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## **The French of Algeria**

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## The French of Algeria: Can the Colonisers Be Colonised?

Aoife Connolly

The Algerian War, 1954–1962, was arguably the most traumatic war of decolonisation fought by Western colonial powers. The French had occupied Algeria since 1830 and the territory had formed three administrative *départements* of France since 1848. Thus, when conflict arose in 1954, the French administration could not conceive of a situation in which France was at war with itself and this ‘war without a name’ was referred to as ‘the events’ or ‘operations to maintain order’. Indeed, the war was only officially recognised in France in 1999. The war was particularly violent as Algeria was a settler colony in which approximately one million European settlers or *Français d’Algérie* (French of Algeria) lived alongside approximately nine million Algerians. It has been noted that decolonisation of settler colonies tends to be more violent due to the three-sided conflict that develops between the settlers, the colonial power and the indigenous population.<sup>1</sup> This was the case in Algeria, despite frequent depictions of the war as a ‘two-way battle’ between the French and the Algerians,<sup>2</sup> as some *Français d’Algérie* became involved in the *Organisation de l’Armée Secrète* (Secret Army Organisation), a terrorist group which opposed Algerian independence. As violence worsened on both sides at the close of the war, it became apparent that the *Français d’Algérie*, now known as the *pieds-noirs*, would not be able to continue living in the territory and the vast majority fled to France. However, this migration has remained ‘invisible’ to a certain extent and the *pieds-noirs* have been an especially neglected aspect of the war.<sup>3</sup>

Although we reached the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence in 2012, the war remains a problematic subject in France, where its commemoration, the teaching of colonial history and issues associated with North African immigration and French identity are still controversial subjects. Debates in late 2009 over then President Nicolas Sarkozy’s

bid to move the remains of the most celebrated French Algerian, Albert Camus, to the *Panthéon* in Paris, to be buried with the other great French writers, and subsequent objections in Algeria to plans to honour Camus 50 years after his death, are indicative of the durably problematic status of the *pieds-noirs*.<sup>4</sup> The identity of the *Français d'Algérie* was less ambiguous for anti-colonial writers such as the Tunisian Albert Memmi (a former student of the University of Algiers), who famously analysed colonialism in terms of 'the coloniser' versus 'the colonised'.<sup>5</sup> In key texts written in Algeria at the height of the war, including *Studies in a Dying Colonialism/L'an V de la revolution algérienne* (1959) and *The Wretched of the Earth/Les damnés de la terre* (1961), Frantz Fanon also portrayed 'the coloniser' and 'the colonised', 'the settler' and 'the native' as binarily opposed.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps as a result of such Manichean tropes, stereotypical images of the French of Algeria as privileged, violent, fascist colonisers persist (Figure 6).

More recent scholarship, however, has pointed to the complexity of colonial encounters and to the categories of coloniser and colonised as 'not fixed but problematic, contested and changing'.<sup>7</sup> Thus, 50 years on from Algerian independence, the oppressor/oppressed split will be examined here from a more nuanced viewpoint. As in other colonial




Figure 6 Colonial Algeria before 1961

Source: <http://perso.netopi.fr/lkeller/palestro/souvenirs/archives/cfa.htm>.

contexts, the primary markers of identity were race and religion, as reflected by the categorisation of inhabitants as ‘European’ or ‘Muslim’. However, within the specific context of French North Africa, other processes were taking place, including what has been termed the ‘colonisation’ of France’s citizens under the Third Republic (1870–1940).<sup>8</sup> This chapter does not seek to suggest that the settlers were oppressed in the same manner as the indigenous population, but it questions whether, paradoxically and in some significant respects, the ‘Frenchification’ of European settlers in Algeria recalls processes of colonisation that undermine conventional depictions of the French of Algeria as straightforwardly conceived colonisers. This discussion will also point to the ambiguous status of the former settlers within France in the aftermath of the war, following their departure from Algeria, and to subsequent attempts to efface them from the national narrative, which may also be considered as an example of the continuing legacy of colonialism in France itself. Firstly, however, the official positioning of Algeria as part of France (and as part of Europe) will be examined.

