of the creative welfare society within an immediately industrial context. Secondly, and in contrast, the emotive symbolism of welfare, as part of the egalitarian

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state (stressing social cohesion and responsibility), is specifically linked to the production of social capital in Finland (Hietala, 2002, p. 1), and is invariably enveloped in discourses of the state as protector and promoter of [active] citizenship and citizens’ “well-being” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p., 2007, p. 5, 2009a, p. 7, 2009b, p. 15, 2010a, p. 7; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010d, p. 6). The concepts of creativity and welfare are therefore part of wider welfare/prosperity discourses, citing the importance of culture and creativity as both a “pillar of national welfare and success” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 4), that aligns with Finland’s “high-level quality of life [and one] that is accessible, sustainable, and representative” (Mulcahy, 2004, p. 157).

Completing the symmetry of these three compound words, and thirdly, the use of society rather than state in the creative welfare society, is not accidental. Society used in this context, stands as a deliberate and resistant construct in opposition to the concept of the state, connoting transience and impermanence on the one hand, versus the universal, responsible and stable protector/provider of the state on the other. The welfare society, therefore, represents a move away from the original ethos of the welfare state and by implication, towards the private sector. This link is supported by claims that the creative welfare society model aims to target efficiencies, that public “services can be provided best by parties other than the public sector” (Himanen, 2004, p. 13) and, that there is a need for more “open competition” as a response to increased “global competition” and an “aging population” (ibid.). Finally, the creative welfare society has been described as “version 2.0” of the (old) welfare state, guaranteeing the “future of the welfare society” (ibid.), which brings in a reference to the digital, information, and global information
The creative welfare society, therefore, essentially represents a particular Nordic hybrid, straddling the ideological divide between social democracy and neoliberalism. This, it will be demonstrated, is a recurring feature of Finland’s policies in general.

### 5.4.4.4 Cultural rights discourses

Another legacy of social democratic discourses concerns the concept of cultural rights (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 19). These rights are asserted as the foundation or “basis for national cultural policy” (Finnish Ministry of Education 2007, p. 40) and are claimed to be part of Finland’s “economic, social and educational” system of rights (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 12), bound up in general discourses of cultural ethics, sustainable development (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010b) and cultural diversity and equity (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011). Though part of a wider European phenomenon since UNESCO’s 2001 and 2005 diversity conventions (though this appears to be waning now), cultural rights are particularly resonant in Finland, and again, are congruent with its relationship to Sweden and Russia, its history of social democracy, its aboriginal population of Saamis, and its recent wave of immigration.

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121 Pekka Himanen, who wrote about the *creativity welfare society*, claimed that it was he who suggested that “Finnish expertise and the Finnish innovation system should be developed” via Florida’s concept of the creative economy (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 35).
122 This interest in cultural rights cites developments in Scottish cultural policy, suggesting the influence of Scottish policy on Finish policy.
123 On 12 June 2006, the Parliament of Finland approved Finland’s adherence to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the President of Finland confirmed this adherence by signing the respective national Act on 29 June 2006 (Ericarts, 2013, n.p.).
5.4.4.5 Civilisation and civil society discourses

Civilisation and civil society discourses are also consistent with Finland’s independence and latterly its interest in cultural rights, forming a discursive link between (high) culture, education, civilisation and democracy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 8). In Finland, therefore, civilisation represents the “future” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p.), a standard or “ideal” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, n.p.), involves the “cultivation of spirit and intellect” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 8), and must be cherished or valued (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, p. 5, 2005, p. 3, 2009b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a, n.p., 2011, n.p.). Civilisation is also charged with shaping Finland’s “national identity” and (conversely) “works purposefully in international interaction” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003a, n.p.) and is concomitant with Finland’s branding. In this way, civilization (again as a trope for national autonomy) is a key concept in Finland and resembles the German concept of Bildung, or the whole and ongoing cultural and education development of a person.

Correspondingly, civil society discourses in Finnish texts also claim benign and legitimising associations for culture through their contribution to the public sphere, concomitant with progress, rationalism, truth and liberty (see 4.2.2.2). This is demonstrated in statements which underline a vision of culture as central to the lifeworld, asserting that: culture is a “dynamic part of democracy, good governance, human rights and civil society programmes” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 68); one of the “pivotal definers of humanity and citizenship” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 17); the “emblem of a civilised society” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10) and creates “actively participating citizens” (Finnish Ministry
of Education, 2009b, p. 23). These concepts of creative welfare society, cultural rights, civilisation, culture, social welfare, democracy, equality and civil society can be viewed as collectively working to affirm Finland’s social democratic brand and self described ethos through the socio-cultural lifeworld, but also serve (and legitimate) its competitiveness society model through appeals to the political-economic system.

5.4.4.6 Nationalism discourses

In parallel with the discourse of civilisation, nationalist discourses are also present in Finnish cultural policy, and, it has been claimed, affirm the link between the “Finnish state, society and [the] cultural community” (Koenis and Saukkonen 2006, p. 8). As such, the cultural ministry has asserted that “Finnish art and cultural policy is marked by a strong national cultural identity” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010c, n.p.) and has emphasised the role of its “common culture” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 31). Despite the positive connotations of this term, however, Finland’s “common culture” has been interpreted in an exclusive and essentialising way through (now defunct) proposals for a Finnish “cultural canon” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p.29). This proposal for a cultural canon (as part of its common culture) involved bringing together artworks considered to represent the best of Finnishness, with the aim of “sustaining and strengthening Finnish culture against other cultures and preserving the Finnish identity amidst increasing cultural diversity and internationalisation” (ibid., p. 30), in order to create the “impression of a homogenous nation and culture” (ibid., p. 31). Though the canon never materialised, this strategy is patently at odds with Finland’s multicultural and civil society agendas, its principles of cultural rights, and its expressed desire for an open and European model of society (Koenis and Saukkonen 2006, p. 13).
A more localised and arguably benign mode of nationalism was demonstrated in discourses (national versus international) over the proposed Guggenheim museum in Helsinki, presented as the defence of local needs over international brands (as above) (Chayka, 2011, n.p.; Palonen, 2012). Other forms of nationalism occur in grandiloquent statements about Finland’s achievements and identity, in claims that: although Finland has only “officially been a member of the Nordic family since the 1950s”... “culturally we [they] have always belonged there. We share the same values, which have evolved over centuries” (Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 12); that Finland is “one of the most democratic states in the world”, with a history of “Western culture and legislation” (ibid.), and that Finland is an “advanced society” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b, p.8). These statements are clearly intended to reflect a Nordic and Western (i.e. non-Russian) Finnish identity back to the electorate, thus reinforcing Finland’s autonomy and collective pride.

5.4.4.7 Conflicting value systems

The contradiction between an exclusive cultural canon and Finland’s discourses of openness and diversity (as will be demonstrated), in addition to the tensions present in Finland’s other discourses (creative economy, citizenship, cultural rights, and particularly its creative welfare society), point to a particular feature of cultural policy in general and cultural policy in Finland in particular, that of a Finnish hybrid discourse. This term refers to the increasingly familiar policy use of “covert semantic relation[s]” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 130), between conflicting or potentially conflicting discourses that obfuscate state ideologies and to appeal to different legitimations. This feature occurs across a range of Finnish policy documents, as well as within the same statements, and
is exemplified in the concept of the creative welfare society. The ministry has also noted conflicting cultural discourses in Finland, but distancing itself from them in claims that “public debate in society often juxtaposes art and culture as activity[ies] of intrinsic value and as profit-generating instrumental activity[ies]” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 9). Likewise, economic agencies in Finland have commented on a similar feature of Finnish discourse in noting how Finland is “innovative” in how it “conceptualises economic growth as an outcome of social capital” (The Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 38).

These conflicts are also demonstrated in intellectual, artistic, civic and social understandings of value, in line with communicative discourses which claim that culture: “underpin[s] civilisation and promote[s] plurality” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011, n.p.); “cannot be measured in financial terms” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 7); is essential to the human being and human existence (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 6); enriches “human and social life in many ways” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, p. 5); and, critically, stands in opposition to “market-driven art” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 7). However, these discourses also claim (as part of a market discourse) that culture is: part of the “soil for creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 16); a “channel for creativity” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10); has an “earning’s logic” (ibid. p. 83); and can enhance “Finland’s competitiveness, tourism and export industries in the international market” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 27).

The most common discursive conflicts occur within the same statements, bridging (and again legitimising) discourses of social welfare or cohesion (or communicative) and
economic and competitive (market) rationales. This is demonstrated in assertions that culture is: a “significant factor in the implementation of welfare, regional and innovation policies” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2011, n.p.); an economic system in its own right that is “built on intellectual capital and trade in commodities and services, which can be used to promote societal development” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16); and one of the “basic elements of intrinsic value in human existence and essential to societal welfare and to the economy” (ibid., p. 6). Equally, similar dualism occur in claims that Finland is a “welfare society resting on world-class knowledge and know-how and on a strong innovation system” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14) and that the “development of the creative industries and internationalisation will improve the national innovation environment, the economy and citizens’ life satisfaction. This in turn will strengthen culture and art and their funding base” (ibid., p. 13).

Notwithstanding the translated nature of these statements, their tone connotes culture’s provisional social versus definitive economic contributions. Different meanings can be derived from the tentative and doubtful enunciations such as can, implying the possibility but not certainty of a societal outcome from culture, in contrast with the certainty of the term essential and will in relation to culture’s role in the economy. The use of can also implies that there are other values attending to culture, and that societal development is simply one of many, while the more affirmative use of will in relation to welfare and the economy, essentialises the values of culture as economic.

More explicit tensions are found in other statements, such as: the “arts and culture live on their own terms” and at the same time contribute to “welfare and tolerance or
boosting innovation potential or economic development” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10); cultural practitioners “must find their own voice” but that “culture is an important player in external relations policy” (ibid., p. 12); and that “creativity capital” is not sufficiently appreciated and “put to appropriate use” in different societal activities (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 15).

An interesting characteristic of these juxtapositions is the false consciousness (see 4.4.13) suggested within the ministry itself. This is the acknowledgement by the ministry of problematic positionings of intrinsic with extrinsic value discourses (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 9), in the same document and series of statements arguing for culture’s contribution to social values (amongst many others) and the creative economy, technology, communications, environmental conservation and even the preparation for crisis situations (ibid., pp. 8-9). This contradiction is also apparent in a key document on cultural ethics (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007), which provides a framework for Finland’s subsequent (cultural) diversity policies (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, etc.; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010b).

This document contains thinly veiled criticisms of Finland’s instrumental cultural policies in general (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 105), and refers to: “tensions” between the “intrinsic” values of art (known as the freedom ethos in Finland) and “instrumentality and economic output” (known as the benefit ethos) (ibid.);124 the fact that the “ethical premises of cultural policy” are no longer “in harmony” (ibid., p. 36); and in a reference to nominalisation in economic discourses (see 2.4.3), that

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economic values are “not value-neutral but are clearly ethically charged” (ibid., p. 35).

This document further asserts that the recent “neoliberal hegemony” depends on “instrumentality and economic applications of art” (ibid., p. 37) and that the “concept of citizenship, previously based on cultural rights” has become about “consumption and paying consumers” (ibid., p. 34). This report also contains criticisms of Richard Florida and raises awareness of the “ethical” problems posed by his model of the creative city (ibid.), foreshadowing a later report cautioning against a wholesale adoption of Florida’s thesis (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8).

However, though this particular document (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007) does not engage in contradictory discourses in relation to its criticisms of instrumentalism (unlike the other document), since it is produced within the ministry, in the context of other highly rational and economic discourses of culture, to which it refers and criticises, it must be seen as contradictory. Similarly, the document’s claims that “discussion on and around” the creative economy is “fairly problematic in ethical terms when seen from the perspective of cultural human rights” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34) is equivocal in light of the centrality of the creativity economy and creative industries to other Finnish cultural policies. Moreover, its assertions that a “class society based on the concept of creativity may conversely paralyse creativity and innovation in society” and that there is a tendency to use a “narrow conception of the nature of creativity” (ibid.), jar with the extent of Finnish creativity discourses as well as narrow interpretations of culture within them (i.e., as the arts) (ibid.).

However, by appearing to operate outside of the commissioning ministry, the report skilfully manages to strategically contain (Shapiro, 1990, p. 332) potential criticisms
and disavows its own position within Finnish instrumentalism. This disavowal lends the document an objectivity and critical distance which is hard to reconcile with its function as policy, even if it also functions as a research document. These discourses, therefore, neutralise the instrumental policies of which they are a part and of which they are critical and can be seen as part of the “instinct for self-preservation” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p.5) in terms of seeking legitimacy from the culture sector, as much as wider government. This ultimately points to a lack of control over policy discourses. Whatever the imperatives behind these discourses, they recall those who “know what they are doing” but still do it (Sloterdijk, 1987, p.5).

5.4.4.8 Finnish dualism

Conflicting value systems, intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomies, or Nordic hybridities, can therefore, be viewed as central to Finnish legitimacy and embody the struggle at the heart of Finnish politics, the reconciling of social democracy with neoliberalism. These dualisms can be summarised as follows: a competitive creative economy agenda using a broad interpretation of culture and extrinsic value discourses (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010a), alongside high culture and intrinsic-value discourses (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2003d, 2009b, 2010a); critiques of Florida’s work (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 13, p. 37), with endorsements of it (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005; 2009b; 2010b); and cultural rights, diversity, openness, multiple identities, hybrid cultures (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a; 2009b), and internationalist discourses of exports and external relations (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a), alongside nationalist and exclusive

Chief amongst these struggles, however, and as demonstrated earlier, are the conflicts that occur within the same statement, usually that of culture in economic competitiveness and social justice (and civilisation/education). While this hybridization is symptomatic of covert discourses and justificatory regimes in general, it particularly suggests the dual mandate and tensions particular to Finnish policies and is underlined in Comedia’s advice for Finnish policymakers not to throw out the (social democratic) “baby with the [neoliberal] bathwater” (Comedia, 2010, p. 11), as well as perhaps the more pragmatic avoidance of difficult policy decisions.

A mild nominalisation occurs in Finnish texts which involves the passive juxtaposition of the concepts of globalisation and competition, as well as to a lesser extent the creative economy. These juxtapositions are common to international media discussions of the economy, but are nevertheless present in Finland’s references to: the pressures of “global competition” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 3); being “competitive actors in the global economy” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p.10); the “globalised world of rapid and wide communication” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10); and the “global creative economy (The Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 11). These statements eschew the purpose behind each of these contingent systems which could always be otherwise (globalisation, competition etc.).

The creative economy is also linked to social justice (underlining the Finnish equation of economic development and well-being) in statements asserting that: “culturally
sustainable development and just global wealth distribution are fundamentals in the paradigm based on the principle of sustainable development”; the “increasing reach of globalisation and multiculturalism is creating unprecedented opportunities for strengthening intercultural exchange” (Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010b, p. 3); and that “diversity can be a central source of innovation and renewal, which are essential factors in globalisation” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 79). These juxtapositions and nominalisations again work to legitimate these concepts within a neoliberal context.

5.4.5 The creative city and Finnish cultural policy discourse

Though the theamtics and discourses discussed above (creativity and the creative economy, cultural rights, civilisation and nationalism) are concerned with economic and market rationales consistent with creative city discourses (the creative economy, neoliberalism, competition, innovation etc.), more discrete discourses linking Finnish cultural policies to the creative city can also be identified. These discourses are broken into three sub-discourses: culture’s role in attracting workers, investment and tourists (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b), through its contribution to place, competitiveness and applications of creativity (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, 2009b, 2010b); culture’s contribution to openness, diversity and tolerance (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006a, 2009b, 2010b); and the privileging of human capital or talent (as part of attraction discourses).
5.4.5.1 Creative cities, creative classes and authors

Like Scotland, despite Landry’s work for the city of Helsinki (Comedia, 2010), most creative city discourses in Finnish cultural policies refer to Florida’s model, and peak in the middle, and at the end of the decade. Explicit citations of creative cities include generic references to the “development of urban areas into ‘creative cities’” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 10), and more specific references to the creative classes (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 28), the 3 T’s theory (ibid., p. 31), and Florida’s competitive creativity indexes (ibid., 34, 2010b, p. 8). Accompanying these explicit discourses are regional development narratives with an information society emphasis citing the importance of “innovation environments and innovation ecosystems” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8), the use of “creative milieus” (ibid., p. 11), and like Scotland, cautions against a strict adoption of Florida’s thesis (ibid.).

The Nordic Innovation Centre Green Paper on the creative economy (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007) is notable for criticising the tendency for cities to adopt wholesale international ideas of urban development, and simultaneously affirming these (creative city) ideas as a response to what it claims, is the Nordic region’s “fierce competition from growing overseas markets” (ibid., p. 10) and “mobile, knowledge-driven labour market” (ibid., p. 11), i.e. a market that might not choose to stay in Finland. The report, therefore, states that: city development needs a “more considered approach” and that the creative industries should not be burdened with the “sole responsibility of resolving every economic or social issue” (ibid., p. 13); that policymakers who are overselling their city as rich in cultural “assets”, are in “error” when it is more “desired” than a
reality; and that this “can undermine the credibility of genuine efforts to deliver on cultural, creative and knowledge agendas” (ibid., p. 37).

In contrast, the report goes on to claim that: the “availability and quality of local cultural resources and their cultural offer, can determine whether or not people think their area is a “good place to live”” (ibid., p. 13); there is a need for a “Nordic Creative brand” (ibid., p. 17) to “attract inward investment” and to provide “new skills and identities that are hoped will bring with them a unique, competitive edge” (ibid., p. 12) and that these skills will help the “construction of vibrant, creative places” (ibid.). The report also stresses the need to recognise that the “assets of any region are its people, their individual creativity, skill and talent” (ibid., p. 9), and that the “Nordic Region is a global leader in policy approaches to building creative places. Nowhere else is there such appetite for, knowledge of, and commitment to, creativity and cultural planning” (ibid., p. 36). More explicit citations of the creative city continue in references to mobile and high human capital creative classes.

5.4.5.2 Discourses of attraction, creative workers, investment and human capital

As such, well-educated or high human capital creative workers the “greatest assets of any region” (ibid., p. 9), the “real scarce resource in the world”, and are likely to be found in “creative environments, [and] world-class knowledge clusters” sought by “companies thirsting after innovations” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 6). Equally, creative workers are described as “top doers” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, n.p.), have a “direct impact on inward investment” (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 13), act as a “glue” for the “retention/re-attraction of creative businesses/individuals” (ibid., p. 58) ), provide “new skills and identities” and bring
with them a “unique, competitive edge” (ibid., p. 12). The metaphor of harnessing is also used in relation to ensuring that creativity is grasped and retained (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 51). Further, in a key reference to the impact of the creative classes and to cultural capital and hegemonies, cultural amenities are asserted as the “things that professionals appreciate” (ibid., p. 10).

These discourses essentially reflect the central creative city premise of the link between creative workers and businesses, in statements that “companies consider even more carefully than before where they locate their operations” (ibid., p. 6) and that “the movement of capital, the attractiveness of investments and capital, the movement of goods and services, the movement of work and the movement of people” are key factors impacting on and predicated by culture and the creative economy (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 31). The imperative behind these statements of flexible accumulation, like Scotland, may be falling confidence in Finland’s “ability to attract international business as a location” (ibid. p. 34), and claims that Finland is acutely aware of competition from other countries, most particularly China (Comedia, 2010, p. 16).

The importance of culture to branding is also part of Finland’s internationalisation strategy, and more specifically, its need “to arouse interest in Finland and Finnishness” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 15). This marketing of Finland is done through cultural exports which are: an “important part of the image Finland projects abroad” ... , “can enhance Finland’s competitiveness” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 27); and are useful for building “an image of an interesting creative economy region in the international marketplace, which in turn could attract international
investment” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 49). Culture is also claimed to be where Finland is most likely to find its “next success” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, n.p.) and a sector whose significance “will continue to grow” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, n.p.). Despite this emphasis on image, however, Finnish cultural policy also rejects the idea that culture is about “image polishing” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10), or is a “soft” sector (ibid., p. 15), or a “mere attraction factor” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 7) or an “embellishment” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10), instead suggesting that it offers “innovativeness” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 7).

5.4.5.3 Tolerance discourses

In addition to attraction and human capital discourses, Florida’s concept of the links between openness, tolerance, diversity and success (and the links created between then), also occur in Finnish texts. These discourses are present in: calls for a “more tolerant value and attitude climate” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2006b, p. 2); claims that people who are “open to new ideas” are a “fundamental asset in inter-regional competition” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010b, p. 8); and statements that “innovation activity is higher than average in tolerant places” (ibid.). These ideas are also expressed alongside discourses of diversity,125 positing immigrants as a new source for “creativity and talent” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 16) and claiming that diversity is “an opportunity – a knowledge resource – that can deliver profit … and a central source of innovation and renewal” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 79). Though this may point to Finland’s ethnic context, egalitarian ideals, and general reputation for tolerance (Comedia, 2010, p. 11), as well as its “cooperation culture”

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125 Cultural diversity in Finland has been defined as the “coexistence of world cultures, the protection and promotion of existing cultures and respect for other cultures” (Ministry of Education, 2007a, p. 11).
(Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 13), the linking of multiculturalism to diversity and innovation also situates this discourse in a creative city context.\footnote{In contrast, and in contradiction to other Finnish discourses on diversity and innovation, a City of Helsinki document has linked innovation and creativity to monoculturalism, positing that homogenous cultures ensure good communication, which help the “spread of innovation” (Karvinen, 2005, p. 12).}

Despite explicit criticisms of the creative city paradigm in Finnish policy, therefore, (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 34; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 12, p. 36), discrete discourses of the creative classes, creative indexes, attraction, investment and tolerance, illustrate an awareness of the international value of creative city discourses. This view is endorsed in statements that acknowledge the role of the creative city: in helping to make culture a “subject of debate” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 32); as “among the most quoted and utilised concepts” in promoting the Finnish creative economy (ibid.); in emphasising the “innovation capacity of the creative sectors” (ibid.); and creating a “positive circle or vortex of creativity” (ibid., p. 3). These texts also confirm criticisms of Finland’s “uncritical devotion” and wholesale “Floridaesque belief on [in] creativity’s unhindered potential” (Karo and Muukkonen, 2007, p. 67), consistent with the positive connotations around creativity (free, non-rivalrous, panacea-like) as outlined in Chapters Three and Four.

While these discourses may indicate a broader assimilation of urban development, a post-industrial emphasis on skilled workers against the threat of job and investment loss (in workers and human capital discourse), and as above, a new multiculturalism, they also represent a specifically Finnish interpretation of the creative city paradigm. Specifically, the application of this paradigm addresses Finland’s legacy of social democracy and the importance of its tolerant image, with its newer competitive economic policies, reconciling and legitimising a distinctly Finnish and newly
neoliberal sensibility. This combination of ideas points to a significant, and localised, creative city discursive transfer in Finnish cultural policy.

5.4.5.4 Postscript on Finland’s cultural policies

Before concluding, it is worth noting the prolific nature of Finnish policy-making and the extent of its availability in English, in the context of Finland’s interest in the internationalism of the creative city. The volume of cultural policy documents available in Finland firstly highlights a hugely ambitious though bureaucratic country, which values culture as a central and useful arm of government, but also suggests the international branding capacities of culture, and potentially, its role in underlining Finland’s separateness to Sweden and Russia (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a). Secondly, as English is the diplomatic language of the EU, the free availability of Finland’s policies in English enables a small nation with a discrete language to disseminate Finnishness throughout much of Europe and the Western world.127

It can be argued, therefore, that the range and number of Finnish documents speak to a number of issues: the historical place of education, common culture and the “civilising ethos” of Finland (Sakarias and Kangas, 2007, p. 190); an increased need for advocacy/research/policy as a response to the global recession; ten years of rapid political turnover (and administrations wanting to put their stamp on policy); the multi-linguistic abilities of the Finns; Finland’s strong travel culture (Wright et al., 2012, p. 6, p.12); and concomitantly, Finland’s keen interest in internationalism and self-promotion, particularly within the EU (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c). These

127 There is a culture of translation already in Finland based on its ethnic mix and multi-lingualism (Wright et. al, 2012, p. 12).
factors, and in particular the internationalism projected by the creative city, are key to Finland’s use of the paradigm and will be further considered in Chapter Six.

5.4.6 Finland conclusions

This section has demonstrated that Finland, though it carries a wide range of discourses within its cultural policies, demonstrates a specific link to creative city discourses, and uses them in a local way to emphasise and legitimate key historic (social democratic/egalitarian) and contemporary (neoliberal) government agendas. It has been demonstrated that Finnish cultural policies specifically leverage the paradigm’s lexicon of attraction (workers and to an extent investment), human capital (see 5.4.5.2), tolerance, openness and innovation (though this might demonstrate older social democracy ideals) (see 5.4.5.3), and directly references the creative city, the creative classes, and creative city authors (chiefly Florida) (see 5.4.5.1).

Specifically, this chapter has shown that Finland has had and maintains a strong national identity as a Nordic social democratic country, with a high value placed on egalitarianism, tolerance, cooperation, culture, education and diversity (multiculturalism), in tandem with an international outlook and fiercely competitive economic agenda. Finland is also a country with strong city marketing, commercialisation and enterprise activity that is often linked with innovation discourses. This results in apparently seamless economic, civil society and social democratic discourses, as well as intrinsic and extrinsic discourses of culture’s value. It is argued that this seamlessness represents a dualism, nominalism and a discursive strategic containment of competing mandates for cultural policy both in Finland and
more generally, seeking legitimation through appeals to more self-evident areas of policy.

The use of culture to promote Finland as an international brand and Finnishness in general is particularly important. This branding is argued to be a response to Finland’s peripheral location, small population, distinctiveness from its former rulers and its need to compete for investment. In conclusion, we can say that Finland’s cultural policies demonstrate on the one hand, a social democratic and civil society ethos, and on the other a desire to position itself as a commercial, innovative, cosmopolitan, autonomous and international country, and an active member of the EU and Eurozone. Having established the manifestation of the creative city paradigm in both Scottish and Finnish cultural policies, and the role of nominalisation, containment, dual legitimacies and state imperatives, it is necessary to turn to the final comparative case. This case is that of Ireland, a small island on the edge of Europe with a growing interest in urban matters, a fragmented history of explicit cultural policy, and an equal if not stronger need to create and maintain a strong national brand.

5.5 Ireland

5.5.1 Introduction

The case of Finland shows how creative city discourses occur within a non-English speaking and Nordic cultural policy context, and specifically, how the creative city aligns and legitimates culture with Finland’s national economic, industrial, political and social agendas. The last of the cases under consideration is the Republic of Ireland, a formerly colonised country, which, like Finland and Scotland, has historically used
culture to assert its independent identity, and, latterly, to assert itself within a competitive international context as a response to its peripheral location and enduring political and economic problems.128 Given Ireland’s “high reputation” for culture internationally (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 122) and its reputed cultural “legacy” (Florida, 2002, p. 301), it is not surprising that culture in Ireland has long been aggressively promoted to creative a “favourable image” of the country (Fanning and Henry, 2012, n.p.). Culture in Ireland has also been central in delivering “Brand Ireland” internationally (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 29; Fanning and Henry, 2012, n.p.). However, this case will show that the latest global recession has created unprecedented pressures on Irish cultural (arts) policy to deliver reputational and foreign investment benefits to Ireland.