In metropolitan France, an imperial culture was, according to historians Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, ‘rooted in collective psychology’, particularly after the success of the international colonial exhibition in Paris, in 1931, which promoted the idea of ‘la plus grande France’ – a Greater France which, paradoxically, included its colonies as part of its identity as a Republic.<sup>9</sup> As an official guide from the exhibition stated: ‘today this great human collectivity that is FRANCE has horizons wider than those you have been accustomed to see on the map of Europe...’.<sup>10</sup> In consequence, the Empire gained unprecedented support from parties of the Right and Left as territories such as Algeria came to be regarded as an extension of France and as a beacon of hope for the future of the nation in times of crisis. This was particularly the case during the Occupation and under the Vichy regime, when the colonies came to symbolise ‘la France éternelle’ (Eternal France).<sup>11</sup> Writing in 1941, the humanitarian René Cassin (winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968) exhorted his readers to accept that ‘Free France’, based in France’s overseas territories, ‘represents the will of the French people’ and ‘should be treated as if it were France’.<sup>12</sup> He claimed that the ‘70 million persons’ of France’s Empire, ‘white and black alike, were loyal to France and anxious to continue fighting’.<sup>13</sup>

Algerian territory, having played a significant role in France’s liberation as the site of its government-in-exile from 1943, came to be perceived as inextricably linked to French identity. Thus, while metropolitan France celebrated the end of the Second World War on

8 May 1945, its army brutally repressed nationalist riots and uprisings at Sétif and Guelma, killing thousands of indigenous Algerians over the course of a few days.<sup>14</sup> As Blanchard and Lemaire have noted, having examined a variety of sources such as literature, cinema, school books, postcards, the press and political speeches, 'to be colonial' was 'to be French' at this time.<sup>15</sup> The positioning of the territory as part of the French nation would end during the Algerian war, as the combined reality of conscripts' involvement in a very violent conflict and protests over the army's use of torture caused utopian perceptions of France's Empire to crumble among the majority of metropolitan citizens.<sup>16</sup>

In Algeria, however, the slogan, 'Ici, c'est la France' (This is France), continued to be used by those who resisted independence. The French of Algeria had tended to represent the territory as forming part of European civilisation from the beginning of settler literature in the late nineteenth century. The founder of this literature, Louis Bertrand, emphasised the presence of Roman ruins in the country and posited the French conquest as a homecoming, stating in a 1921 publication that: 'in coming back to Africa, we simply recuperated a lost province of Latin civilisation'.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the Algerianist movement, which followed Bertrand and was most active from 1920 to 1935, emphasised Algeria's Latin past, while the later *École d'Alger* (Algiers school) which began in the mid-1930s and featured Albert Camus as its most renowned writer, insisted on the Mediterranean aspect of Algeria.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, writers such as Camus have been accused of ignoring the Arab population of Algeria in their works and Rosemarie Jones has noted that 'the thrust of the Algiers school is towards universalism, towards a generalised humanism which is itself Eurocentric in nature'.<sup>19</sup>

Attempts by settler writers to ignore the presence of an Arabo-Berber population are problematic as they situate the French of Algeria as rightful heirs to a Latin or Mediterranean land. In reality, the settlers of the territory came from all over Europe, albeit predominantly the South. Following unsuccessful efforts to colonise Algeria with a metropolitan French community, settlers arrived in large numbers from Spain, Italy and Malta, while administrative statistics from 1843 suggest that there were also settlers from Germany, Switzerland and even Ireland in the early stages of the conquest.<sup>20</sup> Many of these settlers hoped to escape from the poverty of their birth countries, while a smaller number were political exiles from France's Second Empire or from the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine following the Franco-Prussian war.<sup>21</sup> With metropolitan French settlers outnumbered by non-French

settlers in many cities, and with relatively little interest in voluntary applications for French citizenship, officials therefore decided to naturalise the Jewish population of Algeria in 1870, while European settlers were naturalised by laws passed in 1889 and 1893.<sup>22</sup> Both of these populations formed the *Français d'Algérie* and are now known as the *pieds-noirs*. Against this backdrop, the 'Frenchification' of this community may be considered as a process that bears some of the hallmarks of colonisation.

In *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1977), Eugen Weber notes that metropolitan France can 'itself be seen as a colonial empire shaped over the centuries: a complex of territories conquered, annexed, and integrated in a political and administrative whole'.<sup>23</sup> He describes the 'civilisation' of rural France from 1870 to 1914 by the Paris administration, which viewed 'the provincial population as childlike, backward, garrulous, unenterprising natives of underdeveloped lands'.<sup>24</sup> This process was hastened most notably by military service and an education system which instilled the French language.<sup>25</sup> Weber suggests that the order 'imposed by men of different code and speech, somebody else's order, is not easily distinguished from foreign conquest', as rural communities were 'despoiled of their rights', sometimes inciting rebellions by the 'natives'.<sup>26</sup> He further compares the loss of local cultures and languages during this 'colonising enterprise' to the destruction of national culture in Algeria.<sup>27</sup> Herman Lebovics, in his discussion of the creation of a 'true', modern France from 1900 to 1945, also addresses what he calls 'the tyranny of solidarity' which sought to encompass people from Paris, the provinces and colonial France in 'a narrowly defined construction of the French cultural world [...] within an imagined [...] French identity'.<sup>28</sup>

As in France, the French of Algeria were strongly encouraged to have a single identity. It may usefully be noted here that such an exclusionary concept of identity is suggestive of what Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler call the 'dynamics of inclusion and exclusion' that are inherent in processes of colonisation.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, Cooper and Stoler contend that 'tensions between the exclusionary practices and universalising claims of bourgeois culture were crucial to shaping the age of empire' and continue to shape metropolises and former colonies in the present age.<sup>30</sup> By the same token, despite the proclaimed Frenchification of European settlers, the *Français de souche* (ethnic French) occupied a superior position in Algeria. In fact, in his study of colonial Bône (now Annaba), David Prochaska suggests that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 'Parallel to the European

colonialization of the Algerians [...] we have a secondary colonialization by the French of the other Europeans'.<sup>31</sup> While Prochaska rightly states that ethnicity was 'the fundamental basis of social stratification', his study also points to class, as well as ethnic tensions, among 'lower class Europeans who were nonetheless colonizers, and among upper class Algerians who were nonetheless the colonized'.<sup>32</sup> His research highlights residential segregation and a hierarchy with regard to employment that is worth mentioning here. The Arabo-Berber population lived, for the most part, on the outskirts of colonial Bône, with Jews inhabiting the old city and Europeans the new city as well as an area called Colonne Randon.<sup>33</sup> Among the European population, Prochaska notes that the ethnic French tended to reside in the 'swankiest neighborhoods', while the others tended to live in the working-class Colonne Randon, which Prochaska cites as evidence of European 'colonies within the larger French colony'.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the indigenous population and in particular Berbers tended to be unskilled workers and unquestionably occupied the most menial jobs, while the Jews are described as a 'stranger' group that occupied an intermediary position economically.<sup>35</sup> Here again, however, the *Français de souche* were at the top of the hierarchy with regard to positions of authority, while Europeans of other ethnic origin, despite earning significantly more than the Arabo-Berber population, still earned 'unequal pay for equal work' when compared with the ethnic French, until well into the early twentieth century.<sup>36</sup>

Significantly, having interviewed Maltese-origin *pieds-noirs*, Andrea L. Smith claims that economic and social divisions, 'rooted in class and ethnic distinctions', existed between the *Français de souche* and the naturalised French until the end of the colony, with the ethnic French remaining at the top of the hierarchy, followed by Spanish and Italian migrants, while the Maltese and naturalised Jews were at the lower end of the scale.<sup>37</sup> Smith's explanation for the durability of these cleavages is worth citing here: 'class and ethnicity/nationality were mutually reinforcing distinctions; to paraphrase Fanon [in *The Wretched of the Earth*], in French Algeria "you were rich because you were French, you were French because you were rich"'.<sup>38</sup> This ranking is also striking for the value placed on a combined Christian and Romance language heritage, while those whose mother tongue was the Arabic-influenced Maltese had a lower social standing, along with non-Christians.