In order to contextualise this activity, the case will begin with an overview of creative branding and creativity discourses in Ireland, paying particular attention to discourses of industrial creativity and innovation. This will illustrate the leveraging of cultural discourses of creativity within industrial policy contexts, as a corollary of economic discourses occurring within cultural contexts. Following this, and as an introduction to Irish cultural (primarily arts) policy, key Irish cultural policy discourses of Brand Ireland, reputation enhancement (and rescue), and international investment will be outlined, concluding with a consideration of why creative city discourses have only marginally impacted Ireland’s cultural policies.

128 The history of the Republic of Ireland is entangled with civil wars and economic hardship, stemming from the partition and subsequent political struggles for the island of Ireland.
5.5.2 Introduction to the creative city in Ireland: designations, national promotion and innovation

Ireland has been particularly active in “leveraging” its “authentic cultural assets” (Florida, 2002, p. 302) by promoting itself as a uniquely cultural destination, and typically describing itself as a “world leader” in culture (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.). In recognition of this, its capital (Dublin) has been awarded UNESCO City of Literature (2010) and routinely trades on literary tropes of 19th and 20th century writers who lived or were born there (James Joyce, Oscar Wilde, WB Yeats, Patrick Kavanagh, and Brendan Behan amongst others).

Dublin has also been active in hosting or seeking to host international events aimed at showcasing the capital to tourists and businesses, including the City of Science (in 2012), the shortlist (subsequently won by Helsinki) for World Design Capital (2012) and WOMEX/World Music Expo (2013), UNESCO’s Creative Cities’ network, and various urban regeneration and city (cultural) marketing campaigns. These regeneration initiatives include Dublin’s Temple Bar district, one of the first and most “successful cultural quarter development[s]” in Europe (Bayliss, 2004, p. 499), described as a “model of culture-led regeneration” (McCarthy, 2008, p. 271) and (by Florida) an “authentic cultural district” (Florida, 2002, p. 301). Despite this acclaim, Temple Bar is as locally critiqued as Glasgow’s 1990 City of Culture (see 5.3.1), with

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131 Dublin has run many promotional campaigns. These include: the creative consultation exercise What’s Dublin For? from 2010’s Brand Dublin project, and direct branding initiatives such as Dublin City Council’s Love the City project form 2010 as part of the social creativity project Designing Dublin. Available: http://www.dublincity.ie/Press/PressReleases/PR2010/June10/Pages/LovetheCityApplicationsopenforasixmonthlearningprojectaimingtonoeffectrealchangeinDublinsCityCentre.aspx [Accessed 20 June 2012].
reports that it is “best summed up by the placards advertising lapdancing clubs, the hen parties tottering precariously across the cobbles, and the lakes of vomit” (O’Connell, 2013, n.p.).

However, Ireland’s industrial policies have also capitalised on creativity and innovation discourses (as well as talent, human capital etc.) which are present in the seminal Smart Economy report - a local version of the knowledge economy - (Government of Ireland, 2008), the Innovation Island brand (Government of Ireland, 2010), events such as Dublin Innovation week, Dublin as an Open City for Innovation, and conferences promoting creativity, innovation and the creative city in particular.

This promotional activity has taken place against the relatively recent emergence of benign discourses of creativity, culture, investment, business and branding from development agencies, local authorities, advisory boards and media sources.

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132 There have been other major regeneration projects such as the Dublin Docklands, but Dublin has recently launched a major new cultural quarter in the North part of the centre city that will provide an alternative to Temple Bar (see Reilly, 2013).


135 Dublin City Council’s focus on innovation (referencing the lexicon of the creative city) is demonstrated in a media statement from one of its directors, claiming that “it is this kind of creativity we are trying to harness and release.” (The Irish Times, 2010b,n.p.).

136 These conferences include the Creative City Regions conference held in Dublin in October 2007 sponsored by Dublin Regional Authority and the Dublin Employment Pact. Available: http://www.craigiecommunications.com/b.html [Accessed 3 September 2012]. Also, the conference Creating Futures: Building Ireland’s cultural and creative economy, The Institute of Art, Design and Technology, Dun Laoghaire, Wednesday, 29 October, 2008.


138 Dublin City Council make reference to the creative city paradigm the most, followed by Limerick City Council, who have developed a Creative Limerick project, seeking to “enhance vibrancy and active frontages in Limerick City Centre and to provide active uses for vacant properties” in Limerick. Available: http://www.limerickcity.ie/Planning/PropertyManagement/CreativeLimerick/ [Accessed 3
As suggested, Ireland’s largest local authority, Dublin City Council, has been highly active in this regard, claiming that “releasing creative energy [in Dublin] is what it’s all about” (Irish Times, 2010a, n.p.), and refers to: developing “the engine of the Irish economy with a network of thriving spatial and sectoral clusters, a focus for creative talent and creative assets” (Dublin City Council, 2010, p. 7); needing to “create a vibrant place” (Dublin City Council, 2009, p. 18); and needing to “nurture, attract and retain creative people” (ibid., p. 23); as well as outlining “what makes a creative city region?” (ibid., p. 12).

Other local authority documents claim that the arts are: “perceived as being increasingly important in giving a city the capacity to develop a profile, attract investment, deliver quality of life and hold on to [or retain] a talented and creative workforce” (Dublin City Council, 2005, p. 10), who “underpin city identity”; help cities “project themselves, develop profile and compete in the international arena for investment” and “maintain its [Dublin’s] attractiveness as a place to live, work and visit” (ibid., p. 64). These Floridian ideas of attraction, investment, talent and profile-building, alternate between

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Footnotes:
141 “If we just wait around for the next creative wave to come along, we will miss it – that’s not the way things happen. We have to compete at the leading edge with the most creative cities in the world. We have to go back to basics to a certain extent. We have found ourselves in a spot of bother and if we look within ourselves to our own creativity we might come up with sustainable solutions that are different and distinctly Irish. “It’s about job creation – and we want to contribute to that by showcasing our potential as a location for foreign direct investment.” All quotes from Michael Stubbs, assistant city manager with Dublin City Council in 2011, in relation to Dublin Innovation week (Irish Times, 2010b, n.p.).
146 See (McWilliams, 2006; Irish Times, 2008; The Independent, 2007).
148 See also Limerick City Gallery who has stated that it “seeks to develop its role as a primary visitor attraction in the context of a creative city”. Available: http://www.limerickcitygallery.ie/Events/LatestNews/LimerickCityCouncilseeksDirectorCuratorofLCGA.html [Accessed 20 June 2012].
149 For more information see Limerick City Gallery. Available: http://www.limerickcitygallery.ie/Events/LatestNews/LimerickCityCouncilseeksDirectorCuratorofLCGA.html [Accessed 20 June 2012].
an equivocation around culture’s usefulness to cities, suggested by the use of the equivocal term “perceived” (ibid., p.10), and more assertive terms such “underpin” (ibid., p. 64).

Florida’s particular popularity in Dublin City Council may in part arise from his positive endorsements of Dublin and Ireland, as well as his appearances (physical and virtual) at conferences there.144 Like Finland, in the mid 2000s, Florida praised Ireland for being a “high-tech success story envied across Europe and around the world” (Florida, 2002, p. 300), and claimed its success depended on the 3 Ts of economic development (ibid.), and a major “lifestyle effort” (ibid., p. 301), a theory that did not hold with subsequent revelations around Ireland’s property-fuelled boom.145 Florida also lauded Ireland in relation to (his perception of) its sustained investment in higher education,146 its skill at “cultivating creative people” (Florida, 2004, p. 122), and its nurturing of “underlying creative capabilities” (Florida and Tinagli, 2004, p. 6). Despite the global recession, in 2011, Ireland ranked in Florida’s top 20 (out of 82 countries) on the Global Creativity Index,147 and in the top ten per cent in his Global Innovation and Technology survey (Florida, 2011a, n.p.; 2011b, n.p.). The attraction of the creative city model for Ireland’s local authorities, however, has also been linked to the limited financial autonomy of these bodies in Ireland (since local rates were abolished in the

144 Florida appeared at the Dublin, Creative City Region conference in October 2007, as the keynote speaker, aiming to “identify initiatives which can be taken at national and at Dublin level to ensure that Dublin is a leading player in the global creative economy and society into the future.” Available: http://www.craigiecommunications.com/b.html [Accessed 3 September 2012].
145 Ireland’s Celtic Tiger boom of the 1990s and 2000s is ultimately thought to have rested on inflated property prices.
146 More recently, Chairman of Goldman Sachs Peter Sutherland has been reported as saying that “Ireland was ‘deluding itself’ if it thought it had a top-quality education system” (O’Brien, 2011, n.p.).
1970s) and their consequent “over-reliance” on lucrative urban development initiatives which might favour creative city branded initiatives (Lawton, Murphy and Redmond, 2010, p. 281).

5.5.3 Nationalism and early cultural policies

On a national cultural policy level, like Scotland and Finland, nationalist cultural discourses have been a key factor in Ireland’s struggle for independence, the foundation of the state and the assertion of a distinct and independent Irish/Gaelic identity. While the colonial legacy of 18th century British cultural policies are embodied in the system of royal academies and schools, the national movement and the development of implicit national cultural policies gained prominence in the 19th century, exacerbated by the Irish famine and the subsequent ravaging and depopulation of Ireland (to less than half of what it had been). The foundation of the socio-cultural Gaelic League (associated with the revival of the Irish language) and the Irish Literary/Celtic Revival of the 19th and early 20th centuries, was also significant in terms of the development of an independent cultural and national identity, and formed the backdrop to independence in 1921.

Early explicit cultural policies in Ireland, therefore, were based around a number of discrete nationalist initiatives, notably the drive to restore the Irish language which had been fragmented through colonialism (effectively implemented through, and equivalent to, an education policy) and like Finland, the development of a cult of [Irish] authenticity as a response to delegitimating and de-authenticating colonisation from

148 As the historical development of nationalism and Irish cultural policy has been dealt with extensively in other books and is not the specific topic of this research, this introductory section is intended as an overview only. For more information on the history of cultural policy in Ireland, see (Kennedy, 1990) and Quinn (1998).
which the concept of nationhood had arisen in the first place (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). In 1949, following the intense economic hardship of the 1930s and 1940s, an official state arts policy was proposed, leading in 1951 to the first Arts Act and the creation of An Comhairle Ealaion/The Arts Council (henceforth called The Arts Council), modelled on the British Arts Council.

This economically-difficult time was characterised by an inherent cautiousness (and clientelism) in policy which can be linked to Ireland’s post-colonialism and general conservatism, its lack of public support for the arts (and thus lack of interest from politicians), and the exclusion of the civil service and thus power-base from the arts policy process (having no ministry of its own) (Quinn, 1998, pp. 123-126). However, the first formal cultural (arts) policy at government level was consolidated in 1993 with the establishment of a full cultural government department, instituted as the Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht. The ministerial department is currently called the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht and is effectively concerned with ‘high culture’, as well as the film industry.

More recently, however, despite historic hardship and perceptions of Ireland as “conservative” (Florida, 2002, p. 301) and “one of the least cosmopolitan and tolerant nations in Europe” (Boyle, 2006, p. 411), the unprecedented “economic about-turn” of

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149 Clientelism refers to “client politics, characteristic of issues with distributed costs but concentrated benefits” (Jones, 2009, p. 29).

150 Conservatism in Ireland has been underlined by a number of authors (Merriman, 2005; O’Brien, 2007) and is particularly linked to the cautious reproduction of Britain’s political and administrative structures, as a legacy of colonisation (O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). More recently, in November 2012, ongoing debates on religious issues were highlighted in relation to the death of a woman at an Irish hospital who was refused a termination following complications that arose after a miscarriage. This underlines an enduring conservatism and link to the Catholic Church in Ireland. See Irish Times (2012b).

151 The question of whether the place of the Arts Council outside of government (before the existence of the arts ministry) constituted benign neglect and allowed arts policy to develop independently (devoid of unnecessary government interference and led by skilled experts), or whether it lost critical policy expertise and visibility (as well as mandate), is moot.

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the Celtic Tiger period in the late 1990s and 2000s (Hazelkorn and Murphy, 2002, p. 1) and consequent “rapid” integration of Ireland into the world economy, has contributed to a new “outward-looking post-colonial national identity” (Boyle, 2006, p. 411) and internationalism.152 This has resulted in a realignment of government priorities, from nationalism’s “utopian project of decolonisation” towards a wholesale “counter-utopia of globalised capital”, or a new economicism (Merriman, cited in O’Brien, 2007, p. 11).

5.5.4 Industrial policy and cultural discourses

As a result, Ireland’s industrial policies have gained increasing primacy in the desire to keep “moving up the value chain” (Kerr, 2007, p. 111). The knowledge economy (via the Smart Economy)153 and information society154 in particular, are at the centre of Ireland’s economic policies,155 and urge Ireland to “innovate, to adapt, to be creative”, to invest in “human and creative capital” as well as “world-class ambition and achievement” and underline the importance of the arts, cultural and creative industries in “engaging and attracting the business sector” (Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 80). Science and innovation discourses also promote what they refer to as the “less developed and understood” symbolic capacity of the arts (Government of Ireland, 2010, p. 31). This interest in the arts’ uses to science is demonstrated in references to: its

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152 It has been claimed that the “pursuit of an internationalisation agenda” ... is part of an “attempt to promote Dublin’s role in the European and global economy” (Lawton et al., 2010, p. 276).
153 See the Knowledge Society Division (as seen in the New Connections report from 2002 and Technology Actions to Support the Smart Economy in 2009), and Dublin as Knowledge City Region (2008) Available: http://www.dubchamber.ie/docs/policy-reports/krnowledge-city-region.pdf [Accessed 21 June 2012].
155 See Government of Ireland (2008); Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism (2009); Forfás, (2007b); and Dublin City Council (2009).
“branding” capacity and its “innovative role in positioning Ireland in a new way” (ibid., p. 83); helping “translate science to the wider public”; making “complex information more understandable” (ibid., p. 31); working with science to “re-position technology and innovation in innovative new ways in the public mind, and [conversely] helping re-position artists, culture and creative minds into the centre of innovative businesses” (ibid., p. 77).

The discourse of Ireland’s enterprise and science advisory board (Forfás) is particularly interesting in this regard and has been actively engaged in both general creativity and innovation, as well as particular creative city, discourses (citing both Richard Florida and Charles Landry repeatedly). This has resulted in documents urging the need for synergies around “collaboration, creative individuals and the urban environment” (Forfás, 2006a, p. 24) and the importance of “attracting and retaining mobile talent” and “creating innovative places” (Forfás, 2010a, p. 44). Other Forfás documents claim that: highly talented and creative individuals tend to gravitate towards places where there are attractive and challenging employment opportunities, reinforcing innovative potential ... with a critical mass of creative activity and workers, strong social diversity and tolerance, attractive neighbourhoods and cultural amenities [which] develop a marked advantage in the competition for talent (ibid., p. 45); “city creativity is nurtured not only through the diversity of its people but also through civic, cultural and sports infrastructure such as libraries and theatres and through the existence of a thriving creative arts sector” (Forfás, 2009a, p. 30); and that there is a “strong interdependence between the planning, development and creation of an attractive environment (the NSS) and enterprise development” (Forfás, 2010b, p. 6).

Economic initiatives designed to increase investment in Brand Ireland using cultural identity discourses (and mobilised as a response to the global recession) have also been channelled through outlets such as the Global Irish Economic Forum, first initiated in September 2009. This gathering of Ireland’s international business diaspora, like many of Ireland’s policies, was primarily intended to “contribute towards the rebuilding of Ireland’s international reputation”, to leverage international investment and to “use Ireland’s cultural heritage to help rebuild its battered economy” (O’Brien, 2011, n.p.). The initiative, however, was notable for its explicit positioning of culture as a unique Irish asset needing to be maximised or “monetised” (Businessman Dermot Desmond, cited in The Irish Times, 2010b, n.p.), and placed culture as central to Ireland’s economic recovery.

Throughout the report from the first forum (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009), discourses of difference, uniqueness and harnessing occur in narratives describing Ireland’s “strong cultural identity” and how culture give’s Ireland a “significant advantage” and distinction from other countries (ibid., p. 29). Other discourses refer to: the need to “renovate” Brand Ireland (ibid., p. 49) so that it can be ready for the economic “upturn” (ibid., p. 5); the fact that Irish culture holds “a distinct and intrinsic value” … “known the world over” (ibid., p. 49); the need for Ireland to “portray the positives that others see” in its culture (ibid.); the need for culture to be “harnessed as a

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357 The stated aim of the forum was to “explore how the Irish at home and abroad, and those with a strong interest in Ireland, could work together and contribute to our overall efforts at economic recovery; and to examine ways in which Ireland and its global community could develop a more strategic relationship with each other, particularly in the economic sector.” Its key themes were: Ireland - the innovation island, Promoting brand Ireland through our global cultural profile and Ireland's image abroad: what is it now; how could it be improved and what role can new media play? Available: http://www.globalirishforum.ie [Accessed 28 June 2011].
unique brand identifier” (*ibid.*, p. 21); and the fact that culture gives Ireland a “competitive advantage in a globalised world” (*ibid.*, p. 49).

As such and like Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 10), the forum actively disavowed the romantic model of the arts by asserting the “importance of arts and culture, not *merely* for art’s sake”, and stated that the arts are “no longer a *luxury* or a *charity*, but are a hugely important part of the economy” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 21). This statement appeals to those seeking a logical and accountable purpose for the public funding of culture, but also shows a naivety in inferring that the suggestion that the arts are *not* primarily luxury goods (i.e. a utilitarian approach to culture), is a novel one. Other discursive strands link culture to innovation, citing culture as helping Ireland “become a global centre for artistic and creative education, innovation and technology” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 9) and “fostering culture and the imagination generally and innovation *beyond* the realm of arts towards delivering the Smart Economy” (*ibid.*, p. 21).

Despite these discourses and their ultimate legacy in economic initiatives beyond the forum, counter discourses arose amongst a “number of [forum] speakers” who objected to the “view that Ireland should be ‘re-created’ as a brand, which would by nature be *inauthentic*” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 21). This viewpoint, however, was rejoindered by later assertions (by a member of the Irish Arts Council) of there being “no reason” for “apoplexy” at the link between the arts and branding [that had been made at Farmleigh], that Ireland’s arts reputation was “inextricably bound up” with its image, and that the “*only* power we [artists] have is to play an active role in
managing Ireland’s brand” as part of the “long tradition” of artists being “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.).

This forum is also significant for leveraging the sign-value of celebrities, in particular the appointment of a three-year international Cultural Ambassador for Ireland in 2010 (actor Gabriel Byrne),158 an unprecedented investment in international cultural showcases,159 and other cultural initiatives including a Certificate of Irishness and a facebook for the Irish diaspora.160 The most recent and well-publicised outcome of the forum has been The Gathering, a year-long tourism event for 2013 aimed at the Irish diaspora, “inviting anyone with a connection to [Ireland] our country to come and visit”.161 This event was implicitly modelled on Scotland’s Homecoming,162 and like Scotland is a response to political concerns about the “waning” of the diasporic attachment (and its promise of investment) to Ireland (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin, 2009, p. 30). The event, however, has generated a degree of cynicism and negative publicity arising from comments made by those charged with promoting it (including the cultural ambassador) and concerned the packaging of an industrial event (aimed at foreign direct investment), as a cultural/tourism event, a situation that will be further discussed in Chapter Seven. Though these local authority, industrial and tourism discourses can be viewed as part of wider international (EU) narratives about culture and creativity, they also reflect the creative city’s genealogy and systems of dispersion in Ireland.

158 See Fitzgerald (2011).
159 See O’Sullivan (2011).
160 The now defunct Certificate of Irishness was intended to offer Irish cultural citizenship to “up to 70 million people of Irish descent around the world who do not qualify for citizenship” (Irish Times, 2010c). There was also the development of WorldIrish, a self styled “Facebook for the diaspora” which closed in 2013. See (McCaughren, 2013). Forum initiatives also involved the Creative Dublin Alliance. Available: www.creativedublinalliance.ie [Accessed 3 September 2012], and a proposal for a global arts and culture university called the Cultural Odyssey. Available: http://irish.intuition.com/pages/about [Accessed 5 March 2013].
5.5.5 *Irish cultural policy discourses*

This enthusiasm for culture, creativity and innovation within Irish industrial and scientific texts is not shared by the Irish Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, as it is currently called (henceforth called the Department). This department produces a range of operational communications, business plans and strategy statements and has one designated arts plan from 2008. Within these documents, a number of themes and discourses emerge, these are: creativity (throughout all of the thematics); uniqueness, consistent with nationalist but particularly competitive themes (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b); reputation-saving/building (Department of Arts Sport and Tourism 2008a; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b); and the contribution of culture to society and the economy (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2005, p. 3; *ibid.*, 2008a, p. 6; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a, n.p.; Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 4). To a lesser extent, other discourses within these texts comprise cultural diplomacy and “international political” objectives (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24); the (dualist or binary) contribution of culture to “quality of life issues which are a *concomitant* of economic prosperity” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2003, p. 4) and references to cultural democracy (access and participation).

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5.5.5.1 The discourse of rescuing Ireland’s reputation

The discourse of culture in affirming the national brand, and in particular its capacity to salve and act as a panacea for lost reputation (as demonstrated in the post-recession Farmleigh initiative), is one of the driving forces of Irish cultural policy. This is expressed in (pre-recession) calls for the arts/culture to conserve and enhance Ireland’s international reputation, and (post-recession) descriptions of the arts’ ability and responsibility to re-frame the world’s perceptions of the financially immiserated country. Specifically, these discourses comprise the use of the arts to recover Ireland’s “national standing in major markets” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport 2011b, n.p.), to aid “reputational recovery” (ibid.), to re-build “Ireland’s international reputation” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. i), and to “enhance our [Ireland’s] ability to foster trade linkages and encourage international investment” (ibid., p. xxv). More recently and contentiously, this discourse (via the Arts Minister’s speech) has called on the arts to unequivocally “repair the damage” done to Ireland’s reputation by the latest economic downturn (Bonnar, 2011, n.p.), a claim which went beyond simple instrumentalism and caused a “frisson among” arts practitioners (ibid.). The significance of these discourses is that the sought-for reputation has to be recovered and repaired and is thus negatively charged from the outset, as well as explicitly linking this reputation to the industrial profile of the country, rather than the image of the country in general.

5.5.5.2 National branding, success, competition and uniqueness discourses

However, the discourse of reputation-salvage and damage-repair necessarily overlaps with claims of the uniqueness and importance of Ireland’s culture. Broader image-

Another perspective on the narrative of rescuing Ireland’s reputation could be an indirect attempt by the current Irish government (Fine Gael and the Labour Party), to distance itself and blacken the previous government (led by Fianna Fail).
management occurs through the discourse of Ireland’s distinction and in particular, its story-telling ability, claiming that art and culture act as “differentiators” and shapers of image (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 4; Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 80), secure Ireland’s “international reputation as a culturally vibrant place” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 9), are part of Ireland’s “cultural branding” (ibid.) and “distinguish us [Ireland] as a people in the world” (Department of Arts Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 2).

Equally, the arts are also highlighted as of central importance to Ireland, in references to the arts as: Ireland’s “most important area of national competence” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 91); a “unique asset” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.); at the “very heartbeat of this country”; at the “core of our status, our well-being as a society and our success as a nation” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); helping Ireland to be “internationally recognised for innovation and excellence” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.) and key to Ireland’s “frontier breaching creativity” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 1). The arts in Ireland are also argued to be “world-class” (ibid.; Government of Ireland, 2008, p. 80) and Ireland is consequently a “world leader” in the arts (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.).

As indicated in Scotland, policy documents also locate creativity and culture as a competitive, specific and intrinsic feature of Ireland. This discourse comprises statements claiming that: “imagination, flexibility and creativity” are “most prevalent in societies such as ours that actively foster the arts” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); that Ireland has an “innate creativity and innovative culture” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxviii); and is a “culturally vibrant place” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism,
2008a, p. 9). While these narratives partly embody the search for authenticity common to post-colonial countries (O'Brien, 2007, p. 5), like Scotland, they also speak to discourses of competition and defensiveness, aiming to project the *most* creative, innovative, cultural, successful, and confident nation in the world (to the outside world). This message reinforces the profile of the country and sends out the right message to would-be investors or multinational companies, a factor which Florida championed and linked to Ireland’s former economic boom (Florida, 2002, pp. 300-301). The ultimate aim of these discourses, therefore, is to assert that Irish culture is *more* renowned, successful, different and better than other cultures, and that is it of central importance to the state.

5.5.5.3 Culture and the economy discourses

As such, arts and cultural policies in Ireland demonstrate significant policy attachment to economic objectives. This is suggested in framings of the arts as concerned with maximising “economic returns and employment” (as well as participation),\(^\text{165}\) and constituting “primary economic contributors, real businesses, enduring employers” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 2). The use of the words *real* and *enduring* are defensive discourses that reveal the need to convince others (including within the Department) of the arts’ concrete economic outcomes (as an apparently novel observation), amidst fears of perceptions of the arts as somehow *unreal*, or, as one (culture) minister remarked, representing potentially “unstructured or illusive” businesses (O’Donoghue, 2002, n.p.). As might be expected given the prominence of the knowledge economy in Ireland, the Department has also referred to the “important

role” of the arts in developing it (ibid.), and helping to reinforce Ireland’s “innovation offer” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.).

This message has been re-communicated through The Arts Council, in discourses linking the arts with innovation, creativity and again, the knowledge (Smart) economy (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxiii; 2010, n.p.; 2011, p. 3). Like Scotland, however, Arts Council statements are perhaps necessarily (from a cultural sector legitimacy point of view) more equivocal, acknowledging pragmatically that while “economic consequences are not and should not be the main rationale for supporting the arts, an understanding of the economic impacts is an important component of the value of the arts, job creation and employment” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. i); and that “the arts on their own could never solve the unemployment problem, but can make a big contribution” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.).

Less equivocal statements from the Arts Council, however, comprise claims that: “employers in innovative industries and businesses need creative thinkers who are culturally aware to drive their business forward” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2010, n.p.); the arts “bring renown to Ireland as a country where innovation and creativity are strongly supported” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 3); the arts help “leverage the creativity of [Ireland’s] its workforce to develop its competitive advantage” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 93); a “knowledge-based economy must leverage the innovation and creativity of its workforce” (ibid., p. xxiii); the arts are a “critical motivator of creativity and innovation” (Moylan, 2010, n.p.); a “component of innovation-led growth is the creative capacity of the economy” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxiii); the arts are key to the “future prosperity of the Irish economy as we shift
to a more knowledge-based, services-oriented economic platform” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xvi); and that (as above) a “strong knowledge-based economy must leverage the innovation and creativity of its workforce” (ibid., p. xxiii). There is also critical recognition that the exaggeration of economic outcomes from the arts undermines the “real contribution of the sector” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. viii), a statement which simultaneously affirms other potential economic evaluations.