As in the metropole, attempts were made to instil a sense of French identity through military service, most notably during the First and Second World Wars, and by an emphasis on French language and

literature in schools. We can look to Camus' description of school in his semi-autobiographical *Le premier homme* (*The First Man*), published posthumously in France in 1994, for an example of an educational emphasis on metropolitan France, which was often at odds with the pupils' natural environment and personal experience:

The texts were always those used in France. And these children, who knew only the sirocco [wind], the dust, the short torrential cloudbursts, the sand of the beaches, and the sea in flames under the sun, would assiduously read – accenting the commas and periods – stories that to them were mythical, where children in hoods and mufflers, their feet in wooden shoes, would come home dragging bundles of sticks along snowy paths until they saw the snow-covered roof of the house where the smoking chimney told them the pea soup was cooking in the hearth.<sup>39</sup>

John Strachan considers the type of 'Colonial Frenchness', inculcated at school and elsewhere, to be a form of 'cultural colonisation' of the settlers, whom he regards as 'both the subjects and the objects of "colonial forces"'.<sup>40</sup> As Strachan nonetheless points out, mythologies of Frenchness were 'rarely accepted uncritically', by a population who were both 'producers and consumers of the colonial system'.<sup>41</sup>

In consequence, while the previously mentioned Algerianist and Algiers schools of writers emphasised either a Latin or a Mediterranean Algeria, and thus their own Eurocentric outlook, it is important to note that they still both tended to portray the French of Algeria as being different from the metropolitan French. Indeed, they depicted the settlers as having different customs and speech patterns drawn from, among other sources, Arabic, Spanish and Italian as well as French. An iconic figure in this regard is *Cagayous*, a picaresque, working-class character depicted in a series of novels by August Robinet (also known as Musette) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The protagonist of *Cagayous* recounted his tales, which were very widely read among the French of Algeria, using *pataouète* – a settler dialect – while his line 'Are you French? We're Algerian!' underscores a division the settlers and the metropolitan French.<sup>42</sup> An extract from a semi-autobiographical novel set in 1927 by the influential French Algerian writer Emmanuel Roblès further highlights this abiding split between the ethnic and non-ethnic French, which is here revealed to be class based and linguistic. The young protagonist of *Saison violente* (*Violent Season*, 1974) is, like the author, a *Français d'Algérie* of Spanish origin and of modest means,

who describes his wounded reaction to being insultingly called a 'Fifty per cent' citizen of France by a wealthy ethnic French woman:

'Fifty per cent' hurt me to the core, so much did this expression, in my eyes, signal the will to leave me at the door, to prevent me from entering the [French] kingdom. Admittedly, I had a very clear awareness of my double belonging, however on this [Algerian] shore Spain was merely a shoot without flowers.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, despite the official positioning of the *Français d'Algérie* as French, they were not necessarily regarded as true French citizens, as became clear towards the end of the Algerian war.

The French of Algeria came to be known as the *pieds-noirs* during the Algerian war. While the renowned fictional character *Cagayous*, mentioned above, described himself as 'Algerian', this term now designated the indigenous population. The fact that the metropolitan French began to refer to the *Français d'Algérie* as the *pieds-noirs* at this time is indicative of a reluctance to acknowledge them as fully French – a reluctance that had previously applied to Algeria's indigenous population, which, apart from the long-resident Jews, had the status of French subjects, rather than citizens, under the colonial administration. This leads us to consider the difficult 'repatriation' of a million *pieds-noirs* to metropolitan France – a country in which many had never before set foot – as well their durably ambiguous identity.

According to historian and *pied-noir* Jean-Jacques Jordi, the French government grossly underestimated the numbers of settlers who would arrive in the metropole, even when the guerrilla warfare used by both the Front de Libération Nationale (pro-independence) and Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (pro-French Algeria) prompted families to migrate there from 1960, despite threats from the OAS that those who left would be punished.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, the nationalist slogan at the time, *La valise ou le cercueil* ('The Suitcase or the Coffin') – immortalised in the eponymous novel by French Algerian writer Anne Loesch in 1963<sup>45</sup> – prompted the vast majority of *Français d'Algérie* to depart. Two particularly traumatic incidents stand out at the close of the war which had a significant impact on this exodus: the army shot into a crowd of *Français d'Algérie* during a peaceful demonstration on the Rue d'Isly in Algiers on 26 March 1962, leaving up to 90 dead; and thousands of *Français d'Algérie* were massacred in Oran on 5 July 1962, two days after Algerian independence was officially recognised, an incident in which the army was slow to intervene.<sup>46</sup>

The *pieds-noirs* therefore fled *en masse* and in haste, mainly in the summer of 1962, bringing what they could of their possessions and packing by the thousand into ships bound for Marseille. Yet the authorities continued to deny the exodus. Government leaders in 1962 referred to exiles as ‘vacanciers’ (holiday-makers) and it took Charles de Gaulle until October 1962 to recognise the scale of the repatriation.<sup>47</sup> Despite the booming economy, due to the particular circumstances of the *Trente Glorieuses*, that is to say the three decades of sustained economic growth following the Second World War, it seems clear that the government was reluctant to accept the influx of almost a million citizens at this time and hoped that the majority of the *pieds-noirs* would return to Algeria following the end of the war.

As a result of a lack of planning, the city of Marseille was unable to cope with so many new immigrants and many felt unwelcome on their arrival, which further contributed to their trauma.<sup>48</sup> Many *pieds-noirs* fell victim to increased taxi and hotel prices as well as to accommodation shortages and overcrowding, while reported vandalism of their cars (recognisable by their number plates) and lost or damaged luggage did little to ease them into a new life in France.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, Jordi cites a survey and press articles from 1962 which suggest a growing resentment towards the *pieds-noirs* and a feeling that they had profited from colonial life in Algeria and did not deserve to benefit from metropolitan privileges.<sup>50</sup>

It appears that, on arrival, as visible reminders of a failed colonial system, the *pieds-noirs* were viewed with ‘distaste’ by many.<sup>51</sup> In his early work on the *Français d’Algérie* in 1961, the celebrated historian of collective memory Pierre Nora wrote: ‘Ils nous sont étrangers!’ (They are outsiders/strangers/foreigners to us), and this sentiment was shared by other metropolitans who knew very little about them, while some were openly hostile.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, historian Todd Shepard has convincingly shown that metropolitan France could only accept decolonisation by presenting the *pieds-noirs* as having corrupted the French civilising mission.<sup>53</sup> A prevailing discourse in France, particularly voiced by the new Left, therefore portrayed the former settlers as being a non-French, abnormal, violent, deviant people who were at the root of all colonial wrongs.<sup>54</sup> Shepard notes specifically that, during and immediately after the war, the *pieds-noirs* ‘stood accused of embodying abnormal masculinity in ways that recalled charges that orientalist writers and apologists of colonialism in North Africa long had leveled at “Arabs” and “Muslims”’.<sup>55</sup>

Against this backdrop, it may be noted that Stephen Graham, drawing on Michel Foucault’s acknowledgement of the ‘boomerang effect’ of colonialism, has recently drawn attention to colonisation as a ‘two-way

process' and thus to the importation of colonial experiences to metropolises in various attempts to order the 'life of populations at home and abroad', including, for instance, 'Baron Haussmann's radical restructuring of Paris through easily surveilled boulevards' in the nineteenth century.<sup>56</sup> Graham persuasively links the 'boomerang effect' of colonialism to a more recent form of 'internal colonisation', exemplified by the construction after the Second World War of social housing for North African immigrants in the *banlieues* (suburbs) as "'near peripheral" reservations attached to, but distant from, the main metropolitan cores of the country', and additionally to subsequent riots in these areas.<sup>57</sup> Andrew Hussey similarly considers recent episodes of rioting by immigrants of North African origin to be 'only the latest and most dramatic form of engagement with the enemy', in a battle that dates from colonial times, while he also considers the *banlieues* as 'the most literal representation of "otherness"'.<sup>58</sup> Drawing on Graham and Hussey, the use of a discourse which depicted *pieds-noirs* as not quite French and thus abnormal both during and in the immediate aftermath of the Algerian war appears as another, more hidden example of the importation of colonial methods of ordering the lives of non-metropolitan populations. Moreover, having analysed children's school books, political scientist Eric Savarèse has shown that, officially at least, the history of the *pieds-noirs* is still largely unknown in France today.<sup>59</sup> Jordi has similarly called the French of Algeria 'illegitimate subjects' in French historical and sociological research, noting their absence from scholarship such as Gérard Noiriel's 1988 work *Creuset français* (French Melting Pot) and Dominique Schnapper's 1991 study *La France de l'intégration, sociologie de la nation* (France and Integration: Sociology of the Nation).<sup>60</sup> Thus, Savarèse suggests that the *pieds-noirs* are absent from historical narratives as they have a subaltern status in a French society which seeks to erase distinct identities for the purposes of national unification.<sup>61</sup> This apparent effort to homogenise divergent identities echoes Weber's description of the 'colonisation' of rural France under the Third Republic.