Again, like cultural policies in Scotland (in particular the former Scottish Arts Council) and Finland, the emphasis in these discourses is on making the economic (or extrinsic) case, while asserting the intrinsic case for the arts. This dual approach increasingly points to the conflicting and strategic containment of discourses of policy in general and in cultural policy in particular, and the (at worst) involuntary or (at best) pragmatic nature of cultural policymaking. These discourses also reveal the a priori assumption of economic development and capitalism as necessary and desirable, consistent with nominalism, rationalism and liberal democracies.

5.5.5.4 Ireland, government agendas and instrumentalism

More recently, the Council has increased its articulation of the “many ways in which the arts have and create value” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 11). In particular, the Council has emphasised its close links or attachment to central government agendas in its plans to “engage with a range of government departments and public bodies to advance common objectives” (ibid.). The question of the arts in Ireland seeking common objectives with other government departments mirrors the “common cause” sought with other government portfolios by Scotland’s cultural policies (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) and suggests a weakening of the traditional arms’ length
principle of the Council. However, these Arts Council objectives also reflect the needs of its parent ministry to “influence [and thus legitimate] other relevant public policy areas” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 6), add “maximum value” to other government agendas (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24) and thereby help the state to “extract greater benefits” from the arts (Deenihan, 2011a, n.p.).

5.5.6 The creative city and Irish cultural policy discourse

In addition to a broad economic instrumentalism, narratives of rescuing Ireland’s reputation, success, competition and uniqueness, attachments to other government departments and the need for Ireland to “tap into the creativity that’s out there” (Deenihan, 2011b, n.p.), Ireland’s cultural policies demonstrate a limited use of discrete creative city concepts. In line with Ireland’s international investment-focus, those creative city discourses that occur centre on the discourse of attraction and Ireland’s attractiveness as a business and investment location, rather than a global location for mobile creative workers (seen in Scotland and more so Finland).

5.5.6.1 Discourses of attraction, investment, harnessing and creativity

Typical of this discourse, therefore, are claims that: culture is a “primary driver of Ireland’s global attractiveness as a centre of creativity and innovation and as a destination for tourism and business” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008c, p. 10); “profiling Irish creativity as a unique asset reinforces the innovation offer, leading to increased trade and investment” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a, n.p.); culture is an aid to “Ireland’s relative attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 93); culture is important to a “country’s brand for the purposes of its economic enhancement and development” and
is important for attracting “overseas investment”, “tourists” and “export sales” (ibid., p. xxvi). Similarly, the metaphor of “harnessing”, though not present in cultural policy documents, occurs within industrial texts, in relation to harnessing “creativity, vision and connectedness” (Mc Sweeney, 2009, p. vi)166 and in foreign policy documents, in relation to harnessing the “asset” (of arts and culture) as a “unique brand identifier” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 21).

However, as Scotland has demonstrated, while discourses of uniqueness and reputation are suggestive of competitive identity and branding, they can also be attributed to other post-colonial national issues and the search for authenticity, rather than place-development or regeneration (a discourse which is also lacking). Equally, the discourse of attraction is based on (the more traditional model of) attracting businesses rather than the emphasis on workers central to the creative city. Further, though culture is positioned as a competitive feature in cities which attracts investment, and though there is a general lexicon of creativity, innovation, and attraction, there are no explicit references to the creative city itself, or the creative classes. The lack of human capital discourses is especially surprising given the location of major knowledge economy businesses in Ireland and the central industrial policy of attracting foreign direct investment.167 Additionally, there are no discernable discourses on urban regeneration or place-development, or tolerance (the third T), and few references to technology (the second T). In this respect, while there is some evidence of the genealogy of the creative city in other economic narratives and related discourses of economics, creativity,

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166 The linking of harnessing and creativity is also seen in media references to how the employment that was available during the Irish boom both “harnessed and limited their [artists] creativity” (writer Claire Kilroy, cited in Moylan, 2010, n.p.).
reputation, competition and innovation, there is no explicit materialisation of the creative city in Ireland’s national cultural policies.

A recurring but surprising feature of many of these rationalising statements, perhaps, is their origin in The Arts Council. Though this may result from the more active nature of the Council in simply producing more texts and thus more material for analysis, as this body is a paradigm of traditional arts subsidy, typically aligned with autonomous cultural agendas (the arm’s length principle), it is arguably under less pressure to be as instrumental and rationalising as its parent, policy-making department. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Scotland, the Council is not immune to pressure and its increasing adoption of instrumental discourses suggests escalating pressures to justify and legitimate public funding in the arts ministry and thus central government discursive terms, as was underlined recently in the UK (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.).

Given the willingness of Ireland’s arts/cultural policies to attach themselves to Ireland’s finance/economic, tourism and foreign affairs ministries, its predisposition to branding and reputational-recovery discourses and the particular popularity of cultural discourses of creativity in industrial policy in Ireland, the relative absence of creative city discourse from Ireland’s cultural policies is curious. Equally, other factors underline the potential value of the creative city to Irish cultural policies and comprise Ireland’s: peripheral location (need for attention), close links with Europe, “outward-looking post-colonial national” identity (Boyle, 2006, p. 411) and interest in cosmopolitanism (ibid., p. 412); increased multiculturalism, diversity and the return of a well-travelled diaspora

168 Though this research has demonstrated evidence of Florida’s discursive reach into Smart and Innovation economy texts, as well as into publications by Forfás, a policy support agency (ACRE) has asserted that Florida’s ideas are “fairly far removed” and have had “little impact” on national economic policy in Ireland” (Lawton et al, 2010, p. 274).
(suggesting a receptivity to the discourse); focus on attracting knowledge/information economy workers consistent with creative class discourses (in reference to the location of Google, Facebook etc. headquarters in Ireland); tradition as a “major exporter of people” (ibid., p. 407), and, therefore, like Scotland, its interest in attracting new workers; active cultural tourism and regeneration history; increasing role for urban policy (despite the slowness of this agenda to develop); Anglophonic status (in light of its dissemination through English); FDI policies (as above); and finally, Florida’s interest in, and links to the country. These factors have no doubt contributed to an interest in the creative city at local and industrial policy level (see 5.5.2), but do raise the question as to why a transfer has not occurred to Ireland’s cultural policies.

5.5.6.2 The Irish exception

A number of factors have contributed to this lack of attachment to the creative city in Ireland’s cultural policies. In contrast with Scotland, though the creative city is a national as much as a local development paradigm, there has been a general lack of interest in the city as an object of policy in Ireland (as a historically rural country), which has had a profound impact on the positioning of urban issues in its national policies (Lawton et al., 2010, p. 274). Also, despite Ireland’s current openness, it has been slow to absorb cultural influences (possibly demonstrated by the slow take up of the creative economy agenda), reluctant to bring in outside expertise and ideas through commissioning research (with the exception of the devolved agencies) and has been accused of an historic anti-intellectualism, which distrusts the dissemination of international ideas.\footnote{It is generally considered that Ireland’s interest in and adoption of modernism and the modern art movement, outside of literature, was “relatively late” (Halsall, 2008, p. 18).} \footnote{This perception of anti-intellectualism in Ireland concerns reputed historical conflicts between the conservative forces (equated with anti-intellectualism) of nationalism and the Catholic Church (O’Dowd,}
These factors underline the residual conservatism and clientelism alluded to earlier, which discourages policymakers from pushing boundaries (given their proximity to the voter and disinclination to be unpopular) and leads to “incremental” policy-making (Quinn, 1998, p. 26) where change is small and policies are resistant to paradigm shifts, new knowledges and discourses (Jones, 2009, p. 28). This conservatism is supported by limited references to international cultural policy dialogues in Ireland’s cultural policies (e.g., cultural rights, civil society, democracy, multicultural and interculturalism, etc.) as compared with Scotland and Finland,\(^1\) and a general lack of creative economy policy activity.

However, there is another factor contributing to the apparent lack of interest in the creative city paradigm at cultural policy level. This factor is the political lack of interest in and historically weak status of the arts/culture department in Ireland following a history of “benign neglect” (Howlin, 2013, p.15). Although the former economic boom meant huge increases in the budget of the Department at that time,\(^2\) in the last ten years there has been little mention of culture or the arts in central government plans and strategies (e.g. Renewed Programme for Government, October 2009), little investment in research (none available in the Department’s website), and limited public and media

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\(^1\) There are very few references to multiculturalism in cultural policy in Ireland. Instead there are references to multicultural “stakeholders” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 20), the “changing multicultural dimensions of society” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2005, p9) and “today’s multicultural society” (Department of Arts Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 30).

(particularly broadcast media) discourses on art or culture.\textsuperscript{173} Though recent years have seen an increase in references to culture in political manifestos,\textsuperscript{174} Irish national development and industrial plans have typically alternated between representations of culture as an explicit economic instrument (Government of Ireland, 2005) and as a romantic and exoticised entity (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

However, the most explicit demonstration of how negatively the Irish cultural portfolio is viewed and how marginalised the ministry is, occurs in the shifting of ministerial nomenclature and negative media discourses of ministerial appointments. Like Scotland, frequent shifts in the responsibility and the name of ministries (Arts Versus Culture, Heritage, the Gaeltacht, the Islands, as well as Sport and Tourism), as well as the replacement of ministers, not only points to new government administrations and fears of elitism in relation to the terms used (culture v arts), but also registers a confusion and equivocation in relation to the role of the cultural portfolio within government.\textsuperscript{175} However, attitudes to being awarded the ministry go even further in making explicit the pessimistic perception of the cultural or arts ministry in Ireland, vis-à-vis the career path of the politician. This is reflected in descriptions of the cultural portfolio as cast in “a negative light”, and those awarded it being handed a “poisoned chalice”, making it “the end of the political road” and the “last step before departure from Cabinet” (Bacik, 2008, n.p.).

\textsuperscript{173} Despite intermittent meritocratic media coverage (Cullen, 2012; Fitzgerald, 2011), there is a general lack of critical broadcast and broadsheet discussion in Ireland. See also The Irish Times (2012e).

\textsuperscript{174} See for example Fine Gael/Labour Programme for Government (2011, n.p.), which lists Arts Culture and Sport under the heading of Progress. See also (Government of Ireland, 2010).

\textsuperscript{175} There have been seven ministers (including the current minister) for the Department since its foundation in 1993, and four who have spent less than a year in office between 2007 and 2011 (Seamus Brennan, Martin Cullen, Mary Hanafin and, most recently, Jimmy Deenihan).
In recent years, one minister’s negative reaction to her appointment was so extreme as to be likened to her having caught a “nasty disease” (O’Toole, 2010, n.p.) and widely interpreted (by both politicians and the public) as “a demotion” (Falvey, 2010, n.p.; O’Toole, 2010, n.p.; Stokes, 2010, n.p.). This response is also borne out by the career trajectories of six arts and culture ministers following their departure. Of this group, none was awarded another ministry and three resigned from politics.176 In addition, the brief of Minister for (formerly) Social and Family affairs, which preceded three of the last six culture ministers, though financially significant, is also perceived as politically negligible and has been linked to the end of a politician’s career (Bacik, 2008).177 Though it is hard to comparatively measure public statements concerning reactions to appointments within the culture ministry, the publicness of these claims is significant. This explicit disrespect for the office of the culture/arts ministry, therefore, when coupled with the dearth of cultural policies, the relative neglect of and lack of research into cultural policy, the omission of cultural policy in government plans, and poor cultural media coverage, point to a resistance in relation to culture and cultural policies in Ireland, or worse, an apathy. Whether this apathy is determined by, or reflected from the public, or from apathy at more senior and central government level, is difficult to know (Quinn, 1998, p. 25; Gray and Wingfield, 2010).

176The three ministers who resigned were Síle de Valera, Martin Cullen and John O’Donoghue. Founding Minister Michael D Higgins (1993 – 1997), on retiring from the ministry following the coalition party loss in the general election of 1997(Labour, Fine Gael and Progressive Democrats), is the only ex arts/culture minister to have remained in politics. He became the Labour Party spokesperson on Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, was re-elected to Dáil Éireann in 2007 and 2011 and made President of the country in 2011. Síle de Valera, who occupied the ministry from 1997 – 2002, lost her seat in the general elections of 2002, became a Junior Minister and retired from politics in 2005. John O’Donoghue (2002 – 2008) was appointed Ceann Comhairle or chairperson of the government, following the elections of 2008, and resigned in 2009. Seamus Brennan died shortly after leaving office. Martin Cullen (2008-2010) resigned from his ministerial office and as a TD in 2010, Mary Hanafin (2010 – 2011) withdrew from public life following losing her seat in the election of 2011.

177 Martin Cullen, Seamus Brennan and Mary Hanafin were all Ministers for Social and Family Affairs prior to their arts/cultural appointment. See Bacík (2008) for a discussion of Minister Seamus Brennan’s disappointment at being awarded the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs.
Nevertheless, as suggested above, this situation is clearly incongruous with government statements of how central culture is to Ireland and specifically: how “our strong cultural identity” holds “a distinct and intrinsic value”... “known the world over”;\(^{178}\) assertions of “Ireland's reputation as a cradle for the arts” (O’ Donoghue, 2005, n.p.); claims that culture and creativity are at the “core of our status, our well-being as a society and our success as a nation” (Brennan, 2008, n.p.); assertions that Ireland is a country where “creativity is seen as a crucial bedrock” (Cullen/Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2009, n.p.) and media reports of the “importance attached by the State, and through them the people, to the arts” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.).

These discourses, therefore, when looked at alongside the pejorative statements on the culture ministry, show a disconnect between discourse and practice, implying a cynical reasoning on the part of the Irish Government in relation to its use of the arts/culture portfolio, whereby it claims culture is of central importance to the country on the one hand, and as only of importance in terms of delivering other ministerial agendas, and worthy of public disrespect, on the other. As such, despite Ireland’s international reputation for culture, its local authority and industrial discourses of culture and creativity, and its cultural policy assertions of Irish culture as world-leading and of central importance to the state and its success, cultural/arts policy in Ireland lacks particular traction and interest at government level.

5.5.7 Ireland conclusions

This section has shown that the dominant discourses in Ireland’s cultural policies are cultural branding and reputation-building, rather than any significant creative city

narrative, despite its popularity in municipal and industrial sectors and its potential fit with Ireland’s economic policies. Though there is acknowledgement of culture’s usefulness, Ireland’s conservatism and policy cautiousness, its lack of engagement with international cultural influences, and the particularly weak position of its culture department (as well as potentially its lack of commissioned research) may have accidentally resulted in relatively unattached cultural policies. Whether this lack of attachment has unintentionally benefited Ireland’s cultural policies or signals an uninterested and fairly un-dynamic ministry, is a moot point.

5.6 Conclusions

There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland and their implications for wider cultural policy trends. Scotland’s attachment to the creative economy, together with its positioning of culture as a differentiator, an economic driver and Scotland’s own brand of competitive nationalism, within the context of a market and state macro discourse, is explicitly evident in its cultural policy documents. This presence of a competitive nationalist discourse in Scotland’s cultural policies exemplifies its broader nationalist agenda, the globalised competition for workers and investment, its ongoing demographic decline and the explicit role of Scottish cultural policies in making common cause with wider government objectives. Equally, the triumphalism evident in these discourses acts as defensive counter-discourse in relation to the decline of Scotland as a centre of learning (Enlightenment) and industry, and desire to reclaim its former international reputation. The lack of confidence suggested by these discourses is indicated by Scotland’s legitimising leveraging of the past (tradition) and the future (modernity/progress) and its emphasis
on cosmopolitanism. Scotland therefore exhibits creative city discourse most explicitly in its place-development discourses (particularly strong in Creative Scotland), the promotion of culture as an identifier and culture as an attraction for new city workers and investment.

The range and typology of cultural policy documents in Finland demonstrates a dualism that comprises both intrinsic and extrinsic narratives of cultural value, which leverage market and communicative discourses and Finland’s competitive society model of policy, with its social democratic legacy and high culture tradition. As part of these juxtapositions, discourses in Finland are also characterised by an acute awareness, though simultaneous embodiyment, of, the deficits of instrumental discourses. This has resulted in five broad rationales in Finland: economic, image-management and international profile, social cohesion, citizenship (through civilisation and education), cultural rights and autonomous cultural value. These concerns place the Finnish cultural policy firmly within an industrial and competitive neoliberal framework, promoting public/private partnerships and managerialist concepts of professionalism within cultural practices. This chapter has also suggested that the sheer volume of reports and policy documents in Finland, is in part due to the central role of culture as a national brand and in promoting the idea of Finnishness against powerful neighbouring countries and is attributable to Finland’s relative geographical isolation in Europe. Finland exhibits creative city tropes most explicitly in relation to discourses of attraction, creative workers, investment and tolerance.

Ireland’s cultural policies also operate through market and state discourses. These discourses are consistent with balancing industrial policy with identity politics (with
little evidence of communicative ones), culture as a reputation-rescuer and economic driver, and aspects of creativity discourses (seen more in its industrial and science policies), but little discernable creative city or creative economy narratives. It was also demonstrated that in Ireland, science discourses maximise cultural associations with creativity, in the same way that in other countries, cultural contexts usually leverage industrial or scientific creativity. This factor suggests that Ireland’s explicit economic and industrial policies (such as the Smart Economy and Innovation Ireland reports) find more persuasive value in discourses of creativity, than cultural policy. Discourses of culture, attraction, and foreign investment, therefore, were found to be central to Ireland’s cultural policies. While this superficially aligns Irish cultural policies with creative city discourses, it is embedded in wider economic thematics and has a reputation and branding-focus primarily aimed at already-existing national investment agendas. This factor suggests a different origin for this discourse in Ireland. While Irish municipal contexts have welcomed the creative city and it has been claimed that “the creativity thesis has finally arrived on Irish shores” (Western Development Commission, 2011, p. 28), therefore, there is little to indicate any particular cultural policy interest in the creative city paradigm in Ireland.

This chapter, therefore, has illustrated how the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland underline the remarkable flexibility and usefulness of the creative city paradigm in meeting local and national contexts through its apparent balancing or strategic containment of different political-economic (system) and socio-cultural (lifeworld) legitimacies or mandates, despite those policies’ awareness of problems with the model. However, the weakness of the discourse in Ireland suggests that creative city discursive

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179 See Arts Council of Ireland (2010b).
transfer in Europe is not necessarily habitual. In general, these cases have demonstrated: the wide range of uses for culture in government and use of cultural policies to address other (non-cultural) government portfolios; the pragmatic (and thus involuntary) need, rather than desire, for this alignment and consequent degree of cynical reasoning in case-making (evidenced by criticisms and endorsements of Florida); the lack of culture-focused cultural policies; and the need for cultural policies to appeal to multiple legitimacies within and without government. Having considered the individual and located cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, it is now necessary to consider the three sets of cultural policies together, their points of similarity and difference, discursive particularities, the rationales and imperatives behind the use of creative city discourses, and most particularly, the genealogy, trajectory and appeal of the discourse to cultural policy.
CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSING THE CULTURAL POLICY DISCOURSES OF
SCOTLAND, FINLAND AND IRELAND: THE TRAJECTORY, GENEALOGY,
FUNCTION AND APPEAL OF THE CREATIVE CITY

6.1 Introduction

The last chapter has detailed the three national cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, outlining their individual policy contexts, general discourses, and localised creative city narratives. This chapter will take a more comparative and analytical look at the cases in order to consider how and why their cultural policies “came to take the form they ultimately did” given that they could always be otherwise (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 3). The chapter will start by analysing the individual typologies, similarities and differences of the three cases and posit reasons for the trajectory, emigration (from industrial policy) and system of “dispersion” (Foucault, 1972, p. 41) of the paradigm in those countries, considering policy fit as well as genealogy. Following this, the chapter will consider why cultural policy is attracted to strategic paradigms like the creative city despite awareness of its shortcomings (and implications for trust amongst the stakeholders), the use and function of the paradigm within each individual country in terms of respective national agendas, and the role and usefulness of instrumentalism to cultural policymakers in general. The chapter will conclude by analysing the discursive particularities of the creative city in policy and its relationship to government need. This chapter, therefore, will demonstrate how the pressures on and dependencies of cultural policy, compel it to strategically deliver other (more powerful) policy agendas and that the reliance on discourses such as the creative city and instrumentalism more generally, is part of this defensive response.
6.2 Comparing the cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland

Before considering the policy trajectory of the creative city vis-à-vis cultural policy, there is a need to review and compare the level of attachment to the paradigm in the three cases. There are a number of convergences in respect of how culture is positioned (via the creative city paradigm) in Scotland and Finland and to a much lesser extent Ireland, whose cultural policy discourses are generally fewer and less diverse (as indicated in section 5.5.6.2). However, the attachment to the creative city in the three countries’ cultural policies can be summarised as follows:¹ culture and creative workers drive economies and competition (Ireland, and in particular, Scotland and Finland); culture drives place-development (Scotland); culture attracts people (Scotland in particular but also Finland) and talent/human capital (Scotland, but Finland in particular); culture retains people (Finland); culture attracts business/investment (Ireland and Finland); and, finally, tolerance and diversity lead to innovation (Finland and Scotland).²

Surprisingly perhaps, particularly given the key role of the knowledge economy, information society and IP agendas in all three countries, the importance of technology (as the third T of the 3 Ts acronym) is not dominant in any of the cases. In terms of secondary criteria, the creative industries appear as a central policy model in both Finland and Scotland (but not Ireland). Similarly, creativity (and innovation) discourse more generally is strongly present in Scotland and Finland, with the former straddling the semiotic/network (collective) and industrial model of creativity with the rhetorical

¹ See Appendix for a table containing a summary of both creative city and broader discourses used in the three cultural policies.
² Though Scotland emphasises cultural diversity rather than tolerance, indicating various cultural expressions, it can be argued that this term indirectly suggests tolerance.
(artistic) or located (within Scotland) model of creativity. Despite reports to the contrary (European Parliament, 2006, p. 8), creativity discourse is not as dominant in Ireland.

A key discursive feature in the three countries, but Scotland and Ireland in particular, is the explicit, though at times equivocal, acknowledgement of culture’s role (and primary role in relation to Scotland) as a deliverer of other government agendas. Typical statements from these cases express the need for cultural policy to: “influence” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008a, p. 6), “advance common objectives” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2011, p. 11); add “maximum value” (Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b, p. 24) and make “common cause”3 with other government priorities and ministries (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2). Though the range of uses for culture in Finland (branding, diplomatic, economic, and political) support policy aims for culture to be “successfully exploited” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16), discourses underlining the role of cultural policy in wider Finnish government objectives, do not materialise in the same way as in Scotland and Ireland. These statements, backed up by the various roles given to cultural policy in the three countries, support the view that cultural ministries depend on support from more powerful government ministries (e.g. Finance/Exchequer ministries) and colleagues, as suggested in media and policy discourses (Mundy, 2009; Higgins, 2013a, n.p.), and illustrated in Scotland’s disavowal of cultural policy having its own “policy objective” (McConnell, 2003, n.p.).

3 Making a “common cause” with government is also listed as a necessity for cultural policy in a recent cultural policy handbook offering arguments for culture in recessionary times (Mundy, 2009, n.p.). This booklet states that its arguments “help Ministers of Culture make common cause with those responsible for employment generation, social cohesion, security and education” and that “every country will have its own examples and statistics to back up the arguments” and can “develop new proposals based on them for restructuring and regeneration” (Mundy, 2009, n.p.).
Scotland and Finland share a narrative of internationalism and an outward-looking cosmopolitanism (a key Enlightenment narrative particularly present in Scotland), respectively using culture to: “raise the profile of Scotland at home and abroad” and project the image of a “vibrant, cosmopolitan, competitive country” (Scottish Executive, 2004a, p. 1) and “build an image” of Finland (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 49), “manage its brand” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2008a, p. 14) and use culture to “arouse interest in Finland and Finnishness” (ibid.). Ireland’s discourse of culture as a way to repair the country’s reputation or escape the “economic morass” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.) echoes this discourse, but is more specific in its mission to recover Ireland’s “national standing in major markets” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.) and “re-building Ireland’s international reputation” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. i) in order to “repair the damage” done to it. This focus on the branding of Ireland can be interpreted as a response to “geopolitical” shifts in Ireland’s hitherto “favourable image” (Fanning and Henry, 2012, n.p.) and is a serious dent in the country’s enduring belief (like Scotland) that it “punch[es] above [its] our weight on the global stage” (ibid.).

Perhaps not surprisingly, for historical reasons, Scotland and Ireland share a number of discourses of identity politics, most notably triumphalist expressions of how each country is culturally unique, successful and pioneering, or, respectively, “one of the world’s most creative nations” (Scottish Government, 2009c, section 4; Creative Scotland, 2011, p. 20) and a “world leader” (Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011b, n.p.). This hyperbole reflects an “idealised” or essentialist tradition (Humes, Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/ArtsCultureSport/arts [Accessed 5 July 2013 and throughout the research period].

and can be conceived as a defensive “response to the destructive effects of colonialism” (Mulcahy, 2008, p. 22). Equally, this representation of Scotland comprises a competitive nationalism and a drive to be seen as an entrepreneurial nation, reflecting fears and perceptions that it is, in fact, not entrepreneurial enough (Smith, 2013, p. 4). Given Ireland’s history, the lack of an explicit nationalist discourse in its cultural policies, other than in this entrepreneurial way, is notable, but speaks to general difficulties and slipperiness posed by expressions of nationalism in Ireland as a result of the extensive “political turmoil” there since the 1960s (O’Brien, 2007, p. 6), as well as a lack of policy more generally.

Finland is equally interesting in this context. While there are indications of nationalism in the proposition for a cultural canon, when compared with Scotland and Ireland, there is little explicit championing of the difference or uniqueness of the country (and its culture), despite its own struggles with Sweden and Russia. However, Finland’s policies strongly emphasise the specific qualities (as perceived in Finland) of Finland, centring on its political and social histories, its education system and its particular ethos of civilisation, with the acknowledgement of culture’s role in projecting Finland and Finnishness. As a result, this qualitative discourse is no less promotional than the competitive nationalism of Scotland and Ireland, and may be linked to the spirit of Finland’s common culture in the context of its positioning between Sweden and Russia and the implicit message that it is a wholly separate country and culture.

In conclusion, the combination of primary and secondary creative city discourses in both Scotland and Finland make it hard to determine conclusively whether it is more dominant in one country than another. Finland’s cultural policies, though they touch on
a wider range of individual creative city thematics than Scotland (explicit creative class
and city references, attraction, human capital/talent, diversity and tolerance), do not
have the same narrative of place-development or the volume of discourse of attracting
workers as in Scottish cultural policies.