The *Français d'Algérie* were taught from a young age that Algeria was their *pays* or country, while France was their *patrie* or homeland. The metropolitan French population was also strongly encouraged to think of the colonies, particularly Algeria, as part of a Greater France, particularly in the decade following the Second World War. Furthermore, the settler community may be considered, not simply as agents of colonialism but as, to borrow Anne McClintock's description of colonising women, 'privileged and restricted, acted upon and acting',<sup>62</sup> in a colonial system put in place by successive French administrations. This system historically placed the ethnic French population at the top of the

hierarchy and simultaneously encouraged other Europeans to suppress traces of their non-French origins, particularly through an educational emphasis on the French language and literature.

The settlers left Algeria under traumatic circumstances, and adapting to life in metropolitan France, a country many had never visited, was difficult. Prejudicial or stereotypical representations of the *pieds-noirs* in the aftermath of the war echoed a discourse which had previously been used for colonised populations. Moreover, as visible reminders of a failed colonial system, the *pieds-noirs* were a group few wanted to remember and, in a move which echoes Weber's idea of the 'colonisation' of identities for the sake of national unification, subsequent French administrations consequently sought to remove their history from the national narrative or, at the very least, to minimise it.

In addition to more sensational events such as periodic rioting in Parisian *banlieues*, the continuing effect of France's colonial past can be seen by the way in which different groups from the war, including French army officers, Algerian victims of torture, OAS commandos and *harkis* (Algerian auxiliaries who sided with the French) continue to vie for a place in France's historical narrative. Thus, the 2012 gathering in Nîmes of an estimated 30,000 *pieds-noirs* at a pilgrimage to a religious statue brought back from Algeria, the Virgin of Santa Cruz, is just one particularly striking and powerfully symbolic episode which highlights the lasting impact of colonialism within Europe itself.<sup>63</sup>

## Acknowledgements

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## Notes

1. David Prochaska, 'Making Algeria French and Unmaking French Algeria', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1990), 307.
2. Prochaska, 'Making Algeria French and Unmaking French Algeria', 307. According to Prochaska, the role of the French of Algeria in this battle has not been 'systematically analysed'.
3. See Andrea L. Smith, 'Introduction: Europe's Invisible Migrants' in Andrea L. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 9. Smith notes the invisibility in academic literature of populations 'repatriated' to Europe after decolonisation movements since the Second World War, which she estimates at between five and seven million people over approximately thirty-five years.

4. For more on the controversies surrounding Camus, see, for example, Lizzy Davies, 'Nicolas Sarkozy Provokes French Left by Honouring Albert Camus', *The Guardian*, 22 November 2009 and Peter Beaumont, 'Albert Camus, the Outsider, is Still dividing opinion in Algeria 50 Years after His Death', *The Observer*, 28 February 2010.
5. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, trans. Howard Greenfield (London: Earthscan Publications, 1990), originally published as *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (1957).
6. See Frantz Fanon, *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* (London: Earthscan, 1989) and Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Penguin Books, 1990).
7. Frederick Cooper and Ann L. Stoler, 'Introduction. Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (November 1989), 609.
8. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1977), 486.
9. Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, *Culture impériale: Les colonies au coeur de la République, 1931–1961* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2004), 13.
10. Cited and translated by Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 52.
11. Blanchard and Lemaire, *Culture impériale*, 19.
12. René Cassin, 'Vichy or Free France?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (October 1941): 112.
13. Cassin, 'Vichy or Free France?', 105.
14. Blanchard and Lemaire, *Culture impériale*, 22. The authors estimate that 21 European settlers died as a result of the original rioting at Sétif, with a further 103 European deaths in subsequent uprisings (at Guelma, Batna and Kherrata), while between 6,000 and 8,000 indigenous Algerians died.
15. Blanchard and Lemaire, *Culture impériale*, 19.
16. Blanchard and Lemaire, *Culture impériale*, 26–27.
17. Translation from the original text, *Les villes d'or* (1921), by Rosemarie Jones, 'Pied-Noir Literature: The Writing of a Migratory Elite' in Russell King, John Connell and Paul White (eds), *Writing across Worlds: Literature and Migration* (London: Routledge, 1995), 126. On the role of literature, see Philip Dine, 'Reading and Remembering *la guerre des mythes*: French Literary Representations of the Algerian War', *Modern & Contemporary France*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1994): 141–150 and David Prochaska, 'History as Literature, Literature as History: Cagayous of Algiers', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 3 (June 1996): 670–711.
18. Jones, 'Pied-Noir Literature', 127–129.
19. Jones, 'Pied-Noir Literature', 129. Accusations such as these place Camus within Memmi's category of the 'benevolent colonizer' or 'The colonizer who refuses' in *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, 85–110.
20. Andrea L. Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 73.
21. Philip Dine, *Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954–1992* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 150–151. Dine notes that the 'myth of dispossession' promoted by the *pieds-noirs* serves to create sympathy for them and 'denies the historical importance of the colonial profit motive'.
22. Jean-Jacques Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs* (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2009). Jordi notes, 30–31, that in 1886, Spanish, Italian and Maltese settlers represented

- 48 percent of the European population of Algeria despite the previous naturalisation of thousands of Germans, Italians and Spanish and of some 34,000 Jews. The French were outnumbered by Spanish settlers by two, three or even four to one in some cities, including most famously in Oran.
23. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 485.
  24. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 485–487.
  25. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 493–494.
  26. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 487–488.
  27. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 490–491.
  28. Lebovics, *True France*, xii, xi.
  29. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 4.
  30. Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*, 37.
  31. David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 146.
  32. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 153.
  33. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 165.
  34. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 163–165.
  35. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 168–172.
  36. Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 176.
  37. Smith, *Colonial Memory*, 18, 21.
  38. Smith, *Colonial Memory*, 21.
  39. Albert Camus, *The First Man*, trans. David Hapgood (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995), 112–113.
  40. John Strachan, 'Reshaping the Mythologies of Frenchness: Culture, History and Identity in European Algeria, 1870–1930' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Manchester, 2006), 3, 10.
  41. Strachan, 'Reshaping the Mythologies', 131, 3 and Smith, *Colonial Memory*, 17.
  42. Translated from the original text, *Cagayous à la caserne* (1899, republished 1952), by Jones, 'Pied-Noir Literature', 127. For more on *Cagayous* and on *pataouète*, see Prochaska, 'History as Literature'.
  43. Emmanuel Roblès, *Saison violente* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1974), 111–112.
  44. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 66.
  45. Anne Loesch, *La valise et le cercueil* (Paris: Plon, 1963).
  46. Éric Savarèse, *L'Invention des pieds-noirs* (Paris: Editions Séguier, 2002), 124–131.
  47. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 91.
  48. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 75–76.
  49. Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'The Creation of the Pieds-Noirs: Arrival and Settlement in Marseilles, 1962' in Andrea L. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003), 69 and Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 80–81.
  50. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 86–88.
  51. Smith, *Colonial Memory*, 5.
  52. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 9. Jordi quotes from Pierre Nora's *Les Français d'Algérie* (Paris: René Julliard, 1961).
  53. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 192–204. See also

- Todd Shepard, 'Pieds-Noirs, Bêtes Noires: Anti-'European of Algeria' Racism and the Close of the French Empire' in Patricia M.E. Lorcin (ed.), *Algeria & France 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 150–163.
54. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 192–204.
  55. Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 186.
  56. Stephen Graham, 'Foucault's Boomerang – The New Military Urbanism', *Development Dialogue*, Vol. 58 (April 2012), 38–39 (Emphasis in the original). See also Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 103.
  57. Graham, 'Foucault's Boomerang – The New Military Urbanism', 49.
  58. Andrew Hussey, 'The French Intifada: How the Arab Banlieues Are Fighting the French State', *The Observer*, 23 February 2014.
  59. Savarèse, *L'Invention des pieds-noirs*, 46.
  60. Jordi, *Les Pieds-Noirs*, 168.
  61. Savarèse, *L'Invention des pieds-noirs*, 54.
  62. Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 6.
  63. Anonymous, 'Le jeudi de l'Ascension, chaque année, la Santa Cruz réunit à Nîmes la communauté pied-noir dont ceux originaires d'Oranie', *Midi Libre*, 15 May 2012 and Françoise Condotta, 'Santa Cruz: la ferveur des rapatriés', *Midi Libre*, 18 May 2012.