These cases also demonstrate that despite claims of artists’ complicit participation in
regeneration (Zukin, 1998; Malanga, 2004, n.p.), key dissenters to development
processes and narratives are often, though by no means exclusively, artists and cultural
workers. This is illustrated by the Finnish artists group Checkpoint Helsinki (see 5.4.2)
as well as the Scottish artists’/cultural publication Variant, a central point of dissent in
relation to urban entrepreneurialism in Scotland. These initiatives reveal not only
ideological differences in relation to discourses of power, but the unwillingness of some
artists to be co-opted into development processes which operate in their name, are
antithetical to their values and do not contribute to their sustainability. As such, these
groups also show that despite the potential for artists to gain from processes such as
culture-led regeneration (through commissioning or studios), a critical issue where the
ability to earn a living is so precarious, artists can have a heightened interest in social
inequalities and in particular, the inequity of private development.

In general therefore, it can be said that creative city discourses have had a significant
impact on both Scotland and Finland, though with different emphases. Finland has a

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6 This was demonstrated in Hamburg’s Not In Our Name group - see Chapter One (1.2.2) footnote # 23.
7 Variant is a “free arts and culture magazine” based in Scotland, providing “in-depth coverage in the
context of broader social, political & cultural issues.” It has been a key source of critical debate in relation
to many of the issues presented by this research, but in particular the role of Creative Scotland. Variant
has recently had to suspend the publication “for the first time since 1996” as a result of their unsuccessful
2012].
wider range of discourses in its cultural policies (cultural rights, civilisation discourses, multiculturalism) than the other cases, as well as a greater variety of individual creativity discourses (explicit creative class and city references, creative welfare society, human capital, talent and tolerance). Equally, while an emphasis on the economic impact of culture and the discourse of investment and return is not new, these policies are notable for the explicitness, frequency and dominance of discourses of culture as an economic driver and attractor of investment (albeit with other secondary discourses), and more so, the lack of deviance between how creative city and other discourses occur in each country. Equally, the discourse of cultural policy as an adjunct policy or deliverer of other policy objectives is notable (Scotland and Ireland). Finally, the precise creative city terminologies and the collocation of particular concepts and words within the English versions of Finnish policies, show the importance and knowledge of the source texts (i.e. the creative city literature) to the translators and suggest a deliberate replication of the discourse. Having established that there has been a transfer between industrial discourses represented by the creative city, to putatively cultural discourses represented by cultural policy, it is necessary to consider the discursive modes deployed within the texts.

6.3 The role of discourse: dualism, nominalisation and cynical reason

Earlier it was suggested that a key function of discourse is to contain and thus disavow or nominalise potentially conflicting values (Shapiro, 1990, p.332 Fairclough, 2003, p. 12). Equally, Habermas proposes that given the close relationship between the state and the economy, the management or reconciling of conflicting values or viewpoints in policy is of central importance to the state (Habermas, 1973, p. 13). These concerns are exemplified and addressed in the dualisms present in the cases, facilitating the
straddling of different positions whose singular exposure might potentially undermine the state and thus an extremely useful practice.

This dualism has been particularly demonstrated in Scotland and Finland as follows: collective and individual (or located) models of creativity (Scotland and Finland); autonomous (where culture must be independent from market consideration) and instrumental (where culture should serve market values) discourses (Finland); economic development/trade and social welfare, capital, well-being, citizenship and democracy discourses (Finland); narratives invoking tradition/the past and innovation/the future (Scotland); assertions and disavowals of the arms’ length principle (Scotland); positioning a country as attractive and competing to become more so (Scotland); and internationalism/cosmopolitanism and insular models of traditional cultures, as well as competitive nationalism (Scotland and Finland).

These dualisms, therefore, reflect what has been described as “overt/covert” discourses (Shapiro, 1990, p. 333), designed in policy terms to “overcome what appear to many as disjunctures between professed and implemented policy” (ibid., p.332), or the gap between theory and practice. The implicit presentation of processes such as capitalism, the market, corporate investment, flexible accumulation, mobility (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007, p. 11), globalisation and the pursuit of individual interests within creative city discourses and by extension cultural policy discourses, covertly supports both latent and blatant government policies in other policy areas, while being presented passively as self-evident truths devoid of government or human agency. This reflects a “nominalisation” (Fairclough, 2003, p.13), where concepts are staged as neutral
“regime[s]” of truth or thought (Foucault, 1980, p. 81), and become universalised “monuments” (ibid., 1972, p. 8).

As discussed earlier, though Ireland has been noticeably absent from much of these discourse comparisons (resulting from the dearth of policy and limited discourses to analyse), it shares one significant feature with Scotland and Finland. In all three cases, industrialism and capitalism are upheld by being presented as eternal and desirable to societies and therefore the electorate (and in the process legitimising), a key feature of liberalism (Held, 2006, p. 76) and neoliberalism. As a result, the usefulness or problem (depending on whether you agree with the state’s actions and ideologies or not) with these discourses, is not necessarily their irreconcilability or the dominance of one agenda over another, but their disavowal of the point of conflict in the first place (i.e. market versus communicative or lifeworld imperatives).

These cases, therefore, show how cultural policy is used to reinforce key values of the state, which are self-evidently to support the market, capitalism and private sector investment, to speed up the rate of industrial change (movement of workers, development of industry, etc.), and to present these positions as public goods. This strengthens the view that culture should be “pressed into service” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.) to meet the states’ economic needs and that cultural policy exists to make “common cause” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with those needs. The cases have demonstrated that these causes are: international profile and competition (all three cases); re-population (Scotland); recruitment of high value and mobile workers (Scotland and Finland); deindustrialisation (Finland); and reputation/branding (Ireland). These causes ultimately expose the “fundamental priorities” of cultural policymakers.
(Vickery, 2011, p. 9) and reveal the lack of any one coordinating, dominant use, value system, or objective that is primarily cultural. The implications of this will be further developed in Chapter Seven.

Another factor should be mentioned here. Using Sloterdijk’s concept of cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987), earlier it was argued that many of those policymakers using instrumental arguments for culture such as the creative city are aware of what they are doing (in making those arguments), and do not necessarily subscribe to the arguments being made, but are involved in a case-making “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298). The criticisms of instrumentalism (Finland) and of the creative city (Scotland and Finland) in the cases, reflect this performance and show how aware the countries are of the problems and pitfalls of the paradigm, but how driven they are by the need to secure legitimacy and longevity. Florida also participates in this conceptual slippage, in terms of his awareness of problems with urban paradigms, ironically criticising “simplistic schemes that try to bolster a city’s ability to compete for talent by building latte bars” (Florida, 2007, p. 54) and underlining that “inequality is considerably worse in leading creative regions” (ibid., 2005, p. 171).

This performance or slippage is designed to preserve the status quo, and allows policymakers and ultimately politicians to avoid making difficult choices (by choosing one policy above another) and thereby sustain the ministry and the livelihoods of those working there. This situation reflects the tendency for expediency, cynical reason and false consciousness to arise in the cultural sector in particular, driven by the pressures, weakness, dependencies and consequent structural instrumentalism of that sector, as

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8 See also, Jenkins (2011).
introduced in Chapter Four (4.4.13). These critical discourses ultimately represent a common mode of state representation in policy, whereby the policy “pre-empt[s] or respond[s] to modes of representation that are hostile or incompatible with the constructions it[they] desire[s]” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 334), despite actively engaging in those hostile practices. This dual disavowal/endorsement has serious implications for the delicate relationship between civil servants and politicians and will be further explored in Chapter Seven.

This suggestion of cynical reason also reflects the difficulties of finding publicly or politically acceptable language, justifications or legitimations for cultural policies, that do not reference social, economic or tourism benefit, within a rationalised policy context and in the absence of consensus on what these policies are designed for and how they are valued. The positive/negative media discourses around culture also demonstrate the problem of finding acceptable terms to discuss investment in culture, whereby typically it is only the functional or social/economic stories about culture that are positively framed (Daily Record, 2008, n.p.; McMillan, 2011, n.p.), while other stories are framed in terms of wastes of money (BBC Newsnight, 2011, n.p; Reynolds, 2012, n.p.).

This problem of articulation is shared by cultural practitioners and policymakers, underlined by the call for culture to be described in its “own terms” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) as cited earlier. Politicians have also noted that they “have enough reasons to support culture on its own merits to stop apologising for it by speaking only of it in terms of other agendas” (Tessa Jowell, cited in Gray, 2007, p. 206). In a similar vein, it has been claimed that “it is almost impossible to defend art honestly” (Jones, 2012, n.p.), and that
there is a “lack of concern with truth”, or to put it more bluntly, an excess of “bullshit” in cultural policy (Belfiore, 2008, p. 1), again pointing to Sloterdijk’s “enlightened false consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 6).

As examples of cynical reason and in light of the need to get support from other government colleagues (Mundy, 2009, n.p.; Higgins, 2013a, n.p.), these comments ultimately affirm the continuing external (public legitimacy) and internal pressures on cultural policy (government legitimacy). However, though the dualism and cynical reason involved in policymaking are somewhat involuntary, pragmatic and symptomatic of a compromised policy sector, they serve an important purpose in cultural policy, which is to create the conditions for its own survival. As such, before a consideration of why instrumental discourses such as the creative city are also useful and persist in cultural policies, in reference to survival, it is necessary to evaluate how the creative city has arrived or been assimilated within cultural policy in the first place.

6.4 The trajectory of creative city discourses

In using discourse formation theory to consider the emigration (Foucault, 1972, p. 154) of the creative city paradigm to the discourse of cultural policy, a number of factors must be assumed. These factors are: that the creative city (discourse) is an active force that shapes as well as reflects the world and depends for its currency on an ecology of related discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 25); that the creative city (discourse) is an instrument and an effect of power which comes to stand for understandings of the truth (ibid., p. 8); that the creative city (discourse) comes into existence as a result of historical struggles with other competing discourses over which it has triumphed (ibid.,
p. 36); and that creative city discourses carry particular knowledges that have been historically validated through the discourse (ibid., p. 35).

6.4.1 Knowledge
Firstly, within this broad framework, the key symbolism of the creative city within cultural policy is its constitution as a shaping instrument of power, and in particular, a dominant and influential knowledge or truth. This use of knowledge by the creative city overcomes other discourses by positing an irresistible proposition that equates economic development with the public and common good, in claims that culture makes a city a “better place” and creates a “more prosperous future” (Florida, 2002, p. xxx). The creative city also creates knowledge by developing new associations between creativity, culture, neoliberalism, globalisation, capitalism, competition and investment. This simple but persuasive message ultimately derives from the “genealogy” (Foucault, 1980, p. 78) of urban development discourses (primarily urban and industrial development, but also cultural policy), and, as Chapter Five has demonstrated, is reflected and threaded through cultural policies on the one hand, and media reports on the other.

The creative city’s key source of sustaining authority and “enunciative” power (Foucault, 1972, p. 55), however, lies in its knowledge and advocacy communities, comprising: think tanks, academics, policy networks, politicians, civil servants, analysts, and other interest and technocratic groups. In particular, the paradigm relies on the “expert language” (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 375) of the “thinktankerati” (e.g., Comedia, DEMOS, the Creative Class) who drive and influence policy discourses by making various “claims to knowledge” (Schlesinger, 2009b, p. 3). This focus on knowledge-
production through discourses like the creative city, gives cultural policy a discrete “cognitive authority” which politicians find difficult to ignore (Vestheim, 2007, p. 228) and strengthens a policy sector often criticised for its weak methodologies and data systems (Selwood, 2002, n.p.).

6.4.2 Simple paradigms
Secondly, the creation of “policy-friendly” (Vickery, 2011, p. 2) “cognitive paradigm[s]” (Jones, 2009, p. 6) depends on simple discourses and stories (like the creative city) that allow for knowledge to be manipulated in any number of ways by policymakers (Jones, 2009; Vickery, 2011). As such, concrete (clear and easy to grasp as demonstrated in the 3 Ts) ideas and narrativity (which define a problem) tend to dominate policy model choices (ibid.). The need for a narrative to set out “explicit and implicit ideas about what is ‘wrong’ and how to put it ‘right’” (Jones, 2009, p. 15) is of particular interest. This is explicitly suggested in the creative city’s focus on the wrongness of older industrial models of development geared to production and manual labour, and therightness of attracting mobile knowledge workers as a prelude to corporate investment. However, the emotional appeal of a dynamic, meritocratic model of urban and civic development, that showcases culture and creativity in society, cultivating the public sphere (at least in Landry’s case), and promoting tolerance and multiculturalism (demonstrated in Finland), is also alluring. In short, easy-to-follow narratives like the creative city are central to “policy influence” (Jones, 2009, p. 24).

6.4.3 Flexibility, ideas market place and policy stickiness
Thirdly, the paucity of ideas available in the policy “market place” (Parsons, 1995, p. 172), as demonstrated in Ireland, also gives the creative city appeal. In addition to
simplicity, policy is susceptible to flexible and “malleable” concepts that can apply to a range of situations (Jones, 2009, p. 25), amply illustrated by the elasticity of the paradigm in its applications in Scotland and Finland. This underlines the use of the creative city as a blue-print or off-the-shelf policy template that fills a broader policy vacuum. These templates are self-sustaining, and, once embedded, create a “stickiness” (ibid., p. 24) that lead to “armoured policies” (Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 164) incapable of change. Since the struggle for power resides in the primary act of setting the agenda or the “discourse in which a problem is framed” (Parsons, 1995, p. 152), the stickiness of the blueprint is crucial to the success or sustainability of the discourse/policy. Time and familiarity are also key policy “virtue[s]” (Burstein, 1991, p. 339) and offer another reason why the creative city, which has been around since the 1980s, is a key policy influence.

6.4.4 Bounded rationality

Fourthly, the importance of the simplicity and familiarity of ideas also reflects bounded rationality theories of policy. These theories concern the attraction and adherence of policies that have “immediacy and impact” and use rule of thumb heuristics (3Ts=success), rather than nuanced or time-consuming ideas (Dye, 2008, p. 25). These policies are deemed to offer solutions that are “good enough” within the realms of goal-directed rational behaviour and avoid inter-relationships between complex factors (H. Simon cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 278). While the importance of ready policy frameworks may have influenced the use of the creative city within Scotland’s post-devolution situation, the creative city also fits its other policy needs. These needs include: the “interests of the dominant political” powers (Parson, 1995, p. 173);
“thought world[s]” that favour “certainty over accuracy” (Stevens, 2011b, p. 252); and again, a fit with the “story that was[is] already being told” (ibid., 2011a, n.p.).

6.4.5 Other factors: language, shared consultants, the role of Richard Florida and the EU

Fifthly, other factors have also impacted on the dispersion of the creative city within cultural policy. These factors comprise: the high number of creative city consultancies promoting the paradigm (and as above, the dependence of policy on think tanks); the sharing of policy advisors and champions (and thus policy thinking) between Finland and Scotland; Scotland and Ireland, and Ireland and Scotland (allowing particular ideas to circulate); the dissemination of the model via the Anglophonic colonial network of the US (via early urban regeneration discourse and latterly Florida), Australia (via the Creative Nation strategy), and Canada; the dissemination powers of English as the lingua franca of the European Union; and perhaps most significantly, the European Union itself.

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9 As before, there are a number of consultancies running creative city projects which suggest the likelihood of ideas being shared, including: think tanks such as Demos, Comedia, the Creative Class and consultancies such as Noema Research and Planning (http://www.noema.org.uk), Doors of perception (http://www.doorsofperception.com/working-with-john-thackara/), and Creative Cities (creativocities.org) [Accessed 20 June 2010].

10 Tom Fleming is the author of A Creative Economy Green Paper for the Nordic Region (Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007). He is also the creative economy advisor for Scotland (Knell and Fleming, 2008).


12 Francois Matarasso worked in both Scotland and Ireland in the late 1990s and early 2000s, advising Scotland’s nascent independent cultural policy and working as a consultant with the Arts Council of Ireland.

13 Although the creative city movement is influential in regions such as Asia and there are non-English languages associated with the paradigm (German geographer Klaus Kunzmann, Italian Franco Bianchini), Florida and Landry have become better known within creative city discourses and write exclusively in English. See also Landry, Greene, Matarasso, and Bianchini (1996).

14 See The Internet World Stats on internet world users by language, which claim that English-language users dominate the web, representing 26.8 per cent of all users. Given the origination of the creative city within an English-language context (as well as its distribution through the colonial network of the UK, US, Canada and Australia) and the prominence of the web in the distribution of ideas, they may be a link between the spread of the creative city idea and the number of English speakers using the internet.
From a financial perspective, the role of the European Union (and Lisbon agenda as indicated earlier) has been paramount in impacting on discourses of national cultural policies (Power, 2009), and specifically regional development (Dowler, 2004). As a supported competence (where the EU can supplement or coordinate member state’s actions), rather than an exclusive or shared competence (where the EU has the legal right to make laws in an area exclusively or with the member state), EU cultural policies have constituted (and still constitute) a hugely significant source of funding for European cultural projects, and have been central in driving culture, creativity, innovation (see 4.3.4), competition and regional development discourses. Regional development has been particularly important, and forms a direct link with the creative city, the creative industries, cultural tourism, innovation, entrepreneurship, the information society and human capital.

Of these discourses, the European Structural Funds has dominated and impacted all three cases. These funds operated from the 1980s onwards through the wider

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17 The EU Structural Funds, which comprise the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund, came into being in 1986, with the Single European Act, representing an “integrated cohesion policy”. The first tranche of funding was released in 1989. Available: http://eustructuralfunds.gov.ie/background/ [Accessed 7 March 2012].

18 All three cases have benefited or been impacted by the Structural Funds. Finland’s policies are linked to these funds (Power, 2009, p. 449) and Scotland and Ireland were both key recipients of Structural Funds. Scotland was a partial priority in the first (1989 – 1993) round of funding and a key priority in the second (1994 – 1999) and Ireland was a key priority in both rounds.
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which aimed to promote “economic and social cohesion by correcting the main regional imbalances and participating in the development and conversion of regions”. The funds promoted urban regeneration, tourism (including culture-led urban regeneration) and creative industries agendas (Evans, 2009, p. 1029) as part of wider international discourses of culture in urban and regional development. The Structural Funds’ aimed to make “regions more attractive, innovative and competitive places to live and work” (European Commission, 2006b, n.p) and focussed on the “attractiveness of region[s] and encouraging inward investment”, with an emphasis on information technology (European Commission, 2010d, p. 28). This discourse explicitly recalls the discourse of the creative city.

Critically, these funds were central to the sustainability of the European cultural sector in the 1980s, chiefly because of their extraordinary budgets, which far outstripped the EU’s cultural budget (Evans and Foord, 1999, p. 53) and as a result of pressures driven by the recession of the time. The thematic of culture’s contribution to tourism (as a place differentiator) provided not only the “largest single block of finance” to culture between 2000 – 2006, but was key to shaping the broader “thinking” that was developing in Europe about culture’s “potential contribution to the economy and society” (European Commission, 2010d, p.28). In light of the financial clout and significant influence of the Structural Funds, the joint growth of the EU’s regional development agenda with the creative city paradigm, and the distinct similarity between the creative city and Structural Funds’ discourses and concerns, there is clear relationship between the two imperatives. While this relationship may simply be a

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19The ERDF fund addresses sustainability, the regeneration of economic sites and industrial areas suffering from decline, depressed urban and rural areas, local development and employment, as well as initiatives in education and health. Available: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/job_creation_measures/l60015_en.htm [Accessed 10 October 2012].

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correlation, it is possible to speculate that the Structural Funds drove the development and popularity of the creative city within cultural policy thinking.

The creative city paradigm, therefore, can be viewed as a specific cognitive paradigm and regime of truth, which is a recent manifestation of previously successful discourses of place-development and regeneration from the 1970s (as detailed in Chapter Three). The successful transfer of the paradigm into Scotland and Finland’s cultural policies, has been facilitated by its narrative and emotional appeal, its flexibility, simple format, familiarity, use of heuristics, ideological feasibility, shared champions, Anglophonic dissemination, and overall usefulness to, and congruence with, EU funding applications. These factors underline the importance of “a priori” discourses (Foucault, 1981, p. 52) and emphasise the falseness of apparent “silent births” (ibid., 1972, p. 154) in discourse, whereby the interplay of relations and characteristics of the creative city ensured and prepared its acceptance within cultural policy before it ever arrived. While this describes how the creative city has materialised within cultural policies, it is now time to consider why the creative city has had specific appeal to cultural policymakers beyond its simplicity, memorisability and stickiness.

6.5 Policy function and fit with local contexts

While it has been suggested that creative city discourses occur as part of broader ideological, economic and historic place-development discourses (coalescing in both cultural and urban policies), discrete creative city concepts in Scotland and Finland in particular, point to a specific fit with and purpose in those countries. In addition to fulfilling the technical needs of policy as described above, this research has suggested the a priori fit of the creative city with the geo-political and economic contexts of the
cases, comprising: liberal democracies with neoliberal approaches to markets and globalisation; post-industrialism (knowledge/innovation/information/open/creative economies); a geographically peripheral status on the edge of Europe that necessitates strong international brands and outward-looking images; a nationalism borne out of a colonised mentality rather than history accompanied by discourses of uniqueness, difference, success and triumph; and the attention Florida and Landry has paid to the countries. However, there are other more specific reasons for Scotland’s and Finland’s interest in the creative city as touched on in Chapter Five.

6.5.1 Scotland’s emigration, regeneration initiatives and cities

Like Ireland, contemporary political discourses of the Scottish diaspora have become both a story of loss (in terms of widespread emigration) and success (Kidd, 2011, p. 5) and have been central to Scotland’s economic, social and cultural policies of recent years (as suggested in Scotland’s The Homecoming). This concern with the Scottish diaspora arises from Scotland’s historically “high levels” of 19th and 20th century outward migration, de-population and “post-industrial decline” (Kidd, 2011, p. 5), and its more recent “premier position in the European league table of shrinking populations” (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27) partly attributed to its geographically remote living conditions. Scotland’s ensuing emphasis on cities (Scotland also has a Minister for

21 Scotland and Finland have been assimilated rather than colonised, but arguably have quasi post-colonial mentalities driven by their ongoing relationships with former rulers.
22 Landry’s case studies of Glasgow as a creative city and Florida’s particular interest in Finland (and Ireland), as well as the “pervasiveness” of Florida’s model internationally (Lawton et al., 2010, p., 267, p. 270), have undoubtedly had an impact on the dissemination and receptivity to the model at policy level.
and the “migration of skilled workers to Scotland” has been a “corner stone” of the former Scottish Executive’s economic policy (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 13) and precisely underlines the appeal of discourses of talent, residents, tourists and investment into cities.

As such, emigration and the diaspora have been the focus of a number of social and economic reports commissioned by the Scottish government that centre on the theme of attracting human capital and highly skilled workers (Boyle, 2006; Rogerson et al., 2006; Ancien et al., 2009). Though this research has demonstrated that one of these reports is critical of the Florida model (Rogerson et al., 2006, p. 34), others are more approving (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27). As such, these reports acknowledge the broader “reach of Florida into European urban and regional policy communities” in general (Boyle, 2006, p. 412), the “procurement of skilled labour” (ibid.) and the “importance of the creative class to economic growth” (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 27).

The fears of failing to attract creative workers to Scotland are also demonstrated in thinly veiled media criticisms of Ireland’s favourable tax laws, luring away (and thus a threat to) Scotland’s mobile “talented” digital and gaming industry workers (Brown, 2009, n.p.). The need for highly skilled human capital workers in Scotland to both replace a lost population and to bolster their economy was brought into sharp focus in the 2004 initiative, Fresh Talent (Rogerson et al., 2006). This report critically (though equivocally) examined Scotland’s “anxieties over demographic trends” and the outward migration of “talent” (ibid. p. 11) and referred to the need for Scotland to “reposition themselves in the global circulation of talent”, while cautioning against the

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23 At present, Nicola Sturgeon is Deputy First Minister (Government Strategy and the Constitution) and Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure, Investment and Cities. Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/People/14944/Scottish-Cabinet [Accessed 10 October 2012].
“applicability of the so-called ‘creative class’ to Scottish economic policy” (ibid., p. 33), asking “whether creative people really are able to exert a significant impact on economic structures” (ibid., p. 34).24

Creative city discourses were also charged with presenting “stuffy, conservative, insular, parochial, bureaucratic and stifling ‘working class enclaves’, ‘boring post-industrial service centres’” in Scotland ... as “liberal, bohemian, multicultural and culturally cosmopolitan hubs” (Rogerson et al., 2006, p. 33). The concern with Scotland’s international image, together with its aspiration to be seen as modern or contemporary (in line with its Enlightenment legacy), has been subject to “much debate in Scottish economic policy circles” and again, speaks to fears over whether Scotland has the ability to attract and keep its “skilled talent” (ibid.). As the case showed, this underlines Scotland’s concern with presenting its cities as “cosmopolitan as well as metropolitan” (Boyle, 2006, p. 412).25

These factors also help to explain Scotland’s intense city marketing and imagination exercises as outlined in Chapter Four, and its subsequent cultural policy narratives. In summary, the cultural policies of Scotland address a number of its national issues: its concern with emigration (and depopulation) and need to focus on cities and urban regeneration; its aspirations to be seen as a cosmopolitan and modern country (but one which values its heritage); its need for skilled labour; its need to assert its national

24 This premise was also investigated in Boyle’s creative class study of early 21st century Scottish emigration to Dublin. This report concluded that Dublin’s atmosphere (and reputation as a fun city) was an important factor in emigration but not as important as job opportunities. Dublin also contrasted with the limited opportunities and perceptions of Scotland as a more conservative work place. See Boyle (2006).

identity; its UK creative economy policy; and the importance of projecting an entrepreneurial country. These factors make the creative city paradigm extremely useful to cultural policy and the Scottish government. While the imperatives behind creative city discourses in Scotland’s cultural policies may originate from both social (emigration/depopulation) and industrial concerns (decline of industry and cities), Finland’s use of the discourse rests with its industrial policies, though as before, this closely aligns with the social benefits of the economy.

6.5.2 Finland’s knowledge economy, creative industries, skilled labour and commercialisation

As Chapter Five has demonstrated, Finland has become one of the most successful and competitive knowledge economies of Northern Europe, with a focus on innovation and the information society that is highly congruent with the creative city, but also a strong tradition of social cohesion. As a result, the emphasis on innovation and information (as part of the knowledge economy), together with deindustrialisation and the cultural and creative industries in Finland, has developed into a strong discursive triangle (Power, 2009, p. 450) that is essentially designed to bolster Brand Finland. In addition, it has been claimed that the potential loss of international business and transfer of operations to Asian countries with “cheaper manpower” (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2007, p. 13), namely China, has driven Finland’s interest in “dynamic and [in particular] high-value labour” (Power, 2009, p. 450) and thus discourses of human capital.

High value workers, therefore, are consistent with Finland’s economic policies, and represent sectors that tend to locate and settle in particular countries, rather than migratory low value jobs (ibid.). Further, these jobs are perceived as reconciling
Finland’s “environmental, social, wage and welfare standards” (*ibid*.), again aligning and legitimising competition, the economy and social equity. Finland’s “tradition of local self-government” (*ibid.*, p. 451), its careful nurturing of its reputation for tolerance (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 12), its small population, acute northern location, and consequent need to project its Finnishness alongside an internationalism (like Scotland), also points to the usefulness of a discourse like the creative city.

In summation, the creative city meets a number of Finland’s needs: the ideological fit with Finland’s social (projecting equity, tolerance, democracy) and economic (competition etc.) policies; the need for well-paid and sticky (hard to replace) knowledge workers; the need to keep businesses and investment in Finland; the need to further commercialise culture and the creative industries; and the need for a higher international profile that asserts Finland’s readiness for business and its autonomy from Sweden and Russia. This reconciling of potentially conflicting value systems, though it is a characteristic of policy in general, is also particular to Finland’s newly transitional state between welfarism and competitive neoliberalism.

It has been demonstrated, therefore, that Scotland and Finland have strong reasons to embrace the creative city paradigm, as a way of discursively addressing or solving particular state problems. In contrast, despite sharing many of the contexts of both Finland and Scotland, it has been argued that Ireland’s cultural policies show a limited interest in the creative city paradigm, instead reflecting older but equally instrumental urban discourses of culture as a country’s unique identifier, and, as a consequence of the recent recession, a rescuer of Brand Ireland.
In considering the three cases together, therefore, there are a number of deductions that can be made. These deductions are: that the creative city paradigm flourishes in particular situations (the neoliberal political-economic situation referred to earlier) and meets a number of shared national needs: post-industrial economies; high value and sticky jobs; creative industries agendas; branding and image-management; the repopulation of cities and countries; international investment; and a multicultural, diverse profile (necessitating discourses of tolerance). Additionally, Finland’s use of the paradigm demonstrates that language is not a barrier in relation to the dissemination of a predominantly English discourse (though this is also demonstrated through the creative city’s role in Asian countries).

The creative city (and thus cultural policy) therefore, ultimately fulfils the ideological and hegemonic state needs of Scotland and Finland by specifically appealing to: central government ministries/interests/politicians (through extrinsic value discourses), the cultural sector (through intrinsic value discourses), and the public (through either intrinsic discourses or instrumental discourses depending on their interest in culture). While meeting national agendas reveals the local appeal of the creative city, instrumentalism in general has a much broader appeal and will be discussed next.

6.5.3 The appeal of instrumentalism

Although Chapter Three has outlined particular criticisms as well as successes in relation to the creative city, and Chapter Four has outlined a general critique of instrumental discourses, throughout the research a number of cultural policy advantages have become apparent in relation to adopting creative city discourses. Section 6.3 has underlined the ability of the creative city to contain conflicting discourses and thus help
to secure state legitimacy. This was followed by section 6.4 which demonstrated that the creative city represents a readily accessible policy story and format, and then section 6.5 which showed that through cultural policy, the creative city addresses national ideologies and policy needs and meets specific government agendas. However, another benefit of the creative city lies in its role as an implicit cultural policy which appears to explicitly recognise the value of culture and to place culture centrally (in contrast with other implicit policies which may inadvertently impact on culture).

Further, as with all instrumental or “attached” discourses (Gray, 2007, p. 203), Chapter Five has shown how the creative city offers other rational benefits and discrete functions associated with instrumentalism in general, including: leveraging the profile, visibility and political traction of a weak policy sector (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 32; Oakley, 2009a, p. 4); offering the potential to diversify and augment existing budgets and unlock funding in the private sector (Szántó, 2010, n.p.); projecting an Enlightenment prospect of progress, cosmopolitanism and the “promise of radical change”; and, ironically (in light of its emphasis on the economy and neoliberal credentials), offering a “cognitive as well as philosophical alternative to the development of the neo-liberal city” (Vickery, 2011, p. 2). Fourthly, the discourse of the creative city is perceived as presenting new opportunities to cultural practitioners (through funding schemes designed to achieve non-cultural outcomes) by directing them to particular areas of work (such as urban development) which they may not have pursued otherwise (Nisbett, 2012).

Vickery claims that “anyone who remembers the 1970s would agree that British cities have radically changed for the better, and art and creativity has been a visible means of that change” (Vickery, 2011, p. 6).
These benefits touch on one of the key factors behind instrumental arguments. This factor is, that in acknowledging the full extent of benefits or values that culture can offer (both intrinsic and extrinsic), the creative city delivers a comprehensive and tangible argument in support of culture, to a policy sector that is hard to understand. This rational argument is an important counterbalance to apparently anti-democratic (or unrepresentative), autonomous or romantic cultural discourses that are “remote, esoteric, and removed from life” (McCarthy et al, 2005, p. 38). As an instrumental discourse, therefore, the creative city offers the bureaucratic promise of objective and meritocratic decision-making through measurable outputs (O’Brien, 2012, n.p.), reducing potential accusations of cultural policy’s elitism, and its tendency to be overly concerned with “internal” preoccupations (Gray, 2007, p. 207).

Similarly, the veneer of empiricism, objectivity, and therefore truth alluded to by the use of (economic) creativity discourses and statistics, confers a scientific and “positivist” (or measurable) quality to cultural policy, suggesting a “disinterested” and putatively neutral as well as evidence-based approach that also appeals to policymakers (Seale, 2004, p. 80). The economicism implied by the paradigm ultimately responds to a doubting electorate who may see no value in culture but can appreciate the prospect of economic return. As a result, the creative city is a more persuasive advocate for culture than cultural policy alone, legitimating cultural policy to the state and the state to the public.

6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has looked at what is happening, how, and why it is happening, in relation to the creative city as an embedded and apparently helpful discourse of cultural policy
in Scotland, Finland and (to a limited extent) Ireland. In order to do this, the chapter has compared three sets of cultural policies and has underlined the role of dualism and nominalisation in those policies. The chapter has also noted similarities in how creative city discourses are constituted in Scotland and Finland, despite different emphases, cultures and languages. However, the main conclusions of the chapter are that there are many factors contributing to the transfer of creative city discourses within cultural policy and equally, a number of compelling reasons as to its success and purpose in the cases (and in cultural policy in general).

The main transfer factors were demonstrated to be: the ability of the discourse to carry and contain multiple ideologies and discourses (and how this allows politicians to avoid making difficult decisions) and thus support the authority of government (e.g. Finland’s combination of neoliberalism and welfare statism), its fit with readily assimilable policy templates (knowledge paradigm, simplicity, flexibility and heuristics), its international champions, its internet-friendly presence and its parallels with and strategic importance to EU funding discourses. More particularly, this chapter has demonstrated that the cultural policies of Scotland and Finland, despite reservations about the creative city paradigm, have local and strategic uses for it, based on discrete historical, political, social and economic factors in those countries. This chapter also established that these uses or the purpose behind using narratives like the creative city within cultural policies, is to solve or address central government (national branding/visibility and the need for high-value workers, etc.) rather than public or cultural problems.

Finally, it has also been argued that the creative city confers other instrumental benefits in: offering cultural visibility; the promise of diversified funding; a meritocratic
alternative to elitist discourses; new opportunities for cultural practitioners; and most importantly, the appearance of quantifiable decision-making. This results in dual legitimation functions for the creative city (appearing to satisfy internal government and public needs), further explaining its apparent appeal within cultural policy. The significance of the creative city within the discourses of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, therefore, lies not in its specificity in those countries, but in what it indicates about the assumptions underpinning the nature and function of cultural policy, vis-à-vis the market and the state in those countries. The chapter, therefore, indicated that the weakness of the cultural policy sector (including practitioners) reflexively drives rational, instrumental discourses that seek to sustain cultural policies (and markets) by addressing other government portfolios, and are consequently benignly looked upon in those circles. In light of the awareness by policymakers of problems within the creative city paradigm, this welcome can be interpreted as indicating a degree of cynical reasoning. The precise implications of the creative city within cultural policy, therefore, in the context of the concept of colonisation, will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS AND INDICATIONS FOR CULTURAL POLICY, PUBLIC POLICY, THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY

7.1 Introduction

The last chapter has looked at how and why the creative city has transferred to cultural policy, arguing that the paradigm is a flexible and persuasive discourse that meets technical policy requirements, addresses national needs, offers a number of wider benefits for cultural policy and ensures the longevity of the state. In light of these positive characteristics and capacities, the question remains of whether the creative city paradigm, though flawed, is ultimately beneficial to cultural policy and part of an efficient government working pragmatically, visibly and democratically in the public interest through providing a balanced, meritocratic and accountable economic argument for the distribution of tax payers’ money towards cultural activities. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the longer-term implications of the paradigm for cultural policy and its role as an expression of the reason of state.

This chapter, therefore, will return to the broader impact of instrumental discourses on cultural policy in general (as detailed in Chapter Four) and the discrete impact of a discourse like the creative city in particular. This consideration will take place in the context of dominant ideologies and pressures on the cultural policy sector and existing critiques of the creative city. This will be followed by an outline of problems already inherent in cultural policy which further underline the inescapable and self-sustaining nature of cultural instrumentalism, and indicate its weaknesses and openness to domination by non-cultural narratives and colonisation. The chapter will then consider how colonisation has implications beyond cultural policies, illustrating the gap between
policy in theory as a legitimate and democratic arm of the state, and policy in practice as demonstrated through the strategic and obfuscated discourses of the three cases. Following this, there will be a consideration of how these revelations expose key criticisms of liberal democracies, models of democracy and governance more widely, and illustrate the complex relationship between the state and market in many Western countries. This chapter will conclude by returning to the question of how cultural policy is understood and variously described, returning to the fundamental question of why states support culture or what cultural policy is for.

7.2 The problem of the creative city for cultural policy

Notwithstanding established criticisms of the creative city that are necessarily of consequence to public policies for culture (social inequity, market-bias, unreliable methodologies, endorsement of the status quo, etc.: see 3.11), and new cultural criticisms posited by this research (lack of interest in and knowledge of cultural production and practitioners as detailed in 3.12), a further consideration of instrumentalism points to more specific difficulties for cultural policy in relation to the creative city. Earlier it was demonstrated that the core confusion around, and problem with, instrumentalism and thus discourses like the creative city, is largely embodied in ideology, the concepts of positive and negative uses for culture, and whether instrumentalism is a useful policy term (see 4.4.12).

Notwithstanding the overlap between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of cultural value, it has been demonstrated (see 4.4.12) that views of instrumentalism (and thus the creative city) can comprise: a fulfilment of the strategic nature of policy in general, conferring explicable and reasonable (economic and social) benefits on society
that strengthen cultural policy by underlining how it works to deliver other democratically elected government agendas (similar to attachment policies), and intrinsic cultural benefits, or artistic instrumentalism that recognise the individual, private and unique advantages (criticality, education etc.) conferred by culture. Both of these positions suggest the input of trust in the policy and thus policymaker and can be viewed as examples of positive instrumentalism.

In contrast, other views comprise judgment on: the use of culture to fulfil extrinsic (economic and social) objectives which might be better served by other policy areas, and policies that have no regard to the nature of the (cultural) activity supported and which disavow the a priori nature of public and personal engagements with culture. Those who hold negative views of instrumentalism are particularly critical and cynical in relation to how instrumental approaches favour outcome-oriented, mainstream, uncritical and spectacular culture, which co-opts cultural practitioners into quantitative rather than qualitative outcomes.

In terms of cultural policy, cynicism or trust in policies might be judged or viewed in relation to the degree of non-cultural interest (in contrast to disinterest) on the part of the policymaker, or whether or not that policymaker has something to gain from the non-cultural outcome of policy discourses. Given that all policy will necessarily be interested, this term can be applied to cultural policy purely in respect of cultural outcomes. In terms of the cases, this understanding of gain can be viewed as the role of the policymaker in supporting urban development, investment or tourism, but also legitimacy or political gains for the cultural policy ministry. Scotland, Finland and Ireland’s linking of their policies to wider government agendas, while strategic,
indicates an *interested* outcome. Though the previous chapter has suggested that the creative city can be considered a positive example of instrumentalism in that it provides a clear rationale for funding culture and is simply a way to “construct [another] picture of cultural policy” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 5), the *interested* nature of the creative city in the cases (and thus the policymakers’ use of it), suggests a negative interpretation of instrumentalism that needs to be considered both generally and specifically.

Firstly, instrumentalism as a persuasive discourse in cultural policy, as much as proposing non-cultural outcomes from culture, is bound to underperform if compared with economic or social policies/initiatives, leading to “unsubstantiated” claims (McCarthy et.al., 2005, p. 33; Hewitt, 2011, p. 33). In other words, the economic benefits of culture proposed through the creative city (operating in cultural policies) could never deliver in the same way as dedicated economic or industrial policies (Miles, 2006, pp. 233-243; Szántó, 2010, n.p.). Also, key criteria for successful policy-driven investment suggest that there must be both a return greater than the original investment and that the economy or return generated, must not simply replace other economies (or cultural spending) or occur elsewhere in the public exchequer, but must be an *additional* or new (cultural) economy (Markusen and Gadwa, 2010, p. 381). From a cultural (economy) perspective, this calculation also needs to take into account the level of subsidy against foregone tax revenues (*ibid.*).

Given the pragmatic view that “every pound spent on the arts is a pound forgone on an alternative public good or service” (Bakhshi, Freeman and Hitchen, 2009, p. 18), and that “it is not enough to show that the arts and culture can generate income and employment, because all economic activity does that” (Bille, 2006, p. 1059), it can be
argued that culture does not deliver economically *in comparison to other sectors*. This
demonstrates the fundamental difficulty with placing value on culture in this way,¹ and
though investment or support of culture is comparatively small (in respect of other
ministries), can lead to views of public funding on culture as “irresponsible“ (Gray,
2007, p. 204).

Secondly, there are wider problems with measurement and quantitative claims in
cultural policies. Notwithstanding problems with evidence (as Chapter Two has
outlined), the lack of systematic evaluation of the outcomes of instrumental cultural
policies, either to confirm or negate their claims, by either central governments
(monitoring cultural policies) or the cultural policy ministries (monitoring those it
supports), is problematic for how seriously the cultural policy sector is taken. This is not
helped by the lack of clarification over the desired outcomes of funding relationships
which make cultural policies difficult to evaluate in the first instance (Reeves, 2002;
Markusen and Gadwa, 2010, p. 379). Equally, these issues are further exacerbated by
the lack of resources to which most cultural organisations have access, which would
severely impact on their capacity to evaluate their economic impact, regardless of value-
systems attached to quantitative reasoning.

Thirdly, some have questioned (Vickery, 2011, p. 3; Belfiore, 2012, p. 107) whether
instrumental paradigms like the creative city, which depend on the mobilising concept
of the economy, actively diversify or lead to increased funding for culture, as
champions of public/private partnerships might suggest (Paquette, 2008, p. 303). This

¹ This is demonstrated in the recent national campaigns for the arts in both Ireland and the UK, much of
whose work has concentrated on reinforcing economic arguments for supporting culture (or in their case
the arts), though this is beginning to change. See www.ncfa.ie (Ireland) and www.artscampaign.org.uk
(UK) [Accessed 4 June 2013].
has been indicated by studies on the impact of the Structural Funds on other areas of funding, which demonstrated the inconclusive nature of research that seeks to link one source of funding to another (Evans and Foord, 1999, p. 81; Belfiore, 2012, p. 107). These difficulties are also underlined by general problems linking budgets and policies, particularly given the time lag between the arrival of new administrations and the allocation of budgets (Quinn, 1998, p. 45) and the typical policy process taking as “long as a decade” (Stevens, 2011b, p. 251).²

Fourthly, because the problems listed above are driven by the endemic nature of case-making in cultural policy and the view that “reality itself requires all policy decisions to be quantified” (Bakhshi et al., 2009, p. 18),³ these difficulties can lead to exaggeration, which erodes communication and trust between the stakeholders of cultural policy.⁴ This exaggeration often derives from standardised calculations of the indirect effects of expenditure in one area of the economy (how to differentiate it from other potential factors), the questionable validity of the multiplier effect⁵ (Reeves, 2002, p. 43; Dowler, 2004, p. 22; Nagle, 2006, p. 9), and the use of poor and inconsistent research methodologies and data sets (Reeves, 2002; Selwood, 2002; Finnish Ministry of

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² Even where it could be proven that the central economic premise of the creative city delivered (via cultural policy), it is a fundamental conundrum of cultural subsidy systems that financial success can often have the reverse effect — allowing governments to consider reduced funding to cultural ministries or further withdrawal from state funding on the basis of a perceived lack of need.

³ The emphasis on evidence and measurement is demonstrated in the numbers of economic reports on culture produced in national (Scottish Executive, 2004b; Scottish Government, 2009a; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009a) and EU cultural policies (European Commission 2006a; ibid., 2009; Kulturpont Hungary, 2011), and devolved cultural agencies (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, 2011). For information on research, see the Evidence Base for the Impact of Arts and Culture Policy (2008).

⁴ Recent economic impact statements from the arts community include figures from the wider creative industries, despite their exclusion from funding definitions of the arts. See Arts Council of Ireland (2009).

⁵ The Council of Europe stated the following in relation to the multiplier effect: The “arts and culture are ‘labour intensive’ activities and generate economic multiplier effects in other service and manufacturing sectors” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 241) by: providing “content” for the cultural industries and media, creating jobs and contributing to the Gross Domestic Product, and creating other “locally significant economic effects”. The report also states that the arts/culture are “socially profitable”, create “stocks of ideas or images”, and can “enhance and so add value to the built environment” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 238).
Education, 2009c; Gray, C. 2009). These nominally helpful formulae have been described as “optimistic” (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 63), have a “lack of concern with the truth” and more provocatively, as “bullshit” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 1). This amplification applies to assessments of numbers attending cultural events (prospectively or retrospectively) or to the spill-over economies generated from those events, making it difficult to distinguish between “simple incorrect information” (in the enthusiastic rush to extrapolate broader cultural statistics), wilful “mendacity” (Belfiore, 2008, p. 25), and endemic structural advocacy.

However, though these factors are more likely to result in exaggeration than mendacity, and as suggested, though most cultural organisations do not have the resources to conduct these surveys in the first place (a factor pointing to the appeal of multiplier figures), these tactics again underline the “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298) involved in making and interacting with cultural policy (see 4.4.13). These evidences also perpetuate the singular way in which culture is viewed, as well as feeding the unvirtuous cycle of instrumental expectation and cynical reason. This also leads to a cognitive dissonance around structural instrumentalism, whereby practitioners and policymakers may face the uncomfortable situation of viewing it as a negative proposition, alongside an appreciation of a role for it in policy. Nevertheless, the level of obfuscation involved in cultural instrumentalism creates a loss of trust (or good faith) between those attempting to realise cultural practices (cultural practitioners), and the forces influencing those practices in the first place (policymakers and politicians).

There are other more specifically negative impacts suggested by the creative city, however. As suggested by Harvey (1989, 1990) and Rosler (2011a), the creative city, as
an urban development model necessarily favours prominent visual tropes and spectacular cultural activity in cities in order to maximise attention from corporations and tourists. While not wishing to overstate the point, the prevalence of particular kinds of “manufactured” culture (Hunt, cited in Miles and Paddisson, 2005, p. 838), in the sense of culture that may be bought and brought in, rather than emerging from a local culture, may limit public understandings of the wide variety of cultural forms in existence. This is because the reluctance to fund risk-taking and experimental culture in favour of tried-and-tested cultural and iconic brands with strong image-making capacities, is typically led by city promotion, tourism and exhibition, rather than an interest in cultural production.

This was referred to in Chapter Three (3.11) as consistent with urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1990), marketing and the simulacrum. As such, Chapter Four has indicated that Creative city-type initiatives are usually unconcerned with the processes of making (studios, workshops, amateur cultural events, etc.) and locally displaying (small galleries, theatres, community centres, etc.) culture and more concerned with seeking competitive identities through monumental sculptures, buildings and bridges. Consequently, this focus on the tropes, rather than conditions, of culture and creativity, ironically (given the competitive and unique premise) reduces the particularity of a city (Rosler, 2011a, p. 11), so that “what is essential for cities is no longer art, or the people who make it, but the appearance of its being made somewhere nearby” (Rosler, 2011a, p. 6).

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6 Though the concept of spectacle in relation to cultural expressions is necessarily subjective, it can be argued that highly visualised and often monumental visual artworks exemplify this concept. See Chapter 3 (3.4 footnote # 28).
The focus on spectacle and a concern with the surface of cultural life is compounded and exemplified by the romanticism Florida shows towards artists, as explained in Chapter Three. The paradigm’s lack of interest in the conditions of being an artist and Florida’s own admission that he has “only a cursory understanding” of them (Florida, 2007, p. 41), is incongruous in terms of the basic premise of the creative city: that artists attract (and comprise) creative workers, businesses and investment and should be supported (though he equivocates in relation to this too). Even when appearing to explicitly place cultural provision (amenities) central to those amenities needed by cities and talent, citing the creative classes as “attracted more by cultural amenities than by recreational amenities and climate” (Florida: 2005, p. 99), Florida contradicts himself by positing that there is “no clear relationship between arts and culture and high-technology industries or the ability to attract creative workers” (ibid., p. 71) and that “they [arts and culture] alone are not enough, as other amenities come into play” (ibid.).

In Florida’s creative city, therefore, artists rarely appear outside of their signifying presence, whether as creative visionaries or even economic actors and aides to regeneration (like Landry, 2000 etc.). This lends credence to the view that the creative city paradigm “could not care less of the arts community in itself” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298).

The instrumentalism of the creative city also impacts on normative and bureaucratic understandings and mechanisms of cultural policy. This begins with the failure of the creative city to balance intrinsic (or artistic instrumentalism) and extrinsic instrumental cultural value, by reconciling the needs of the cultural practitioner, the politician, the policymaker and the public (Holden, 2006, p. 57), as a prerequisite to legitimacy (Vestheim, 2007, p. 230; DCMS, 2010, p. 18). Other accounts of cultural value, bound
up with cultural rights, sustainability, diversity and other intrinsic valuations (Reeves, 2002, pp. 36-37; Throsby, cited in Keaney, 2006, p. 31) are also compromised by the predisposition of the paradigm to the corporatised culture referred to above. Similarly, the creative city compromises “cultural policy ethics” by eroding culture’s “freedom” (intrinsic value) and “responsibility” (community value) “ethic”, as posed by the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (Koivunen and Marsio, 2008, p. 3). Since concepts of cultural value, cultural rights and cultural ethics are concerned with legitimacy, any undermining of these concepts, ironically, has implications for the legitimacy of cultural policy.

As suggested in Chapters One and Three, the creative city also impacts on understandings of public goods in the context of “democratic conceptions of citizenship rights” (Bennett and Silva, 2006, p. 94) by promoting a neoliberal conflation of private and public goods. This is demonstrated by the dependence of urban development models on private investment and thus profits (proffered as the public good) through the “differential advantages they secure for some at the expense of others” (ibid., pp. 94 – 95). Even the civic or community discourses of the creative city, suggesting social cohesion through the public sphere, present private goods as public goods in the following way: the presentation of culture as a “means of overcoming social exclusion” (ibid., p. 95) as suggested by Landry (see 3.5), is dependent on “assessing the benefits to society”... by “acting on the social to secure certain outcomes: neighbourhood renewal, reduced crime” etc. (Bennett and Silva, 2006, p. 95). This understanding of social cohesion ultimately results or aims to result in economic outcomes, representing a

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7 There are three ethics posited in Finland: a freedom ethic (the premise that creativity and art are “intrinsically valuable and therefore legitimate goals in themselves”), a responsibility ethic (“the cultural identity of a community, the safeguarding of cultural traditions, and the realisation of cultural rights”) and a benefit/instrumental ethic (Koivunen and Marsio, 2008, p. 3).
“different policy and civic calculus to equity discourses of cultural democracy” in cultural policies (ibid.).

As a result, the creative city and the cynical reason it implies, poses a number of longer-term problems for how culture is perceived in cities vis-à-vis cultural policy. These implications are (from a broadly instrumental perspective) that cultural policy: compares badly with dedicated economic and social policies; uses poor methodologies and untested claims (all leading to loss of trust); fails to diversify cultural funding; leads to exaggerated statistics and results in an over-promising on deliverables. Other negative impacts via the creative city comprise: the promotion of one form of spectacular culture (undermining the variety of work supported through policy); a lack of interest in cultural working spaces (eroding understandings of how culture is produced with sustainability issues for artists); an unhelpful romanticism towards artists (exoticising and distancing policy from them); an undermining of cultural value and, finally, the eroding of principles of cultural democracy and the nature of public goods. This activity necessarily has a de-legitimising impact on cultural policy itself.

7.2.1 Existing problems in cultural policy

Notwithstanding the negative implications for cultural policy in respect of the influence of an instrumental discourse such as the creative city, and as has been demonstrated, instrumental and attached benefit narratives are already endemic in cultural policy. As such and from the outset, cultural policy is compromised, under constant pressure to justify itself, predisposed to respond to conflicting mandates and thus to instrumentalisation and a degree of cynical reason. The shoring up of longer-term problems for cultural policy by the creative city, therefore, takes place in the context of
a policy sector already beset by issues and complexities, particularly affected by hierarchical discourses of cultural values and the primary legitimacy (from the public) and rationale of the sector itself. As has been suggested throughout this dissertation, these factors (instrumentalism, dualism and lack of policy clarity) reflexively point to one of cultural policy’s key and inescapable issues, that it is a disempowered and “marginal” policy area (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217).

Firstly, despite the richness as well as usefulness of culture to ruling elites, and as demonstrated in Ireland (Falvey, 2010, n.p.; O’Toole, 2010, n.p.; Stokes, 2010, n.p.; Howlin, 2013, p. 15), research points to the fact that cultural ministries are “assigned little weight by voters” (Gray and Wingfield, 2010, p. 7) and are a “low priority” in government (Mundy, 2000, p. 11). Equally, people remain “less willing to spend money on culture than on other matters” (ibid., p. 5), culture is “never the focus of electoral choice” (ibid., p. 7), and cultural subsidy is routinely posited in the media as a “form of grand larceny” (Edgar, 2012b, n.p.) or an “insult to the bodily welfare” of citizens (Mundy, 2000, p. 11). Considering this research on the low status and the lack of international importance attached to cultural ministries (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 14), ministers’ needs for their colleagues’ support (Higgins, 2013a) and the use of terms such as demotion in respect of ministerial appointments (as in Ireland), the link between political and public views of and apathy towards culture may be reflexive (if judged by media reports and voter preference research). Thus, in an inversion of an earlier citation, there is a link between the lack of “importance attached by the State, and through them the people, to the arts” (Fanning, 2011, n.p.). Depending

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8 The difference in national commitments to cultural policy is acknowledged in Finland’s cultural policy, which claims that “culture is not given the same weight by all policymakers as we do here” (Ministry of Education, 2009a, p. 14).
on your perspective, therefore, culture is instrumentalised by governments and/or irrelevant to the public.

Secondly, despite the limited access that culture gets to the media in general (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 6), this hostility is reflected in conflicting media representations of culture which either wholly “support[s]” or conversely “attack[s]” art or artists (Holden, 2006, p. 42). These accounts result in confused reports of cultural value circulating within the public domain, which can be broadly categorised into approving narratives of cultural instrumentalism on the one hand, and disapproving accounts of autonomous or at least obscurely legitimised cultural projects, on the other. Examples of these reports include: egregiously framed descriptions of public spending on cultural projects which ask “why should people pay taxes” for the arts, especially “at a time of serious spending cuts?” (BBC Newsnight, 2011, n.p.) and narratives of “taxpayers” as “horrified to discover that their hard-earned cash is being spent” on (putatively wasteful) artistic projects (Reynolds, 2012, n.p.). These discourses often use “false and emotive” analogies contrasting cultural provision with urgent social services in accounts of resources being directed to “opera with the money needed to buy kidney machines or children’s hospitals” (Mundy, 2000, p. 11) and tend to end with the implicit or explicit question of why the state is “allowed to fund these things?” (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.). Like policy, the singular or universal public as rhetorically constructed by the media (i.e. taxpayer, accountability etc.), is presented as consensual to these negative and hostile attitudes.

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9 This article went on to quote the director of Taxpayer Scotland as saying that “when we reach the point that nearly all of us are totally baffled, and probably in this case bored stiff, by an idea then we really do have to ask, ‘Why the state is allowed to fund these things?’” (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.).
In contrast, approving media reports of culture are utilitarian and meritorious (and mostly economic), endorsing narratives of culture, regeneration and tourism. Examples of these reports comprise culture’s role in: giving a “significant long-term boost “ to a country’s “chronically weak economy” (McDonald, 2011, n.p.); lending a “sexy” edge to cities (Connolly, 2010, n.p.); working to rouse “people from a depression brought on by long-term unemployment and the current fierce economic crisis”; delivering “joy, glamour, insight, image-building, international prestige and employment, on a scale no other sector can match for similar sums” (McMillan, 2011, n.p.); helping countries to turn a “bright, confident face” to the world” (Cullen, 2012, p. 10) and helping to create “funky towns”(Ward, 2002, n.p.).

Given the particular role of the media in shaping the “world outside as a picture in our heads” (Parsons, 1995, p. 110), and its “key role in [policy] agenda setting” (ibid., p. 113), these discourses, both positive and negative, are crucial to constructions of culture in the public imagination, which it is argued, is confused as to the nature of its value or purpose in society and the state. These discourses also hint at the lack of clear rationales as to why governments are allowed to support culture in a way that the media can understand. Since it has been suggested that “public opinion” (notwithstanding the difficulties of representing any one public) is “to the political market what consumer demand is to the economic market place” (ibid., p. 110), and vice versa (Fanning, 2011, n.p.), it holds that public attitudes to culture impact on government attitudes, whether negative or positive and that there is a reflexive connection between the two.

Not surprisingly perhaps, outside of the media, policy-commissioned reports also carry positive accounts of culture, usually concerning the benign impact of (and attitudes to)
subsidised culture on the lives of the public. These reports cite culture as having an “important role in the lives of many Europeans” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 9), claim that people have “very positive views” of culture/the arts (Arts Council of Ireland, 2006, p. 10), and state that the “value of culture to the public is unlimited and infinitely expandable” (Holden, 2006, p. 10). These claims, produced from within cultural policy circles, are inescapably advocacy-oriented and clearly self-justificatory, as well as difficult to definitively evidence when confronted by conflicting research (as indicated above). As such, it has been asserted that “if culture was as important as many government speeches [or reports] make it sound, it would have a budget to match welfare or defence” (Mundy, 2000, p. 10), suggesting the prospect of cynicism again. Equally, though these accounts may appear to strengthen cultural policy, when viewed alongside contrasting accounts, they point to an embattled, defensive and misunderstood sector.

Thirdly, notwithstanding tensions at play within cultural policies engendered by the dualisms and obfuscations around culture, other problems within cultural policy are more structurally or historically determined and contextualise the place of instrumental discourses (like the creative city) within cultural policy in general. During the development of the first European and “liberal humanist” (Belfiore and Bennett, 2006, p. 29) models of (high) cultural policy (as expressed through the Arts Council model), egalitarian objectives were concerned with widening the “accessibility” (Quinn, 1998 p. 103), “stimulation” and “practice” of the arts (as it was designated) (ibid., p. 117). These objectives, which remain key to many cultural policies, were part of the broader

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10 This has recently been demonstrated in the first ever UK Arts [vitality] Index, which purports to measure the vitality of the arts through financial indicators (public funding, earned income), interest in arts (from numbers of students studying and volunteers), combined reserves of funded arts organisations, participation levels (attendance and participation, digital attendance, adults and children), satisfaction reports and income and employment generated (National Campaign for the Arts, 2011, pp 13-14).
political project of democracy at the time and were thus concerned with the *democratisation of culture* (access to consume culture) and, later, *cultural democracy* (access to making culture). However, despite decades of effort on behalf of cultural practitioners, these concepts remain relatively aspirational, as implicitly indicated by reports (Arts Council of Ireland, 2006; European Commission 2007b), and particularly so when judged against participation in more industrialised cultural expressions (Higgins, 2012a, n.p.). In this respect, the project of making (high) culture accessible has been described as an unequivocal “failure” (During, 2007, p. 441).

Fourthly, as a result of historic political territorialism and the deficits of these democratisation and democracy agendas, accusations of elitism and classism endure in relation to cultural policies (Eagleton, 2000; Lewis and Miller, 2003; McGuigan, 1996; Sennett, 2006; Oakley, 2009c). The use of “excellence” in artistic judgement, is a key hierarchical and difficult term to define, and has been linked to poor decision-making when contrasted with de-centralised and more diverse judgments (Frey, 2003, p. 127). Also, together with its concomitant cultural policy term “access” (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005, p. 7; Lee et al., 2011, p. 295), excellence continues to connote access to high culture in particular, rather than culture in general. As such, the “unacceptable” reluctance of cultural policy to define culture or the arts (Quinn, 1998, p. 236) links fears of elitism (despite practising high culture), ethnic biases (certain cultures promoted over others), and a lack of political accountability (*ibid.*, p. 15, p. 194).

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11 These aims are partly demonstrated in the three case studies, respectively, in references to access and practice: promoting “access to and participation in” the arts (Ireland); maintaining “cultural rights” and ensuring “access” to culture (Finland), ensuring that “as many people as possible in Scotland and overseas are able to benefit from, be inspired by and enjoy” culture. All references from government websites respectively as indicated previously.
The concepts of *cultural capital* and cultural competence are also central to cultural policies, along with issues of class, classification, elitism and hegemony. Cultural capital describes the “act of deciphering, [and] decoding” that demarcates those who *can* reflexively consume high culture (prioritised in all three cases) and who know what it *is*, from those who don’t have the cultural confidence bestowed by education or class status, and have no engagement with it (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 2). Cultural capital, therefore, constitutes a “socially transmitted inheritance” (Bennett and Silva, 2011, p. 430), and (via a Foucauldian perspective) set of skills “that can be enhanced through varied *strategies* of training and *self cultivation*” (ibid., p. 431). These terms reflect the equation of social with cultural divisions, and further underline the *a priori*, elitist nature of cultural production. This situation refers to the financial ability of many cultural practitioners to withstand (by subsidising) the precarity of working in the cultural sphere (McRobbie, 2004; Lorey, 2006), in contrast to those who cannot *afford* a cultural career. Cumulatively, these biases reflect a range of hierarchies, political struggles, and issues of class and hegemony, demonstrating that the sentiments or discourses of funding and subsidy may be egalitarian, but the practises and consequences may not.

Fifthly, biases are also at play in the perceived superiority of traditional over newer media (O’Regan, 2001, p. 2), an historic suspiciousness of technology and the wider creative industries (despite strategically leveraging these discourses more recently in cultural policy) and a lack of balance between producers’ and consumers’ intellectual property rights (suggestive of capitalism’s pressures on cultural policy). As Chapters

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12 Though Bourdieu is widely understood to have pinpointed key difficulties with the hierarchical deployment of culture in societies and vigorously espoused “democratic civil entitlement” to culture, he is also criticised for compounding these hierarchies by avoiding questions of “universality that such policies attributed to the canonical works of the Western art tradition” (Bennett and Silva, 2011, p. 431).
Four and Chapter Five have outlined, this is reflected in equivocation over “rhetorical” and located (in either individuals or individual countries) models of creativity and “networked” or collective models (Stapleton, 2002, p. 12).

Sixthly, despite the struggles for power embodied in these criticisms, for some, the greatest issue for cultural policy lies in its political failure, or inability to engage with the political issues of the day (e.g. immigration, multiculturalism, citizenship) (O’Regan, 2001, p. 8) and that it is simply too weak a sector to “mobilise huge masses of people in political actions” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 217). Given the critical role of culture in politics and thus the potential role for cultural policy, this failure is viewed as particularly egregious. Despite this, others perceive the socio-political expectations of cultural policy as inevitably leading to problems (Eagleton, 2000, p. 59) and these imperatives as calling to mind paternalistic and “chilling image[s] of art workers managing the underclass” (Hewitt, 2011, p. 33). The discourses of democracy, citizenship, and civil society employed by cultural policies, therefore, further underline the function of those discourses to legitimate cultural policy, rather than any willingness to engage in the political arena.

Seventhly, despite discourses to the contrary, democratic public representation and participation within cultural policy decisions is generally poor (Gray, 2010b). To date, though democratically elected politicians are theoretically responsible for policy-making, the common practice, at least in Western European countries, is for cultural policy to be made by non-elected civil servants (albeit in relation to political imperatives), often with the assistance of (also non-elected) cultural experts. In addition, the lengthy policy-making process can supersede the sitting of elected governments in
office and requires the perseverance of civil service personnel to see policies through to conclusion. This demonstrates the importance of non-elected civil service staff to the policymaking process. The primacy of the civil servant (who may or may not have any expertise in culture), the (common) lack of interest (as indicated in Ireland) and expertise of the minister, and the perceived specialization or technocratic needs of culture, compounded by a general level of public apathy for culture (if indicated by electoral preferences as above), work to remove the public from cultural decision making. This leads to what has been described as a general deficit of democracy in cultural policy (Gray, 2010b, p. 8). The lack of public involvement in cultural decisions is driven both by structural policy issues (which apply to all policy areas), but also, more damningly, an endemic fear of populist cultural policy decisions translating as anxieties over the public making the wrong decisions.

Finally and eighthly, the poor position of cultural policy academically as suggested by its usual exclusion from general policy handbooks, also indicates its marginal or misunderstood role as an area of legitimate academic enquiry. Given the place of endorsement, territorialism and discourse in discipline reproduction, this omission mitigates against cultural policy being taken seriously as an intellectual academic discipline. Cumulatively, these factors illustrate the vast range of problems confronting a policy sector that is highly compromised by its: weak status in government; predisposition to exaggerate statistics; failure to democratize culture; endemic elitism/classism; biases towards traditional media; apoliticism, and general lack of democratic decision-making. In particular, the see-sawing of public and media opinions on culture, which are either wholly approving or wholly disapproving, when considered in light of these other factors, once again points to the complexities of culture, confusion
over what culture is, and uncertainty over why the state is “allowed” to support it (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.) in the first place. These factors also raise the question as to what cultural policy is deemed for if not to bend itself to the “purposes” of others (O’Regan, 2001, p. 28).

7.2.2 The problem of mandate

In re-raising the topical question of what cultural policy is for, the question of a singular mandate for cultural policy arises again. This reference to mandate suggests a coherent articulation of a cultural policy problem, or issue to be solved by culture, rather than the multiple instrumental mandates referred to earlier. As suggested in Chapter One, a number of problems, including the chaotic post-World War II foundation of European cultural policies, have been linked to difficulties with its mandate (Quinn, 1998, p. 97). Given the importance (to the success, coherence and future of the policy) of how policies are initially defined (Parsons, 1995, p. xv, p. 87, p5; Hogan and Doyle, 2009, p. 151), the lack of clarity over cultural policy’s purpose has a negative legacy for the sector. More recently, however, the problem with cultural policy’s mandate is revealed by the political and public apathy referred to above. From the public’s perspective, this apathy can be characterised by an instrumental acceptance (of cultural policy), which is merely acquiescence, rather than active public consent which is actively and knowingly given (Held, 2006, p. 190).

As such, the consideration of a missing mandate for cultural policy opens up a key area of analysis in relation to the creative city’s relationship to cultural policy. From a policy, social science or bureaucratic point of view, the three cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland demonstrate the lack of any one identifiable or sui generis cultural policy
rationale which addresses a coherent public issue. Instead, these policies address a multitude of disparate state issues. As a result, their cultural policies lack the necessary (cultural) problem, public concern, persuasive “causal story” (Burstein, 1991, p. 331), or “reason” (McGuigan, 2005, p. 235) around which all policies must coalesce (Parsons, 1995, p. 141). Though policy problems are discursively and deliberately “constructed in order to justify solutions” (ibid., p. 180), the lack of a clear policy problem, constructed or not, is significant if compared with other, weightier or harder policy areas (vis-à-vis government priority), with more easily identifiable problems (such as the economy or health).

Even an area like education, which is often compared to culture (and shares the same portfolio in many European ministries), is viewed as more readily, if not unquestioningly, accepted as a “public good” than culture (Holden, 2006, p. 12). It can also be argued that comparatively, cultural policy differs from education policy in terms of its highly political and resistant genealogy, its chaotic and extra-ministerial foundations, and as suggested in relation to perceptions of the public good, its greater instrumentalisation.13 This is not to argue that cultural policies are uniformly thought to have no value, or that all cultural policies should share one aim. Rather, if cultural policy was equal to other government sectors and connected with the public, it would have a greater sense of meta purpose, which might go some way to responding to McGuigan’s call for it to offer something “meaningfully better” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 299). The apparent lack of this purpose, problem or rationale, therefore, has a hugely negative impact on the cultural policy sector. It is contended, therefore, that cultural

13 See Collini (2012).
policies in the main, have no recognisable or coherent foundational principle to which public support can gravitate.

7.2.3 Colonisation by the creative city

While cultural policy may already have a number of issues, therefore, of which the creative city is an inescapable symptom, there are longer-term problems for cultural policy associated with dominant instrumentalism. The nature of these problems centres again on structural instrumentalism in cultural policy and its role in colonisation (Habermas, 1987). In Habermas’s view, colonisation takes place when the balance between the lifeworld and the system is breached or imbalanced (Habermas, 1987, p. 318). As suggested in Chapter Two, the competition, place-development, corporate investment and human capital discourses represented by the creative city clearly reflect dominant neoliberal ideologies and thus the quantitative needs of the economy, the state and capitalism (or the system), rather than the qualitative social and communicative needs of the public (or the lifeworld). In this respect, the cultural policy texts of Scotland and Finland represent a rationality that judges culture on the basis of “standards of efficiency” (Røyseng, 2008, p. 7) and thus creative city discourses represent a colonisation.

The inevitability of this colonisation can be demonstrated if a number of premises are accepted: that neoliberalism privileges the freedom of the market and therefore its systems and policies privilege the economic over the socio-cultural; that culture, as well as policy (and thus cultural policy) is primarily representative of the socio-cultural lifeworld which provides the framework through which communication takes place in society (Habermas, 1987, p. 135); that the creative city is primarily representative of the
rationalising and dominating political-economic system, or the state, economy and capitalism (ibid., p. 318); and that the historical model of cultural production lends itself to dependence on and thus subservience to elites. If these premises are agreed, it can be extrapolated that the dominance of cultural policy by the instrumentalising market-oriented creative city, is firstly inevitable, and secondly, can be viewed as a form of systemic “colonisation” (ibid., p. 196).

In light of the legitimising role of the lifeworld in relations between the state and electorate, and in particular the role of culture in the lifeworld, the colonisation of cultural policy has significant repercussions for not only cultural policy, but also the state. These implications include: the erosion of “presuppositions” needed for productive and “meaningful” communication in society (Habermas, 1987, p. 131); the downgrading of “freedom of expression” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 229); and the failure of the state to resolve “problematic situations” (Habermas, 1987, p. 125) and “chronic antagonism[s]” in society (Eagleton, 2000, p. 6). However, the colonisation of cultural policy also undermines its own discourses of the public sphere and democracy (Eagleton, 2000, pp. 6-7; McGuigan, 2004, p. 59; Mokre, 2006; Mulcahy, 2006, p. 328; Vestheim, 2007, p. 217). The “common good” (Mokre, 2006, p. 308), and, as demonstrated in Scotland and Finland, civil society (Scottish Government, 2008; Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b).

This concern with democracy is replicated in arts projects, many of which explore issues of agency, activism and democracy, and include: Cork Caucus: on art possibility and democracy, a one-year project in 2005 developed by the National Sculpture Factory, Cork, Ireland, aiming to “provide ways in which the ambition of art to intervene in social life and political thinking could begin to be realised” (www.corkcaucus.org); Becoming Dutch, a two-year project developed by the Van Abbe Museum in Eindhoven in 2006, concerned with asking “whether art can offer alternative examples of thinking about how we can live together today” (http://www.becomingdutch.com/events); What keeps mankind alive?, conceived by curators WHW for the 2009 Istanbul Biennial project and named after a Bertolt Brecht song, concerned with rethinking the past, and asking how “art today harbours new potential in articulating the age-old relationship between art for social change and aesthetic gestures.” Available: http://universes-in-universe.org/eng/bien/istanbul_biennial/2009[Accessed 25 November 2012].
To illustrate this, just prior to Scottish devolution, in keeping with the legacy of the Scottish Enlightenment, the resurgence of nationalism through the SNP’s legitimation programme, and the influence of New Labour in Scotland, Scotland’s cultural policies have linked culture to “democratic renewal” (Matarasso, 1998, p. 1), “engaging citizens with civic life” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 8), encouraging “responsible citizens” (Scottish Executive, 2006a, p. 31) and improving citizenship (as indicated in the cultural performance measurement) (Scottish Government, 2009a). Similar discourses occur in Finland which posit culture as a “dynamic part of democracy, good governance, human rights and civil society programmes” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 68), creating “actively participating citizens” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009b, p. 23), and one of the “pivotal definers of humanity and citizenship” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 17). The colonisation of these cultural policies by the creative city, negates, disavows, undermines and renders hollow these cultural policy discourses (Chapter Three). Conversely, however, it should also be noted that although these discourses are driven by legitimation, they can also be viewed as a sincere political response to the growth of neoliberalism and perceived erosion of civil society (and lifeworld) agendas since the 1980s (Hewitt, 2011).

Nevertheless, there are complications with this analysis that were touched on in Chapter Two. Cultural policy, though it is symbolically representative of culture (if not practically) and therefore the lifeworld, is also a function of the state, and is thus representative of the system that is colonising it. This is not to disavow the a priori role of policy as a discourse working in symbolic meaning-creation, and therefore part of the

15 The use of civil society discourses by NGOs standing as a trope for “governance and democratization” (Spurk, 2010, p. 15) was particularly prevalent in the 1990s and specifically linked to funding applications (p. 14).
Similarly, as the creative city is a mode of implicit cultural policy and operates in a quasi-cultural field of symbolic meaning, it is also representative of the lifeworld. This demonstrates the interdependence and difficulty with separating these concepts, but potentially highlights the slippage (or colonisation) that occurs between system and lifeworld under neoliberalism, similar to that of the collapse in divisions between the public and private as critiqued by Habermas (Habermas, 1989, p. 27).

Similarly, if the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland are inherently instrumental and quantitative in terms of their broader economic discourses, and cultural policy is generally dominated by economic and social narratives and pressures, these policies are already colonised and thus there is nothing lost. However, these policies are in turn colonising those that depend on their support by using these narratives and operating their imperatives, resulting in structural instrumentalism. The creative city, therefore, further colonises an already historically colonised sector, and is merely the latest coloniser, undermining the original “radical” hopes for the paradigm (Vickery, 2011, p. 2).

As a result, both the creative city and cultural policy simultaneously legitimate (lifeworld) and colonise (system), which speaks to both the conflicting (the state’s and the public’s) mandates and political uses for culture and the dependence of the state on both public support and the market (illustrating Foucault and Habermas’s different understandings of legitimacy). Consequently, there are a number of ironies and paradoxes to contend with: cultural policy (and possibly the creative city) has been colonised and has been so for a long time and both cultural policy and the creative city represent aspects of the lifeworld and the system, are colonisers and operate as
justifications and legitimations for the state. This means that both paradigms ultimately de-legitimize policy and the state, undermining meaningful communication and trust in policy.

These factors suggest that despite criticisms and perceptions of both the creative city and cultural policy, their economic rationales, interests, influences, themes and approaches are closely aligned: instrumentally or transformatively deploying culture in the service of extrinsic (economic and social) objectives; being complicit in the colonisation of culture and both justifying and undermining the state and its relationship with the public. This ultimately suggests that cultural policy is historically, contemporaneously and structurally counterproductive (depending on its purpose), cannibalising, instrumental and colonisable. This situation necessarily suggests a Habermasian loss of legitimacy for cultural policy, public policy and thus the state. The next question that must be asked, therefore, is whether the creative city’s colonisation of cultural policy represents a crisis of legitimacy, involving a voluntary withdrawal of support for government and, via cultural policy, a failure of the necessary trust and public faith in the political system (Habermas, 1973, p. 46), a simple legitimacy loss, or business-as-usual.

7.2.4 Problems of legitimacy and examples from the cases

It has been suggested earlier that ongoing problems within cultural policy arise from its historical lack of mandate or policy problem and suggests a particular need for legitimacy. Later it was suggested that this legitimacy comes from two sources, within government (more powerful ministries) and without (the public). However, since the support needed by cultural policy from within government is directed at politicians and
ministries who are essentially concerned with re-election, this research has posited that internal government legitimacy ultimately serves external public legitimacy. Since Habermasian legitimacy concerns issues specific to public trust and uses the term crisis (in contrast with Foucault, for whom legitimacy is about longevity), there are two potential problems with the specific attribution of a crisis of legitimacy. In light of dual legitimation sources for cultural policy, its lack of an identifiable public mandate (evidenced by the shifting rationales), as well as the fragmented public support for subsidised culture (as evidenced by research), the loss (or lack) of legitimacy may or may not come from the public, and cannot constitute a crisis, as there cannot be a withdrawal of mass input of loyalty if an unsupportive public and sceptical central government never invested their loyalty or legitimacy in the first place.

Nevertheless, economic models such as the creative city, which blur the boundaries between public and private benefit, can be said to pose legitimacy problems if not crises, which create issues for not only the cultural sector affected by the colonising rationales, but also for the state. Examples of the impact of economic if not creative city colonisation on cultural policy, with potential legitimacy problems for the state, have in fact, already been referred to in the cases. Scotland offers two cases to consider. The first of these cases concerns Glasgow Life (see 5.3.1) and comprises allegations of corruption and criticisms of its operation as a “private company” (Gordon Nesbitt, 2011, p. 15). The specific charge at Glasgow Life was that it was involved in the unorthodox tendering out of services to a private corporation with links to its board and the board of Creative Scotland in 2009, in a process that was described as “odd” and “uneven” and subject to blatant vested interests (ibid., pp. 15-16). Though Glasgow Life refuted this accusation, the critical media attention it received and the debate it caused in cultural
circles (*ibid.*) undermined both Scotland’s cultural governance as well as the Scottish Government.

The second example of a legitimacy crisis comprises the gradual collapse of Creative Scotland and resignation of its first Chief Executive following its perceived disconnect with public cultural values in favour of government economic values, and the subsequent campaign of highly public criticism and scrutiny. This crisis followed the sustained withdrawal of trust in Creative Scotland from the arts community in particular, with “embarrassing” reputational implications for the Scottish Government (Miller, 2012, n.p.), particularly given the lengthy gestation process from which the body originally emerged.

Similarly in Ireland and as suggested in Chapter Five (5.5.4), Ireland’s major cultural tourism event, *The Gathering* (2013) made negative headlines with damaging reputational consequences for the country. The Gathering was primarily designed to leverage international investment through the diaspora who it urged to “work together to contribute to our overall efforts at economic recovery” (Slattery, 2009, n.p.) and to restore the “reputation of Ireland as a business-friendly State” (*ibid.*). Despite these statements, this event was packaged as a cultural initiative, with multiple references to high culture on its website, as well as homespun discourses of welcome, Irishness, belongingness and aims to showcase the “very best of Irish culture, tradition, business, sport, fighting spirit and the uniquely Irish sense of fun”.*16

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*16* Available: [www.thegathering.com](http://www.thegathering.com) [Accessed 5 March 2013].
Ironically, problems with the event came to prominence through the highly publicised comments of Ireland’s former cultural ambassador (actor Gabriel Byrne) who publicly described The Gathering as a naked “shakedown” of the Irish diaspora, the milking of tourists for a “few quid” (Irish Times, 2012c, n.p.) and a “scam” (Coyle, 2013, p. 3). The debate caused by Byrne’s statements in relation to the cynical presentation of an economic event, as a tourism or cultural event, was added to by comments from the head of Ryanair, who renamed the event, “the Grabbing” (ibid). These statements confirmed a stereotype of Ireland as a provincial country attempting to lure international visitors and businesses by hawking what the creative city championed as its “authentic cultural assets” (Florida, 2002, p. 302). This incident not only undermined public perceptions of the event, but from the state’s perspective, had the potential to undermine Brand Ireland, and the (new at the time) Irish Government. Given the importance of national branding to investment, as seen in all three cases, the potential for these cases to negatively impact the governments of Scotland and Ireland, is significant.

7.3 Colonisation and public policy

This reputational impact on governments (as demonstrated above), arising from too close a link between the state and the market, has wider implications if creative city discourse is judged against the principles of public policy as discussed in Chapter Four (see 4.4.4 and 4.4.5). That chapter demonstrated that policy originates from and is primarily about “the public” (Dewey, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. xv), as well as: the reconciliation or balance of public and private interests (Parsons, 1995, p. 16); the non-profit imperative (ibid., p. 6); the use of reason and knowledge; and the application of

17 The Gathering can be described as an implicit cultural policy in relation to the events it aims to influence and its work on the “culture of the territory over which it presides” (Ahearne, 2009, p. 143). The current Arts Minister commented that his “Department and the national cultural institutions which operate under its aegis are very pleased to support and participate” in the Gathering. Available: http://www.kildarestreet.com/debates/?id=2012-03-06.21.0 [Accessed 18 February 2013].
various problem-solving techniques (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4). Chapter Four also detailed how policy acts at a symbolic level as part of government legitimacy apparatuses and ideological tools, capable of manipulating and distorting information (Parsons, 1995, p. 14-15) as much as communication. The history of policy as both positive and negative, therefore, is embodied in these two apparatuses of decision-making and legitimising, and aligns with Habermas and Foucault’s different understandings of legitimacy (necessary v coercive) and discourse (productive v coercive) as demonstrated in Chapter Two (2.5.2).

Specifically, the positive or first model of policy can be viewed as part of a wider and transformational policy spirit or principle, concerning the duty of governments towards their collective citizens, despite those governments’ alignments with the often competing force of the market. Policy in this light can be viewed as contributing to: “the democratic or political capacities of people” (Parsons, 1995, p. 614); the “progressive democratization of mankind” (ibid., p. 616); the “sphere or domain of life which is not private or purely individual, but held in common” (ibid., p. 3); and (as influenced by the Utilitarians) “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (ibid., p. 45). This view is exemplified and amplified in citations from the “early days” of the social sciences (ibid., p. 612), in particular the views of mid-20th century US political scientist Harold Laswell. Lasswell described public policy as helping people to reach “a fuller realisation of human dignity” (Lasswell, cited in Parsons, 1995, p. 384), as well as aiding “enlightenment, the fuller development of individuals in society, and the development of consent, consensus, social awareness and legitimacy” (Parsons, 1995, p. 613).
Like Habermas’s theory of communicative reason and discourse ethics (1987), Lasswell’s interpretation of policy can be viewed as a 19th century paternalism or even governmentality, rooted in improving and civilising discourses based on rationalism and a disavowal of the issue of equity (ibid., p. 46). However, Lasswell’s emphasis on representation, education and spirit can also be viewed as opening out a wider space of policy discourse beyond policy as a technical, distorting or manipulative mechanism (though it may also be this), and echoes the positive aspects of modernity referred to earlier (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40). This view of policy places emphasis on the knowledgeable citizen (as much as knowledgeable government), positing policy as a form of public education (through the state), helping citizens to be better informed and their relationship to the state more productive, in contrast to policy as “simply the delivery of goods and services” (Parsons, 1995, p. 613). This model, therefore, resembles Habermas’s model of communicative reason, emphasising the transformational capacities of policy, rather than the pragmatic solving of issues that “clog up” the state’s agenda (Quinn, 1998, p. 15).

While avoiding an idealised paradigm of policy as predicated on Habermas’s discourse consensus, this view of policy offers a broad philosophical framework which can be argued to underpin the four key tenets of policy above (public spirit/balance of public/private interests, not-for-profit imperative, technical and knowledge base, and claim for legitimacy). While the creative city underlines the perpetually colonised status of cultural policy and notwithstanding the use of policy to distort (aligning with Foucault’s interpretation of discourse), this philosophical and practical policy framework helps consider the gap between policy in principle or at least the aspirations of policy, and policy in practice.
7.3.1 Compromising the principles of public policy

Firstly, it has been demonstrated that the creative city conflates public and private interests by focusing its benefits on private investment and development in cities. This activity directly challenges the balancing of public/private interests in the service of a common good and the welfare of the collective population (Parsons, 1995, p. 16), and furthers the slippage in understandings of the private and the public (Schlesinger, 2009a, p. 2), as criticised by Habermas (Habermas, 1989, p. 21). This is illustrated by the cases’ discourses of: attracting “international partners and new talent” (Scottish Government, 2008, p. 5); benefiting “significantly Scotland’s business and enterprise sectors” (Scottish Government, 2010b, p. 1); contributing to “investments and capital” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2009c, p. 31); and aiding “foreign direct investment” (Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. 92).18

Secondly, in presenting these economic development discourses, cultural policy is effectively positing private goods (investment, developments, etc.) as self-evident public goods arising out of public policy, which again underlines the ideological nature of “public good” (Hewitt, 2011, p. 20). This obscures, in plain sight, the “elite” (private) investor benefits (Sennett, 2006, p. 293) that arise from investment and development in cities (and that are implied by public goods), sustains the “status quo and the powerful” and works “against change and the powerless” (Edelman, cited in Parsons, 1995, pp. 180-181). In this way, cultural policies provide “ideological cover” for state-sponsored and market-oriented gentrification (Peck, 2007, n.p.) and understandings of the public good.

18Both Finland and Ireland also discuss private investment (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 34; Arts Council of Ireland, 2009, p. xxvii).
Similarly, the universal and singular public targeted by private commercial developments typical to regeneration (i.e., public coffee shops, meeting squares, etc.), represent a commercial public only, or a private interpretation of the public. Since “public spaces” are “always plural”, “striated and hegemonically structured”, if they are only open to those who wish to trade (i.e., buy or sell something), rather than those who wish to engage in a productive conflict, or agonistic and non-consensual public sphere (Mouffe, 2007, p. 158), they cannot be called public spaces. These developments, therefore, flatten unknowable publics (who are not allowed to enter putatively public spaces) and counter publics (or those offering an alternative to a normative public), compressing and making “impossible” a more inclusive and dynamic public sphere (Fraser, 1990, p. 68), as well as restricting democratic engagement (ibid., p. 80).

Equally, these spaces question the identity of the public, given that the identity of a space is a “function of its public, and reciprocally the identity of the public is at stake in the way the public space is constructed” (Mouffe, 2007, p. 160).

Thirdly, the creative city paradigm clearly contests the function of public policy as an alternative to, or a regulation of, the market that is unconcerned with profitability (Parsons, 1995, p. 6). Again, the privatisation of cultural activity, as demonstrated in Glasgow Life and Creative Scotland, as well as the investment discourses of the cases, and the general commodification of culture, clearly implies the drive for profitability (rather than sustainability) and thus the support of capitalism. National or local authority partnerships with the private sector, therefore, have also been described as substituting transient, unpredictable and risky “private resources for [non-risky] state responsibility” (Raunig, 2005, p. 17).
Forthly, the creative city ironically challenges the role of knowledge and expertise in public policy (Moran et al., 2006, p. 4). Though the appeal of creative city discourse lies partly in its function as a putative knowledge paradigm (as suggested earlier), and while knowledge is contingent and ideological, criticisms of its methodology and conclusions (lack of rigour, confusion between causation and correlation) raise the question as to whether the creative city can be said to constitute knowledge at all (Malanga, 2004, n.p.). Worse, however, the presence of elite, academic, industrial (non-public, expert) and private business interests in policy, actively represses public participation and knowledge–creation in policy (Parsons, 1995, pp. 167-168). This is due to the suffocating impact of expertise (and knowing better) on public involvement, agenda-setting, debate, and decisions, which narrows the range of policy options, and introduces a “one dimensionality” in policy debates (ibid., p. 396), as well as, again, degrading the public sphere.

Fifthly, the means-ends rationality and rhetorical devices (such as Florida’s 3 T’s) used by the creative city constitute limiting and “predefined goals” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 52), which can shut down open, deliberative or communicative processes, leading to an “uncritical acceptance” of means-end values (Oakley, 2004, p. 68). Further, the formulaic approach of the creative city, despite its flexibility to meet various state needs (as demonstrated by the case studies), ironically stretches understandings of reason and knowledge in policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 611).

Taken together: the support of the market (capitalism) at the expense of the public and electorate; the disavowal and distortion of understandings of public/private interests,
goods and spaces; the active pursuit of profit through culture; the misuse of knowledge and suppression of public input into policy; and the rational erosion of deliberative processes, undermines policy as a function and legitimation of the state, a core function of policy (Parsons, 1995, p. 612). Further, if policy is viewed as having at least the potential for positive (as well as negative) impact, the creative city’s colonisation of cultural policy necessarily disables its capacity to be part of the “progressive democratization of mankind” (Parsons, 1995, p. 616) and to represent the “fuller development of individuals in society” (ibid., p. 613).

In summary, this colonisation challenges policy’s capacity to uphold the “communicative rather than instrumental rationality of democratic societies” (Parsons, 1995, p. 615) by destabilising key public policy principles. While cultural policy may already be problematic and colonised, therefore, its colonisation by the creative city in particular, results in a broader and deeper colonisation of public policy in general, and a disavowal of policy per se. Ironically, what was intended as a legitimation strategy, delegitimates governments with repercussions for political-ideological systems.

7.3.2 Exposing issues in liberal democracies and models of democracy

The colonised cultural policies of Scotland and Finland not only demonstrate how cultural policies undermine core policy principles, pointing to legitimacy issues within their states, but also reflect historical and contemporary problems with models of democracy. As such, though democracy is usually benignly interpreted and invoked, there are deep criticisms of the basis on which it is upheld. Positive models of democracy typically describe it as comprising: participation and representation, legitimacy, balancing the rights of the individual and rights of the collective, resolving
conflict, nurturing knowledgeable and informed citizens (Held, 2006, p. 275), and
confering concepts of fairness, equality, (good) governance, and the good life (or life
worth living). While it has been demonstrated that the creative city clearly challenges
these descriptions of democracy (and therefore could be viewed as undemocratic), it is
more useful to consider the criticisms of democracy in order to further understand the
role of the paradigm in public policies.

There are many criticisms of democracy, each of which (as above) could be applied to
the creative city model, these are: its incapacity or unwillingness to effectively
determine how the people (or public) are constituted and who or what is representative
of them (Held, 2006, p. 1) as indicated by the creative city’s conflation of private space
with public terminology; its “indistinction between the public and private” (Ranciere,
2006, p. 55); and the invariable hegemony of property (owners) and the middle classes
(Held, 2006, p. 206, p. 177) rather than the “struggle against privatisation” that
democracy promises (Ranciere, 2006, p. 55). This view of cultural policy as revealing
the deficits of democratic models extends equally to criticisms of liberal democracies
which focus on the aggregation of the public good as the sum of private preferences
rather than collective benefit (Held, 2006, p. 246) and again, view those who challenge
the security or property of the market [as] actively threaten[ing] the “public good”
(Held, 2006, p. 76). By underlining the gap between policy in principle and practice,
and embodying key problems with democracy, the creative city essentially underlines
the flawed (and obfuscated) governance model used by most Western countries,
including the three cases.

19 Other criticisms of democracy consist of how to ensure the appropriate conditions for and articulation
of participation in rule and how to ensure “knowledgeable and informed” citizens to ensure a quality of
participation (Held, 2006, p. 275).
7.3.3 Underlining relationships: the state, market, private property, legitimacy, the common good and good governance

As referred to in Chapter One, the privileging of private property and private ownership of the means of production has historically been linked to utilitarianism (Held, 2006, p. 77) but constitutes one of the fundamental criticisms of democratic models. As such, privatisation is one of the key ideological issues in contemporary political economy and theories of the state. As a proponent of liberalism, the utilitarian tradition is a key challenger to the power of the state, advancing a limited state intervention into the market, while promoting maximum freedom to the private sector (ibid., p. 76). The advantages conferred on the private sector by the state arises from its dependence on the generation of wealth by private corporations (as pursued through the policies of Scotland and Finland), which, as Habermas contends, leads to the need for legitimacy in the first place (Habermas, 1973, p. 11). In Habermas’s view, class-dominated systems implicitly privilege the market and the “appropriation of socially produced wealth” (ibid., p. 20), and are therefore challenged to “resolve the problem of distributing the surplus social product inequitably and yet legitimately” (ibid., p. 96). This helps to obscure the uneven distribution of wealth via the complex role of the state and capitalism in relation to the public and the market (Foucault, 1994, p. 201).

In order to understand the reflexive bind between the state and the market vis-à-vis the colonised cultural policies of Scotland and Finland, it is necessary to briefly consider the nature of their (the state and market) relationship. While the economy is understood as a legitimate area of public concern (Fraser, 1990, p. 73), views are divided between those who charge the state with regulating and monitoring corporations and the market (on behalf of the electorate), and liberals who believe in a hands-off or laissez-faire
approach. Max Weber, a key critic of rationalism sided with the former approach, believing that in the absence of monitoring bureaucrats, the state would “fall prey” to “powerful private interests” (such as landholders and capitalists) who would “not have the national interest as their prime concern” (Weber, cited in Held, 2006, p. 133). However, as the three cases show, the state and its civil servants (via politicians) also push the boundaries of market co-operation/regulation.

The close relationship between states and markets in the twentieth century also arises out of the link between (and discursive appeal of) capitalism and democracy. This link has roots in the “social compromise between capital and labour” that followed World War II, where huge wealth was created in tandem with increased social benefit, stability, and the welfare state (Harvey, 2005, p. 16). This created an enduring and benign view of democracy as a facilitator of consumer capacity and choice, bringing the concepts of state, market and democracy together. The state’s vested interest in capital accumulation, or capitalist-friendly decision making (and thus its closeness to the private sector and property development), however, is not simply a question of democracy or providing for the public, but is fundamentally a consequence of ensuring its own welfare and longevity (Offe, cited in Held, 2006, p. 176). Since the state depends on international investors to finance its administration, it essentially depends on the markets as represented by investors. As the cases of Scotland and Finland show, their states are engaged in servicing the needs of their economies by providing the right kind of workers, by engineering education systems and labour law to create these workers; by generating tax regulations that favour private companies; and by facilitating taxation and banking to make it easier for corporations to locate. In other words, these

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processes help secure the capitalist “structural prerequisites of reproduction” (Habermas, 1973, p. 21).

The closeness of states and markets (and the market colonisation of the former) has been emphasised by the recent international recession, and specifically, the “public bailout of private capitalism” and investors in the EU (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). This specific colonisation revealed how states were operating as private “debt-collecting agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of investors” (ibid., p. 28). Similarly, the requirements of international bailout mechanisms such as the IMF and EU, further increased the dependency of the state on the market, as well as decreasing national sovereignties, most particularly in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal (ibid., p. 26). In addition to colonisation, this situation demonstrates the erosion of democracy (however contested) that ensues from too close a relationship between the state and the market, resulting in the state’s inability or unwillingness to “mediate between the rights of citizens and the requirements of capital accumulation” (ibid., p. 25).20 This relationship makes it difficult for those outside “political and financial elites” to decode the balance of interests in policy, and, in particular, to “identify their own” (ibid., p. 28). Further, the situation underlines how citizens’ “interests and demands are incommensurable with those of capital owners” (ibid., p. 29).

As indicated by Habermas (1973, p. 96), however, and critical to these cultural policies, in order to secure or maintain legitimacy and thus “mass electoral support” (Held, 2006, p. 194), the state’s embrace of capitalism (and markets) must appear neutral (as

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20 The case of a country indebted to international banks and investors, equating sovereign debt with private debt, has been highlighted many times in recessionary Ireland. Most specifically, this conflation of public and private debt concerns the state’s assigning of promissory notes to cover and indemnify the huge debts incurred by (now defunct) private banking institutions, who the Irish state deemed essential to the health of the Irish economy. See (Regan, 2012).
indicated in the dualist discourses of the three cases) and sustain the “accumulation process without undermining either private accumulation or the belief in the market as a fair distributor of scarce resources” (Held, 2006, p. 177). The cases of Scotland and Finland exemplify this in their benign narratives of culture, citizenship and the public sphere in juxtaposition with private investment discourses, which are designed to prevent a “focus on the contradictions of capital” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 30).

This understanding of the obfuscated relationship between the state and the economy posits the “contradictory imperatives” and legitimacy needs of the state as both intervening and providing longevity for capitalism on which it depends (for taxes) and thereby working “in the service of the ruling class” (Bennett, 1998, p. 5), while simultaneously maintaining the facade of even-handedness (to the public collective interest) (Held, 2006, p. 177). This represents once more how discourse works as “containment in the face of anomalies and contradictions”, particularly in relation to state policy (Shapiro, 1990, p. 333) and demonstrates the contradictory imperatives of policy, covertly championing the economy and capitalism while maintaining equity and citizenship discourses.

The close relationship between the state and the market as seen in cultural policies (also maintained by the market which needs the state as a financial partner and provider of a secure and stable business environment) highlights tensions between models of democracy, capitalism and those who criticise the separation of the public sphere from the state. However, the implication of these factors (conflating public and private interests, compromising understandings of the people, privileging private above public
interests, the hegemony of the middle classes) goes beyond models of democracy, to the concept of the common good, government, and governance (see 4.4.2).

As Chapter Seven (7.3.1) has demonstrated, the creative city also disrupts collective rather than individual understandings of the common good (Foucault, 1994, p. 210)\textsuperscript{21} by equating economic development with the public (and common) good. Also, while the creative city may partly meet the rationalist and efficiency aims of both government and governance, the paradigm abjures UNESCO’s model of good governance (albeit contested), comprising: participation (diminished through the exclusiveness of the creative city), transparency (undermined through the conflation of public and private), equity (as before) and inclusiveness.\textsuperscript{22} In this light, and bearing in mind Chapters Five and Six, colonisation by the creative city not only delegitimates cultural policy and highlights many of its problems, but undermines public policies more widely, reflecting critical problems in democracy, challenging benign views of government as “society’s better self” (McGuigan, 2004, p. 35), and eroding collective (Aristotelian) understandings of the common good and governance.

\textbf{7.4 What is cultural policy for?: returning to the question of mandate}

Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to return to the question that continues to be raised in this research and particularly within the last three chapters. While it has been demonstrated that the state and private sector get to decide what constitutes cultural policy in the first place, via narratives, constructions, and the endorsement of

\textsuperscript{21} See also section 4.4.2. The private sector and individualist focus of the creative city paradigm supports the liberal conception of the common good, as predicated on, and determined by, individual rights and liberties, rather than the reverse, which stresses the dependency of individual freedoms on the \textit{a priori} exercise of civic and public services or duties, representing a collective concept of the common good (Skinner, 1992).

\textsuperscript{22} See Chapter Four (4.4.2. footnote # 21).
value systems (i.e. the state’s role is to prop up capitalism), questions around the purpose of cultural policy, or what cultural policy is for, remain. It has been argued that the contested, complex and amorphous character of culture, the limiting of definitions of cultural policy to activities rather than purposes (and activities that other sectors deliver better) and the wide range of uses for culture in cultural policies, is central to this question. As such, Chapter Four has shown that typical definitions of cultural policy describe the benefits of culture and thus what cultural policy does, whether that be forming and governing subjects (O’Regan, 2001), regularising and promoting cultural practices (ICCPR), and/or intervening in cultural activity more generally (Cunningham, 2003), rather than what cultural policies are designed for in the wider sense of electoral mandate.23

However, in addition to the shifting nature of culture and the lack of explicit purpose in these definitions, other factors have emerged throughout this dissertation which also highlight and inform this question. These factors are: the function of discourse and thus policy as a strategic system of communication, power, and state legitimation (Chapter Two); the general (Chapter Three) and particular (local) uses for culture and cultural practitioners in the cultural policies of Scotland, Finland and Ireland (Chapters Five and Six); the shifts in (non-cultural) uses and rationales for culture (Chapter Four); the limited nature of public good or market failure rationales to explain the state funding of culture (Chapter Four); the dichotomous and confused (positive and negative) media accounts of cultural investment (Chapter Six); the “performance” (Paquette, 2008, p. 298) ; the lack of sincerity and the presence of cynical reason involved in funding relationships (Chapters Four and Six); the lack of an identifiable cultural policy problem

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23 The question of what cultural policy is for is the same question asked of universities and education, particularly in the context of neoliberal market functionalities. See Collini (2012).
or public mandate (this chapter); the questionable validity of economic or social arguments for cultural policy if judged on their own terms (this chapter); the dualisms and paradoxes involved in arguments for culture; the creative city’s simultaneous legitimation and delegitimation of policy and the state (this chapter); and finally, the state’s obfuscated relationship with the market (this chapter).

These contexts demonstrate the lack of consensus, lack of trust, confusion and crisis of ideas in cultural policies in general (Szántó, 2010), at least in terms of how to represent the greater value or putative purpose of culture in societies. The covert nature of cultural policy discourses in particular, as demonstrated in the research, also points to a reluctance on the part of governments to make cultural policy “subject to public validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336), recalling both cynical reason (Sloterdijk, 1987) and a lifeworld/system imbalance (see 2.5.1). In this context, it is not surprising that cultural policy has no clear mandate, is a weak sector that is perpetually colonised and has sustained legitimacy problems (both within and without).

Equally, while it has been said that “most parties, conservative as well as radical and socialistic/social democratic ones, accept the viewpoint that the nation state and the regional and local government bodies should support culture” (Vestheim, 2007, p. 218), this does not explain why. While it may not be realistic for all policy texts to set out their respective founding principles, it might reasonably be expected that a coordinating policy principle would underpin or at least be inferred from individual policies. This lack of articulacy has been touched on repeatedly in relation to claims about cultural policy’s inability to find the “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.), though, again,
there is no consensus over what “necessary” means in a sector divided between pragmatic and romantic views of instrumentalism.

However, this research has demonstrated the extreme pliability of culture to governments, and consequently the various uses to which culture is put by ruling elites. The dissertation has also illustrated the local needs that culture addresses for countries, most particularly in relation to the economy (Scotland, Finland, Ireland), declining populations, workers (Scotland), globalisation (Finland) and reputation (Ireland). While these goals arguably represent the state’s rather than the public’s problems/needs (i.e. the cases’ discourses of attracting investment through cultural symbolism speaks to governments’ support of capitalism) and in that sense are not mandated, they can be viewed conversely as the *sui generis* reason or purpose behind cultural policy. This situation suggests that cultural policy is not only *used* to deliver other government agendas, but that its’ *a priori purpose* and role in government, is to deliver other government agendas. As section 6.2 has outlined, this claim is supported at the highest echelons of political representation, highlighted in comments by Scotland’s former First Minister Jack McConnell, who asserted that cultural policy should not have any policy objective of its own (McConnell, 2003, n.p.).

Further, if various discourses in cultural policy, including those in Scotland, Finland and Ireland (encouraging foreign direct investment, attracting highly educated workers and branding countries), are viewed not as legitimising culture, but as legitimising the state’s involvement with capitalism, or the actions of various states, *through* culture, this would explain the apparent lack of consensus on cultural policy and its role in delivering other agendas, however inadequately. As such, if other policy sectors can
deliver economic, social or diplomatic agendas better or more directly than culture, the maintaining of cultural policy as a separate sector is redundant. This also suggests that discourses of market failure and public goods, as well as rationales, measurement and evidence (size and impact of sector, public interest), though described as a “matter of survival for the cultural sector” (DCMS, 2010, p. 13), are effectively “displacement” (Belfiore, 2012, p. 107) discourses, and are immaterial in terms of advocacy and funding. This is a profound situation in the context of the time and effort spent on research and in appealing to and justifying cultural policies.

All three sets of cultural policies, therefore, have shown that the state’s complicit relationship with, and democratic legitimation of, capitalism and the market, is part of the survival of those states and constitutes the purpose of cultural policy, a factor consistent with theories of hegemonic cultural capital. Like many contradictions pointed to during the course of this research and as indicated earlier (see 7.2.3), this also suggests that cultural policy, like the creative city, works apparently counterproductively (depending on how you view its purpose) and structurally to colonise and be colonised, impacting on relationships amongst its stakeholders. In short, debates about instrumentalism and the role of culture in society and discussions in relation to the public funding of culture, raise the question of whether these terms can be interrogated or even matter, if there is either no agreement about the purpose and desired impact of cultural policy in the first instance, or if its purpose is indeed only to deliver other sectoral agendas.

Though it has been claimed that all policy is instrumental and strategic (Gray, 2007, p. 205) and legitimates government, and in this respect cultural policies are no different, as Chapter One outlined at the start of the thesis, this is usually achieved by addressing a self-evident public need (Burstein, 1991), in the particular policy sector area. This research has therefore demonstrated that while cultural policies reflect a range of state rather than public needs, the result of this is that there is no self-evident requirement for cultural policy other than to meet wider government agendas. As such, this effectively makes cultural policy a comparatively different area of government activity, despite policy’s attempts to bring it into line with other areas by increased evidence-building, and argumentation.

7.5 Conclusions
This chapter has underlined the potential problems for cultural policy and the state arising from its use of instrumental discourses such as the creative city. It showed how the colonisation of cultural policy by the creative city arises from structural instrumentalism and, therefore, is endemic, creating long-term issues for an already problematic, colonised and colonising sector lacking an identifiable public mandate. Specifically, the chapter demonstrated that the creative city presents both general and specific problems for cultural policy. The chapter recalled the general problems caused by cultural instrumentalism, which included: the addressing of objectives which might be better served by other policy areas, a disregard for cultural content, and the prioritisation of outcomes ahead of processes. In addition, the chapter outlined the particular problems caused by the creative city: the spectacularisation and simulation of culture (reinforcing a limited view of what culture might constitute), the exaggeration of economic impacts (and erosion of trust between policy stakeholders) and the ignoring of
the practical terms and needs of cultural production (thus eschewing sustainability issues).

However, as was suggested in Chapter Four, it was also demonstrated that cultural policy is deeply flawed (lacking consensus on culture, lacking a policy problem and mandate, an excess of rationalism, dualism, apathy, biases, a lack of democracy and a lack of status). Further, it was suggested that cultural policy is instrumentalising and colonising those it supports, reflecting the structural and cyclical impact of colonisation and in particular, the precarious relationship between the state, the market, and the public/electorate. Though putatively legitimising cultural policy, therefore, the creative city creates an imbalance between the demands of the system, over those of the lifeworld which raises the prospect of a legitimacy problem for cultural policy.

The chapter further underlined how the colonisation of cultural policy by the creative city undermines the benign principles of public policy in general, with serious ramifications for the state beyond cultural policy. These implications are that the creative city, through policy, upholds stringent criticisms of models of democracy, by emphasising how the state privileges capital and private property, conflates and distorts concepts of the public and private (goods), supports the market at the expense of the collective good, implicitly presents capital accumulation as desirable and unquestionable and uses policy to confuse and obfuscate economic agendas. This situation represents the profound contradiction in contemporary capitalist states, that of the dualist position of the state vis-à-vis its appeal to the public for its legitimacy on the one hand, and its dependence on the private sector for its longevity on the other, or the democratic legitimisation of capitalism. These factors also point to the historical
continuum of culture and cultural policy’s role in state and ruling power legitimation. This is especially significant as both the creative city and cultural policy purport to enhance democracy and participation by deploying anti-colonising (or communicative and civil society) discourses (which may or may not be covert attempts to obscure the inherent contradictions of the discourse), in spite of the broader legitimising function of policy.

Ultimately, it was demonstrated that the weakness of cultural policy as a sector, as reflected in the many definitions of and uses for culture, and thus its lack of a coherent public mandate (and presence of multiple conflicting mandates), creates many of its problems. Together, the chapters have demonstrated that these weaknesses originate in the shifting and contested (and political) nature of culture and its lack of a tangible public policy problem to solve, pointing to a general confusion over what cultural policy is for other than to deliver other more important government agendas. The problems caused by and reflecting this weakness were demonstrated to be: transient rationales for culture in cultural policy; dualisms; public and political apathy for cultural policy; the delivery of other government agendas as the de facto and primary role of cultural policy; the erosion of trust amongst cultural policy stakeholders and structural (cultural) instrumentalism coupled with colonisation.

Despite being designed to legitimate the state, therefore, (negative) instrumentalism, as demonstrated by the colonisation of Scotland’s, Finland’s and Ireland’s cultural policies (by the creative city), both undermines trust amongst the stakeholders of cultural policy and delegitimizes the state. Instrumentalism also erodes the normative models of
democracy on which the discourses of cultural policy and the state depend, once again revealing culture to be inadvertently complicit with capitalism.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL POLICY

8.1 Introduction

This dissertation presented a case for analysing the text-based discourses of cultural policy vis-à-vis the framework of the creative city paradigm, in order to explore and expose key characteristics, pressures and imperatives in the cultural policy sector. Of equal importance to this research was a consideration of what was at stake in the relationship between cultural policy and the creative city, which was demonstrated to be: the purposes, rationales and mandate of cultural policy and the impact of this on the status and legitimacy of culture ministries; the relationships between cultural policy stakeholders and the effect of this on cultural policy and its value systems; and the state’s balance between public and private interests and the legitimacy of the state itself.

In order to answer the question of what constituted the relationship between a popular model of urban development and explicit cultural policy, three investigations were conducted. These investigations comprised: a survey of the historical and genealogical connections between the two paradigms, a discourse analysis of three sets of cultural policies, and an examination of what occurred, how and why it occurred and the meanings generated from that. Following the claim that difficulties within cultural policies lead to legitimacy deficits and perpetual and problematic argumentation (of which the creative city was one example), this dissertation established a number of key factors. Firstly, the research established the historical, conceptual and discursive links between explicit cultural policy and the narrative of the creative city. Secondly, using discourse analysis and Foucauldian discourse formation theory in relation to policy texts
produced between 2000 and 2010 in Scotland, Finland and Ireland, the dissertation demonstrated the overlapping and emigration of creative city discourses to the cultural policies of Scotland and Finland. Thirdly, using Habermas and Sloterdijk, the research analysed what this revealed about the state of cultural policies in general and what the implications of this were in respect of wider public policy, the state and models of democracy.

8.2 Main outcomes/findings

As a result, this research demonstrated that key features of creative city discourses were particularly present in the cultural policies of Scotland and Finland (and less so in Ireland) and that it operates as a legitimation device within those policies. The legitimation of cultural policy to the electorate by the creative city depends on providing tangible rationales for investment into culture based on its role as an important economic generator. In legitimating cultural policy to the public, the creative city legitimates the state, in the ultimate service of state longevity, though given the dominance of system (political-economic) imperatives in the creative city, this is counterproductive.

Specifically, within cultural policy, the creative city operates as an unquestioned and elite form of knowledge, claim or truth about culture, whose persuasiveness is dependent on a range of policy fits and socio-cultural and political-economic ideologies and discourses. This factor is a key feature of the successful integration of the creative city into, and traction within, policy in general. This dissertation also showed that the appeal of the creative city is equally driven by its role as an apparently disinterested and
meritocratic paradigm, pointing to the importance of renewing the supply of supportive or legitimising discourses to cultural policies in ways that the public can understand.

As such, while contested as a term, the putatively democratic and often quantifiable nature of instrumentalism, through the creative city, was demonstrated and acknowledged to be useful to policymakers in raising the profile of and legitimising culture to other government departments, as well as to a lesser degree, aspects of the electorate. In addition to legitimising the actions of the state, instrumentalism works to counteract accusations of elitist autonomous discourses of culture’s intrinsic value and again, points to the value of a paradigm like the creative city.

The local or individual fit of the creative city paradigm within each country (responding to different state problems), also showed that the paradigm, like culture, has the flexibility to meet a range of local and national (non-cultural) needs and that in the absence of any meta cultural rationale, delivering other government agendas can be understood as constituting the primary function of cultural policies. As such, instrumental discourses such as the creative city (as a generator of private wealth) can also be posited as a simulacrum of the searched-for cultural policy problem, further highlighting the lack of cultural purpose in cultural policy. This meeting of needs further ensured the transferability of creative city discourse, and highlighted the adaptability of the paradigm to liberal democratic policies in particular.

In addition, given the shared geographic and peripheral situations of the three cases on the northern fringes of Europe, it can be homologously extrapolated that the creative city particularly appeals to countries struggling to assert an internationalism, visibility and strong identity (especially those looking to promote themselves as cosmopolitan
hubs of the knowledge economy). It can also be deduced that the creative city appeals to countries with few natural resources and small populations that depend on securing and maintaining renewed supplies of workers and residents.

However, it was equally demonstrated (through the creative city), that cultural policy discourses are often contradictory, and have to appeal to dual expectations and multiple mandates from cultural policy stakeholders, as well as indicating a political unwillingness to be tied to one policy discourse rather than another. These discourses also deploy devices such as strategic containment and nominalisation to create particular regimes of thought that support and obfuscate state ideologies, particularly that of its relationship with the market. In addition, as an expression of these policies, the presence of the creative city in cultural policy simultaneously demonstrates and embodies key criticisms of and problems within liberal democracies in general.

It was deduced, therefore, that there is a structural receptivity in cultural policy to instrumental (usually economic) discourses due the vacuum of purpose within the sector and the need for the state to justify its actions through policy. The structural nature of instrumentalism in cultural policy particularly arises from the hierarchical and thus unequal relationship between the funder and the funded, driving an involuntary cycle of cynical reasoning in that relationship. As such, in considering the (lack of) agency and traction available to cultural policymakers as well as practitioners, a case was made that instrumentalism of any kind is rarely truly voluntary, and arises from the need, rather than desire, to attach cultural projects to whichever source of funding or influence offers the most chance of success (power, finance, status). This potentially causes more problems than it solves by creating a cycle of (often inauthentic narratives in both
policies and funding applications, which compromise value-systems, exaggerate deliverables, and divert scarce resources of time and money to poor or culturally-secondary outcomes.

From this analysis, using Habermas’s concept of colonisation, it was possible to extrapolate that all three sets of policies were colonised and made colonisers by the political-economic system (which leads to them colonising those they encounter), following the imbalance between system and lifeworld imperatives, through the creative city paradigm and ultimately the reason of state. As indicated by cynical reason, this colonised and colonising behaviour of cultural policy undermines trust in the sector by fostering a culture of “performance” amongst the policy stakeholders (Paquette, 2008, p. 298), as well promoting discordant discourses of capitalism and commodification, alongside civil society, democratic and intrinsic discourses of cultural value.

The creative city paradigm, therefore, exacerbates an already difficult situation and points to the potential for a future Habermasian crisis of legitimacy for cultural policy and the state (as was hinted at in examples from the cases), despite the paradoxical fact that this colonisation and possible crisis, was caused by a discourse designed to legitimate. However, it was concluded that the presence of the creative city in cultural policy might not represent a crisis of legitimacy, given that as a policy sector without a self-evident purpose, it is in permanent crisis. Nevertheless, as suggested, the cases demonstrated that the economic colonisation of cultural policy, arising from structural instrumentalism, fundamentally undermines relationships between cultural policy stakeholders and causes identifiable (via the cases) legitimation problems for both cultural policy and the state.
It was ultimately claimed that it is the richness, immersive, multi-functionality and horizontal nature of culture as central to all expressive life, which contributes to the lack of clarity around the policy role for culture. This situation makes it difficult to administer culture and separate the cultural from the non-cultural, though the strategic outcome of this is also linked to the inherently instrumental nature of all policymaking. It also revealed that the creative city aligns with the strategic approach of cultural policy and operates as a mode of implicit cultural policy (operating within explicit cultural policy) that ultimately challenges and weakens it.

In summation, therefore, this research demonstrated that various discourses such as the creative city are used by cultural policies to justify and legitimate (to a range of different constituencies), not just those policies, but also the actions and ideologies (in this case capitalism and neoliberalism) of the individual state, as well as offering a rare insight on how cultural policies are used to solve (at least symbolically), as well as obfuscate, individual national problems and agendas. As such, this dissertation has illustrated the profound pressure and role of cultural policies to: make “common cause” (Cultural Commission, 2005, p. 2) with government; deliver other ministers’ (McConnell, 2003, n.p.); and political “colleagues” (Higgins, 2013a, n.p.) objectives; and to be effectively “exploited” (Finnish Ministry of Education, 2010a, p. 16). This dissertation, therefore, revealed how normative discourses in cultural policy (i.e. the creative city) can demonstrate structural deficits and a lack of clear mandate within it, highlighting the assumed nature of capitalism in European liberal democratic policies, and inconsistencies in democratic capitalism and the actions and reason of the state.
8.3 Contributions to knowledge

This research has built the case for a new consideration of the discursive and theoretical relationship between the general field of explicit cultural policy and the specific construct of the creative city urban policy paradigm, via individual cultural policy cases. This investigation has led to a better understanding of both cultural policy and the creative city, but cultural policy in particular. Specifically it demonstrated that though the discourse of public policy is already an established area of inquiry (Shapiro, 1990; Cataldi, 2004; Jones, 2009), as has been shown (Barbieri, 2012), there is particular value in excavating the discourses of the apparently marginal policy area of culture to reveal legitimation mechanisms for not just cultural policies, but local problems and state ideologies. This excavation also demonstrated that the purpose of cultural policy is to address other government agendas, in the absence of any other public or cultural mandate and by way of legitimising state activity. The research also underlined new connections as well as positing new trajectories and genealogies between creativity discourses, cultural policy and the creative city.

The research demonstrated that the creative city paradigm is a dominant and colonising discourse (along with others) that flexibly meets the needs of (Scottish and Finnish) national agendas, and is a counter-productive justificatory regime for cultural and public policy. The research showed that instrumentalism in cultural policy is cyclical, structural, self-perpetuating and fosters cynical reason amongst cultural policy stakeholders. This ultimately pointed to the reflexive and restrictive nature of cultural policy’s conflicting and/or unidentified public mandate, low status, and consequent drives for and facilitation of legitimacy in government. This uniquely highlights, with
the help of Habermas’s system and lifeworld concepts, if not the involuntary nature of attaching non-cultural state agendas to cultural policy, at least a compromised agency.

However, this research equally established the closeness and interdependency of the state and the market via the covert presentation of capital (via investment and development) and flexible accumulation present in cultural policy, as desirable and natural, and economic progress as a self-evident public good (rather than an ideological position). As suggested above, this research also revealed that cultural policies effectively operate as industrial and urban development policies (along with environmental, foreign and social policy) which have come to constitute cultural policy per se. While there are beneficial aspects to this horizontality in government (visibility, promoting values, apparent relevance), it ultimately undermines the independence, status and potential of cultural policy to address specifically cultural issues.

In this way, the policy success of the creative city raises important questions to do with both the unrealised potential of cultural policy and the role of the state vis-à-vis its ability to “mediate between the rights of citizens and the requirements of capital accumulation” (Streeck, 2011, p. 25). These issues, and in particular the private sector discourses in cultural policies, were not revealed, but were in effect, as discourses, hiding in plain sight, or existing in a “public form” particular to discourse (Foucault, 1984, n.p.). The public form of cultural policy discourse, therefore, effectively called to attention the “incommensurable” interests and demands of citizens and capital owners (Streeck, 2011, p. 29).
This research therefore brings new issues to light (the structural colonisation of cultural policy by the creative city paradigm), and insights to an old problem (legitimacy, cultural policy, the state and capitalism), with a view to a deeper understanding of fundamental principles of cultural policy and the state. Ultimately this research argues that means-end and dualist rationalism in cultural policy, starts out as a strategy of survival based on the state’s complicated but complicit relationship with capitalism and the lack of mandate within cultural policy, but has the potential to end up as a politics of extinction in revealing the putatively undemocratic nature of that relationship. Having investigated the colonising and legitimising paradigms of the creative city and cultural policy, the question remains of whether something can be salvaged from both paradigms.

8.4 Future directions

This research did not intend to posit a new model or norm for cultural policy by calling to attention its deficits and its exposure of wider state issues. Given the lack of consensus as to what cultural policy is for in the first place (though this research has deduced this to be a vehicle to deliver other government agendas), a normative view of cultural policy is not only undesirable but also unrealistic. Rather, the aim behind this research was to interpret the meaning of cultural policy as is. What the cases revealed was the influence of neoliberalism on cultural policy and that of instrumentalism, but a particularly negative or one-dimensional, contradictory and cynical instrumentalism, of which the creative city was but one example.

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1 This term arises from environmentalism and was coined by Lewis Regenstein for his book, ‘The Politics of Extinction’ (Macmillan Press), 1975, concerning the threat to various animal species from instrumental legislation.
However, by analysing policy literature and discourses of culture, and looking at
democratic principles in respect of colonisation, a number of additional insights about
cultural policy can be posited. Though it might be assumed, both conceptually and
etymologically, that culture and policy (and thus cultural policy) concern culture and the
public (as contested as the public is), embodying public policy and democratic norms, it
was demonstrated that neither culture nor the public are driving factors of cultural
policy. Instead, this research argued that what drives cultural policy is ultimately the
legitimation of the state, as a response to confusions over what cultural policy is for and
the broader alignment of the state with the economy and capitalism.

Cultural policy, therefore, only represents the public insofar as the state needs
legitimation from the public to survive. As such, while the research aimed to consider
the benign attributes of the creative city paradigm (cultural visibility, tangible outcomes
etc.) in the context of both the narrow and wider imperatives driving it within cultural
policies, by charging it in respect of reflexive colonisation and legitimacy loss for
cultural and public policy, the research ultimately aligned itself with a view of the
paradigm as an example of negative instrumentalism. This raises the question of
whether anything can be salvaged from the creative city model.

To answer this question, the visibility and branding appeal of the paradigm must be
considered. Despite the implications of the creative city for public policy and models of
democracy, the creative city, as a cultural as well as urban development model, has
arguably worked, and as demonstrated, has been perceived to work as a more effective
and rational cultural advocate than explicit cultural policy itself. In line with
observations that the tourism sector is often the most visible champion of culture in
cities (Garcia, 2004, p. 316), creative city activity, as described through the cases of Scotland, Finland and Ireland, widens the debate about the way culture is understood and valued in societies and governments. Equally, culture and urban regeneration narratives are easier for media sources and politicians to grasp than more autonomous cultural policy rationales. The creative city paradigm, therefore, underlines the capacity of culture to work across and prove its value to other sectors, calling to attention its central role in all aspects of life.

In this respect there may be room for reclaiming at least the “promise of radical change” engendered by the creative city (Vickery, 2011, p. 2). There may also be value in considering the potential role for cultural policy in creating the “social conditions” for creativity rather than prescriptions for it (ibid., p. 13) and greater clarity around the state’s interest in and purpose for culture. A new role for the creative city paradigm in policy, therefore, might be to work with a renewed and purposeful (or mandated) discrete cultural policy sector, rather than replacing or dominating it and, in particular, move away from its singular commodification and competition mode.

This would also provide a template for other government policy portfolios or causes to actively engage with culture, complementing, though separate to, cultural policy. It might be more useful to consider urban development narratives as more generally beneficial for culture within an urban rather than cultural policy context, leaving room for explicit cultural policy to offer something different. Without proposing a silo-based approach to policy and recognising the value of cross-sectoral co-operation and acknowledgment of culture’s values across government, this proposes leaving the
(amended) creative city within industrial policy and culture (primarily) within cultural policy.

Nevertheless, as argued above, it is unclear how the creative city project can be re-realised along the lines described, given how deeply entrenched its branding is, but, more so, the inevitable imbalance of power between it as representative of the system and explicit cultural policy as primarily driven by the lifeworld. It might also be argued that a renewed role for creativity in societies was the basis for the paradigm in the first instance. This research, therefore, contends that in spite of potentialities embedded in the creative city, as it is currently interpreted, it has negative implications for both cultural and public policy, regardless of where it is placed. Though it may be possible for the creative city paradigm to deliver a series of benefits that could separately meet cultural policy, urban tourism and heritage policy objectives (in addition to its industrial objectives), the extent of reconsideration that would need to take place could be viewed as a new policy model.

In considering the difficulty of mandate, purpose and apathy in governments towards culture, the question turns again to what is wanted from cultural policy other than its subservience to other policy sectors, if it is not to become “obsolete or irrelevant” to the public/s (Pratt, 2005, p. 41). Given this dissertation’s suggestion that cultural policy is in perpetual crisis, and in light of the contested nature of culture, is it possible to salvage or recover an unidentifiable object (i.e., cultural policy)? The research has shown that opinion is divided between those who see long-term risk for culture (and thus deliberative possibilities) in relation to instrumentalist rationales (McGuigan, 2004) and those who see both good and bad instrumentalisms, viewing it as a democratic and
pragmatic necessity (in terms of the function of government) and something to be managed in balance with other (intrinsic) cultural valuations (Belfiore, 2012).

This disagreement over instrumentalism points to what is a fundamental dilemma in cultural policy discourses of instrumentalism, which is that it is: “no good trying to relate all the value of arts and culture to monetary valuations, and equally unhelpful to try to justify the arts as some kind of special case, different from all other spending priorities and subject to unique criteria” (Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 13). The implication of this position is that cultural policies need a balanced range of instrumental arguments, those that stress the economic outputs of culture and those that stress the putatively intrinsic values of culture.

However, this suggestion of balance arises precisely because arts and cultural policies are different to other more self-evident areas of government, by virtue of their multiple legitimacy discourses and servicing of other more important government agendas. Equally, other factors pointing to the dissimilarity of cultural policy to other policy areas comprise: culture’s complex, contested, subjective, and shifting nature; cultural policy’s exceptionally difficult foundation period and extra-ministerial construction; its lack of an identifiable cultural or public problem that needs solving, and consequently its lack of public mandate. It is these issues and vacuums, which lead to “monetary valuations” and instrumentalism in the first place (Selwood, cited in DCMS, 2010, p. 13). In this respect, cultural policy is a different policy area, rather than a special case.

Equally, this dissertation does not argue for a singular consensus on what culture vis-à-vis the state is for, an unrealistic and potentially limiting proposition. In the absence of
any consensus between the public, the government and practitioners on what is wanted from culture, however, the question returns to whether an appropriate instrumentalism, or a balance of instrumentalism, can co-exist with what has been called the “proper independence” of culture (EU Council of Europe, 1997, p. 54), assuming “proper independence” refers to intrinsic value and that this kind of value can withstand economic imperatives. The difficulty seems to lie in what are seen as antidemocratic and elitist discourses of culture’s intrinsic value on the one hand, and approaches to culture solely as a “means of production” (Vuyk, 2010, p. 183) and social panacea, on the other, which, as we have seen, ironically works against the state.

Notwithstanding the intention of this research not to posit a new vision for cultural policy, in moderating (but not obliterating) arguments in respect of instrumental, secondary or extrinsic values for culture, there is a case for a more effective assessment of balance in cultural policy rationales. In particular, it is proposed that more convincing articulations and qualitative research into non-economic and social benefits of culture, while instrumental, might offer equilibrium and a more comprehensive picture of the whole value of culture, in concert with more typical quantitative social and economic research and cultural rationales. A clearer mandate from publics as to what cultural policy might be, could also open up the field of cultural policy as embodying collective rather than individual principles. With this in mind, greater clarity and public expressions of this clarity, if not the elusive “necessary language” (Tusa, 2011, n.p.) or authenticity from governments, might at least create a wider understanding of why the state “is allowed to fund these things” in the first place (Telegraph, 2012, n.p.), and indeed what these “things” are.
Though there is little doubt that a consensus on the individual discourses of instrumentalism might be achieved (which might secure Habermas’s ideal legitimacy), particularly in light of the essentially ideological nature of discourse, a number of factors might improve the clarity, trust, sincerity, potential of and mandate for cultural policies. These factors include the need for: recognition that cultural policy is a different policy area from others and that this is a strength and a challenge to the sector; mutual respect and greater understanding between cultural policy stakeholders; increased dialogue between those making cultural policies and those affected by them; more public debate on cultural policy in general; balanced instrumental rationales and more effective articulations of non-economic and social values from policymakers (and researchers); a shift from cultural policy meeting wider government agendas to predominantly (but not exclusively) cultural issues; and, more significantly, the need for increased sincerity as to why the state chooses to support these activities. At its simplest, what could be proposed for cultural policy, admittedly provocatively, is less “bullshit” (Belfiore, 2008) and “cynical reason” (Sloterdijk, 1987). Equally, the principles of policy (if normative and problematic) as discussed earlier (fairness, representation, expertise, knowledge, democracy, legitimacy, dignity, social awareness), like Habermas’s ideal public sphere, still hold an ideal against which a (re)consideration of cultural policy might take place.

Though it could be argued that the prevalent naturalisation of capital accumulation negates the proposal for a radical cultural politics, whether instrumental, non-instrumental, economic or non-economic, there are more philosophical ways to consider this issue. One potential model for cultural policy is Terry Eagleton’s suggestion of an
“ethical” cultural policy approach (Coleridge, cited in Eagleton, 2000, p. 7), underlining the capacity of the sector to “fit us for political citizenship by liberating the ideal of collective self buried within each of us” (Eagleton, 2000, p. 7). This approach, though touching on the legitimising civil society discourses discussed earlier, is less about creating culture (which is produced regardless) and more about facilitating agonistic dialogue on the nature of identity and the fundamental question of “how to live with each other” (Mokre, 2006, p. 308). The political nature of this task, however, in light of the desire for governments to be re-elected, mitigates against this happening and secondly, even if the will was there, how to liberate our collective selves is another question.

8.5 Final conclusions

To conclude, this research has asserted that investigating the discourses of the creative city paradigm in respect of cultural policy reveals problems within cultural and public policies, as well as models of governance and democracy. Though the research indicated difficulties with identifying the specificities of the creative city paradigm, within the surfeit of other strategic discourses in cultural policy, it did establish a theoretical and discursive connection and extrapolated from that. This extrapolation demonstrated that the structural weaknesses and consequent endemic instrumentalism and colonisation of cultural policy unambiguously point to the question of whose interests are represented and served by policies and the state. Equally, this research builds on existing scholarship on policy and discourse and provides data for additional studies into creative city and regeneration discourses in wider European cultural policies in particular, a hitherto underexplored area. In general, this dissertation points to the

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2 Poet Samuel Coleridge is also credited with stating that we need to be men before we can be citizens (Eagleton, 2000, p. 7).
need for further mining of discourse in cultural policies (such as imperatives behind
civil society discourses) to facilitate the generation of policies that are more “overt and
thus subject to public validation” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 336). Since the nature of this work
was qualitative and interpretive, these suggestions and interpretations necessarily
remain open to challenge, but, it is hoped, have progressed debate about the complexity
and pressures of working in such a simultaneously useful and marginal policy area.
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## APPENDIX

### Creative City Discourse Analysis Criteria Comparative Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY CRITERIA</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Thematics</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Explicit endorsements of creative city paradigm, associated authors and branded concepts of the ‘creative class’ and the ‘creative city’</td>
<td>Yes Creative city, creative class and Florida (Cultural Commission, 2005; Scottish Government, 2009a)</td>
<td>Yes Creative city, creative class, Florida and Landry (Ministry of Education, 2005; 2006b; 2007; 2010b; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Culture/cultural/creative workers drive economies and competition</td>
<td>Yes (Scottish Executive, 1999; Cultural Commission, 2005; Scottish Executive, 2006b; Scottish Government, 2008; 2009a,b,c; 2010b; Creative Scotland, 2010c; 2011)</td>
<td>Yes (Ministry of Education, 2005; 2006b; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007)</td>
<td>Yes (O’Donoghue, 2002; Department of Arts Sport and Tourism, 2008b; 2008d; Arts Council of Ireland, 2009; 2011; Moylan, 2010; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a; 2011b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Culture drives regeneration and place-</td>
<td>Yes, very strong. Culture as USP (via competitive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Culture as USP (via</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>development by making places unique</td>
<td>nationalism)</td>
<td>competitive nationalism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Places need to attract creative people (talent/human capital/creative class) to attract business and international investment and drive competition (Florida’s 3 T’s)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, very strongly (via human capital)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Scottish Executive, 1999; Scottish National Party, 2007; Scottish Government, 2009a,b,c; 2010a; Creative Scotland, 2011)</td>
<td>(Ministry of Education, 2005; 2006b; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; Nordic Innovation Centre, 2007)</td>
<td>(Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism, 2008b; Arts Council of Ireland, 2009; Deenihan, 2011b; Department of Tourism, Culture and Sport, 2011a)</td>
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</table>

5 Associated lexicon: Attraction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes – very strong</th>
<th>Yes – very strong</th>
<th>Yes – very strong</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See # 4</td>
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6 Associated lexicon: Talent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes – very strong (via Human capital)</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See # 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Associated metaphor: Harnessing</td>
<td>Yes, but not as strong as other lexicons (Scottish Government, 2010a; Scottish Executive, 2006a).</td>
<td>Yes, but not as strong as other lexicons (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2010b).</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Places need to be tolerant (diverse/open) to attract creatives (Florida’s 3 T’s)</td>
<td>Diversity rhetoric (Scottish Executive, 2006b; Scottish Arts Council, 2009)</td>
<td>Yes, very strong (via tolerance discourses) (Ministry of Education, 2006b; 2009b; 2009c; 2010b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Technology is needed to drive competitiveness (and is a knowledge economy trope) (Florida’s 3 T’s)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>References to importance of information technology and technology and content, but not significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECONDARY CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creativity/innovation rhetorics</th>
<th>Yes – very strong</th>
<th>Yes, with local variant of creativity welfare society</th>
<th>Present but not strong</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creative industries</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and creative economy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not strong</td>
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<td>Other themes and features</td>
<td>. Creative economy</td>
<td>. Creative economy</td>
<td>. Creativity discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td>(creative industries)</td>
<td>(creative industries)</td>
<td>(general)</td>
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<td>Creativity discourse (general)</td>
<td>Creativity discourse (general)</td>
<td>Social and economic contribution, well-being and cultural democracy</td>
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<td>Past/tradition V present/modernity/cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>Creativity welfare society</td>
<td>Competitive nationalism/unicueness</td>
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<td>Competitive nationalism and identity</td>
<td>Internationalism and multiculturalism/diversity</td>
<td>Reputation building/repair</td>
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<td>Government agendas and instrumentalism</td>
<td>Cultural rights</td>
<td>Culture as an economic driver</td>
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<td>Place-development</td>
<td>Civilisation and civil society</td>
<td>Government agendas and instrumentalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attraction discourse: Scotland as wanting to be more attractive and Scotland already being attractive</td>
<td>Common culture/national pride</td>
<td>Attraction and investment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Criticism and endorsement of Florida</td>
<td>Dualism and intrinsic vs extrinsic discourses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative city equivocation: Criticism and endorsement of Florida</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attraction of workers and investment</td>
<td>Attraction of workers and investment</td>
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<td>Human capital</td>
<td>Human capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
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